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DEFINITIONS
£erminologies of the Electrical System and Mission Support
Activities are described to establish a single meaning for key words
and phrases used herein.
Missl;n Operations Related Terminologies
Mission Support Phases
Pre-Misslon - Includes all activities prior to launch, such as
planning, preparation, training, familiarization briefings, coordi-
nation meetings, mission simulations, and prelaunch test and checkout.
Mission - Includes all activities from launch of the Skylab
(SL-I) to splash.own of the SL-4. Both manned and unmanned orbital
phases are included.
Post-Mission - Includes all activities following splashdown of
the SL-2, SL-3, and SL-4; primarily post-flight data analysis and eval-
uation report inputs.
Mission Evaluation - Includes
The significant event events of each SL mission with
regard to anomalies, trends, problems, and their solu-
tions, and
System performance.
Real-Time Data - All TM data transmitted from Skylab to HOSC
via Mission Control Center (MCC) without being processed (except for
compression) in near real-time. This is also referred to as "Operations
compressed data". In addition, Skylab data tranR_,itted from Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) to HOSC via the DATA-CORE is in real-tlme.
Non-Real-Time Data - All data from any source which has been
processed (i.e., tapped,computed, converted) prior to receipt at HOSC;
includes all Data Digital Tape (ADDT), Auxiliary Storage and Playback
(ASAP), Mission Operations Planning System (MOPS), and AM Recorded data.
A_omaly - Any off-normal operation of the system, subsystem or
component t>at occurs randomly and is not repeatable.
Malfunction - Any failure of a piece of hardware to function as
it should.
xiv i
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i Contingency, Condition - A condition resulting from one or more
component malfunctions that require actions to be taken to either con- ,4
tinue or safely terminate the mission. !
Flight Controller - A person responsible for monitoring and i
controlling spacecraft systems via flight control consoles at the
MCC at JSC during missions. !
Flisht Crew - The astronauts manning each Skylab mission con-
stitute the flight crew.
_eta Angle - The angle between the orbital plane and earth-sun 1
line (solar vector) This angle is measured perpendicular to the orbit
plane as follows: i
M _
Beta can be expressed in terms of the following angles:
8 : Inclination of the orbit plane to the ecliptic plane.
¢ : Right ascension of the incident rays of the sun in the
plane of the ecliptic (dependent o_, launch date).
¢ : Right ascension of the ascending mode of the orbit ino
the plane of the ecliptic.
Based on these angles, 8 = -sln'l [sin 8 sin (_ - ¢o)] °
When the sun is north of the orbit plane, beta is positive. _ ,
For a 50-degree orbit inclination, beta ranges between plus and minus
73.5 degrees. This is the definition o£ Beta Angle used by the EPS
team. Other de{i,_Itionso_ Beta Angle do exist; these are acceptable
for use by other engineering disciplines.
XV _ "
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Sl Attitude, X-Axis in Orbit Plane (X-IOP_ - The principal SWS
X-axis is in the orbital plane with the Z-axis co-incident with ti_e
sunline. The folly,wing diagram shows the axes definitions. The plus
i Z-axis points directly toward the sun. The major portion of the mis-
sion is in this attitude.
*Z
t :
-)
)
 p '_-
?
Earth Pointing Attitude ; Z-LV-E - The SWS X-axis is in the
orbital plane with the minus Z-axis pointing toward the center of the
earth and the plus X-axis in the direction of the velocity vector. A >
total of 65 Z-LV-E passes during the planned eight-month mission were
baselined.
Integrated System Testing - All multi-module testing at the
Manned Spacecra Operations Building (MSOB), the Vehicle Assembly
Building (VAB) or at the launch pad at KSC.
Electrical STstems Terminologies-
Sk_lab or Cluster EPS - Defined as ATM and AM/OWS EPSs opera-
ting in parallel.
ATM EPS - Defined to include the solar array, Charger-Battery-
Regulator Modules (CBRM's), power distribution network, and all as-
sociated control circuits and devices. The power distribution shall
include power feeders, connectors, relays, diodes, fuses, and circuit
breakers (on ATM Control and Display (C&D) panel) from:
Solar panel power connected to the CBRM
CBRM to buses 7DIO, (7DII) and 7D20 (7D21).
Buses 7DII and 7D21 to all loads connected to their
sub-buses, to the ATM/AM power feeder interface and '_
to the AT_ C&D console.
+
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AM/OWS EPS - Defined to include the solar array, Power Con-
ditionong Groups (PCG s), power distribution network, and all
associated control circuits and devices. The power distribution shall
include power feeders, connectors, relays, diodes, fuses and circuit
breakers from:
Solar array modules to PCG s.
PCG s to Regulated Buses.
Regulated buses to all loads connected to their sub-
buses and to the ATM/AM and Command Module/MDA (CM/MDA)
power feeder interfaces. OWS buses and MDA sub-buses
shall be considered sub-buses of the AM/OWS EPS. _ _
Power Distribution Network - Includes all wiring that provides |
primary Direct Current (DC) power (bus to bus and bus to load) and l
secondary DC power (e.g., from DC-DC converter to load).
Electrical Network - Includes all wiring between black boxes
which are not part of the power distribution network. This includes
the signal circuits up to the black box.
Electrical S_stem - Consists of the EPS and the electrical
network.
Power Re_ulrement - Power requirement as referred to in this
document is the electrical power required by the equipment. This
term is synonymous with "load" requirement.
Power Capabillt_ - The power capability of the individual
power system is the power available at major buses 7DII and 7D21 in
the ATM EPS, Regulated Bus 1 and Regulated Bus 2 in the AM EPS. Power
Capability is defined for the SI and Earth pointing attitudes as
follows:
S.._I- Average power per one orbit (i.e., one battery charge/
discharge cycle) that does not violate any of the following criteria:
Energy balance condition for each power subsystem in
one orbit.
Battery Depth of Discharge (DOD) not more than 30 per-
cent of rated capacity during the orbit.
Maximum load rating of an ATM load regulator of 15.5A
(415 watts); Maximum load rating of an AM load reg_lla-
tor of 50A (1,400 watts).
xvii
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°
Z-LV - Average power per one Z-LV interval that does not
violate any of the following criteria:
The difference between the highest battery State-of-
" Charge (SOC) during the Sl orbit preceding the Z-LV
operation and the lowest SOC through the first subse-
quent SI orbit shall be less than 50 percent of the
rated capacity. (Pre-Mission definition.)
Battery capacity remaining shall he at least 30 percent
i of the rated capability. (This criteria was dropped
for ATM batteries.)
Power Mar_in - This is the difference between the total equip-
ment load requirement at the bus and the power capability expressed
in terms of average power during the orbit. A positive power margin
exists when the capability exceeds the power requirement. To deter-
mine the power margin, the average load requirement during one orbit
must first be determined since the capability value is given in terms
of the average per orbit.
Power Sharing - Power sharing is referred to in this document
primarily as the amount of power contributed by the ATM and the AM/OWS
EPS's at the respective buses when they are operating in parallel.
The power sharing is a function of the Regulated Bus V_Itage setting,
load condition, and the number of CBRM s and PCG s operating.
Energy Balance - An energy balance condition for a solar array
battery power system exists when the energy available from the solar
array is exactly equal to the energy required by the equipment during
the day portion of the orbit and the energy required to fully recharge
the batteries that were discharged in the previous night portion of the
orbit. The energy balance equation foxms the basis for the computation
of the power capability and margin for the SI orbit.
Battery DOD - This is the battery capacity removed during a
certain time period, expressed in absolute units (ampere-hours) or in
percentage. _en expressed in percent, it is the ratio of ampere-
hours removed to the rated ampere-hours multiplied by I00.
Batter_ State of Charge _SOC_ - This is defined in terms of
the actual output capacity available, and is expre_bed in percent of
the rated capacity or in ampere-hours.
Solar Array Incident An_le - This is the angle betweer the sun
llne and the no'rmal to the plane of the solar panel.
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ABBREVIATIONS
A, AMP Ampere
AD Auto-Disconnect |._
ADDT All Digital Data Tape
Ag Ti Silver Titanium
Ag Zn Silver Zinc
AHM Ampere-Hour Meter
ALT Altitude
AM Airlock Module
AMP-HRS, AH Ampere Hours
APCS Attitude and Pointing Control System
AR Action Request
ASAP Auxiliary Storage and Playback
AT Acceptance Testing
ATM Apollo Telescope Mount
ATP Acceptance Test Procedure
i AVE AverageAWG American Wire Gauge
B Beta
BAT Battery
BED Box External Data
BID Box Internal Data
BOM Beginning of Mission
BVcE0 Collector to Emitter Output Voltage
C Charge
°C Degrees Centigrade
CB Circuit Breaker
CBRM Charger/Battery/Regulator Module
CCB Configuration Control Board
CD Countdown
CDF Contained Detonating Fuse
C&D Control and Display
C&W Caution and Warning
CDR Critical Design Review
CEI Contract End Item
CHGR Charger
CM Command Module
cm Centimeter
CND Command
CMG Control Moment Gyro
CoAS Crew Optical Alignment Sight
C/O Checkout
con't Cvntinued
CRS Cluster Requirements Specification
CSDR Cluster System Desi_n Review
CSN Command and Service Module
CY Calendar Year
I xtx
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ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)
DA Deployment Assembly
DAS Data Acquisition System _.
DC Direct Current _,
DCR Design Certification Review
DCS Digital Co_nand System
DEG Degrees !!
DOD Depth of Discharge i_
. EBW Exploding Bridgewlre _:
ED Engineering Document
EHC Electromagnetic Compatibility¢
EHI Electromagnetic Interferet:ce _:
:. EO Engineering Order ,_
, EOM End of Mission
- EPEA Experiment Pointing Electronics Assembly i_
EPS Electrical Power System
EPSTE Electrical Power System Telemetry Evaluation _
EREP Earth Resources Experiment Package
ESE Electrlcal Support Equipment
• EVA Extra-Vehlcular Activ{ty
.. "F Degrees Fahrenheit
, FAS Fixed Airlock Shroud
FLT Flight -.
FRR Flight Readiness Review
FSA Fire Sensor Assembly
FSCP Fire Sensor Control Panel
: FU Firing Unlt
FWD Forward
G Gravity
GET Ground Elapsed Time _'
•- GMT Greenwich Mean Time
i, GND Ground
:, GOSS Ground Operational Support System :
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center
HI High
" HLAA High Level Audio Amplifier
' HOSC Huntsville Operations Support Center
I_ Hour
HTR Heater
I Current :_
ICD Interface Control Document
i.e. For example
IF Interface
i
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AgRREVIATIONS (Continued) =_
I&C Instrumentation and Communication i -;
ILCA Inverter/Lightlng Control Assembly _
IR Infrared _ _
IU Instrument Unit _ _-
Jett Jettison
JOP Joint Observing Program
JSC Johnson Space Center
k Kilo _ .:
"K Degrees Kelvin _ "
KSC Kennedy Space Center
LEM Lunar Excursion Module _
LV Launch Vehicle _ '
mA Milliampere
MAN Manned _ _.
MAR Mission Action Request _ .
MAX Maximum
MCC Mission Control Center
Hultlple Docking Adapter 1MDA
MGR Hanager ,_
MIL One-thousandth of an inch
MIN _nute i i
MD "dission Operations _
MOPS Mission Operations Planning System
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center _
MSG Mi_sion Support Group i
MSGL Mission Support Group Leader
MSOB Manned Spacecraft Operations Building
mS Milliseconds _ '
MUX Multiplexer =
mV Milllvolts 1
mW Milllwatt !
n Efficiency
NASA National A_ronautics and S?ace Administration
I NiCd Nickel Cadmium
nMi Nautical Miles
No. Number
OA Orbital A_sembly (AM, MDA, AT}/, OWS)
OAT Orbital As_emb_ f_t
OCV Open Circuit Voltage
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, ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)
ODB Operational Data Book
O&C Operations and Checkout
,_ Ohm
O/P Output
OPS Operations
OWS Orbital Workshop
P Pressure
PAD Power Allocation Document
PCG Power Conditioning Group
PDR Preliminary Design Review :_
PIA Preinstallation Acceptance
PH Program Management
PMC Post Manufacturing Checkout
I_L Panel
POT Potentiometer
PPO2 Partial Pressure of Oxygen
PPCO2 Partial Pressure of Carbon Dioxide
PRE-FLT Pre-Flight
PREP Preparations
PRIM Primary
PROC Procedure
PS Payload Shroud
PSI Pounds per Square Inch
P_ Pulse Width Nodulator
P_n_ Power
QTY Quantity
QUAL Qualification
R Resistance
PAD Radiation Absorption Dose
RCS Reaction Control System
REG Regulator
REP Representative
RET Return
RF Recharge Fraction
rf Radio Frequency
RFI Radio Frequency Interference
Rs Refrigeration Subsystem
RTG Radlo-Isotope Thermoelectrlc Generator
SAA South Atlantic Anomaly
SA or S/A Solar Array
SAG Solar Array Group
SAL Scientific Airlock
xxti
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ABBREVIATIONS (Continued) i
SAS Solar Array System
SAWS Solar Array Wing Simulator
SCA Sneak Circuit Analysis
SCD Specification Control Drawing
SCPS Skylab Cluster Power Simulator
SCR Silicon Control Rectifier
S&E Science and Engineering
SEC Second
SEDR Service Engineering Data Reports
SEPSA Skylab Electrical Power System Analysis
SI Solar Inertial
SIA Speaker Intercom Assembly
SIC Signal ,_
SL Skylab
SIT Systems Interface Test
S-IVB Saturn V - Third Stage
S/N Serial Number
• SOC State-of-Charge
SOCAR Systems/Operations Compatibility Assessment Review
SP Solar Panel
SPEC Speclflcat ion
SPG Single Point Ground
SST Spacecraft System Testing
STDN Spacecraft Tracking and Data Network
STS Structural Transition Section
STU Skylab Test Unit
bUS Suit Umbilical System
SW Svttch
SWS Saturn Workshop
SYS Sy s tem
TACS Thruster Attitude Control System
TB Terminal Board
TCS Thermal Control System
TCSRD Test and Checkout Specification Requirement Document
TD4P, T Temperature
TIR Total Indicator Reading
TM, T/M Telemetry
TV Television
T-V Thermal Vacuum
Tx Tins, Reference Signal
I
U_L_N Unmanned !IMB Umbilical
UV Ulatraviolet
_A Kicroaupere
U1, U2 Ylisht and Backup AN
xxiii
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1ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)
V Volts
VAB Vehicle Assembly Building
VDC Volts D£rect Current
VCP Vehicle Ground Point
Voc Open Circuit Voltage
WCIU Workshop Computer Interface Unit
XFER Transfer
X-lOP X Axis in Orbit Plane
X-IOP/Z X Axis in Orbit Plane/Z Axis Solar Inertial
Z-LV-E Z-Local Vertical - Earth Point£n8 Mode
Z-LV-R Z-Local Vertical - Rendezvous Mode
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A. S_Y
The Skylab Electrical Power System (EPS) launch configuration
consisting of two independent and complementary power generation,
storage, control, distribution, and monitor systems was the
i culmination of a prolonged evolutionary stage The evolution was
prompted by major changes in mission objectives, design requirements,
state-of-the-art advances, test results, and crew desires, which were
coordinated st NASA Intercenter Electrical Panel meetings, design
reviews, SOCARs, DCRs, and FRRs.
The complexity of the EPS imposed the development and use of
analytical tools that could rapidly reflect the system con£iguration
as it changed and yield accurate performance predictions. These tools
included use of Functional Flow Diagram8, Load Assumptions and Power
Allocation Documents and Computer Programs for System Analyses.
Contingency analyses performed prior to launch included the possible
t failure to deploy the (NS Solar Array Wings and thus proved invaluablefor quick response to the reel-time occurrence•
! Pre-Htssion Design Verification was conducted at the component,
i black box, sub-system, system, and flight vehicle levels• Results
from this program required some design modifications, performance
requirement and prediction up-dating, end gave insight into hardware/
system anomalies to be expected in-flight as well as the knowledge
of how to overcome, work-around, or repair those conditions. Several
contingency procedures were generated, pre-lsunch, for use, as
requlred,durlng the mission. During the mission, unexpected anomalies
imposed additional ground testin_ using back-up hardware and/or the
Skylab Cluster Power Simulator (SCPS_ to verify analytical conclusions
prior to implementation by the flight crew. In some cases the back-up
i crew verified astronaut ability to accomplish proposed repair
procedures.
The Skylab Cluster used the available power to operate,
control, and monitor the life-support, housekeeping, experiment,
instrumentation and com_nicatlon, end attitude control systems. All
electrical power for Skylab was generated directly from the sun by
photovoltaic solar arrays. An exception was the CSHwhich was powered
by fuel cells until fuel depletion. Xickel-Cadmium batteries stored
some of this energy to allow continuous powerin 8 of imposed loads
during each orbital night. Power distribution end control was by
means of a two-wire electrical network which utilized a Single Point
Groundin_ system for the entire Cluster. Th- two independent power
systems, were deslsnsd to be operated norumlLy in 8 paralleled mode.
This permitted sharing of potmr in either direction, and upon fuel
cell depletion, either sub-system could supply G_4 electrical loads.
Tb_ sub-system having the highest open-circuit voltage (OCV) supplied
the majority of the load. OCV was adjustable within the airlock KP$.
I ,, .,.. ............
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TPre-MismlcMe p_adictione fc_ _S perforemnce required up-dati_
due to the redu_tion in AM_$ capability ca_eed by the lose of one
OgS Solar Array winS, at launch, and accelerated AT}i I_S battery
desredatlon. Several ofi-normal vehicle attitude maneuvers, imposed
for vehicle thermal control until a sun-shield could be _._ually
deployed, s_verely stressed the ATMEPS hardvare. ILestrlcted by
debris from the msteorold shield, OWSvlns I deployment 2as not "
possible, thus power scheduled for loads and for AJ4battery charsln S
was not available. This condition presented an abnormal storaSe
mode for the N4 EPS until the orew of 8L-2 cleared the reetrlctlnS
debris and deployed the solar array winS. The decision to parallel
the two power systems, proved mission essential. This parallellns
provided the necessary _PS flexibility, under s variety of
non-scheduled and anomalous oparatlnK conditions, and with systems
havln$ dlfferln$ desradation rates, to satisfy all imposed electrical
loads and for eupportln S all imposed uaneuvere and operating
conditions. Analyses of the data retrieved resulted in asinine
eisnlflcant and valuable II_ enSlneerln$ knogledse, usable for
estsbliehins effective desisn concepts and requirements for future
spacecraft. Althoush the report is presented in discipline
lanSuage and Is priuarily intended for discipline use, the
Info_'mstlon contained may be useful to desisnere to whom Inter-syeteu
effects are important.
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s. I_V_ODUCTION
1. Purpose. Thi_ report concludes the analyses of the Elec-
I crlcal Power System, In-orblt, performance. The results are presented
in discipline language and are intended for discipline use. Hovever,
anyone involved in spacecraft system8 will gain useful intelligence
and insights, from this report, which are applicable duri,_g the estab--
lighment of design; concepts, requirements, and constraints for future
" spacecraft.
2. Scope. Skylab electrical power was supplied by three in-
dependent, complementary, power subsyscews. This report is limited to
: t_o of these, namely, the AM/OgS EPS and the AT_ EPS. Discussion of
the third (CSMEPS) is beyond the scope of this report.
Skylab is considered an integral laboratory, however, in the
interest of emphasizing specific performance characteristics, both
Cluster and Module hardware distinct section are #ncluded.
Significant concept and requirement evolutiot,, testing, and
modifAcations resultin$ from tests, are briefly summarized to aid in
undQrstandin8 the "_aunch configuration descrlpt$on and the procedures
and performance discussed for In-orblt operation.
Only in-orbit; hardware, operational interfaces, repairs, work-
f 8rounds, unscheduled sad scheduled activities are included under mission
perforuance. Anomalous performance is also treated separately for
emphasis and visibility.
Ma_-wd operations covered 174 of th e total 272 mission days
: which began Hay l&, 1973 and ended on February 9, 1974. The three
3-usa uissious vere for 29, 60, and 85 days respectively. Table A
details various time references used during the mission, the primary
references used throughout this report are DAY (i.e. days from launch
of SL-1) and G_f. Figure 6,1 shows the significant events and power
profiles for the entire sdssion.
Detailed event times may be found in the S_/lsb Hisston Events
List, 2_q00700, available in the MSI_ Documentation Repository. Skvlab
systum8 evaluation details may be found in the following MASkTechnical
Mumorends.
_X-64808 HSI_ Skylab Final Prograu Report
THX-64809 MSFC Skylab Corollary l_porlmant8 Final Tachnlcal Report
THX-64810 MSFCSkylab Atrlock Hodula Final Technical Report
THX-64811 MSFCSkylab Apollo Telescope Hou_t Final Technical Report
TMX-64812 HSI'C Skylab HuXttple Docking Adapter Yina] Technical Report
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THX-64813 MSFC Skylab Orbltal Norkshop Final Technical Report
TMX-64814 Skylab Mission Report-Saturn Workshop _
TMX-64815 MSFC Skylab Apollo Telescope Mount Summary Mission Report
TMX-64817 MSFC Skylab Attitude and Pointing Control System Mission
Evaluation Report
TMX-64819 MSFC Skylab Instrumentation and Comunlcatlon System
Mission Evaluation Report
TMX-64820 MSFC Skylab Corollary Experiments Systems Mission
Evaluatlon Report
TMX-64821 MSFC Skylab Apollo Telescope Mount Experiment Systems ;,
Mission Evaluatlon Report
TMX-64822 MSFC Skylab Thermal & Environmental Control System
Mission Evaluatlon Report
TMX-64823 MSFC Skylab Apollo Telescope Mount Thermal Control System
Mission Evaluation Report
TMX-64824 MSFC Skylab Structures and Mechanical Systems Mission
Evaluation Report
TMX-64825 MSFC Skylab Crew Systems Mission Evaluation Report
TMX-64826 MSFC Skyla5 Contamination Control Systems Mission
Evaluation Report
4
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C. DESCRIPTION _ :
1 DesiRn Evolution. :
a. Power Generatl, n.
(i) &MOWS. The Airlock Electrical Power System (AM
EPS) design evolved from a simple primary battery system to a complex
solar array/secondary battery system. This evolution was prompted by
changes in mission objectives and design requirements.
Until 1967, all system power after docking was to be derived
from the CSM EPS. The AM EPS was required to provide only a minimal
amount of power during the initial (pre-docking) mission phase, a
period of only 11.5 hours. The AM EPS consisted of silver-zlnc
primary batteries and a power distribution system.
The mission duration was extended and the sophistication of the
Orbital Workshop (OWS) increased to accommodate the growing experiment _
program. The AM EPS design concept was then changed to a solar array/
secondary battery system with silver-zinc primary batteries to be used
for pre-activation power only. The first of many concepts had solar
arrays mounted on the Airlock. Through the evolutionary design phase,
as the power requirements increased, the solar arrays were relocated
on the OWS to accommodate the increasing array size. Also, in these
early design stages, batteries and power conditioning equipment con-
cepts evolved through a series of trade-off studies. One such study
compared both Silver-Cadmlum and Nickel-Cadmium batteries. The selec-
tion of Nickel-Cadmium was based on the availability of more ground
teat data and flight history implying less development risk. Several
solar array/secondary battery system design were evaluated, with the
primary goal of increasing the overall efficiency and reliability of
the system. Buck regulation was selected to maximi=e efficiency, for
both the battery charger and voltage regulator. In addition, a peak
power tracker was incorporated in the charger to extract maximum array
power when demanded by the system. The modular regulator design was
selected for both the battery charger and voltage regulator with
maximum reliability, high efficiency and redundant control circuitry
in mind. When the results of this design approach were established,
the AM EPS consisted of four _ower Conditioning Groups (PCGs), each
including; a battery charger, a voltage regulator and a 30 cell, 33
ampere-hour Nickel-Cadi_um battery. Input power for the PCGs was
derived from solar arrays mounted on the OWS. The solar array was an
adaptation of an existing Agena design and, in order to achieve the
high input voltage required for a buck regulation scheme, the two
array modules were to be wired in series.
At this time, the ATMwas a free flying vehicle which was to
dock with the Skylab during the final manned mission. In the earlier
i •
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imissions, it was planned to fly the cluster in a gravity gradient atti-
tude with the vehicle X-axis along the local vertical. After the ATM
had docked, the attitude was to be solar inertial. While in the gravity
gradient attitude, it was planned to have an articulated solar array
for solar pointing to maximize PCG input power.
i Power requirements continued to increase thus imposing both a !
larger solar array and the expansion of the number of AM PCGs first to
six and finally to eight. Reduction of pre-activation load require-
: ments coupled with the increased available Nickel-Cadmlum battery
energy from eight units, led to the elimination of AM primary silver- _:
zinc batteries.
At the time PCG component construction was authorized, the de-
sign differed from the flight PCGs in the following important respects:
Maximum component voltage ratings for the battery charger and
voltage regulator were 110 volts rather than 125 volts.
Only one charger Ampere-Hour Meter (AHM) was available for
charge control and TM.
There was no provision for astronaut override of the i00
percent State of Charge (SOC) signal from the AHM.
The AHM return factor and battery trickle charge rate were
higher than used in flight chargers.
The discharge limit feature at an AHM SOC of 30% was not
incorporated.
The battery case was magnesium and individual cells were of
the same design as those flown on Agena.
At this time, the use of ATM solar modules, for both the ATMand OWS
solar arrays, to achieve design standardlzatlon_was considered desire-
able. However, since the input voltage requirement for the two power
systems was different, it would have been necessary to modify the ATM
solar module wiring such that one-half of the aeries string of one
module was wired in series with a second module, Also, thermal analyses
of the solar array indicated temperatures that caused the maximum array "
output voltage to be higher than the llO volts used for AM PCG design.
Design requirements for the AM charger and voltage regulator were
changed at this time to accept input voltages of 125 volts maximum
(3 siva, worst case) which provided some design margin. Shortly after
this, the so-called, "dry launch" concept was adopted which made the ! _
ATMan integral part of the cluster and made the OWS S-IVB a true space _
laboratory rather than a propulsive stage. Since the ATM attitude
7
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control system was capable of holding the cluster in the solar iner-
tial attitude at all times, there was no longer any need for a separate
OWS solar array orientation system and the articulation requirement was
deleted. Analysis indicated a power margin for ATMwhich was consider-
ably larger than expected. Thus, a more flexible cluster power system
: became feasible. A concept of AM/ATM power system paralleling was
adopted as it provided better interface voltage regulation at the CSM.
A solar array was later conceived, for'the OWS, which was
specifically to be used with the AM PCGs as an integrated power system.
Maximum and minimum voltage and power requirements _re deliberately
specifleC to be 1.5 times the A_4 module design to minimize the impact
on PCG redesign. Based on imposed constraints and requirements, sig-
nificant trade-offs were made in this area. First, it was desired to
maximize the power obtained from the area available and to minimize
weight. The 2x4 cm solar cell size, having a 2 ohm-centlmeter base
resistivity, had a 11.1% AMO, 28@C efficiency and thus proved to be
both cost and performance effective from fabrication, assembly, and
power standpoints. Other sizes considered were the 2x2 and 2x6 cm
sizes. Second, was the decision to use a panel approach. The equiva-
lent of four solar cell modules were contained on one panel substrate,
thereby optimizing the useful area and minimizing overall system wei_ht
and complexity.
The requirements were evaluated and it was concluded that, (I)
SAS power at the end of mission should be specified, (2) on-orbit
degradation should be accounted for (_6%), (3) shadowing by the ATM
solar array and the OWS structure should be considered, (4) the 55°C
(328°K) array temperature was too low, and should have been around
70°C (343¢K), and (5) performance should be specified at the AM/OWS
interface. To cope with the potential effects from the ATM solar
array and OWS stage shadowing during unconstrai_,ed cluster man_uvers,
* the "slngle-strlng" design concept, consisting of four single series
strings of 154 solar cells connecte/ in parallel only at their end
} points, was implemented.
A deslgn-phase trade-off to optimize thermal control paint for
, the solar panel rear surface resulted in selection of Z-93 to take
advaatage of its superior absorptivity and emissivity properties.
Analysis indicated a panel temperature reduction of about 7°F (power
gain of about 250 watts total). This potential galn initially out-
weighed the historic difficulty in application, maintenance (cleanli-
ness), and repair for this paint. The method used to assure that
equal output from 8 arrays was satisfied, wa_ to combine the modules
into groups and distribute them across both wings to compensate for
the effects of uneven temperature distribution, which influences array
output power. Complete interconnect and wJ:ing redundancy was includ-
ed at that time.
8
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In the process of design evolution, a second Amp-Hour Meter was
added to the battery charger to improve reliability. Also, a discharge
limit feature was added to provide a signal to the voltage regulator
when the AHM computed battery SOC equaled 30%. The voltage regulator
reduced its output and effectively removed the associated battery from
the bus. This feature _as added to prevent inadvertent overloading of
any one battery, although intentional deep discharges were still possi-
ble by use of over-ride logic circuitry. Both onboard display and
ground TM of AHM status was available. Manual override of the 100%
SOC signal from the AHMwas added to permit continued battery charging
at the voltage limit.
Battery thermal gradients observed during cyclic ground
testing prompted a redesign of the battery case to aluminum for
improved heat transfer to the coldplate. Internal cell changes
were incorporated to reduce the probability of cell internal shorts.
To further reduce battery operating temperature and therefore
improve cyclic life, the coolant loop temperatures were lowered and
both AHM ret.rn factor and battery trickle charge rate were reduced.
The latter necessitated battery charger design changes.
Late incorporation of the Earth Resources Experiment Package
(EREP) as part of the MDA equipment added the complication of off-
solar inertial pointing to the mission requirements. This imposed a
reduction in power capabillty (due to off-sun pointing) and an in-
creased electrical load. All imposed loads were satisfied, by design,
and certified by test data and analysis prior to launch.
(2) ATM. Three types of power sources were originally
considered to meet the electrical load requirement: fuel cell, radio-
isotope thermoelectric generator (RTG), and solar cell array/secondary
battery system.
Fuel cell operation had reactant storage limitations and heat
removal problems. Power systems of 2 to 4 kw capacity required an
active coolant loop to remove the waste heat. Fuel cell systems with
proven llfe capability for an 18-month mission were not available.
The RTG had two prominent limitations: fuel was not available
for a large system, and radiation danger to personnel could exist.
The RTGs in development at the beginning of the program had maximum
power output capabilities of 500 watts with conversion efficiencies
of approximately 5 percent. Thermal heating due to this power loss
would have demanded active cooling.
A solar cell array sized electrically to two and one-half times
the spacecraft load would be required to allow for charging secondary
batteries to supply power during earth occultation periods. Solar
_w , ................... I ...........L
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cells with proven performance and reliability were readily available, i
and the low earth orbit minimized degradation caused by charged par-
ticle bombardment. Solar cells were particularly attractive on
sun-oriented missions because cf the availability of 90 degree incident
solar radiation without ancillary array pointing systems.
The choice of using solar cells for power generators on the
ATM evolved early in the program from initial project power condi-
tioning tradeoff studies. Initial ATM Electrical Power System require-
ments provided for the ATM to power both the LEM ascent stage and ATM
systems via 24 solar panels/power modules (CBRM). Further power con-
ditioning studies evaluated the overall system power requirements and
a, 20 solar module, panel/power module configuration was considered
acceptable.
To obtain the required surface area for mounting the solar cell
modules an array of four deployable wing assemblies was selected. The
cruciform pattern was chosen to minimize reaction forces during deploy-
ment and the wings oriented 45° to the SW$ X-axle for minlhum shadow-
ing of other SWS areas and to fit the launch configuration packaging
envelope.
The final ATM EPS design did not change significantly from its
original concept (i.e., the solar array/battery design). The design
evolution involved the quantity of charger-battery-regulator-modules
(CBRMs) and solar panels, as well as battery design, mission duration
and type.
The mission concept began with the ATM as a free-flying vehicle
which used the Lunar Excursion Module (LEM) to provide electrical power
prior to solar array deployment.
The ATM solar array was designed so that individual panels were
connected to each CBRMwhich were connected in parallel only at the
ATM load buses. Two module configurations were used; one used 2x6 cm
solar cells with two cells in parallel, the other used 2x2 cm solar
cells with six cells in parallel. Both used 10 ohm-centimeter base
resistivity cells and had 114 cells in series.
The initial solar wing assembly panel configuration consisted
of 6 solar panels. The total 4 wing configuration consisted of 24
solar panels (16 modules/panel) supplying power to 24 separate power
modules (CBRMs). Subsequent power requirement versus capability eval-
uations indicated a need for reduction1 in the w_llg assembly panel
configuration. First, the number of panels per wing was reduced to
five full panels with a total array configuration of 20 panels and 20
CBRMs. Finally, the number of panels per wlng was changed to the
flight configuration of four full 20 solar _ell module panels and an
inboard half panel containing 10 solar cell modules for each wing.
This configuration was frozen based upon payload shroud sims limitations.
10
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Both module types were universally interchangeable on the ATM
wings; thus, the solar array consisted of a combination of each type g
module. Differences in cell size and construction were the result of
individual manufacturer preferences. Two different contractors were
employed in order to have a backup module supplier should one experience _.
difficulty in satisfying the imposed schedule, considering the large
quantity of modules required. Since both deszgns were acceptable and _
on schedule, both type modules wure used.
Early solar cell module environmental tests established the !
limitation of a maximum of 114 solar cells connected in series per
module arrangement. The tests revealed that at extreme low tempera-
Cures, predicted for ATM solar array operations, high module/panel
output voltages were experienced. These voltages were in the magnitudes
which could damage components (capacitors) within other ATM systems.
The solar cell cerles connection limits were set for a maximum panel
output of 70-80 volts at the expected orbital low temperature.
Nickel-Cadmium batteries were desirable because of weight,
volume, and proven lifetime. Also, existing secondary battery designs
already included 20 ampere-hour, 28 volt, Nickel-Cadmlum batteries.
This was a logical choice because of the relatively low development
cost that would be required for this item.
The major spacecraft constraint was the requirement for passive i
cooling of the power system components. This constraint required that
the electronics packages be designed and oriented for maximum heat
radiation. The temperature of the package depended upon the avail-
able radiating area. High energy conversion efflclencies were neces-
sary co reduce the amount of heat generated.
Other constraints imposed on the power conversion system included
minimum weight an_ volunm and nO _ingle point failure system features.
These constraints, the passive cooling requirements, and the desira-
bility of having the power conditioning electronics as an integral unit
with the battery to simplify interconnect problems, suggested the CBRM
rationale. Reliability considerations also supported the modular power
system approach.
k
The maximum sustained load for each CBRMwas based on the
battery ampere-hour racing and the allowable depth of discharge for
the batteries to assure sufficient cycle llfe to meet the mission
llfeClme requlremenC_ The electrlcal load requirements and reliability
considerations then indicated the number of CBRMs required.
The number of CBRMs required was originally determined to be 24
when the mission requirements were 18 months of operation at 20 percent
allowable depth of discharge. Later, when the mission requirements
were changed to 2 months of operation at 25 percent allowable depth of
discharge, the number of C3_Is required was reduced to 18. An analysis,
J
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using the latest data available, showed that 18 CBRMs were still
appropriate for the final mission requirements of 8 months of operation
at 30 percent depth of discharge (nominal maximum). The quantity of
CBRMs also allowed for loss of up to three CBRMs during the mission.
• iiBatteries composed of 20 A-H NI-Cd cells were chosen becausethey were the largest capacity available, with proven performance, tosatisfy the original mission requirements.
The 24 cell battery size was the result of a tradeoff analysis. 1
The results indicated that using less than 24 cells would; i) increase i
the operating range of the load regulator and decrease its operating !i
efficiency and 2) have high llne losses for equal power input. Bat- 4
terles containing more than 24 cells present dlfflcultles, one of
which was an aggrevatlon of cell voltage and capacity mismatch. Mis-
match would have been serious if any ATM cell voltage exceeded 1.55
volts.
The 24 cell approach permitted the use of a step-down switching
charger which maximized efficiency. The maximum 24 cell battery volt-
age during charge was approximately 36 volts. A minimum solar array
voltage of approximately 38 volts, insured a voltage step-down for
cell charging.
Safe, rellabl_ and effective performance was achieved through
the definition and appllcatlon of cell and battery operatlonal limits
for all expected operating conditions. Essentlally these llmlts and
: control characteristics were subdivided into two areas of battery
; operation: normal cyclic operation between 0°C and 30°C, and battery
limit conditions such as over and under temperature and emergency
conditions.
Four types of NI-Cd cells were investigated at MSFC. The AB09
cell provided only the negative and positive electrodes and did not
have auxillary slgnal or recombination electrodes. The AB10 cell, in
addition to the two maln electrodes, contained a third adhydrode
electrode which developed an electrlcal signal that was proportional
to the partial pressure of oxygen. Any hydrogen which evolved was not
recomblned. The ABI2 cell contained a precharged negative electrode,
a third adhydrode electrode, and a fourth (fuel cell) electrode. A
major difference between the ABIO and ABI2 type cell was the 20 per-
cent of precharged cadmium plate surface area added in the ABI2 cell.
The purpose of precharge, which increased the effective cadmium
electrode area, was to maintaia the useful battery capacity for longer
periods of cyclic operation. The apparent deficiency of oxygen recom-
bination area in the AB12 cell was offset by the fourth electrode
which provided rapid recombinetion of oxygen and hydrogen. The flight
type AB12 cell increased the negative/positive ratio from 1.35 to 1.45
and the final configuration (AB12G) had the third electrode relocated
to relieve the non-uniform cell plate pressures.
12
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The third electrode of the AB10 cell could have been either a
type B or type C. The third electrode for the AB12 cell was a type C.
The basic differences of the type B and type C electrodes were as
follows:
Xtcm Type B Electrode Type C Electrode
i Nickel substrata 40 square ce_timeters 10 square centi-
meters
Catalyst Platinum None
Ox78en diffusion barrier Electrolyte 1/2-mil teflon
film pressed into
electrode
The diffusion barrier stabilized the third electrode response
as a function of life. The catalyst function in the type B electrode
was co recombine oxygen with hydrosen. The evolution of cell design
Co the AB12C cell took place between 1966 and 1972.
b. Power Distribution and Controls.
(1) AM/OWS. The final confisuration of the A_4/OWS Power
Distribution and Control System was the culmination of many design
reviews. The followin 8 identifies two of the design trade-offs conduct-
ed durins the conceptu&, and requirements definition phases of the
system dasis, period.
Initially. a trade-off study was performed
between a "one-wire" and a "two-wire" system.
Based upon flight history and NASA preference,
the t_o-wire sinsle point ground concept was
selected. In this concept, all end items were
routed back to the power 8ource return and then
the power source return was connected to the
vehicle structure at a sinSle point.
The parallel feeder concept which connected all
of the nineA}/ supplied feeders electrically
together in the OWS to provide a "stiff bus"
or one main bus for each of the Aid regulator
buses was selected. The power was distributed
to each end item from one of the stiff buses and
for many and items from either bus and included
individual protection. One of the basic requi-
rmuents imposed upon the OWS system was to
limit the voltap drop (line loss) from the AM/
OWS interface to any OWS end item to 1.5 Vdc
(Positiva and Return).
13
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1A basic constraint upon the initial design (wet workshop) was
to use existing qualified hardware. The largest feed through recep-
tacle qualified for the "wet" workshop environment was 12 gauge. There-
fore, the parallel conductor concept was selected.
"Utilize existing qualified hardware" was still the theme when
the OW5was converted from a "wet" to a "dry" launch conftgaratton.
The Power Distribution and Control console for the "wet" workshop
consisted of t_o enclosed "drag-on" panels (one circuit breaker panel
and one control and display panel). The panels were to be stowed in
the AM for the launch and would be installed on the wall by the crew.
The crew would then connect the pre-tnstalled wire harness connectors
to the panels.
The conversion from a "wet" to a "dry'* wor:_shop resulted in a
i complete redesign of the Powe- Distribution and control Console. All
of the system components could now be hard mounted within the OWS
! prior to launch.
A console was developed within which the system electronic
modules, circuit breaker panels, and control and display panels would
be installed. However, the "wet" to "dry" conversion also resulted in
more systems, and more sophistication. The circuit breakers, switches,
and display arrangement were finalized after mid-year 1971.
In addition to the console mounted panels, four (4) "remote"
control and display panels were baselined. The "remote" panels
provided local crew control of functions which would be cycled many
t_mea during the mission. By providing th_ controls in the area of
usage, traffic to and from the power distribution and control console
was considerably reduced.
The original OWSinternal wire harness installations concept
was to route wiring In as many "hidden" areas as possible to preclude
crew contact. Lightweight, protective covers were to be used in e_ees
where it was Impossible to "hide" the wiring. These covers would
utilize the same pickup points as the clamps for attaching the wiring.
The cable routing allowed for physical separation required to maintain
D4I control.
After HSFC-SPEC-IO1A (flammability) was imposed as a require-
mont, much effort was expended to Investigate and evaluate available
materials and methods to meet the raqu/rements. This effort included
dateruinins the:
Availability of new materials for connector sealing grommets,
wire insulation, and cla:p cushions;
Available materials for wrapping or enclosing the wire
harness and attach cls_s;
III i i, •
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_ethods of prot_ctlng the wire harness if suitable insula-
tion materials were unavailable; i
Effects of the above approaches on engineering design, menu- _
facturing operations, and schedules. _ _.
The resulting flammability and physical protection offered two major
advantages. One was better ENI control of the wire harnesses through
the use of a continuous metallic barrier afforded by a compartmentized
trough. Another was the reduction in the number of routing paths and
attach points that would be required in the tank wall insulation.
The number and location of the utility outlets and extension
cables was baselined as a function of the crew system reviews. Iv
general, they were located by anticipated/planned usage of the por_-
able equipment (vacuum cleaner, fans, lights, cameras).
The basic design concept for the "wet" OWSwas that all wire
harnesses would be pre-installed and that all electronic equipment
which could not withstand the liquid hydrogen cryogenic temperature
enviro_ent would be crew installed items. The "drag-in" concept
coupled with a potential hazardous atmosphere dictated the use of a
connector thdt provided:
Ease of operation:
Could be operated (connected/disconnected) with one gloved
hand under sero-G conditions.
Safety:
Precluded hazardous condition due to arcing when connected/ :
disconnected under load.
Basic requirements for conversion from '_et" to a "dry" OWSyore
to utilise 811 applicable '_et" hardware. Therefore, the "dry" OWS
retained the '_et" zero-C connec_or for those end-items which would
still require the crew to connect/disconnect.
A worst case voltage drop analysis yes performed on all MDA
wiring. The analysis indicated the need to increase the number of wires
from the AM transfer bus to the C_I/NDA interface to meet the minimm
requirmumt of 27.6 volts at the interface.
The following circuit nodifieations were t_lmented: -
Wires from the CSM/}4_ to the AM transfer bus were increased
fr_ S to 10, #10 &WG,on each positive bus and from 8 to 18,
QIO AWG, on the return bus in the AM.
15
Ig74C)222C)2-C)3g
Wires from the AM to CSM/MDA were increased from 5 to I0,
#12 AWG, on each positive bus and from 8 to 18, #12 AWG,
on the return bus in the HDA.
A drag through cable was provided to supplement the addl-
tional bus wirins. This cable also provided a redundant
power transfer connector at the CSH/MDA interface.
(2) ATM. Early in the program the decision was made to
have a t_o-wire system for power distribution and load circuitry employ-
ing separate wiring for power feeder and power returns. Distribution
of power to ATM loads was accomplished with two positive, isolated,
buses each routed through separate connectors, where practical. The
ATH return bus was referenced to the structure at the cluster single
point ground. Positive polarity lines of the distribution system wir-
ing were protected with circuit breakers or fuses.
The ATM CaD console design concepts evolved throuKh many stages,
each constrained by specific envelope, hardware and operational require-
meats. In the initial stages, design concepts were based upon the fact
that solar experimentation was to be controlled by two cre_nnen station-
ed in the flight cabin of the IJ_. Although the major experiment cont-
rols and displays were essentially the sa_e as those of the flight unit,
the console configuration was considerably different. All experiment
common controls and displays were functionally grouped and contained on
a separate panel located and arranged _o accommodate an operator in an
erect position. The ATM C&D station was defined based on available and
extremely limited LEM tunnel space. _onsole design and operational
requirements imposed by the ATM experlmenta and supporting subsystems
were considered secondary. The decision to launch the Saturn V '_ry"
Workshop configuration eliminated th_ requirement for the L_. The
_xietin8 console was mounted internal to the HDA. A basic constraint
was to use existing qualified hardware due to cost and schedule
constraints. Thus, no major redesign of the console was authorizedl
and the ATH C&D console, as initially designed for LEM compatibility
and conflsuratlon, was relorated to the MDA.
An additional deslsn problem occurred when the ATM CaD console
was removed from the LEM. The AC power necessary for console lighting
had been provided by the LEq. An adaptation of the existing L_-Inver- :
ter/Lightin6 Control Assembly (I/LCA) requirements was used in th_ MDA
I design.
A detailed thermal analysis of the I-LCA and the MDA internal
mounted equipment indicated the requirement to relocate, and actively
heat i_on the MDA external structure.
The fundamental design Foal remained unaltered from the concept
phase through fabrication to provide a C&D interface sufficient for
crew participation in the collection and maintenance of solar experi-
mentation. Selected astronauts were given an opportunity to impose
16
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their preference as to switch iocatio_ and nomenclature. The final
arrangement was ag.-eed upon during astronaut review meetings.
The CBRMpower sharing scheme was a new and unique technology
application. Analyses made early in the ATM program indicated that
the electrical power system effectiveness could be increased by up to
25% if a reliable power sharing scheme could be Jeveloped to assure
that all batteries shared power equal =. The re_ulting circ,_it, v]sich
_,ad a redundant master control that aL;omatically demanded equal cur-
rent from all on-line regulators, was a departure from previous designs
and fulfilled the system requirements completeiy. The master/slave
principle normally used for this purpose in ground applications was not
applicable to flight since its reliability depended on the reliability
of the master (a CBP_), and thus would be single failure p_lnt in the
system.
The power transfer distzibutor, main power distributor and the
auxiliary power distributor used a Deutsch integrated termination
system instead of a solder pin termination system. A crlmp-ty_e con-
tact was used by inserting it into a sealed termination that requircd
no soldering, vrapping, or 8plicin£, and was easy to maintain. These
terminations were nodular in design, fit in_o a compact fr_,Je and were
erranled in various bus configurations which could accoamodate wire
sizes from 12 A_ to 26 AWG. When inserted, the contacts were locked
in place and were envirormentally protected.
After the conversion to the "Dry" Workshop :oncept, due to the
cluster load distribution, the available power _s_gin on the ATM was
found to be considerably larger than that of the AM. In order to pro-
vide 8 more flexible cluster paver system, and tc provide better inter-
face voltage regulation at the C514 interface, the AM and AI_ power
systr_ paralleling concept was approved.
c. Cluster. The Skylab pronrsm involv_d three NA$A Centers,
five prim hardware contractors, several in:agrarian contractors end
nu_rous subcontractors and vendors, re insure the success o_ the Sky-
lab program, it was necessary that a continuou_ interchen_e of design
and performance data flow anon8 the numerous organlzatlons involved and
that 8 clear understa_dlng of the inpsct of systems design 8eels and
operational constraints be established and reviewed by all the organ-
intions. To crea_c a vehicle for dispersion of data and dissemination
of electrical power systeu performance predictions and operational
procedures the Intercenter Ela_trlcal Panel was constituted. Co-
chalruen free each NASA center were stoned to coordinate the effort.
Originally the Intercenter |lectp/cal Panel yea Scheduled
to meet quarterly, rotating t_e ueettn8 locations among the three
centers. ,l_e attendance for each ueattng wea determined by the
co-chslrnen after the subjects to be reviewed ve:e estebllshed. A
amber of pernanant action itesu were established for presentation at
each _etin8 including the following:
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Report on the status of Cluster Electrical Power
System Performance Analysis. _
Report the predicted load profile for each Skylab
mission.
Review the status of the component load requirements
per the module Power Allocatlon Documents.
Review the operational sequencing of components per
the mission sequence documents and the electrical
load assumptions document.
_evlew the status of level A ICDs.
Additional items for review were suggested by the panel co-
chairmen prior to each meeting and a presentation was prepared by the
appropriate organization.
The predicted performance of the electrical power systems was
reviewed at each panel meeting to insure that the stated capabillty
was adequate to support the missions identified in the flight plans.
The predicted performance was given both for the solar inertial mode
and the various off-nomlnal pointing modes identified. Since the
cluster power system was required to provide power to the CSM after
depletion of the CSM Fuel Cells, it was necessary that both MSFC and
JSC have a clear understanding of both the CSM and the cluster power
systems. During initiation and termination of cluster power transfer
to the CSM, the two systems operated, momentarily, in parallel. The {
dynamics of each power system were presented in the Intercenter Elec-
trlcal Panel meetings for review by all affected organizations.
Some of the dynamic characteristics that were reviewed were
the source impedance of each power source; the transient response of
the system caused by significant load changes, and the voltage-current
characterlst_cs of the power source as reflected on the system load
buses. The studies resulting from presentations at the panel meetings
revealed that th2 power systems involved were compatible and could be
operated in parallel without degradation of power system performance.
The power system operational requirements were specified in
the Cluster Requirements Specification, RS003M00003. Many of these
requirements were determined by the Intercenter Electrical Panel and
the inputs were submitted for approval. The panel reviewed the inter-
face voltage requirement between the power source and the cluster
modules and components, A maximum allowable voltage drop was establi- i
shed and the cabling design was reviewed by the panel to insure that
the network design would meet the requirement. Since the electrical
18
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power system design requirements specified a two wire system using a
single ground point, the return of fault currents to the single ground
point was reviewed _nd the maximum fault current value was established
to be used in design of the return paths. All components which vlolat-
ed the two-wlre system and used the structure for a return path were
identified and reviewed by the panel for impact. Upon approval, the
component deviation was documented in the Appendix to the Cluster
Requirement Specification. ,
Items invo]vlng the flight crew,such as the design and layout of
controls and displays, were reviewed by the astronaut assigned to repre-
sent the crew on the electrical panel. Suggestions for panel redesign
or nomenclature changes were directed to the module contractors for
incorporation. Of special importance to the crew were the emergency
power disconnect circuits required to remove all power in the case of
an anomaly such as a fire. Several revisions were made to these cir-
cults as a result of the panel meeting reviews.
i
Since the operation of the EREP experiments involved a peak
electrical load requirement during periods of reduced power system
capability due to off-nomlnal pointing_the Intercenter Electrical
Panel reviewed the EREP requirements at each meeting. In addition
to the power system output capabillt_ the voltage drop to each EREP
component was carefully analyzed and the interaction between the _
EREP operation and related subsystems was studied. As a result of
those studies the maximum data-take duration and the location of the
data-take in the orbit were specified in the Cluster Requirements
Specification.
Numerous other subjects of interest to the design and perform-
ance evaluation of the electrica] ,ystems were reviewed. Such items
as corona, electrical bondlng_and lightning protection were reviewed,
in detail, to insure that power system design would support r'-_planned i
Skylab missions without undue operational or procedural consLraints.
As the design of the electrical power system evolved toward
the final flight configuration a series of reviews were identified
by the Skylab Program Management which culminated in the certifica-
tion of the electrical power system. The Intercenter Electrical Panel
continued to function through these reviews to certify the design
and performance of the system.
Preliminary Design Reviews and Critical Deslgn Revlewz were
held for each module. Individual members of the electrical panel
participated in the electrical section of these reviews although the
Intercenter Electrical Panel did not function as a unit. The action
items from these design reviews were reviewed at a subsequent panel
meeting to insure that all items requiring panel action or cognizance
_I !!'!' i ii .... u _ i
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were properly noted. The first cluster level review was the Cluster
Systems Design Review (CSDR) in December 1969.
The CSDR resulted in three significant action items related to
the e]ectrlcal power system operation. Back-up commands from the
AM command system were added for both AIM and ATM Solar Array Deploy-
ment. These commands provided a redundant system for increased deploy-
ment reliability of the Solar Array system.
The decision to operate the ATM and AM electrical power systems
in parallel as the normal operational mode was made during the CSDR
review of the predicted power system performance. Operating the
power systems in parallel permitted the total power available to be
used as required to supply loads anywhere in the cluster or to the CSM.
The use of the _otal available power was thus optimized and the impact
of power system management on mission planning and crew activity was
minimized. Figure i.I shows the orbital average load prediction
history from 1967 through launch.
From 1967 through 1969, a major attempt to lower the orbital
average load requirement was made. Seven hundred and fifty watts
were subtracted by lowering the planned usage times and duty cycles
of equipment. The 666 watt increase in mld-1969 was the preliminary
"dry" workshop load increase. The orbital average load remained
essentially unchanged until 1971 when crew tlmellnes began to be
written, and hscdware testing, to determine actual connected loads,
was in progress. The final changes, in late 1972, were caused by
a redefinition of heater duty cycles.
The third significant CSDR action item basellned the average
and maximum power transfer to the CSM. The maximum power transfer
to the CSM was baselined as I000 watts per each transfer circuit or
2000 watts total. The average power was specified to be 1100 watts.
These power values received concurrence by MSFC and JSC panel members
and were submitted to the custodian for the Cluster Requirements
Specification for inclusion in that document.
All the remaining CSDR action items were assigned Lo the appro-
priate group for cesolutlon and all items were closed within the
requlr_d _?hedule.
The next review of the electrical system was conducted in a
series of meetings beginning in November 1971 and continuing into
May 1972. The Systems/Operatlons Compatibility Assessment Review
(SOCAR) objective was to review the mainstream program activities
for compatibility and develop a good understanding between hardware
design and planned hardware operation by directly iuterfacing the
responsible Skylab systems design/development personnel and the
operations personnel.
20
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The SOCAR was a thorough review of the electrical systems
design, systems tests, and operational documentation. All partici-
pants were directed to review the applicable areas to be discussed
at each of the SOCAR meetings and to report changes or comments as
required.
Numerous special study results were presented during the SOCAR
meetings to insure that the hardware design met all design requirements.
Review of the hardware design included reports evaluating corona,
lightning, static electricity and shock, sneak circuits and circuit
protection. Each of these subjects were reviewed in detail by the
SOCAR team members. Action items were assigned if further investiga-
tion was required and the required clarification or explanation was
given at a subsequent meeting. In addition to these special studies
the results of the systems testing were reviewed. Special attention
was given to the test anomalies and the disposition of the anomalies.
Since many of the system tests had not been completed at this time
the test requirements documents were reviewed by the SOCAR team to
determine if the test requirements were accurately and adequately
described. Further evaluation of system testing was included in the
next review phase.
The SOCAR team also reviewed each of the 42 single failure
points (SFPs) in the electrical system. Each SFP was analyzed in
detail and disposltloned by the SOCAR team. Three SFPs were ellml-
nated by redesign; 12 were acceptable because a work-around was avail-
able to correct a failed condition. Twenty-one SFPs were considered
to be acceptable risks because of a high level of confidence from
previous performance or minimal degradation affect of the failure.
The remaining six SPFs reviewed by the electrical SOCAR team were
referred to other groups for disposition.
To complete the review of the power system design, all waivers
and deviations to the CRS requirements were reviewed and dlspositloned.
Additionally the system operational constraints and limitations were
reviewed and revised as required to properly reflect the planned sys-
tem operation.
The SOCAR team was also responsible for reviewing the opera-
tlonal documentation to insure that the planned operation was com-
patible with the hardware design. The documents were reviewed with
the document custodian for accuracy, and comments were submitted where
required. The operational documents were in a preliminary state at
this time and many comments were submitted to the custodians for
incorporation.
The operational documents reviewed included the Skylab Opera-
tions Handbook_ both; Volume I, which included the systems descrip-
tion, and Volume If, which contained the system operating procedures.
These handbooks were prepared separately for the two Skylab electrical
22
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power systems; one set covered the ATM system, and another set covered
the AM/OWS system. In addition, Volume IV of the Operational Data Book,
which contained the performance data, was reviewed by the SOCAR team. i
One of the most important operational documents reviewed during _"
the SOCAR meetings was the Flight Mission Rules. This document con- i
talned a group of rules to be used during the mission to minimize the
need for real time decisions. Emphasis was placed on identifying all
p_obable causes of redline violations. The mission rule reviews were
conducted in SOCAR team leaders meetings, The JSC SOCAR team leader
was the document custodian for the EPS sections. All known mission
constraints were identified and included in the document.
The data presented during the SOCAR confirmed that the existing
electrical power system design was adequate to meet or exceed the
design requirements. Additionally, it was concluded that with continu-
ing hardware designer review the operatlonal uocumentatlon would make
a timely transition to its final flight support configuration.
To accomplish the objectives of SOCAR, 19 meetings were sched-
uled to assure that all design and operational data was reviewed.
Only five action items were not resolved and/or closed during the
SOCAR time frame. The five open items required additional data or
action to be taken properly document system performance or operational
procedures. None of them impacted the hardware design or its certl-
flcation for flight. All items were resolved and closed prior to the
DCR.
The review of the Skylab electrical power system continued
through July 1972 with the Design Certification Review (DCR). The
purpose of the DCR was to review the design and performance require-
ments at the system level as specified in the CRS, module CEI Speci-
flcations, n_dule ICDs, and as clarified in the minutes of the Inter-
center Electrical Panel, and to verify by test and analysis that the
design requirements were satisfied.
All design and performance requirements were listed, and the
type of verification was identified, either by analysis or tests.
Test verification was further divided into breadboard, component,
module, or system tests. The results and conclusions of the verifi-
cation of each requirement were included with plans for future test i
that impose verification. The DCR confirmed that all electrical
power system requirements had been verified by test or analysis.
During component and module level testing, several test problems
resulted in minor redesign or piece part replacement. During the DCR
each of these problems was analyzed in detail with the corrective
action to increase confidence in the ability of the system to meet t1_e
performance requirements. Each problem was listed individually, and '_
its significance _o the system operation was given. The corrective
action was then _aown for completlon of the analysis. Some adJitlonal
23
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test anomalies were being analyzed during the DCR time period but it
i was not expected that the resolution of any of these would have a major
impact on the electrical power system design.
Additional DCR effort included a re-review of the SOCAR material.
All SOCAR tasks were updated, where applicable, to insure that the elec-
trical power system could be certified as flight ready.
The DCR concluded that the electrical power system, as built,
was capable of supporting the imposed Skylab mission operations,
however, its ability to meet required performance requirements since
the module CDRs had been reduced due to additional loads and Z-LV-E
requirements. Potential I-LV-E operational requirements being con-
sidered caused additional concern regarding the capability of th_
system to meet those power requirements.
A Skylab Cluster basic design requirement was for protection
of all operational systems against damage from lightning strike.
Imposed was a structural assembly that provided a continuous, circum-
ferential, electrical path from the forward tip of the payload shroud
to the aft interface of the OWS, including all points along the length
of the stowed cluster. The cluster consisted of 4 major structural
assemblies that formed the outer conductive she?l: i) payload shroud,
2) airlock shroud, 3) instrument unit, and 4) orbital workshop.
The first three being of a regular structural profile, provided
the imposed electrically conductive path by use of standard ground
strapping and mating surface electrical bonding techniques.
The OWS was not a regular structural profile as it included
several protuberances such as; the solar array beam fairings, several
tunnels, for wiring protection, and piping routed along the external
tank structure. A deployable meteoroid shield covered the entire OWS
tank wall area, complicating the method used to assure that an elect-
rically continuous path existed as it did on the prime structure for
i lightning protection purposes.
Non-deployable structures of the OWS were bonded in the same
manner as other cluster elements. On the deployable structures, the
spring clip method, developed and flight proven from the SIVB program
were used. This method made forced mechanical and electrical contact
with a piece of electrically bonded structure. Discharge paths were
provided over the deployable perimeter of the assembly (e.g., SAS
Fairing) at no greater than 5 foot intervals. This method was imple-
mented, on the forward and aft ends of the meteoroid shield, and on
both SAS beam falrlngs and the main tunnel, of the OWS.
d. Skylab Caution and Warnln8 System. The Saturn
Workshop (SWS) Caution and Warnln8 (C&W) System provided the crew
with visual displays and audible tones when specified cluster para-
meters reached out-of-tolerance conditions.
24
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The original C&W System design concept consisted of a Call and
Warning Unit and an alarm tone generator that was part of the Ge_Inl
Voice Control Center. Initially, only twelve parameters were to be
monitored. System sensors and a_.,clate_ el_ctronlcs were non- _
redundant. Later, the system was ,-_>_i£1edt_ consist of an Emergency
and Warning Unit capable of monitoring 35 parameters, includlng fire
and rapid loss of vehicle pressure. Redundant sensors and electron-
ics were added along with two klaxons for providing emergency tones.
Finally, the C&W System was expanded to contain redundant subsystems
within a caution and warning unit. Seventy-slx selected parameters
were monitored and four separate audio tones, along with visual in-
dicators, were provided.
_ The total effort regarding this system included the following: _J
The design and development of the C&W system.
Performance of the integration effort required for defining
and evaluating the AM, ATM, MDA, and OWS C&W System for
compllance with cluster requirements.
Qualification of system components and verification of
system performance.
Performance of C&W System support activities for all
Skylab missions.
i THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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2. System Desisn and Performance Analysis. The eleccrlcal |
power system design evolution resulted in the development of analytical !tools that could be rapidly revised to reflect proposed power system
design configurations. Due to the complex nature of the power system
and the interaction between the power system and other cluster sub-
systems, the tools developed for design and performance analysis were
computer programs. Through interaction of these computer programs
the adequacy of the power sysvem design was continually assessed, and
the acceptability of the operational procedures were verified.
a. Analytical Tools. Due to the complexity of the Skylab
EPS, unique analytical tools had to be developed which had been un-
necessary on simpler systems. These tools included sophisticated com-
puter simulations, generation of specialized documentation intended
to facilitate analysis, and detailed manual and computer procedures
for telemetry reduction and analysis during flight. The analyses for
the Skylab Program were divided into two major groups: Premlssion and
Flight.
(I) Premlsslon Tools. The premlsslon analyses made use
of four major tools:
Simplified Power Flow Equations, i
Skylab Electric Power System Analysis (SEPSA)
Computer Program, .
Load Assumptions and Power Allocation Docu-
ments,
Functional Schematics.
A brief description of these tools is given below.
(2) Simplified Power Flow Equations. The simplified
equations given below were used durln_ tiL_ early portion of the Skylab
Program to provide approximate, quick look, answers to design problems.
After the more complex computer programs were developed, these equa-
tions took on secondary importance.
(3) Model Description. Using the energy balance con-
cept and the simplified EPS models given in Figure 2.1, the following
energy balance, margin determination, and battery DOD equations were
developed:
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i I
f
7
i
f ATN EPS: PL LR '_'B TC N
= T + e.. _.: ,: TC! D /c :sp :V /_
I PN = PL PE
PE TD(100)DOD =
N ,:R :_'LR :#D 2 WH
: ."R LR .':SPTC N
OWS/AM EPS: PL = PSP 'PLS _DEC _C ¢'B "• " TD'+:sTc
PN•PL "PE
PETD(tO0)D_D "
N :_ _"LRWH
where: PL • Energy Balance Bul Power Output Capability,
PSP = Average S/P Output during Illumlnated Period
of the Orblt,
?P'LS = S/P to Charger Line Efficiency,
"DEC • S/P Degradatlon Efficiency,
.¢
:
SP " S/P Utiliz._tion Efftclency,(Includai_D considerations)
C • Charger Efficiency,
_'R = Regulator Efficiency,
.'LR • Load Regulator to Bus Efficiency,
D = Diode Efficiency,
#.
g = Battery Efficiency,
N = Number of Operating Subsystems,
TD - Sunlight Duration,
TC - Shadow Duration,
PN - Power Margln,
PE • F.quipawnt Load,
WH = Rated Watt-Hour Capacity
Km & Kin'- Niimatch Factor
28
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(4) Skylab Electric Power System Analysis (SEPSA).
This computer program is described in Appendix 4 of thls document.
(5) Load Assumptions and Paver Allocation Documents.
Due to the larse number of components and the differing operational
characteristics of each, It became apparent that special documentation
was required to describe each component. Contractual documentation
such as procurement drmrLnss, end item specifications, ICD's, etc.,
did not have the information necessary to model each of the components.
The contractual documents, in seneral, contained only the maximum power
value for deslsn purposes and did _t contain the planned operational
seque nc •.
To provide the information required for the EPS analysis, a
series of documents were prepared. These included a Power A11ocaClon
Document for each module and a Load Assumptions Document for the Skylab.
When refinement of the analytlcal model besan to take place, it was
obvious that addltlonal data on each component was required to accur-
ately predict the component operational load. The missing data was the
distribution system resistances. Both the interconnecting resistances
between the major buses and the wiring from the bus to the component
and return was necessary for accurate predictions. Since these reals-
tances were not included in either the Power Allocation or Load Assump-
tlons Documents, they were documented in each Load Profile Document
i release. The Power Allocation and Load Profile Documents, together,
contained the following data:
i (a) Power required for each operational mode at
the required range of input voltnges. For resistive loads, the differ-
en_e in the electrical load between 24 volts input voltnge and 30 volts
is yew sIsnlflcant. For some devices, such as Invertera, 8 constant
power is required over the range of input voltJse8. Therefore, it was
very important that this characteristic be t_nderstood for each com-
ponent. Peak loads were also identified.
(b) The bus (or source) from vhich each component
received power was identified.
(c) The resistance of the distribution system
wiring from the bus (or source) to each component was defined.
(d) The resistance of the interconnecting vlrlng
between the distribution system buses and the power source was defined.
The Load Assumptions Document yea essential for definition of
the operstio,_sl sequence of each electrical component. In a lares,
manned spacecraft, the numerous components were sequenced independently
to satisfy a number of operational constraints. The sequenctns of some
29
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components was by thermostatic controls; some were sequenced over ground
stations; some to support experiment operation or _stronaut tasks; while
other components had operated continually to n_aln_aln spacecraft con-
trol and monitoring. It was therefore, essential that the operational
sequences of each component be identified early in the development of
the analytical model to facilitate accurate prediction of the electri-
cal power requirements. The Load Assumptions Document contained the
following data:
(a) The duration of the operation of each compo-
nent at each operational power level.
(b) The factors affecting the operational sequence
such as temperature, ground track, etc.
(c) The relationship of the operational sequence
co that of other components.
The use of these documents provided the required visibility
for design verification, premlsslon planning and mission support by
each contractor and discipline area.
(6) Functional Schematics (Electrical). To accurately
model and analyze the electrical system, it was essential that the
configuration of the syste_ be clearly understood. To achieve a clear
understanding of the configuration required that all drawings be re-
viewed. In most spacecraft this requires reviewln_ both design and
fabrication drawings of the prime contractor and t;umerous subcon-
tractors and vendors. As design changes were implemented, the draw-
ings were continually reviewed to assure that the analytical model
was accurate to the current design. In addition, it was sometimes
very difficult to clearly model the relationship of the components by
reviewing schematics intended for _anufacturlng usage (such as airing
sch_atics or packaging drawlnss).
To eliminate the problems discussed above and to ensure that
the proper configuration was used by all groups for design analysis
and operational predictions, an accurate set of functional schematics
was essential. This type of drying facilitated the understanding
of the operation of a complex campenent of t_e power system. The
execution of ccamands was easily traced and the interaction of one
component with another was more easily visualized than through block
die&rms or wiring diagrama.
The functional schmatic presented all circuitry to a level of
detail sufficient to explain the interaction b6tween all _Jor compe-
nenta in the EPS. The component nomenclature, reference designators
and bus identification was consistent with that used in other progrm
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documentation. Individual piece parts were shown when required for
clarity (such as, blocking diodes). Additionally, all EPS controls,
monitoring, and swltchln8 capability were depicted. These included
relays, motor driven switches, toggle swi.ches and circuit breakers.
(7) Flight Tools. The analytical "9ols used during
the mission were identical _o those used premlsslon except for the
followlng:
Electrical Power System Telemetry Evaluation
(EPSTE) Computer Program,
EPS Engineering _ata Package.
(a) EP_TE. This computer program was developed
for analysis of telemetry data supplled on magnetic tape by MSFC.
Its main purpose was to supply updated parameters for use by the
SEPSA computer program. Such parameters Included charger and regu-
lator efflclencles, battery voltage and current profiles, etc. The
program was used as an adjunct to manual data analysls in providing
the necessary update of premlsslon electrlcal parameters.
(b) EPS Engineering Data Package (40M35744). The
EPS Engineering Data Package was intended to f_,_ a general data base
for use in analysis o_ the Skylab Electric Power System during mission
support activities. The data provided was parametric and time vary-
ing in nature and considered both the normal operating mode ard several
contingency cases. The par_et_c data was divided into six major
categories: Attltude-traJectory data, Solar Array Data, Battexy _ata,
Cluster Power Vistrlbutlon S_atem Information, Bus Power Capability
Analyses and Sta_Istlcal Loads Analysis.
These data were intended to be used for quick look ana]yses
and were updated and reissued prior to each manned mission.
b. Contingency Studies. Prior to the SL-I mission, several
studies wer_ performed to analy_e system or compo_,ent malfunctlon_
which would drastically effect the plenned mission hut which would not
necessarily abort _he mission. These malfunctions "ere termed contln-
sencv operstln_ modes. The major specific studies were:
Inability to deploy the OwS Solar Array,
Loss of AM Telemetry System,
Inability to deploy the Meteoroid Shield,
Failure to deploy the ATH,
31
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Inability to deploy the ATM Solar Arrays.
A short summary of the results of these analyses follows: __
(i) Inability to Deploy the OWS Solar Array.*
(a) Failure. OWS solar wing section(s) fail to
decinch and/or deploy.
(b) Program Impact.
Adequate electrical power is available to
support manned activation and a limited
laission. Power management plan required.
Degraded OWS thermal control and meteoroid
protection if meteoroid shield cannot be
deployed Both OWS ..... __ c^:_. .........
be deployed to allow shield deplo_ment.
Manual decinching and deplo}_ment of the
OWS solar arrays is not feasible.
(c) Resolution.
Limited mission can be performed based on
the degraded power capability. Power
management plan required.
(d) Procedures.
No crew action is possible to deploy solar
wings.
* NOTE: OWS Wing 2 was torn off following loss of the meteoroid ?
shield during early boost. Wing i was constrained in
partially deployed configuration by remnants of the i
meteoroid shield for the first 25 days of th__ mission.
This contingency analysis proved invaluable during the
ear|y mission days and with wing i deployed, a segment
of the anal_sis became standard operating procedure for
the remainder of the mission. _
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(2) Loss of AM Telemetry System.
(a) Failure. Loss of AM telemetry system; no real
or delayed time data,
(b) Program Impact. Loss of knowledge of airborne
system status except for onboard readouts.
(c) Resolution. Crew to monitor systems and relay :
available data to ground via real-tlme voice and television; tape re-
corders and film on earth return.
(d) Procedure.
: No repair capability. No crew procedures
possible.
Contingency action to be taken real-tlme.
(3) Inability to Deploy the Meteoroid Shield.
(a) Failure. Meteoroid shield fails to deploy.
(b) Program Impact.
Risk of meteoroid penetration is accept-
able.
OWS gas temperature will not remain within
crew comfort box at 0° and 60.5° beta
angles for -3 sigma conditions,
Experiments utilizing scientific airlocks
will be lost.
1
(c) Resolution. To maintain OWS within crew com-
fort box, divert power to OWS heaters by off-loadlng other system
loads.
(d) Procedures.
No crew procedures are required.
Contingency action to be taken real-tlme.
(4) Failure to Deploy the ATM.
i
I (a) Failure. ATM locked in launch position.
33
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(b) Program Impact.
APCS software change required.
Adequate electrical power is available for
docking _nd possible manual deployment.
Manual release and rotation of ATM is
functionally possible (involves crew hazard;
crew training).
(c) Resolution.
APCS software changes to maintain attitude
control.
Possible attitude reorientation; power
management.
CSM dock to MDA radial port; attempt manual
ATM release and rotation.
(d) Procedure.
Requires special tools to be taken up on
CSM.
There are feasible methods for manual re-
leasing and rotating the ATM to the de-
ployed position.
(5) Inability to Deploy the ATM Solar Arrays.
(a) Failure. ATM solar wlng(s) fall to declnch
and/or deploy.
(b) Program Impact.
Adequate power is available to permit ini-
tial crew activation and manual solar wing
deployment. Power management plan required.
Degradation of ATM command and telemetry
capability.
Manual declnchtng and deployment of one or
more solar wings is required. Provision
is being made to obtain special tools re-
qulred to declnch wing,
34
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Near normal experiment objectives can be
achieved during the first 14 days with the
.J.
following limitations:
_ Attitude control is by 2-CMG control only.
Deactivated rate gyros are activated for
:: ATH fine pointing only. ::
The vehicle cannot achieve Z-LV. There-
fore, Z-LV EREP is not possible, i.e., SI
EPJgPonly. All biomedlcal, ATH and Corol-
lary experiments can be accomplished.
After the C.q.Hfuel cells have been depleted, no mission is
possible unless critical systems are severely degraded or offloading
is available from the CSH. (Hay 14, 1973 Launch Date.)
?
An extended mission beyond 14 days with
no CSH offloading is possible if the launch
date of SL-2 is delayed 20 days (from
Hay 14, 1973) to provide maximum solar
array power during the second half of the
mission.
:" (c) Resolution.
Hanually deploy solar wlng(s) via EVA.
If deploy_ment c;mnot be ;iccomplished, a
power management plan will be required.
(d) Procedure. Hethod for m,lnuallv dectnching ;rod
deploying A'rH solar wing has been developed.
c. Flight Readiness Reviews. A series of module Flight
Readiness Reviews (FRRs) were held after the DCR review was complete. _
l'hesemodule FRRs assessed that readiness of each module to support (
the total Skylab mission. Both the AH and the A fH electrical power
systems were determined to be ready to support the mission. There
were no open items against either the AH or ATH power systems.
The Cluster FRR was held in April 1973. The Skylab electrical
power system presentation revealed that some testing was in profess.
CBRH life testing, to w rify the relocation of the third electrode°
was in process and was completed in June 1973. Additional testing was
on schedule. The presentation showed that there were no open problems
from module FRRs.
;
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The Skylab power system was certified ready to support the
Skylab mission and to meet all design and performance requirements.
A status of the Skylab system wns presented at the SL-3 FRR,
early in July 1973. Degradation of the system capability from the
premission predictions was noted. The major source of the degrada-
tion was the loss of one-half of the AM power generation system capa-
bility due to the loss of the solar array wing. The major source of
degr3dation in the ATM power system resulted from the loss of one
CBRM due to a regulator failure. These configuration changes were
noted and revised power system capability predictions for SL-3 were
generated for presentation at the FRR, together with the revised
electrical load requirements for the mission.
The FRR power system presentations showed a wo[st case power
margin of 500 watts for the solar inertial flight mode. The Z-LV-E
flight mode showed a worst case power margin of minus 1200 watts and
therefore, power management was required for worst cast Z-LV-E passes.
A possible effloading, of 1500 watts was shown in the FRR presenta-
tion and Lherefore a positive power margin of 300 watts was possible
for _he worst case Z-LV-E passes identified. The Skylab power system
was 1:herefore verified ready to support the SL-3 mission.
A similar FRR was held in October 1973 prior to launch of the
third and last manned Skylab Mission. The loss of one additional
CBRM during the SL-3 mission was noted leaving a total of sixteen
active CBRMs. A plan was presented to recover the equivalent of one
CBRM during the SL-4 EVA by interconnection of CBRM 3 and CBRM 5.
An additional loss of CBRM capability was reported due to low CBRM
battery capacity detected during inflight battery capacity tests.
Due so this low capacity of a limit of 9 ampere hours DOD was imposed
on t'_e CBRMs. The loss of TV Bus 2 due to a short was revealed. The
short drew 500 amps for 2.5 seconds but operation was continued from
TV Bu_ I.
The FRR power system presentation showed a worst case power
margin of 200 watts in the solar inertial mode. The maximum battery
DOD during a 120 degree Z-LV-E pass centered at noon with a AM Reg
Bus OCV of 29,4 was increased to 54 percent for AM and 22 percent for
ATM. With these changes, the Skylab power system would have the abi-
lity to support the SL-4 mission and was verified ready to support
the mission.
36
1974022202-060
d. Skylab Caution and Warning System. The finalized re-
quirements for the C&W System are defined in the Cluster Requirement
Specification, RSOO3MO0003, Appendix H. A summary of these require-
ments is presented below.
(I) Caution and Warning System Purpose. The C&W System
for the cluster (CSM docked to SWS) was required to monitor the per-
formance of itself (voltage only) and other selected systems parameters,
and alert the crew to imminent hazards or out-of-limit conditions which
could result in jeopardizing the crew, compromising primary mission
objectives, or if not responded to in time could result in loss of a
sy_;tem. Parameters monitored by the C&W System were to be categorized
as either EMERGENCY, WARNING, or CAUTION. When any of the parameters
reached the predetermined out-of-tolerance level appropriate visual
and acoustical signals were to be activated.
(2) Caution and Warning Subsystems Each vehicle (SWS
or CSM) C&W System was to consist of the following:
(a) Emergency Subsystem. The emergency subsystem
was tu alert the crew to defined emergency conditions which could re-
sult in crew injury or threat to life and required immediate correc-
tive action, including predetermined crew response. The emergency sub-
system was to alezt the crew by triggering an acoustical alarm sys-
tem within the vehicle atmosphere and by providing typical warning
category outputs. The _mergency subsystem was to be DC isolated from
the caution and warning subsystem.
(b) Caution and Warning Subsystem. The caution
and warning subsystem was to alert the crew to defined caution or
warning out-of-tolerance conditions. All outputs of the caution and
warning subsystem were to be displayed on the caution and warning
system panel(s) and were to generate the appropriate caution or warn-
ing tone for routing to the crewman earphones 3nd speaker intercom
assemblies (SIA's). The caution or warning conditions were defined
as follows:
Caution. Any out-of-limit condition or
malfunction of a cluster system that could result in not meeting pri-
mary mission objectives or could result in loss of a clusr.r system
if not responded to in time, Crew action was required a!.._ough not
immediately,
Warning, Any existing or impending con-
d_t£on or malfunction of a cluster system that would adversely affect
crew safety or compromise primary mission objectives. Immediate action
by the crew was required,
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3. Testing.
a. Pre-Mission. Testing of the Skylab EPS was conducted
at the component, b]ack box, system, subsystem, and flight vehicle
: levels. The objective of the test program was to assure that the
flight vehicle EPS could meet all the Skylab requirements with a high
level of confidence. The testing was divided into three categories;
qualification, development and confidence, and fllght vehicle. The
chronology of these tests is summarized on the history chart of Figure
3.1. Details of each test are given in other program test reports.
Qualification testing was performed on all individual components and
functional units which were to comprise the Skylab EPS. Qualification
testing on representative EPS hardware is illustrated in Table 3.1.
Qualification testing was performed on all components compris-
ing the ATH Electrical Power System, Table 3.11. In some cases, an
assembly was qualified by similarity to another assembly. As an
example, the measuring distributors were all baslcally the same item;
therefore, the complete series of tests was conduzted on only one
distributor and the remainder were qualified by similarity.
Due to the mission essential nature of the solar cell modules,
CB_Ms, and PCGs, llfe tests were run to determine their probable char-
acteristics of performance over the lifetime of the mission. As built
solar cell module thermal aycllng llfe testing of approximately 4000
cycles was performed at MSFC.
The ATM solar array utilized designs by two separate contrac-
tors, so modules from each were tested. During life testing of the
solar cell modules, the output power degraded more than predicted.
Six CBRMs were submitted to an elght-month simulated mission
in a thermal vacuum environment. All parameters were controlled to
within the mission predicted range. During the storage mode, after
the simulated one-half mission, two battery failures occurred. The
failures were traced to shorted cells that evidently resulted from
non-uniform pLessure on the cell plates in the third electrode area.
The cell design was modified to relocate the third electrode. The test
was completed wlch new cells without the third electrode relocation
incorporated. Subsequent life testing with flight configured cells
in the battery completed over 4000 cycle% at launch without cell
failures.
Significant development and confidence testing, Table 3.111,
was necessary prior to committing the hardware to system level test-
inz and finally to assure flight readiness. The final EPS testing
was on the flight vehicle. This primarily verified the compatibility
of the EPS with all other systems, and verified the flight worthiness
of the actual flight system. ATM tests verified design feasibility.
Many ATH network components were Saturn qualified parts and uhu_ im-
posed testing was minimal. The progression of the AM EPS through the
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Space System Testing (SST) is sho_ by Figure 3.2. These are the
major tests, changes, end retests which verified that the AM EPS
design met all requirements _nd that the EPS hardware was ready for
flight. The procedures for the SST and the test results are detailed
in the various Service Engineering Data Reports (SEDRs) referenced.
Simulated flight Lefts, SEOR _3-E75-I, Volume II, demonstrated
both the operational and the electromagnetic compatibility between the
AM/MDA supporting systems and the earth resources experiment package
(EREP).
Table 3-1V sum_rlzes the significant EPS problems, which oc-
curred during SST. Thls table also sun_marlzes the solutlon/actlon
which was taken to overcome each problem, and it references the appro-
priate associated docu_.,entation.
The ATM module (systems) tests were conducted on the integrated
ATM module. Included in the systems qualification and acceptance
testing of the ATM were svecific procedures to determine the compliance
of the Electrical v_j' _ystem w_;, the design and interface require-
ments.
Bus resista_ce _nd single point ground checks were run to verify
that: the positive b_¢s were isolated with and without the ESE and
C&D Panel connected t_e common bus potential was above the vehicle
skin prior to connection of the ESE and C&D Panel and was electrically
connected to the vehicle skin when the ESE was connected.
Power distribution and control tests were conducted to verify
the control of power by the C&D Panel, switch selector, and ESE, in-
cluding the veriftcs_ion of redundant control lines; the distribution
of DC power by monitdring for correct voltage and polarity at the black
box before being concocted; and the distribution of AC power by moni-
toring for correct voltage and phase rotation at the black box inter-
face without the black box being connected.
The control and display circuits associated with the Electrical
Power System, CBRM control, and regulation, were exercised to verify
the commands to and response fro_ the CBRMs, the C&D Panel, and ESE;
the TM signals from the CBRMs; the CBP_! power sharing capabilities;
and to verify operations during simulated orbit cycles of 58 minutes
of day and 36 minutes of night.
i Full ATM power up/down was accomplished to verify that the ESE
w_s ready to support testing; to power up the AI_! to a level where the
39
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t.'PS and TM systems were ready to support testing; and to power down
the A_t and ESE.
A networks system checkout was conducted to verify [he func-
tionq of the EBW firing units and associated circuitry; the r,peration
of the EVA lighting systems; the operation of the subsystem blanket
heaters: the switch selector inMbit circuitry; and the watt-hour
assembly operation. Telemetry signals associated with the AX_I EPS were
also verified.
The thermal performance of the A_I prototype unit under a sim-
ulated space environment was evaiuated. The results of the qualifi-
cati,.n testing on the Electrical Power System were acceptable.
one of the major objectives of the systems qualification was
to identify problems in the A_I Prototype Unit that could affect the
ATM Flight Unit. Qualification testing provided the opportunity to
correct these problems prior to the acceptance testing of the ATM
Flight Unit.
Systems acceptance testing of the AT:IFlight Unit consisted of
the same series of tests as the systems qualification testing of the
AT?.IPrototype Unit. The systems acceptance tests were designed to
verify that the AI)[ Flight Unit met the full mission specification
requirements for the ATH program.
Sunlight tests were performed on solar cell modules and solar
array panels to calibrate the as-built performance. No significant
problems were encountered in these tests.
Solar cell temperature coefficient tests were performed to
determine the temperature coefficients over the expected mission
temperature range. No slguificant problems were encountered during
this test series.
A recap of the most significant problems identified in the
subsystem tests are shown in Table 3-V.
Further testing at the launch sites verified the status of
both systems through launch. Figure 3.3 summarizes the AI2,Itest flow
at the launch slte.
b. Mission (ground). During the mission conditions oc-
curred which required ground testing wlth the SCPS to verify analytical
results. These are summarized in Table 3-VI.
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TEST TES'i
COMPONE yr PROC/SPEC RE PORT
SOLAR CELL MODULE 50M26423 40M26452 J
40M26410
40M26411
CBP_I 40M26709A 40M26993
40M26200
_L_S'I'ER _ASURING 40M26269A 40M26268
SUPPLY
40M2627 l
POWER SUPPLY 40M26662B 40M26619
40M26580
POWER TRANSFER 40M39601 40M39608
DISTRIBUTOR 50MO2408D
40M37 380
I_L_IN POE_ER 40M39599 40M39606
DISTRIBUTOR 50M02408C 40M39629
40M37381
AUXILIARY POWER 4OM39600 40H39607
DISTRIBU i'OR 50M02408D 40M39629
40M37382
CONTROL DISTRIBIYrORS 40M39597 40M39604
40M37383 50M02408C 40M39629
40M37384
40M37387
40M37388
40M37393
40M37394
CO,_I'ROL_,DISPLAY 40M3961_ ......
LOGIC DISTRIBUTOR
40M37390
_ASURIXG DISTRIBUTORS 40M39598 40M39605
40M37385 50M02408C 40M39629
40M37386
4JM37389
, Table 3,11 Qualification Test Summary for ATM Components
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TEST TEST
COMPONENT PROC/SPEC REPORT
J-BOX ASSEMBLIES 40M39613 40M39615
40M33680 5OM02408C
40M33681
40M33691
SWITCH SELECTOR 40M51488
MOD-II
50M67864-7 50M02408C
WATT-HOUR ASSEMBLY 40M39620 40M39621
40M37998 50MO2408D 40M39628
EBW FIRING UNIT 40M39566 40M51487
40M39515 50M02408C 40M39056
EVA LIGHTS DELTA QUAL
40M51269 TEST REPORT
SEPTEMBER 197 l
TRANSIENT FILTER 40M38570 40M39631
ASSEMBLY 50MO2408D
40M38547-1
MOTOR TRANSIENT 40M38704 ......
SUPPRESSOR 50M02408D
40M38697
CABLES CABLES WERE ASSEbIBLED FROM A QUALI-
FIED PARTS LIST. THE END ITEM
RECEIVED CONTINUITY TEST, INSULATION
RESISTANCE TEST AND QUALITY INSPECTION.
Table 3.11 Qualification Test Summary for ATM Components.(cont.)
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c. Skylab Caution and Warning System. Verification of _| ,the Caution and Warning System design requirements was successfully _
_ completed during the course of the testing program. The testing •
_ phase on the flight hardware employed a comprehensive program of -_
_ tests. These tests began at .he component level, in-house and at
_ vendor facilities, and co._ :d through module interface, systems,
systems interface#and systems ._tegration testing. Completion of the
_ testing program was accomplished at the launch site.
(i) Contractor Tests. A large part of the system
consisted of various types of sensors supplied by outside vendors
who were required to verify conformance to the contractor component
Specification Control Drawings (SCD). All sensors were required to
pass in-house PIA tests as documented in SEDR D3-20, the Preinstalla-
tion Acceptance Tests for the Instrumentation System.
Contractor manufactured equipment was also tested per SEDR D3-20.
This equipment included the C&W instrumentation packages and the slg-
nal conditioner co'_verters. The individual printed circuit card assem-
blies were testing prior to installation in the instrumentation pack-
ages. PIA tests on the C&W unit and high level audio amplifier were
performed at the manufacturing facility. Other assemblies such as the
parameter display panel, switch and circuit breaker panels, and
associated wire bundles were subjected to manufacturing mechanicalt
and electrical checks and inspections prior to integrated system
level testing. The system level test flow utilized to
verify the performance of the C&W System is shown in Figure 3.4.
During systems evaluation testing, SEDR D3-N70, C&W System
input/output signal handling, sensor trip point levels, and
compatibility with other systems (i.e., audio, TM, ECS, EPS, DCS,
and coolant) were verified. C&W interface parameters were checked !
during the systems assurance test, SEDR D3-E72. This test also
verified AM/MDA C&W functions end-to-end and supported all AM/MDA
systems in an EMC check. AM/MDA C&Winterfaces were rechecked per
SEDR D3-E76, after installation of MDA equipment that arrived late.
Simuk ted flight test, SEDR D3-E75, Volume i, permitted activation,
monitoring, and power down of the C&W System in the manner planned
for the mission. Further EMC checks were supported by the C&i4
System as a part of this test. During the altitude chamber test,
•_ SEDR D3-E73, the C&WSystem was checked for proper responses to
simulator inputs during an unmanned run, and functionally checked for
visual and audio indications at simulated altitude by the flight
crew. Prior to shipment, the nEP was reinstalled, and manned
orbital mode and EMC tests were repeated as a part of an abbreviated
simulated flight, SEDR D3-E75, Volume If.
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_ (2) Problems end Solutions. Teetin_ of the C&W
System identified the follo_inR discrepancies:
(a) Alarm Tone Variations in Frequency end
Quality. The caution and warning alarm tone quality varied, became
less clear, and changed in frequency during system validation.
Troubleshooting indicated an intermittent condition having the effect
of a short on the C_/_ System High Level Audio/unplifier No. 2 output.
The circuit was monitored during subsequent testing. During simulat-
ed flight the tone degradation reoccurred. The C_ System High Level
Audio Amplifier (S/N 100) was removed from the vehicle. A functional
test was then performed which verified that the system No. 2 output
was defective. Unit S/N 101 was subjected to the same functional
bench test, met ell requirements end was installed on the vehicle.
S/N 100 was found to contain resistors having incorrect values in-
stalled in the No. 2 subsection of the amplifier. All additional
units were verified to have the correct parts installed. The dis-
crepant parts in S/N 100 were causing intermittent operation of the
short circuit protection circuitry which resulted in the changes in
tone amplitude and frequency.
= (b) Erratic Gas Flowmeter T/N Parameter.
During sy3tem validation, gas flow sensor parameters F205, F209, F210 &
F211 had erratic outputs end indicated below normel flow rates. In-
vestigation of this condition indlceted that the flowmeters had
improper shielding. In addition, the OWS gas interchange sensor
(Parameter F20§) was improperly located in the duct. The RF type
shielding was changed to audio shie_dins on all four gas flow sensors
and the OWS gas interchange sensor was relocated. The C6W gas flow
trip points were also lowered to further reduce the probability of
false alarms.
(c) Unexpected Caution end Warning Power
Light. The parameter identification light illuminated when panel
_07 signal conditioner inhibit switch was placed to the enable posi-
tt_ during system validation. Laboratory tests found that e short
had developed between e component and ground on a printed circuit
card assembly. A new circuit card assembly was installed end system
reteeted.
(d) Primary Coolant Low Temperature Below
, Specification. During system assurance. C&W System temperature
: parameter trip points were below specifications on the primary
coolant low parameter and on the EVA 1 and IVA 2 inlet temperature
low parameters. The CW instrumentation package trip points were
found to be ]owerod by the presence of 2 to 4 Hlts noise observed
: between vehicle structure and Lhe DCreturns from the DC-DC
"_ 79
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!:r converters to the instrumentation packages. The problem was success-
fully resolved by the addition of jumper plugs to both C6_ signal
conditioner (instrumentation) packages. The Jumper plugs contained _"
capacitors installed between the pins connected to structure and the
DC power returns. These capacitors shorted the conducted noise. !.
(e) Noise Perturbations on MDA Temperature
Parameters. Various MDA temperature parameters experienced up to
15 counts of noise at random intervals on the T/14 outputs during
altitude chamber tests. Testing revealed the C&W unit internal DC-
: DC converters were generating the noise due to their electronic +
switching action. The noise was coupled into the MDA temperature
:r parameter T/M lines in the vehicle wire bundles. Capacitors install-
ed between the C&W telemetry output signal return lines and chassis
ground and between the C&W telemetry output signal return lines and
'_ chassis ground and between the C_ subunits signal ground and chassis
• significantly reduced the noise coupled into the MDA temperature
parameters. Modifications were performed on all C&W units to incorpo-
rate the internal capacitors, iI:
L
(f) No Secondary Coolant Flow Alarm. A C&W
System alarm did not occur when the secondary coolant pump A switch
was placed to on during altitude chamber tests. The problem was
isolated to a reed switch failure. The pump containing the defective
reed switch was removed and replaced.
(g) Two C&WSystem Alarms not Recallable from
Memory. During descent from altitude, two separate C&WSystem alarms
occurred which could not be recalled from memory to be identified.
Retest and troubleshooting at ambient altitude after the run _ould
not repeat the condition. Memory recall cicuitry functioned correct-
ly in all cases. During crew debriefing, it was stated that follow-
lug the first alarm the memory clear switch had been inadvertently
_ actuated prior to attempting memory recall. The crew believed the
memory recall sequence was performed correctly after the second alarm;
• 'loweverj the parameter identification light did not illuminate. Since "
the problem could not be repeated it was categorized as an unknown
condition. The problem never reoccurred during subsequent testing.
(h) Rapid Delta P Alarms from RFI. The rapid
delta P C&Walarm triggered at various times during simulated flight
_4C tests. It was found that the rapid delta P sensors w_re suscepti-
ble to low frequency variations in RF field strength of VI_ trans-
mitters. False alarms occurred as a result of the sensor detecting
the RF variations induced on the sensor leads. Problem resolution
was accomplished by installing new wire bundles, which incorporated
P,F filtering and shielding, between the sensors and vehicle pressure
bulkhead.
8O
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/• (i) Secondary Coolant temperature Low Alarm.
A secondary coolant temperature low alarm occurred during slmulated
flight, Vol. II. The sensor was found to have s low resistance short
to structure. The defective sensor was removed and replaced.
(J) Lack of EVA No. 2 Pump Delta P Alarm.
EVA No. 2 pump delta P C&Walarm did not occur with zero pressure on
SUS loop No. 2. The problem was determined to be a defective sensor
: which was remaining open. The sensor was removed and replaced.
(3) Launch Slte Testing. Launch site test require-
ments for the CW System are defined in Report NDC E0122, Test and
Checkout Requirements Specifications and Criteria for use st KSC, and
by the Skylab Zntegrsted System Test Checkout Requirements and Specifi-
cations, Document No. TM012-OO3-2H. Tests per these requirements
i were successfully accomplished during the system level and integrated
: testing performed st KSC.
; One significant C&[_ System problem occurred during KSC testing.
During the AM/ldDA/CSM interface test, an inadvertent rapid delta P
alarm could not be correlated with vehicle activity. The new wire
bundles, mentioned in paragraph (h) above, had been installed. Duplica-
tion of the problem was attempted at St. Louis. Test results con-
firmed that the alarm occurred due to fluctuations thet existed in the
rgte output section of the delta P sensor. The erroneous rate output
was found tO be a £unction of internal interference in the sensor re- i
suiting from the effect of two harmonics heterodynin8. The transducer
oscillator and the DC-DC converter oscillator, both internal to the i
sensor, were generating the harmonics. The sensors were modified to
synchronize the DC-DC converter oscillators. In addition, filter
capacitors were added between the +28 VDCreturn and signal return to
chassis, and a zener diode wee installed between the 428 VDC input
lines to prevent transients on the sensor voltage regulator inputs.
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J4. Destsn _kMlficatione
Duttns the course of desigu, analysis, end test sceivttieo_
: for cheroots, batteries, voltase regulators, solar arrays, and distri-
bution, several hardware modifications were imposed. Table 4-X susmarises
those considered sisnificant to the success of the flisht hsrdwre
operations.
Although the basic battery type gas selected because of s
8sod flisht history and expected uintz_n development risk, nodLftcstions
becone necessary for the reasons indicated on the table.
Zn addition to the listed uodtficattons, one design devts-
! alan yes sranted for the A;4 EPS. That gas sKetnst the ZCD d_H35659-3 :
"AT_ Electrica! Xnterface." Zn this case, the 12 AW6 power feeders
between the At4 transfer bus and the A'I'14bus gore dssigued ucin8 _a-
t_Lsted vires. This violated the XCDuhtch celled for t_Asted pairs.
_ Since the coot and schedule impact of conforuinS to the XCDgas not
considered varramted by )ISFC, s request for deviation yes approved.
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5. F11ght System Description.
a. General. The Skylab Cluster required electrical power
for life support, housekeeping, experiment operation, instrumentation
and communications, and attitude control of the vehicle. This power
was used to operate, monitor, and control each subsystem.
The electrical energy was supplied by three complementary, in-
dependent, electrlcal power systems. This description Is llmited to
two of these, namely, the AM/OWSand the ATMelectrical power systems.
The CSM discussion is beyond the scope of chls report. Figure 5.1 il-
lustrates the cluster power sources end their general physical lots-
CIOflS.
All Skylab electrical energy was generated from sunlight by
photovoltalc solar cell arrays. These direct energy conversion devices
collected, and converted vlslble light Into electricity. Thls power
was conditioned, stored, and controlled. It was then distributed to
commands, indications, and at a nominal 28 Vdc, to all applied loads.
During sunlight conditions, the solar arrays supplied loads directly.
However, depending upon orbital Inclination angle (Beta), the cluster
experienced sunlight periods of various lengths durlng each orbit,
Figure 5.2. During these periods, the stored energy In each system's
" nickel cadmium batteries which maintained continuous power flow to all
loads during night periods, was replenished.
The power conditioning portion of each power system was com-
posed of a battery, battery charger, and voltage regulator. Appropriate
control switching for effective management of inputs to various buses
was provided on various instrument contxol end dlsplay panels through-
out the cluster or by ground control through either DAS for ATH or DCS
: for AH/OWS, Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.4 is s slmplifled block dlegrem of the cluster power
distribution and grounding arrangement. Interconnections between buses
; and module power sharing interfaces are indicated. Figure 5.5 end 5.6
are details of grounding and transfer bus portions of the overall dis-
gram. The two power systems, although independent in design, norm#lly
_ operated In parallel to permit power sharlns in either direction. Nhen
paralleled, the power system hevtng the highest bus voltage supplied
the majority of the tote1 cluster load. The AId/OWSEPS output voltage
was adjustable and thus was used to achieve the desired load sharing
for both EPSs. During each manned phase, the CSH remained independent
until fuel cell depletion, e period of about 20 days. After depletion,
the CSH received power from the paralleled power systems until undock-
ins. This occurred by way of • power cable (indicated In Figure 5.4)
between the CSH end the MDA. It was installed and removed by crew
action during ectlvsClon end deactivation activities, for each manned
phase.
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FLgure 5.3a CommandSystem used For Ground Control of _:: EPS (DCS)
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i The overall, parallel bus, power distribution system supplied
regulated DC power continuously and was controlled by appropriate
monitoring of specific parameters displayed by onboard instruments
and telemetered to the ground
Additional power distribution capability existed throughout
the cluster for portable equipment by way of utility power outlets.
The major components of each power system were: solar array
(flSAGs for AM/OWS, 18 panels for ATM); power condltioner/energy stor-
age (one for each solar array group); control and display panel assem-
blles; du,l bus distribution; relay panels; and two shunt regulators
for AM/OWS. The physical locations of the power conditioning equip-
ment of each subsystem are given in Figure 5.8. The AM/OWS shunt re-
gulators were mounted on the -Y axis under Truss Panel No. 1. Control
panel assemblies were located within each module and included onboard
controls, displays, circuit breakers (and other protective devices
associated with the respective system).
-' Tracking lights were required to provide each crew with a means
of visually locating the SWS during rendezvous at orbital night in
conjunction with the Apollo sextant, or with the Crew Optical Align_ent
Sight (COAS) as a close-range backup. The requirement for these lights
was created as a result of a vehicle redesign which eliminated four
acquisition lights originally installed on the OWS.
Four tracking lights, two primary and two secondary, were pro-
vided. Each light consisted of a flash head and an electronics unit.
The four flash heads were mounted on the AM deployment assembly, two
on each side of the MDA, near the SWS Y-axls (Figure 5.9a), and the
electronics units were mounted on Electronics Module #6. Each light
provided a 90° con_ of light centered on the SWS +X-axis, with a mini-
mum light intensity of I000 beam candle seconds. The lights flashed
at a rate of 50-65 flashes per minute, with a maximum flash duration of
0.3 millisecond. The primary lights were only synchronized with each
other, as were the two secondary lights.
The tracking lights selected were a modified version of the
Apollo Program lights. A number of changes were requlred to the lights
to produce the increased light intensity required for the Skylab pro-
gram. The higher light intensity requirements created _ertaln design
problems, such as operating in the corona susceptible region and meet-
Ing the requirements of the AM Electromagnetic Compatibility Control
Plan.
The operation of the lights also created a personnel eye damage
hazard which required specltlc operational constraints, such a_ shield-
ing the lights during test operations and turning them off ,_h_ the CSM
was in close proximity to the SWS. A block diagram of the tracking
lights is shown in Figure 5.9a. Control of the lights was normally
provided by the DCS; however, an onboard switch was available for crew
_ I06
L
1974022202-130
use. Automatic switchover circuitry provided the use of secondary
lights in the event of a malfunction in the primary lights. If the
secondary ligh=s were selected, this circuitry energized all remaining
lights in event of a secondary malfunction.
An alternate means of off control for the tracking lights was
provided by the electronic timer Tx function, to provide for termina-
tion of operation when the spacecraft was out of range of a tracking
station.
! The primary and secondary tracking lights were powered from
alternate buses. Each electronics unit required 180 watts maximum of |:
unregulated power and supplied 80 watts to the flash head. Docking '
lights were required to pzovide the CSM crews with orientation and
alignment information during final docking maneuvers.
Initially there were eight (8) docking lights, four mounted on
the FAS and four mounted on the MDA, Figure 5.9b. The lights were color
coded to aid the crew in orienting the CSM for final rendezvous and
docking maneuvers, Subsequently the discone antenna docking lights [_
were added which acted as visual locators for the crew so the antennas
could be avoided during fly around and docking maneuvers. The addi-
tional capability of powering the white AM docking light from the EVA
lighting system existed. I"
ix
Although the lights were normally controlled via the DCS, an
onboard switch provided the capability for crew control in the event
of an EVA or a CSM rescue mission. AM busses 1 and 2 each powered half
of the docking lights. The individual lights were not redundant since
the loss of several lights would not Jeopardize docking.
For purposes of clarity _nd organization, this section separates
detailed discussion of Power Distribution from that of power generation.
In addition, those d_c_Issions will bc separated into AM/OWS and ATM. i
b. Power Generation.
(I)AM/OWS.
(a) Solar Array. The Solar Array Subsystem (SAS)
consisted of two (2) wings, each having a beam fairing and three (3)
wing sections. Each wing section contained ten (I0) identical active
solar panels for a total of 30 panels per wing or 60 panels per system.
Two additional panels were included in each wing section to provide
spacing between active panels and the beam f_ring; one a truss panel
vn_ the other a "dummy" panel. A typical SA_ wing assembly and loca-
tion is shown in Figure 5.10a.
Figares 5.10 and 5.11 detail the assembly of solar cell modules.
The overall phyalcal description is summarized in Table 5.I. The four
107
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• _ PARAMETER VALUE
ARRAY
SIZE - 9.4 m2 (372 inches long, 328 inches wide)
(per wing)
WEIGHT - 1840 kg (4,056 pounds) (including deployment
and stowage structures)
. PANELS - 30 per wing
MODULES - 240 total
SOLAR CELLS - 147,840 total
SOLAR PANEL
SIZE - 6.5 m (27.13 inches wide),
3 m (120.70 inches long)
WEIGHT - 28 pounds
i MODULES - 4 per panel
SERIES CELLS - 154 per module
PARALLEL SERIES - 4 per module
STRINGS
TOTAL CELLS - 2,464 each
SUBSTRATE - Aluminum Facesheet/Aluminum Honeycomb
i DIELECTRIC - Perforated 0.O02-iuch Kapton
INSULATION
SOLAR CELL GROUP
TYPE - Overlapped
CELLS PER GROUP - Ii series
CELL INTERCONNECTOR - .025 mm (0.001 inch Kovar) (S61der Plated)
GROUP INTERCONNECTOR - .075 mm (0.003 inch Kovar) (Solder Plated)
CELL TO SUBSTRATE - RTV 3145
ADHESIVE
SOLAR CELL
TYPE - N/P
SIZE - 2x4 cm (0.014 inch thick)
EFFICIENCY - AMO, 28"C-II.I percent Average Bare, New
BASE RESISTIVITY - 2 ohm-cm
CELL CONTACT - AgTi Machlne-Pressed Fully Solder
Covered Contacts
Table 5.1 Physical Characteristics of OWS Solar Array
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(4) strings indicated were connected electrically in paratlel at the
module output terminals.
The electrical power was ro_ted from each solar cell module
through stabilizer beam channels on the backside of each wing section,
inside the beam fairing, and then into the forward skirt of the OWS.
Inside the forward skirt, solar module power entered the Power Unit
which provided diode isolation and busing into eight (8) groups of
15 modules each. Power was then routed from the Power Unit to the
AM/OWS interface. The eight (8) 15 module groups from each wing were
paired to make eight (8) Solar Array Groups (SAGs) of 30 modules each.
Each of the eight (8_ groups in turn was connected to one of the AM
Power Conditioning Groups (PCGs) to form the AM/OWS Electrical Power
: System. The AM included provisions for applying the output of each
SAG to an alternate PCG. Figure 5.12 illustrates a typical SAG/PCG
interface.
Solar arra¥ temperature was determined by 20 temperature trans-
ducers, ten (i0) on each wing. Transducer locations were defined based
upon predicted temperature profiles for each wing.
SAS deployment occurred in two phases, beam fairing deployment,
and wing section deployment. Each phase utilized redundant (primary
and backup) exploding bridgewire (EBW) firing systems consisting of
EBW detonators and EBW firing units.
The firing unit (FU) for the primary system received commands
from the Instrument Unit (IU) through the OWS switch selector. After
the AM deploy buses were commanded On through the IU automatic sequence,
the deployment sequence was initiated by the IU automatic sequenced
command SAS Fairing EBW FU No. 2 C_RGE. This command applied 28 Vdc
Deploy Bus 2 power to charge EBW FU 2. Five seconds later, the SAS
Fairing EBW FU No. 2 FIRE command was sent, triggering FU 2 and de-
tonating the CDF of the primary ordnance system.
Beam fairing fully deployed indications performed a switch in-
terlock function preventing the wing sections from being deployed prior
to beam fairing full deployment. Commands to deploy wing sections were
enabled by these switches. The same switches were also interlocked
with the automatically sequenced IU commands to deploy the OWS Meteo-
roid Shield.
Wing Section deployment was to be initiated upon completion of
beam fairing deployment. SAS Wing Section EBW FU No. 2 CHARGE was sent
by the IU. The command closed relay contacts that apply DEPLO_ BUS 2
POWER to charge the EBW FU 2. Five seconds later, provided the fairing
deployment interlock was closed, the trigger command, SAS Wing Sections
EBW FU No. 2 FIRE was issued. This detonated the SAS wing section
deployment ordnance.
7
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Beam fairing and wing section deployment backup commands were
transmitted by way of the AM Digital Command System (DCS). The backup
deplo_nnent system which were independent of the beam fairing deployed --
interlock switches, and were powered from DEPLOY BUS i.
(b) Power Conditioning Groups. A total of eight
power conditioning groups were required to efficiently utilize the
total energy received from the solar array. _he number of PCGs also
provided redundancy to meet mission reliability requirements. A typi-
cal PCG circuit configuration, including controls and instrumentation,
is shown in Figure 5.13. The control functions are discussed as they
relate to the operation of the major PCG components; the battery,
battery charger, and voltage regulator. The PCG equipments interfacing
with the OWS solar array were designed to operate compatibly with the
solar ar=ay group design characteristics. The following paragraphs
describes the characteristics of major items of hardware as shown in :
Figure 5,14.
! Battery Charger. A reference summary of
the physical and performance characteristics of a battery charger is
given in Table 5.11 and Figure 5.15. Each battery charger conditioned
the power obtained from an associated so]ar array group, controlled the
charging of ira associated nickel-cadmium battery, and fed solar array
conditioned power or battery power to its associated voltage regulator
to satisfy system load requirements. The battery charger was designed
to condition a maximum instantaneous and a maximum continuous output
power of 2300 and 1500 watts, respective]y.
The acceptable AH/OWS interface voltage range for battery char-
ger operation was from 125 volts maximum at open circuit to 51 volts
minimum at the peak power point of the solar array group V-I charac-
teristics.
The battery charger consisted functionally of three major cir-
¢
cults; the switching regulator clrciut, the peak power tracker circuit,
and the ampere-hour meter circuit. The switching regulator was the
actual power conversion circuit which conditioned the solar array paw-
• er and provided the regulated output. The peak power tracker restricted
the load demand on the solar array group to the peak power availaEle
: from the group. The ampere-hour meter controlled the charging modes
for the battery.
! Peak Power Tracker - The function of the peak power tracker
! circuit was to automatically adjust the battery charger output voltage
; such that the power demand on the associated solar array group was
I limited _o its available peak power. Without the peak power tracker,
a ].oad demand in of the available peak would sharp
excess power cause a
I drop in the solar array output voltage and, therefore, a sharp drop In _
its output power. Under limiting conditions, it caused operation at
or within 5% of the solar array peak power point. Redundant, active,
: i
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PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
! Size: Maximum Envelope Dimensions, 7.25"xlO"xll.55".
Weight : 27 ibs (maximum)
! Connectors :
Cooling: Coldplate mounting provides active cooling
PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
Input Characteristics
Maximum Voltage: 125VDC
: Turn On Voltage: =64 VDC
Turn Off Voltage: =51 VDC at AM/OWS Interface
Maximum Power: 2580 watts !
Output Characteristics
Maximum Voltage: 53 VDC
Voltage Control Signals: Battery Temperature, Battery SOC,
Load Demand, and Manual and DCS
: Control Commands.
Maximum Instantaneous Power: 2300 watts
Max_m_,m Continuous Power: 1500 watts
Battery ChaKger _osses
Losses do not exceed the following:
Battery Supplying Array Supplying
Total Power Total Power
No Load Losses* 1.7 watts 23 _tts (maximum)
Full Load Losses* 1.7 watts 212 watts (maximum)
* Ampere Hour Meter losses are not included but they shall
not exceed 3.4 watts total. <
: Table 5.11 Battery Charger Physical end Performance Characteristics
Summary
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peak power tracker circuits were provided in each battery charger for
improved system reliability. '_
In addition, the peak power tracker circuit was designed such
that any failure within the circuits affected only its peak power
tracking function and did not affect any other function of the battery
charger.
Ampere-Hour Meter - The function of the ampere-hour meter cir-
cuit was to continuously compute the state-of-charge (SOC) of the asso-
, ciated battery and to provide charge control signals based on the com-
i puted SOC. This was accomplished by monitoring the battery discharge
in ampere-hours during dark periods and the battery recharge in ampere-
hours (including the return factor) during daylight periods. The bat-
tery status at any tlme was then computed in % SOC based on starting
at 100% with a fully charged battery. The 100% SOC was based on a
battery capacity of 33 ampere-hours. The primary control signal,
generated when the computed SOC reached 100%, terminated the voltage
limited charge mode and initiated the current limited charge mode.
An analog signal indicating the computed SOC was also generated in the
ampere-hour meter for telemetry and display usage. Two identical
ampere-hour meter circuits were provided in each battery charger, as
shown in Figure 5.16. Both of these circuits computed the battery SOC
at all times and provided a continuous analog signal indicating com-
puted battery SOC for telemetry and display. However, only one of
these circuits provided battery charge control signals at any one time.
Selection of either the primary or secondary circuit for control pur-
poses was made by a DCS command or by a crew manual switch.
The current flowing from the battery during discharge cycles
i and to the battery during charge cycles was integrated with respect
to time by the ampere-hour meter to determine changes in the battery
state-of-charge. Temperature compensation was provided during charge
cycles to account for the Inter-relationshlp between charging effi-
: ciency and battery temperature. Three thermistors in the associated
battery provided temperature sense signals to the compensating network
of the ampere-hoar meter. The ampere-hour meter then varied the
ratio of the ampere hours delivered to the battery during charge to
the ampere hours removed from the battery during discharge based on
battery temperature during charging. The "return factor" was auto-
matically varied as the battery temperature changed. The battery
was considered fully recharged when the ampere hours delivered to the
battery were equal to the ampere hours removed multiplied by the
"return factor." At that polnr, the ampere-hour meter output indi-
cated a battery SOC of I00%. During system operation, the battery
was alternately charged and discharged. Since it was not necessarily
completely discharged or fully recharged during any one charge/dis-
charge cycle, the ampere-hour meter was designed to be capable of
reversing its mode of measurement any number of times without losing
its memory of the battery SOC. The ampere-hour meter provided several
/
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Tcontrol signals which were generated by specific SOC values. When the
ampere-hour meter computed that the battery was fully charged or at
the 100% SOC value, a signal was provided to the battery charger re-
gulator circuit to cause operation in the constant current battery
charging mode rather than the voltage limited battery charging mode -_
used at computed SOC values less than 100%. When the computed battery
SOC value dropped to 30%, a signal was provided to the associated
voltage regulator which caused the voltage regulator to red,ice its
output voltage by approximately two volts. This effectivel) removed
all load from the PCG and permitted all available power from the asso-
ciated solar array group to be utilized for the recharging of the
battery. The initiating control signal could be inhibited by a DCS
command or by astronaut control. Subsequent recovery of the computed
battery SOC to 50% automatically removed this control signal and allowed
the voltage regulator to reLurn to its original voltage level of opera-
tion. Each ampere-hour meter circuit provided a 0 to 5 volt signal
equivalent to a computed 0 to 100% battery SOC. One du31 meter was
provided on the instrument panel to display computed battery SOCs.
The crew manually selected one of the eight sets of ampere-hour meter
circuit signals (primary and secondary) to be displayed on thls meter.
Thls was accomplished by means of an eight position, panel mounted,
rotary switch. All eight sets of computed SOC signals were contlnu-
ously available for telemetry usage.
Hardllne controls were provided to permit setting each ampere-
hour meter circuit to a 100% SOC value at any time during ground opera-
tions and particularly prior to launch. Interruption of power and the
subsequent reappllcatlon of power to the ampere-hour meter circuits In
a battery charger, reset the bidirectional counter circults_ their
memory was lost, and the SOC value went to 0%. Power was provided to
the ampcre-hour meter circuits of each battery charger from two sources,
the associated battery and the EPS control bus. To remove power, it
was necessary to intentlonally open both the associated "Ampere Hour
Integrator" and "Battery Control" circuit breakers.
Regulator - The battery charger regulator was a pulse width
modulated type voltage regulator where the regulated DC output voltage
was less than the unregulated DC input voltage. The regulator con-
sisted of an input filter and five individual power modules. A multi-
ple number of regulator modules were _sed for both increased system
reliability and for minimum parasitic losses at low load conditions
resulting in overall high efflcZency of operation.
The regulated DC output voltage of the battery charger was
controlled by various signals generated within the PCG to be computlble
vlth load, battery, and solar array requirements and characteristics.
Conditions which affected the charger output voltage include: battery
temperature, battery voltage, battery state-of-charge, solar array peak
power, load power, and the status of sppllcable EPS control elements.
The output voltage, depending on these conditions, varied from approxi-
mately 38.7 volts up to a maximum of 53 volts.
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A battery charging cycle could include three modes of battery
charger operation, a peak power tracking mode as explained above, a
voltage limited mode and a constant current mode. A charging cycle
would start with the battery SOC at some value less than 100% as com- __
puted by the AH meter. The battery charger would operate.in the peak
power tracking mode until the battery terminal voltage increased to
the temperature dependent voltage limit. The battery charger would
then operate in the voltage limited mode and provide an output voltage
determined by the battery temperature. The voltage in this mode varied
from nominal 42.8 volts to 48 volts. This voltage level provided for
a high initial rate of battery charging. The 4B volts, possible in
this mode, was the upper limit on the voltage applied to the battery
under any circumstances.
Nhen the battery SOC, as computed by the ampere-hour meter cir-
cuit, reached 100_,,the _npere-hour meter circuit provided a control
signal. In response to this signal_ the battery charger switched from
the voltage llmited mode to the constant current mode. In this mode
the current to the battery was sensed_and the regulator output voltage
was adjusted to maintain the battery charging current at 0.75 + 0.5
amps.
The battery charger would automatlcally modify the charging
cycle described above if certain operating conditions were violated.
If the battery terminal voltage dropped below 25 volts during voltage
llmlted mode charging, the battery charger would change to the con-
stant current mode. Battery charging in either mode was terminated_
and battery current was reduced to zero amps if the battery tempera-
ture exceeded a high temperature limit of approximately 120°F as meas-
ured by thermistors in the battery. A thermal switch in the battery
acted as a backup to the thermistors and provided the same results at
a maximum temperature of 125OF.
Several manual and DCS controls could be used to modify the
charging cycle. The Charge Mode Control (manual only) when set to
its temperature limited position inhibited the 1007 SOC signal. This
prevented the automatic changeover from the voltage limited mode to
the constant current mode when 100% SOC was reached. Battery charging
would then proceed in the voltage limited mode as long as the battery
temperature limit was not reached. The Charge Rate Control (manual or
DCS) when set to its low position restricted charging to the constant
current mode. This included overriding of the Charge Diode control.
The Charge Disable control (DCS only) when set tc its cutoff position
caused the battery charger to maintain the battery charging current at
zero amperes. The positive power c_nnectlon from the battery to the
battery charger could be opetted by posltlonln_ the battery switch
(manual or DCS) to its off position. This condition was sensed by the
: battery charger as a complete loss of the battery voltage signal. The
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battery charger voltage, then applied only to the voltage regulator,
was controlled at 52 + 1 volts for this condition.
The peak power tracker circuit of the battery charger, as pre-
vlously described, limited the load on the solar array to the peak
power available. The peak power tracker, in effect, controlled the
battery charger regulator to adjust its output voltage until the out-
put power corresponded to the peak power point value of the solar
array. This reduction in voltage did not effect the power supplied
to the system load because of the characteristics of the PCG voltage
regulator. It did, however, reduce the charging current to the bat-
tery and thereby reduced the total power output from the battery
charger to the value allowed by the available solar array input power.
There were four different operational conditions arising from
varying levels of available solar array power. The condition where
solar array power was sufficient to supply both the equipment load and
the battery load has previously been described. Under the condition
vhere the available power was sufficient to supply equipment loads,
the charger output voltage was reduced such that the equipment load
was satisfied and the remaining aval;able power was utilized for charg-
ing the battery. When the available array power was not sufficient to
supply the equipment load alone, the charger output voltage was reduced
further until the battery and battery charger in parallel could supply
the equipment load. When the solar array voltage became less than
approximately 51 volts at the AM/OWS interface, the battery charger
was switched off and equipment loads were totally supplied fr_u the
battery. The latter condition included the normal operation during
orbital dark periods.
Battery. The batteries were nlckel-cadmlum
batteries designed for active cooling. A reference summary of battery
physical and performance characteristics is given in Table 5-111 and
Hgure 5.17.
The function of the batteries was to furnish power to equipment
loads through the AM EPS voltage regulators during orbital dark periods
when there was no solar array power available.
The batteries were recharged whenever array power greater than
the bus load requirement was available. The charge potential applied
to the battery during the initial phase of recharging yes llmlted to
a level consistent vith malntalnln8 peak solar array power utilization.
This limitation was a function of the peak po_er circuitry within the
charger. The recharge potential necessary to maintain peak solar array
power utilization increased as the batteries approached cumpletlon of Z
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PHYSICAL CHAFACTERISTICS
Size: Maximum Envelope Dimensions, 7" x 8.25" x 27.25"
Container Material: Cast Aluminum
Power and Instr Connector: Mates with PTO6P-22-41P.
Cell Monitor Connector : Mates with PTO6P-18-32P.
Weight : 123 ibs _ximum
0.010 TIR on Bottom Surface for Coldplate Mounting.
Container Provided with Reseatable Relief- Valve.
Number of Cells: 30 (each with reseatable relief valve).
PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
Ampere-Hour Capacity: 33 Ampere-Hours (Minimum Required)
(Based on 1200F operation and discharged at
18 ampere rate to a 30 volt terminal value>.
Acceptance Ampere-Hour
Capacity Range on Flight Units: 40.5 to 42.9 Ampere-Hours
(Obtained at 75 _ 5°F and dis-
charged at 18 ampere rate to a
30 volt terminal value).
Charge Voltage Range: 39.0 to 48.0 volts
Average Discharge Voltage. 36 volts
Container Relief Valve Operation: 35 + 5 psla
Cell Relief Valve Operation: 200 + 25-psiam
Table 5.111 Nickel Cadmium Battery Physical and Performance
Characteristics Summary
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recharge, This phase of recharge was terminated when a pote_-tial
limit consistent with battery temperature was imposed by additional
circuitry within the charger, Full utilization of the array power
was no longer accomplished during the constant potential charge mode
which continued unti! such time as the ampere-hour meter within the
charger indicated sufficient recharge had been accomplished. Upon
generation of such an indication the charger switched to a low level
(0.75 + 0.5 ampere) constant current charge mode for tileremainder of
the charging period.
Each of the eight batteries consisted of 30 series connected
cells 3nd associated temperature sensing devices packaged in an
aluminum container.
Each cell consisted of a parallel connecLed group of positive
and negative plates packaged in a stainless steel can and sealed with
a cell header assembly. All plates were fabricated using a nickel
wire sintered-nickel structure into which either active nickel or
cadmium material was impregnated to produce a positive or a negative
: Tlate, respectively. Each plate had welded to it an annealed nickel
t_b to be used for the electrical attachment to the appropriate cell
termin_l. The header assembly contained the electrically insulated
cell terminals and provisions for relief valve insertion. Seventeen
nickel (+) plates and eighteen cadmium (-) plates, alternately arranged
and separated by non-woven nylo_made up a cell pack. The cell pack
was inserted into a deep drawn cell can once the plate tabs had been
shaped and welded to the header assembly terminals_ and the resultant
pack had been wrapped in a nylon jacket. The header assembly was
welded to the cell can to complete the cell assembly. Each cell was
fitted with a self-reseating pressure relief valve; cell leakage cri-
teria was the same as that imposed on hermitically sealed assemblies.
Each of the 30 cells was taped and then epoxy potted into one
of the 30 individual compartments in the battery containers. Each
battery also contained three platinum wire temperature sensors; two
temperature sensor assemblies containing three thermistor elements,
and a normally closed thermal switch. Figure 5.17 details the
function of each of these units. The temperature sensin_ devices
were placed such that the top of cell case temperature was monitored
rather than terminal or cell interconnect temperatures to minimize
or preclude terminal and/or cell interconnect 12R heating effects.
The container was compartmentized to provide heat transfer from five
surfaces of each cell to the container coldplate mounting surface.
One electrical connector was provided for power transfer and charge
control circuits_and another for ground access to individual cell
voltages. The battery container also contained a pressure relief
valve.
i 130
1974022202-154
Voltage Regulator. A reference summary o£
the physical and performance characteristics of the voltage regulator
is given in Table 5-1V. Eight voltage regulators were included, one
in each PCG. The function of the voltage regul_ or was to furnish
regulated DC power, within specified voltage limits, to the Re_ and
the EPS control buses.
Each voltage regulator received input power from one of four
sources, the nlckel-cadmium battery, the battery charger, the battery
and battery charger operating in parallel, or the associated solar
array group. The input voltage level varied according to the output
characteristics of these sources. The battery supplied power within
an approximate voltage range of 30 to 40 volts depending on battery
SOC and battery temperature. For the parallel battery and battery
charger operation, the voltage would vary from approximately 35 volts
to 40 volts depending on the amount of sharing and on battery SOC.
The above conditions are discussed in detail in the descriptions of the
battery charger and battery. In a contingency mode of operatio_ power
could be supplied directly from the solar array group output to the
voltage regulator input by positioning the charger switch to its bypass
position. For this case, the input voltage to the regulator would be
approximately 51 volts minimum to 125 volts maximum.
The voltage regulator provided specified voltage levels at
the AM Reg. bus for input voltages from 32 to 125 volts. For input
voltages less than 32 volts, the r_gulator provided the specified bus
voltage level or the input voltage level minus approximately two
volts, whichever was lower.
Each voltage regulator basically consisted of five power modules
and an input filter. The multiple number of power modules was includ-
ed in the design for improved system reliability. Each power module
was a pulse-width modulated type regulato_where the output voltage
was less than the input voltage at all times. The power module was
designed to provide operation at a high efficiency even at low load
conditions.
A remote sensing signal for each regulator was obtained directly
from the Reg. bus to which it was supplying power. Remote sensing
eliminated the effects of variations in the llne voltage drop between
the regulator output and the Reg. bus. The voltage at any output cur-
rent, as illustrated by the V-I curve, could be defined by the equation:
VI - Voc - I(V/A) where (V/_) is the slope factor determined by the
regulator design. For _he AM EPS voltage regulators, the slope factor
had a value of 0.04 * 0.002 volts per ampere.
The no-load voltage for each regulator was crew adjustable
only by means of two EPS manual control potentiometers, a Reg. bus
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PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
Size: Maximum Envelope Dimension: 4.3" x i0" x 10.85"
: Weight : 14 Ibs (maximum)
Connectors :
Cooling: Coldplate mounting provides active cooling
PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
Input Voltage Range: Maximum: 125 VDC
Minimum: 1.0 volt above regulated output
voltage
C'_version Efficiency: >93%
No Load Losses: <4.5 watts
Output Characteristics
Design for Parallel Operation
Open Circuit Voltage: 26 to 30 volts (By external Reg. Bus f
potentlometer adjust-
ment)
Fine Adjust Voltage: +0.45 volts (Referenced to Reg. Bus ad-
Justment setting)
Voltage Droop: -0.04 volts/amp at Reg. Bus
Regulated Voltage Accuracy: +0.05 VDC (Coldplate temperature
range from +40°F to •
+I20@F)
Regulation Current Range: 0 to 50 Amps
Maximum Current: 65 Amps _
Short Circuit Current: 26 Amps
Table 5.1V Voltage Regulator Physical and Performance
Characteristics Summary .,
L
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fand a fine adjust potentiometer. Each of these potentiometers was
i connected directly across the Reg. bus and furnished a signal to the
voltage regulator from its adjustable contact.
There were two Reg. bus potentiometers, one for each of the two
Reg. buses in the AM EPS. Each Reg. bus potentlometer was hard-wlred
to its Reg. bu_but its control signal was switched to each of the
voltage regulators supplying power to that Reg. bus. It, therefore,
simultaneously adjusted the outputs of a group of regulators in ordez
to adjust the Reg. bus voltage level. The no-load adjustment voltage
range provided by the Reg. bus potentiometers was from 26 to 30 volts.
There were eight Fine Adjust potentiometers in the AM EPS, one
for each of the eight voltage regulators. The control signal output
of each Fine Adjust potentiometer was hard-wlred to an individual volt-
age regulator. The two sense leads of the potentlometer were auto-
matically switched to whichever Reg. bus the regulator output is con-
nected. The adjustment range associated with a Fine Adjust potentiom-
eter was + 0.45 volts with respect to the voltage level set by the
appropriate Reg. bus potentiometer. The purpose of the Fine Adjust
potentiometers was to provide an individual regulator adjustment to
allow control of load sharing among regulators connected to a common
Reg. bus.
In addition to the above parameters which affect the output V-I
curve, the regulator output had an allowable drift of + 0.05 volts
under conditions of constant loading within the allowable output
current rangc.
The output current range for voltage regulator specification
performance was from 0 to 50 amperes. The voltage r_ulator auto-
matically limited its output current to a maxlmum of 65 ± 3 amperes,
regardless of loading conditions. For current loads in excess of 50
amperes the regulator was not required to maintain specified voltage
performance. The regulator was, however, capable of operating con-
tlnuously under any load condition without sustaining damage and was
capable of providing specified performance upon removal of any excess
current loading condition.
In a special mode of operation, the output of the voltage reg-
ulator was reduced by two volts upon receipt of a signal from its as-
sociated battery charger. This signal was the 30% battery SOC signal
previously described in the battery charger description. The effect
of the two volt reduction was to totally unload the regulator as
previously discussed. Upon removal of the signal from the battery
charger the voltage regulator output rose two volts tc its original
voltage level of operation.
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(2) ATM.
(a) Solar Array. The solar array was stowed in
a folded position and mechanically cinched to a supporting structure
on the ATM (Figure 5.8). Table 5.V describes the physical charac-
teristics of the deployment mechanisms. Deployment was to be accom-
plished automatically at approximately 25 minutes after liftoff. The
solar array consisted of 18 solar array sources that comprised the
four solar wings (see Figures 5.18 and 5.19). The Skylab cluster was
to be normally oriented by the attitude and pointing control system
such that the array would be held normal to the sunline during the or-
bital dry. Each ATM solar array panel was composed of 20 solar cell
modules that were arcanged electrically in parallel. Each solar array
source was electrically independent of the others and provided the
power input to one CBRM.
The basic building block of the solar panel was the solar cell
module. Two configurations of the module were used, and the physical
description is detailed in Table 5.VI. A cross section of the solar
cell is shown in Figure 5.20. The minimum powe_ rating of a solar
cell module under one solar constant (140 mW/cm_), as specified for
procurement, was 700 mA at 49 volts at 28oc. The power available from
each solar cell module at other temperatures was inversely propor-
tional to the operating temperature.
(b) CBRM. This power subsystem was modular in con-
cept. It consisted of 18 solar panel sources and 18 Charger Battery
Regulator Modules (CBRMs). A CB_M and a PCG perform essentially the
same functions. Each CBRM was designed to operate at various power
levels, as supplied by its associated solar cell panel, to condition,
store, and control the power and provide power to the appropriate
power buses. The maximum capability of each CBRM was 415 watts at an
efficiency of 92 percent. The output of the CBRM was fed to two (re-
dundant) buses. The 18 CBRMs were packaged as self-contalned unlts.
Each CBRM consisted of a battery charger, a rechargeable battery, and
load regulator (see Figure 5.21). The CBRM also contained automatic
protection and alert circuitry, telemetry and astronaut display cir-
cuits for monltorlng_ heater control circuits, and other automatic
controls. Figure 5.22 is a simplified functional diagram of the CBRM
circuits.
Charger. The b tery charger had a step-
down, slngle-ended switching regulator cir_ult designed to convert the
wide range of input voltages from the solar array source to the level
required for charging the battery, while achieving maximum utilization
of solar array power. The solar array source fed the charger and
regulator in parallel. The charger output was connected to the battery
only when charging power was available. The regulator power demands
were met first. The charger sensed the solar array source voltage
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SUPPORT STRUCTURE - MAIN
: Construction Stiff Frame, Box Beam (2 Vertical
Track, I Upper and i Lower Box Beams
With Stiffeners and Braces)
Material Aluminum (6061-T6)
ATM/Wing Interface 6 Main Attachment Points Symmetrical
AbouE Wing Longitudinal Centerllne
Dark End Attachment 2 Each Turnbuckle Fittings (With
Points Spherical Bearings)
Sun End (Main) Attach- 2 Each Attachment Fittings (With
ment Points Spherical Bearings)
SUPPORT STRUCTURE - PANELS
Construction Rectangular Frame - 5 Parallel Tubes,
Interconnected at Ends by Hinge Fit-
tings and Short Tube Sectioas
Material 1 in. x 2 in. Tubing, 0.06 in. Wail
Thickness
Inboard Panel Heat Treated Steel (4140)
All Other Panels Extruded Aluminum (2219-T87)
PANEL/PANEI INTERFACE
Hinge Fittings 5 Sets of Male/Female Clevises (Teflon
Lined Spherical Bearings on Male
Halves)
Shear Plates 5 Setp of Tapered Male and Female
Plates - Mounted Adjacent to Hinges
DEPLOYMENTMECHANISM- WINGS
Scissors Arms 5 Sets of Scissors Arms, End Attachment
: Hinges Incorporate Torsion Springs.
Centers Incorporate Pivo_ (Flanged
Journal Bearings) Points which Attach
to Panel Outboard Centers.
Table $.V ATH Solar Array Dtployment Structural and Mechanical
Components Physical Characteristics
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DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM - WINGS (Continued)
Material 1 in. by 2 in. Tubing 0.06 in. Wall
Thickness (except Inboard Pair - 0.125
in.)
Inboard, Second and Steel
Third Pairs
Fourth and Fifth Pairs Aluminum
All Hinge Fittings Aluminum Castings (Precedent 71A-T6)
Scissors Arms Aluminum (6061-T6) Beam Interconnect
Cross Beam Between Inboard Scissors Ends and
Track Beam Slidcrs
Electro/Mechanlcal Dual Tavdem Mounted, Metal Bellows
Rotary Actuator Hermetically Sealed 28 VDC Torque
Motors with Nutating Gears Driving a
Dual Sllp Clutch Output Ball Drive
Cable Sheave
Ball/Drlve Cable Slider Dual Closed Loop 291 in. Long Cable/
Slider. Nominal 0.125 in. Dia. Air-
craft Cable with 0.312 in. Dia. Swaged
Steel Balls Spaced 2.35 in. Apart and
Secured via Turnbuckles at Both Ends
to Track Beam Sliders
CINCHING MECHANISM Retains Wing In a Rigid Package During
Handling, Stowage and Launch
Cinching Ties ii Each (7 Sun End, 4 Dark End) Ties
Mounted on a Fifth Pane] (Outboard)
and Retained to Main Structure by Ball
End Rod Seated in Torque Tube Rotary
Ball Seat. Consists of Arm, Clevis,
Turnbuckle Ball End Rod, Pivot Bolts
and Torsion Springs
! Pyrotechnic Thrusters/ 2 Each Dual Piston and Cylinder Assem-
Torque Tubes bly Utilizing 'I_o CDF 2000 Pyrotechnic
: Cartridges. Pistons are Secured to a
Crank Which in Turn is Secured to the
Torque Tubes
Table 5.V ATH Solar Array Deployment Structural and Mechanical
Components Physical Characteristics (Continued)
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DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM -
WING ANTENNAS
WJng No. 1 Trlangular Panel Assembly Hinge Mounted
to Outboard End of 5th Panel. Deployed
by Dead Position Torsion Springs, Re-
tained by a Pretensloned Cable Activated
Spring Plunger and Sear Pin
Wings No. 3 and 4 Dipole Antenna Assembly. Nestled in a
Teflon Lined Cradle Which Is Bolted to
the Outboard End of the 5th Panel.
Deployed by Torsion Springs, Retained
by Cinching Strap and a Pretenslo_ed
Cable Activated Spring Loaded Plunger
and Sear Pin
TltISSPACEINTgNTIONALLYLEFTBTANK
t
Table $.V ATE. Solar Array l_ploymnt Structural and Mechanical
Components Physical Characteristics
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PARAMETER VALUE
ARRAY
SIZE - 13.2 m (521 inches ions), 2.7 m (104.5 inches
sdde) (per wing)
WEIGHT - 1723 kg (3,800 pounds) (including deployment
st ructure)
PANELS - 5 per wlng (inboard panels are half covered
with modules)
PANELS - 20 total
MODULES - 360 total
SOLAR CELLS - 2x2 cm - 123,120 and
- 2x6 cm - 41,040 TOTAL = 164,160"
SOLAR PANEL
SIZE - 2.7 m (104.3 inches long), 2.7 m (104.5 inches
wide)
WEIGHT - 66.2 ks (146 pounds) (includingpanel frame)
MODULES - 20 per panel (inboard panels contain I0 modules
each)
TOTAL CELLS - 2x2 cm - 13,680 or
.-2x6 cm - 4,560 (per panel)
SOLARCELL MODUIoE(Both Types)
SIZE - .5 m (20.0 inches long), .63 m (24.625 inches
wide)
WEIGHT - 2.2 kg (4.q3 pounds)
SERIES CELLS - 114
PARALLELCELLS - 2x2 cm - 6 or
- 2x6 cm - 2
TOTALCELLS - 2x2 cm - 684 or
- 2x6 cm- 228
CELL INTEP_ONNECTOR - 2x2 cm - Expanded Silver Mesh
- 2x6 cm - Solder Plated Copper
CELL TO SUBS_Tg - .127 m (0.005 Inch) Stlastic 140
ADI_SIVE
SUBSTRATE - ktuminum Facesheet/Alumlnum Honeycomb
DIELECTRIC - .127 usu (0.005 inch) Mi:aply
, INSULATION
SOLARCELL
TWE - sip
SIZE - 2x2 cm and
- 2x6 ca (both 0.014 inch thick)
mASERESISTIVITY - 7 to 14 ohm-tin
CELl. CONTACT - A_TI, fully solder covered contacts
EFFICIENCY - _d40, 28°C, 10 X bare, new
*Assusmd 50 percent-of modules have 2x2 ca cells and 50 percent have
2x6 cu cells.
Table 5.VI Physical Characteristics of AIM Solar Array
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BATTERYHNUSIqG
16 CELLS
8 CELLS
Figure 5.21 Charger Battery Regulator Hodulea
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and current, battery temperature, charger current, battery voltage,
and third electrode voltage of the battery to provide proper charge
control (Figures 5.23 and 5.24). Charge termination occurred when
the third electrode signal was greater than 200 mV, or the battery
relay was opened at 51.5°C, or when array power was insufficient.
Battery. The 18 storage batteries were
to supply continuous power flow during the dark portion of each orbit
)r during the day when vehicle was not sun oriented. Each CBRM bat-
tery was composed of 24 nickel-cadmium, 4 electrode, hermetically
sealed cells connected in series. In addition to normal positive and
negative power electrodes, the cells had a third electrode (Figure 5.24)
which was used in charge control and a passive fourth electrode which
was an oxygen and hydrogen recombination electrode.
The battery temperature operating range was O°C to 30°C. How-
ever, operatlon at 30 C would cause significant capacity loss if opera-
o o
ted for an extended period. Operation between 0 C and 20 C was there-
fore preferred, Thermal control _n the form of a proportional heater
(which operated between 0 and 10°C) was provided to prevent the bat-
O
tery temperature from going below 0 C. Heat was removed from the
battery by passive cooling.
The batteries were rechargeable and the energy depleted during
the dark portion of each orbit was replenished during the daylight
portion of each orbit. The energy for charging was supplied by the
solar array to the CBRM electronics where it was conditioned and uti-
lized, The voltage output was 26.4 to 32.5 volts when discharged in
the load range of up to I0 amperes. Each battery had a life require-
ment of 4000 cycles st a depth of discharge (DOD) of 30%.
Voltage Regulator. The regulator was a
single-ended switching regulator circuit designed to convert the input
voltage (25.5 to 80 Vdc) into a regulated output _oltage. The output
voltage was maintained between 27.1Vdc at full load and 30.'_ V1c st
no load with the output current ]imited to 20.0 amps m,:×imum LJ _r #
output short circuit conditions. The regulator had average ar peak
output power capabilities of 235 and 415 watts, respectively. Power
sh_ring _etween regulators was forced by a power sharing signal de-
riv=d _rom redundant circuitry located in the power transfer dis-
tributor. Power was obtainable from either solar array source or
battery, or both, and was converted to the regulator vol_.._e that was
fed through isolation diodes to redundant power buses in the power
tran=fer distributor. The regulator provided protection to the bus
from over-vo]tage if its output exceeded 31.8 Vdc. Any failure in the
regulator power circuit resulted in zero or low output voltage, thus
protecting the buses from high battery and solar ar. ay voltages.
$
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c. Power Distribution.
(I) AM/OWS. The Power Distribution System zeceived
power from the AM Power Conditioning Groups at the AM Reg. buses.
The power Distribution System utilized two separate isolated
DC bus systems. These systems were two wire systems with the excep-
tions that the OWS buses, the ATM buses, and the CSM buses utilized
a common return bus system. The negative return bus system (Figure
5.5) was connected to vehicle structure at one point only, either the
single point ground (SPG) in the AM or the vehicle ground point (VGP)
in the CSM. All loads identified throughout the Skylab were powered
from one of the buses on Figures 5.25 and 5.26. Circuit breakers in
the AM Power Distribution System were located on STS Circuit Breaker
Panels 201 and 202. The onboard controls and moni=ors for the AM Pow-
er Distribution System were located on STS Control Panels 205 and 206
with three exceptions. The three exceptions are: the AM transfer
bus to the CSM bus interconnections were independently controlled
from the CSM; the ON/OF;; controls for the AM EREP buses were con-
trolled from the MDA C&D Panel; and the AM Transfer bus to the ATM
bus interconnections could also be opened in case of emergency by the
ATM power off switch located on the ATM C&D Panel in the MDA.
The functions, interconnections, and controls associated with
each bus in a set of isolated positive buses were identical. Loa4s
were connected to each bus through protective devices, circuit break-
ers or fuses, to protect the distribution system.
Each EPS control bus received power directly from four of the
eight AM PCG voltage regulator outputs; EPS control bus i from regu-
lators I through 4 and EPS control bus 2 from regulators 5 through 8.
The regulator output to EPS control bus connections were made through
diodes in order to maintain bus isolation. The function of the EPS
control buses was to provide the power source for critical loads.
The EPS control buses were therefore hard-wlre connected to the regu-
lators such that power could not be removed from these buses by means
of astronaut or ground controls. Loads supplied from the EPS control
buses included: I) equipment required for primary power system con-
trols for PCGs I through 4 and for PCGs 5 through 8 were powered from
EPS buses 2 and I, respectively, as a precautionary design feature),
2) lighting zequlred for astronaut egress from AM/MDA/OWS in an emer-
gency, 3) Caution and Warning System equipments, and 4) Time Reference
System equipments.
Each Reg bus could be powered from any of the AM PCG voltagei *
i regulators but each regulator could be connected to only one of the
Reg. buses at a time. The standard operating condition was four reg-
ulators supplying each bus. Power from the Reg. buses was distributed
i
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to the AM buses and the transfer buses within the AM and to the OWS
main buses in the OWS.
The AM buses provided power to all the loads in the AM except
those which were connected to the EPS control buses. The AM buses
also provi4ed power to the loads in the MDA, to certain loads in the
OWS, and to the Deploy, Sequential, and EREP buses.
i The Sequential buses provided the power required for payload
: shroud jettison, OWS radiator shield jettison, and ATM deployment.
The deploy buses provided the power required for the following:
antenna deployment, OWS solar array deployment, OWS meteoroid bumper
deployment, and ATM solar array deployment. The Deploy and Sequential
buses were disabled after the sequential portions of the SL-I mission,
for purposes of safety.
The transfer buses provided the electrical power interface be-
tween the AM, ATM, and CSM, Bidirectional power transfer between the
AM EPS and the ATM EPS was accomplished by connecting both the AM Reg
buses and the ATM load buses to the transfer buses, Figure 5.6. The
CSM, when present as pa" of the cluster, also had its power system
normally connected to the transfer buses. Power for the CSM could z
therefore be supplied by either the AM or ATM EPS or by the parallel
combination of the two EPS systems. The system having the highest
voltage supplied the major portion of the cluster loads.
The EREP buses, located in the AM, provided power to the Earth
Resources Experiments which were primarily located in the MDA.
The output of each voltage regulator could also be connected
to either of the Re_ buses by means of two conrro1_. Thp P_ n,rp,,_
bus select control connected the output to either Reg bus 1 or t_
Reg bus 2 when the PCG output ON/OFF control was in the ON position.
The OFF position of the PCG output ON/OFF control isolated the regu-
l_ror output from eltber of the Ro_ busc_.
The output voltage level of each voltage regulator was con-
trolled by two adjustment potentiometers, a fine adjust potentiometer
and a Reg bus adjust potentiometer. The required switching of connec-T
tions between the regulator, the Reg buses, and the adjustment pots
were made by m_;Ins of the PCG output bus select control and PCG out-
put ON/OFF control. There was a fine adjust pot associated with each
voltage regulator. The fine adjust potentiometer controlled the out-
put level of each regulator relative to the other PCGs. This capa-
bility was designed so that variations between PCGs could be overcome,
as well as possible contingencies such as module failures in a battery
charger or regulator. There were only two Reg bus pots, one for each
i 150
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Reg bus. The load sharing between the AM/OWS and the ATM power systems,
when operated in parallel, was controlled by means of these AM Reg bus
adjustment potentiometers. These potentiometers adjusted the overall
J
AM Reg bus V-I curve with respect to the overall ATM load bus V-I curve.
The functions of the OWS bus I, Reg transfer tie-bus i, ATM/
transfer tie-bus i, and AM bus I were straightforward. One feature to
be noted is that a single Reg bus could supply power to both AM buses
by meamz of the AM bus i and AM bus 2 switches (Figure 5.4).
All of the control functions describe@ in this section, so far,
with the exception of the adjustment pots, wele controllable either by
astronaut m_nu_l switching or by ground control commands. The type
of control was dependent upon the setting of an astronaut manual con-
trol designated as the Power System Control switch. This Power Sys-
tem Control switch was located on control panel 205. Inflight con-
trol of the EPS by the various astronaut manual switches was obtained
when the power system control switch was placed in the Manual posi-
tion. When the switch was in the CMD (Command) position, control was
possible only from the ground by means of DCS commands.
There were, however, several controls which were not controlled
by the Power System Control Switch. The Power Disconnect switches 1
and 2 were for emergency power down of Reg buses 1 and 2, respectively.
They were operational at all times by crew action only. Power Discon-
nect switch #I, when thrown to its Off position, disconnected the
outputs of PCGs 1 through 4 and disconnected transfer bus #I from Reg
bus #I. Power Disconnect switch #2_ when thrown to its Off position,
disconnected the outputs of PCGs 5 through 8 and disconnected transfer
bus #2 from Reg bus #2. The Electrical Ground Switch, which controlled
the location of the single point ground, was also indpendent of the
Power System Control switch position. The connections between the
transfer buses and the CSM buses were controlled from the CSM and were
independent of the AM Power System Control. The connections between
the ATM btt_es :_nd the AM trnnsfer buses could also be opened in an
emergency by a Power Off switch on the ATM C&D panel which was inde-
pendent of the Power System Control Switch. The connections between
the AM buses and the Sequential and Deploy buses were normally con-
trolled automatically by the Sequential and Deploy systems, respec-
tively. There were Sequential and Deploy switches on the S?S panel
to provide backup control for these buses.
In addition to the control logic functions discussed above,
the Reg Bus Fie ,'ircuit breakers between Reg bus 1 and Reg bus 2
could also be considered as part of the control logic. By m_Inual
crew control of these two 26.4 amp circuit breakers the two Reg
buses could be operated in parallel. Parallel operation could be
used to reduce the effects of unbalanced system i and 2 load demnnds
151
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or unbalanced system 1 and 2 power availability. The normal operating
mode was with the Reg Bus Tie circuit breakers closed.
(a) Power Return and Grounding. The electrical
power distribution system, as previously discussed: consisted of a
two wire system employing separate buses for both power feeJers and
negative returns. The return buses were tied to vehicle structure at
only one point. This connection to vehicle structure was accomplished
in one of two ]ocations. During periods when the CSM/MDA interface
connectors were not mated, the grounding was via the SPG in the AM
(Figure 3.5). During periods when the CSM was present as part of the
OA, with the CSM/MDA interface connectors mated, grounding w_s via
the VGP in the CSM structure. The connection to the VGP in the CSM
was automatic when the CSM/MDA interface connectors were mated. The
control switching in the AM was used to connect and disconnect the SPG
in the AM. Control of the SPG connection in the AM was by either
crew manual operation or by DCS command at all times.
(5) Power Feeder Design and Protection. The power
feeder lines between the various power and return buses consisted of
multiple wires which were selected both for current carrying capacity
and voltage drop requirements. Circuit breakers were incorporated in
the positive feeder lines between buses located in different Skylab
modules (see Figure 5.4) with a separate set of breakers located in
each of the modules. In addition to these circuit breakers, adequate
circuit protection was incorporated into power distribution circuitr.,
to all equipment powered from the AM EPS buses. The circuit protec-
tion was comprised of circuit breakers compatible with load require-
ments which protected the power distribution wiring from damage re-
suiting from system overloads or short circuit conditions.
(c) Shunt Regulator. _he function of the shunt
regulator was to prevent the occurrence of an overvoltage on the AM
EPS buses as the result of a PCG voltage regulator module failure.
Therc were two shunt regulators in the AM EPS. One was connected to
each of the EPS control buses.
A shunt regulator, Figure 5.27, consisted of a sense circuit,
a drive circuit, and a transistor regulator band of parallel power
transistors. The sense circuit monitored the terminal voltage of the
shunt regulntor which was the EPS contro] bus voltage. When this
voltage exceeded a preset level in the range of 30 to 32 volts, the
sense circuit provided an output current signal to the drive circuit.
The drive circuit amplified this current input and drove the base
circuit of _he parallel regulator transistors. Each regulator tran=
: sistor amplified its base current producing an increased collector
152
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MAXIMUM TURN-ONTIM[. 10MICROS[CO,J_DS
MINIMUM TURN-ONVOLTAGESINS[ IFvtL ]) 5 VDC
MAXIMUM TURN-ONVOLTAG[SINS[ L[VEL. ]2 VDC
CURRENT- TIME CAPABILITY.
L_OAMP[RI[SFOR0. 05 SECONDS
AMPERESFOR |00 SECONDS
Figure 5.27 Shunt Regulator Schematic
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current flmJ. Since _he regulator transistors were connt,ctc,I,,cr_,ss
tile I:I)S coqtrol bus, their incre._st'd coll_._ctor curr_nt,; i)ro,l_tcc,_I ._n
increased load on the bus. lhe effect of this int. rt.,iscd toad v,,s to
redu_e the bus voltage because of the, lo._d_r_; (.lft.ct ,,n _he F,m.:_.r
source and the incr,-ased voltage drops From the power source to the
bus.
The regulation capability of Lh_._hunt rc_ul,_tor ,_.,nsvnt,b-
l£shed by its V-I characteristic, below i _pecifie sense volt,v.c, cht,
,.'huntregulator ,.Irewncgliglble current (l_,ss th,_n IO0 mil li,_mpvrcq).
: A_ove that sense volt,lg_ its V-! ch,lr,mteristic c::hibited a c!,'nv:lic
impedance in the range of 0.67 to 6.7 miIlic_hms, lhi_ vt,rv ]m' ,!,'nl-
mic impedance w,l._ produced by the, high ,doin from thL, sense circuit
input voltage to the tran_cisror r gulator b:_nk lo,_d .urr_.nt. ,his
high gain, nnd the correspondin,4 low dvnlr'lic z,.pc_lancv provi,[t,_! _he
: shunt regulator with the c,pahilitv tt, ,!r,,w st,fficicnt lo:_d current
to limit the bus voltage to the ,iesirv' 1,,v_,',. .\t the s.lme time,
tile current drawn bv the shunt re,_ul,_tor insured the rapi,I clearing
of ehe fuses in any f.ilcd :nod,,le _,f tne volt,:,4e regt, la+or.
(d) ._Ianual and I)CS Control Functions. Primary
control of both I_PSs was bx either manual control provisions installed
on instrument pzme,s or by [)CS or [)AS commands from :4rot, hal control.
The functions, which were controlled, included thnse associated with
I'C,(; and CI_RH control, .rod those associated with power distribution bus
control.
(e_ i)isplav anti 'l'elemctry Parame=ers. A number of
:malo,_, parameters were ,li.-plaved on meters inst:_lled on tht. instrun',cn_
panels, these parameters were displayed to indicate inst:mt:_neous
pincer system st._ttts to _he natron.mrs anti to assist tile astro_._t,t._ in
their manual m;magement of the system. A greater number of par,mwtvrs
were monitored ond transmit_.ed by means of telemetry to _round con-
tro! to aid in ,_round performance a.d control an,_lvsis and their m._n-
&_ement.
(2) ATM. The AI'M electrical power and distribution
subsystems p_:rformed essentially tile same functions as those of the.
AM/OWS. Thus, these following paragraphs will naatnl," eovvr .,r_,,,s where
ATM differed from AM/OWS.
The operational modes of each system were si,n[ 1.r except f_,r
control limits. The output of each ('B[DI was connected _,_ p_r,_l lvl
through isolation diodes anti connector buses to the two _ajor At._I
load buses in the power trnnsfer dtstetbutor (|'ignite 5.,%). Ii lcL bu._
was capable of supplying all electric._l requ[renae,_t_, ;n,lcpvnd,.,atlv,
154
{ i
1974022202-178
Control and monitor circuitry of CBRNs provided the capabillty
for both internal and remote control, automatic malfunction detection,
automatic clearing, astronaut display warning, and telemetry data. The
CBRMs were controlied from the Control and Display panel in the MDA
through the use of switches or the DAS. Each CBRM _ontained semi-
conductor sw_tchlng devices to operate remote indicators on the C&D
panel for crltlcal parameters. The distribution subsystem provided
an interface and integration of electrlcal functions among all assoc-
clated components, assemblles, subsystems, and modules. Distribution
of the power, commands, and indications throughout was accc-mplished
by the network as indicated in Figures 5.4 and 5.6 , which allowed
several assemblies and subassemblies access to a common distribution
system. The distribution system provided the capabillty to operate the
ATH EPS in parallel with the AM EPS; to manage and evaluate the power
by crew md/or ground station; to vrovlde power and control logic
circuitry to the various ATH subsystem loads; and to perform integrated
prelaunch test and checkout, module testingjand launch operations,
The dual output lines of each CBRM were fed to the power trans-
fer distributor so that all CBgMs feed two collector buses (see
_Igure 5.4). Diode isolatlon was provided on the input lines so that
the load buses were electrlcallf isolated from each other as well
as being physically separated. Each redundant b,lswas capable of pro-
viding the total power required by the ATM loeds. The collector buses
fed the main buses to provide power to circuits and loads required
during initial power up and deployment sequences.
Redundant subsystem buses were established to facilltate power
management, power evaluation and an integrated system operation.
Several methods of control were used to ensure that tl:ebuses could be
turned "On" or "Off" during manned and unmanned modes of operation.
At launch, the main buses would be "On" and the subsystem buses would
be "Off." Programmed coaenands from the Saturn Instrument Unit flight
sequencer would be issued via the one to energize all subsystem buses
a'irlng the initial orbital phase. Back,,p commands were by the AM DCS.
The ATM DAS and C&D panel switch commands were primarily for the
manned modes.
Nhen the subsystem buses were actlvated in the power transfer
distributor, ;,owez was immediately distributed to the other 12 dis-
tributors, Each redundant subsystem bus was capable of providing the
total powe: required by its subsystem. Redundancy was maintained by
dlstrlbutln_ the power through two separate connectors end cables.
E_ch poslti c polarity power feeder line was fused to provide fire
protection _Inst a shorted condition, the current carrying capacity
of all cablln_ was de-rated by 50% for space use. The wlre size and
number of wires used were designed to mect interface voltage r_quire-
ments, and to maintain the bus voltage level st 26.0 Vdc to 30.5 Vdc.
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TEach distributor maintained power redundancy, and pus isolation. The
distributors were used to aid in routing of all signals, to contain the
logic and switching required by the ATH subsystems, and to contain any
special electronics to ensure proper operation.
Power was routed to ATM ioads on a two wire system with the
positive polarity feeders protected by fuses (see Figure 5,4),
Where feasible, redundancy was mPintained through separate connectors i
and diodes, which were inside the load, to maintain bus isolation. When
items of equipment did not contain isolation diodes, the distributor
provided diode isolation. The power return remained isolated from
structure except in those items which were waivered. Electrical bo;m-
ing and grounding of the ATM electrical equipment were accomplished at
grounding straps.
The number of wires and wire size in the AH/ATH po_er transfer
cables were selected to ensure the voltage Icvel of 28.3 Vdc to 30.5
Vdc at the interface. The primary control for connectin_ and dis-
connecting the power feeders was in the AM; but when the A'[_! power "ofS"
command was give,t, a co_mmand t_ disconnect the power feeders was sent.
The single point ground for the ATM had been established in the AH by
connecting the ATH power return to the AM power return (Figure 5.3).
WheL the CSH docked to the HI)A, the single poin_ _round was transJerred
to the CSH.
If the ATH power had to be turned off in an emergency, control
was provided by the ATH power switch on the ATM C&D panel. A locked
switch requiring a positive action to activate was used. Activating
the switch provided power from the ATH main buses for the fo11_wing _
functions: s signal was sent to the AM to disconnect the power from
the transfer buses; all the power relays controlling t_= redundant
subsystem buses were reset: and a 300 mtlllsecond timing oscillator
was started which turned off all 18 (_RMs.
The AT.4 EPS interfaced with the cluster Caution and Warnlng
subsystem in the AH and provided two warning signals which wer_
ATH BUS I '_J_q and ATH BUS 2 LOW. The signals were actlvatec' _'
the respective bus voltage fell to 25.0 + 0.5 Vdc. There were no
indications for high voltage as the regulators w_re automatically
disconnected tf they reac_ed 31.8 _ e.2 volts. The C&_/ bus power was
provided to the A'FH by the AM.
The capability for control a_d monitoring by the crew and
ground stations was provided by the measurement ard telemetry system.
The subsystem had three measuring distrib,,tors and 12 J-box as_emblles
that were associated primarily vlth assemblies of the telemetry system.
The measuring distributors took th_ indications and measurements, such
as, temperature, current, pressure, and voltage levels from the
_e
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transducers and ATM equipment and routed them to the proper telemetry
assembly for ultimate transmittal to the ground receiving stations.
The J-boxes were used to branch single outputs from the multiplexers
and experiment packages to redundant PCM/DDAS tele_ .try equipment.
Controlled monitoring operation and testing was through the
ATM command system. The methods of control were: the Digital Address
System (DAS) and switches on the C&D panel; ground station rf uplink
via the rf command receivers and rf cow,hand decoders. The primary
method of control by the crew was through the use of C&D panel switches,
with the DAS keyboard used as backup. Control was provided by four
switch selectors which issued discrete pulse commands to relays in the
ATM. The rf uplink commands and DAS commands were integrated with the !
switch selectors. The crew was provided with a ground command enable/
inhibit switch to disable the rf capability during the manned mode,
: if desired. The two digital coxaputers were also controlled by this
con_nand system. The DAS keyboard converted an octal code input to a
"inary output pulse. The octal code was arranged in such a way that
° _ four switch selectors and two diBital computers would receive the
address conm_ands simultaneously but only one ol them would be enabled.
When the address was verified, an execute con_nand was given to the
item enabled.
m
m
THI3 IONALLY LEFT BLANK
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d. Skylab Caution and Warning System. _he design fea-
tures and major components of the C&W System _re described below;
detailed description of this system is contained in the Skylab
Caution and Warning Technical Manual, MSFC 40M35701.
(i) C&W System Operation. The Skylab C&W System
consisted of C&W Systems installed in both the SWS and the CSM. Each
system provided the crew with visual displays and audio tones when
selected parameters reached out-of-tolerance conditions. In the
docked configuration, the two C&W Systems interfaced by means of
discrete contact closures to provide for cluster wioe monitoring of
selected parameters. The C&W Sjstem equipment used to monitor these
parameters is depicted in block diagram form in Figure 5.29. The SWS
C&W System control and display panels are shown in Figure 5.30.
(a) SWS C&W System. The system monitored the
performance of specified vehicle systems and alerted the crew to
hazards or out-of-limit conditions. The SWS C&W System utilized two
independent subsystems, a caution and ,_arning subsystem for monitor-
ing various system parameters and an emergency subsystem for detect-
ing fire or rapid loss of pressure. A list of the 76 cluster para-
meters monitored by the SWS C&W System as well as the nominal trip
points is enumerated in Table 5.Vll.
(b) CSM C&W System. The CSM contained a
separate C&W System for monitoring thirty-six critical system para-
meters in the CSM. An out-of-tolerance condition in the CSM resulted
in the generation of audio tones and the illumination o_ visual dis-
plays in the CM. In addition, the CSM C&W System provided redundant
contact closures to the SWS C&W System. Upon receiving the CSM inputs,
the SWS C&W System activated the corresponding SWS warning audio tone
and illuminated the visual displays to alert the crew so that correct-
tive action could be taken. The audio tones continued until the SWS
C&W System was reset; however, the CSM closur_ remained until reset
from wJthin the C_. The CSM C&W equipment and operation is discussed
in detail in the Sky_b Operations Handbook, Volume I, SM2A-O3-
SKYLAB- (i).
(2) Major SWS C&W Comportents. The SWS C&W System
was made up of the following major components:
(a) Circuit Breaker Panel 202. Circuit
Breaker Panel 202 housed the 3WS C&W System related circuit breakers.
This panel was located In the STS. Fourteen circuit breakers were
utilized for controlting power to various components of the C&W
System. These circuit breakers pcovided power to the redundant
components within the system from two independent energized buses.
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(b) Control and Display Panels. A total of fifteen
separate control and display (C&D) panels were provided in the SWS for
control, display, operation, and testing of the caution & warning and
emergency subsystems. Three of these panels were used for control and
display of both subsystems; whereas, the remaining twelve were used
for control and display of the fire detection portion of the emergency
subsystem.
! Control and Display Panel 206. The major
power and control switches for the SWS C&W System were located on
Panel 206 in the STS. The master alarm red telelight switch was
illuminated when either a caution, warning, or emergency parameter
was activated. When depressed, the master alarm telellght switch pro-
vided a reset signal to the C&W unit electronics to terminate the audio
tones, extinguish all master alarm telelight switches and master alarm
status lights, and remove the telemetry closures. In the emergency
subsystems, this reset signal also extinguished the parameter identi-
fication lights when the parameters had returned within limits. The
memory recall amber telelight switch was used to indicate that caution
and/or warning parameter(s) which activated the C&W subsystem has been
stored in memory. Depressing the memory recall telelight switch caused
the identification llght(s) to be illuminated for the parameter(s)
which were stored in memory. This provided for the identity of short
term C&W subsystem activations after the fact. The clear switch
erased the memory clrcultry in the C&W unit and extinguished the re-
call telelight switch. Three power switches were provided for power-
ing the SWS C&W System. One switch was used to control power to the
C&W subsystem and the other two switches were used for the emergency
subsystem. Four test switches were provided for testin_ the C&W sub-
system electronics, audio tone, and visual displays. Three volume
controls were also provided for controlling the intensit> of the
emergency, warning, and caution tones.
Display and Inhibit Switch Panel 207. The
paran_ter identification lights and inhibit switches were located on
Panel 207, clso in the STS. _
There were forty parameter identification lights used to aid
the crew in identifying which parameter or system had gone out-of-
tolerance. Emergency and warning parameter lights were color coded
aviation red bile caution parameter lights were colored aviation
yellow. Each display had two bulbs for redundancy, wi_h each bulb
being driven by separate power sources.
Each parameter monitored by the C&WSystem had a corresponding
inhibit swltch(s) on Panel 207. The inhibit switches were used to
disab:a a mslfunctionin8 circuit or input signal without disabling
other active parameter inputs. They could also be used to determine
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Ithe nature of the malfunction in those cases where more than one
parameter shared a common identification light. There were 76 double-
pole single-throw inhibit switches utilized on this panel,
OWS Repeater Panel 616. This panel was
located in the Experiment Compartment of the OWS. The panel contained
one master alarm reset telelight switch (aviation ted) which performed
the same functicL as the master alarm telelight switch on AM Panel 206.
Ten parameter identification lights w_,_ _tillzed to aid the
crew in identifying various parameters of systems that had gone out-
of-tolerance. Each display contained two bulbs which were powered
from separate power sources. The lights were color-coded the same
as those appearing on AM Panel 207.
4 Fire Detection Control Panels. The fire
sensor control panels (Panels 120, 236, 237, 238, 392, 529, 530, 618,
619, 633, 638, and 639) provided the controls for operation and test
of the fire sensor assemblies. A typical panel is shown in Figure
5.30.
Each panel had the capability of controlling two sensors. Two
power swltcbes were provided, one for each sensor, which allowed man-
ual selection of one of two normally energized buses capable of supply-
ing power to the re_p,-ctlve sensor. A master alarm reset/test switch
was provided for testis6 the sensor(s) and resetting _he SWS C&W Sys-
tem. A red display lamp was provided for each of the two sensors
which illuminated upon activation of the sensor and remained i11umi-
nated until nower was momentarily removed from the sensor. The bulbs
and lenses ot the panels and the panels themselves coull be replaced
infllghc. Two spare panels (complete with lenses and bulbs) and
eight lens and bulb assemblies, were stowed in the OWS for infllght
replacement. In cases where one panel controlled only one sensor, a
cllp was provided for covering the unused control and display. When
both sensors were energized, the panel dissipated 5.5 watts of power.
(c) Caution and Warning Unit. The C&W unit con-
tained redundant C&W subu:xits and redundant emergency subunits. Each
subunit was powered from a normally energized bus and was protected
by an independent circuit breaker. Each C&W subunit utilized 36 cau-
tion and 26 warning parameter inputs and provided 22 caution and 17
warning outputs for parameter identification llzhts. Each emergency
subunlt had 12 parameter inputs and provided 12 outputs for para-
meter identification lights. The capacity of the C&W unit, includlng
growth capability, is shown in Figure 5.31.
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Each subunlt provided a current limited control voltage that
was DC isolated frc the input bus. The control voltages from the
two C&W subunits were dioded together to provide one combined control
voltage; whereas, the emergency subun_ts control voltages remained
isolated. These voltage_ were routed to their respective C&W System
parameter closures and control switches for operating the C&_,7System.
The control voltage returns for all subunits were isolated from each
other and all other vehicle returns.
The C&W unit was coldplate mounted on AM Electronics Module 5.
In the standby mode, the unit consumed a maximum of i00 watts of
power.
(d) High Level Audio Amplifier. A high level audio
amplifier (HLAA) was added to the SWS C&W System to provide caution
and warning tones in the event of a failure to the buses powering
the speaker intercom _ssemblles. The HLAA amplified the caution or
warning tone from the C&W subunlts and applied the to_c directly to
t_,espeakers in the speaker intercom assen_lles. The HLAA contained
two amplifiers for redundancy; each amplifier was powered fLom a nor-
mally energized bus and was protected by an independent clrculr breaker.
The HLAA consumed ten watts of power when in the standby mode and a
maximum of lO0 watts when amplifying the caution and warni.,g audio
signals. The HLAA was coldplate mounted on AM Electronics Module 5.
(e) Signal Conditioning Packages. Two slgl_al
conditioning packages _C&W instrumentation packages) were Frovlded for
redundancy. The signal conditioning packages conditioned preselected
signals from the C&W System sensors and voltage levels from monitored
buses. A total of 19 caution and 17 warning parameters were routed
into level detect,rs that were preset to trigger when a designated
signal level was exceeded. The level detector turned on a relay
driver which provided a relay closure to the C&U System. #II level
detector_ in the signal conditioning packages except the PPO2 low
detectors received their basic power from the C&W signal conditioner
con2erters which supplied _ 24 VDC regulated voltages to the detec-
tors. Power for the relays and the PPO2 low detectors were powered
directly by the EPS control buses. '[hesignal conditioning packages
were coldplate mounted on AM Electronlc, Module 5. The total level
detector power consumption was 3.7 watts per package. In _ddltion,
each energized relay required approximately one watt of power.
(f) Signal Conditioner Converters. The DC-i)C
converters converted the EPS bus voltage into _ 24 VDC and + 5 VDC
regulated voltages. The _ 24 voltages were used to power the level
detectors in the signal conditioning packages and the differential
amplifiers in the PPC_ 2 sensors. The + 5 volts were used to power
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the EVA suit inlet water temperature sensors and the AH coolant loop
temperature _ensors. two signal :on." tloner ccnver_ers were utilized
for redundancy and were mounted on AM Electronics Module 5. Each ""
converter ccnsumed 11.5 watts of powex.
(g) ATH Digltal Computer Workshop Computer Inter-
face Unit (ATM Provided). The ATM digital computer provided the pri-
mary computational capability for the h'_ poir,_tng control syLtem
and the cluster attitude control system. There were redundant Ai_!
digital computers which interfaced with the workshop computer inter-
face unit (WCIU) _'ILhin the ATM. The WCIU prov4ded the input/output
buffering and automatic swttchover capability for the two digital
computers. Each computer contained su_-routines for determining o_
of-tolerance conditions and for setting the dlscr,.e output registers
in the WCIU. The discrete output registers deter_ned th. status of
the relays which pr:mi_ed the discrete C&Wclosures. Each ATH dlgl-
tal computer weighed 100 pounds and dissipated 165 watts. The WCIU
dissipated 105 watts.
(h) Cc,:_trol and Display Logic Distributor (_TM
Provided). The control and dlsplay logic dlst,'bu:or housed the
relays which were uses to pro,'_ th_ C&Wclc._res tn the ATM. The
combined CbW control voltages, routed ,,_a r_dundant :_nths from the
ATH/AN Interface to the C&D loglc dlstri_a;_r, were applied to two
control buses within the distributor. These cow _ _ buses pcovi_ed
the CbW control veltage for the variocs C&Wclosuces. The unit
accepted discrete inputs for energizlng the vazious relays _nd pro-
vided redundant outp,'ts which were routed across the ATM/AM inter-
face through separate connectors. The control and display logic
dlstrlbucor d_aslpated 40 watts of power.
(1) Speeker Intercom Ass_mblies. Thirteen _peaker
intercom assemblies ($IAs) were located through toe SWS for inter-
communications between the crew and communlc_t_ons with the grcund.
These assemblies contained a red master alarm status llght on each
unlt and _ere aI'_ used for reproducing the cautiun and warning tones,
The caution tone was a continuous 1 kHz frequency while the warnlr,_
tone was 1 kHz frequency, modulated at s 1.4 Hz rate. The CbW tones
_ere routed to both the $IA apeeker and the crewman communication
umbilica_ connec:tora, In the active mode e_ch SIA consumed 4.0 watts
of power. Two flight spares were s_ored in the O_S for inf_i_l:t re-
placement.
(j) K1axon Assemblies. ?.,e k!axon assemblies
contained redundant speakers which converted _he emergency signals
into audio tones. _ha emergency audio tones were co_!_d to permit the
crew to re_'ily identify the nature of the _ergency _ituati_,_. |tw
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&fire tone was a siren while the rapid delta P tone was a buzzer. For _
isolation purposes, one speaker in each klaxon assembly was driven by
Emergency Su_,nlit i" whereas, the second speaker was driven by Subunit
2. One klaxon assembly was located in the forward tunnel of the AM j
and the other in the forward compartment of the OWS.
(_) Sensors. Two sensors, i.e., fire and rapid
delta P, were unique to the SWS C&W System. A description of these
se Lsors follows. The remaining sensors used by the C&W System were _
previously developed. /
Fire Sensor Assembly. Detection of fire
conditions aboard the SWS was accomplished by twenty-two fire sensor
assemblies (FSAs) located throughout the pressurized compartments.
The fire sensor assembly consisted of an ultraviolet (UV) fire detector
and a quick release adapter plate which provided for easy installa- _
tion and replacement. There were two FSAs located in the MDA, eight ,
FSAs located in the STS, and twelve FSAs located in the OWS. The
FSAB located in the MDA and OWS were used to provide general area
coverage, whereas, those in the STS were t_ed for viewing particular
modules. Each fire sensor assembly was a self-contained unit whose
operation was controlled by a fire sensor control panel (FSCP). The
FSAs were designed with an optical fleld-of-vlew of 120 degrees in-
cluded cone angle. The detectors, though not totally redundant,
were mounted in such a manner as to provide as much coverage overlap 1
as possible. A fire detected by any of the FSAs would result in a
generation of an emergency alarm by the C&W System. Six FSAs were
stored in the OWS for flight replacement.
The detectors monitored the UV emission from flames and pro-
vided for the initiation of an emergency alarm when the UV intensity _
exceeded the detector threshold level. Flames emit large amounts of
photons which include the 1800 to 2800 Angstrom wavelength region of
the UV fire sensor.
The detector consisted of two UV radiation sensing tubes and
the associated electronics for conditioning the signals. A twin tube
approach was utilized to preclude false fire alarms with passage of
the Skylab through the earth's radiation belts. One sensing tube
monitored background particulates incident upon the system while a
z
second tube monitored both the background particulates and ultra-
violet radiation. The pulse rate out of each tube was conditioned
by the electronics and Zilterad to obtain a DC voltage proportional _ <
to the pulse rate. The difference between the DC voltage represent-
ing the UV detector tube and the background tube was . measure of the i
UV flux emitted from a fire source. An emergency alarm was initiated }
when the difference in tube outputs exceeded a preselected value. A
I '
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statistical analysis of the design, based on estimates of radiation
levels expected to be encountered in Lhe Skylab orbit, indicated •
that a threshold of 35 counts/see and a time constant of one second
would preclude more than one false alarm for each 56 day mission. _':
To compensate for the unexpected, the FSAs were designed with a gain
_ adjust having the capability to select a sensitivity setting from 25
to 75 counts/sec. Typical FSA response time to UV input equivalent
to a 50 microampere standard flame at a distance of ten feet was less
than one second.
; The emergency alarm activated by the FSA had two forms. One
was switch closure to the fire sensor control panel (FSCP), which in
_ turn initiated a relay closure for the C&W control voltage which ac-
tlvated the C&W unit. The other emergency signal generated by the
sensor provided an electrical ground for a displ_y light located on
the FSCP. Extinguishment of the fire resulted in the relay opening.
The electrical ground output for the display light remained latched
on after a fire was sensed and could only be reset by temporarily re-
moving power from the sensor.
Preflight system verification tests of the fire sensor opera-
: tion were accomplished during ground tests via a UV light source and ?
, the panel mounted test switches. In-flight, partial circuitry tests )
were performe@ using the FSCP test switch or the C&W system test fire
switch on AM Panel 206.
_ Although an abundance and variety of commercial fire sensors
existed, it was found that little had been accomplished toward de-
: veloping space qualified devices. Devices subject to an intensive '
; study included the following:
• Correlation spectrometer (gaseous products).
Ultraviolet and/or infrared sensors (flame).
Temperature sensors (heat).
The ultraviolet radiation detector was selected.
mhe results of the study indicated that detection of ultra- _
! violet radiation emitted immediately following the ignition of a fire
provided better overall sensitivity, response time and coverage than
other type flame detectors. In addition, UV was considered the better
parameter for detecting flames, primarily from background considera- !
tions, i.e., the OV radiation from the sun was determined to be less
' likely to trigger false alarms than the infrared radiation given off
by any hot body onboard the vehicle.
c
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2 Rapid Delta P Sensor. Detection of rapid
decompression of the Skylab pressure was performed by redundant rapid
pressure loss sensors. Should the cluster pressure have decreased at
a rate of 0.I PSI/mlnute or greater, an emergency alarm was generated.
This particular pressure decay rate was selected in order to permit
time for emergency action. Typically, a meteorite puncture of the
vehicle or a large rupture of the vehicle would be the cause of a rapid
leak rate. The detectors were located behind the teleprinter paper
storage container in the STS.
{
The rapid pressure loss sensors consisted of a variable reluct-
ance pressure transducer and associated electronics. The electronics
buffered the absolute pressure transducer signal to the AM telemetrv
absolute system, differentiated the pressure signal to obtain a rate of
: pressure change for the telemetry system, and energized a relay to pro-
vide contact closures to the emergency control voltages when the pres-
sure decay rate exceeded 0.I0 PSI/mlnute. The trip point could be ad-
justed prior to installation via a potentlometer located on the side
of the sensor. Application of 28 VDC via the delta P test switch on
AM Panel 206 activated a self-test mode in the detector which simulated
electrically, an excessive pressure loss and allowed verification of
all electronics downstream of the pressure transducer. The sensor
consumed 5.6 watts of power.
The rapid pressure loss sensor design utilized was selected
following an intensive investigation of available sensors. _le to
rigid schedule requirements, sensing devices which required limited
development effort and methods with similar application were sought.
The devices and methods reviewed included:
Detection of high leak rates which exceeded the makeup
capability of the cabin pressure regulators using pressure
switches.
, Detection of pressure changes across a capillary restric-
tion utilizing a los range differential pressure trans-
ducer,
Analysis of the sound spectrum associated with escaping
gas as a function of orifice size, direction, pressure
- differential, etc.
Differentiation of the output of an absolute pressure
transducer referenced to cabin pressure.
The absolute pressure transducer/differentlator sensing scheme
• was selecteJ primarily because oF its excellent response time and its
ability to directly convert rate information from cabin pressure mea-
surement 8•
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(3) Telemetry. Individual discrete parameters were
provided from each subunit to enable ground control to distinguish
when a caution, warning, fire or rapid delta P alarm had been gen-
erated. Analog data associated with each CI_ converter voltage out-
put was also provided. These parameters, in conjunction with the
selected vehicle systems telemetry parameters in the Instrumentation
System, were used to determine system status and to resolve system
anomalies.
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6. Cluster Mission Performance_ The major difference between
the Skylab Electrical Power System (EPS) performance during the Skylab
mission and the premission performance predictions resulted when a
structural failure during launch caused the loss of one Orbital Nork-
shop (owe) solar array wing and restricted the remaining wing to a
partially deployed position. The loss of power generation capability
: represented by this failure temporarily restricted the use of the AM
EPS. However, after the remaining one solar array wing was deployed
and the AM ,_xlmum Depth-of-Discharge (DOD) constraints were redefined
to compensate for the reduced power generation capability, the AM Power
• Conditioning Groups (PCGs) performed as predicted to achieve all pre-
mission goals.
: The energy required during initial phases of the mission was
. supplied by the eight PCG batteries and the 18 ATM Charger/Battery/
_egulator/Module (CBRM) batteries. The SL-1 activation sequence re-
quired the two Skylab power systems to operate independently until
four hours and 40 minutes after launch, when they would normally have
been paralleled and begun to share the total Cluster load requirements.
Initially the ATMbatteries were essentially inert, since all ATM loads
were inactive until after the Cluster was inserted into the planned
orbit. Therefore, the AMbauterles supplied all the Cluster loads re-
qulred to be operational during the first moments of the Skylab mission.
Proper operation of the PCGs was verified by ground controllers
prior to liftoff of the Cluster. Since the total power requirement at
this time was only 1600 watts, each A_. battery had a discharge current
of 5.5 amps. The power required during the launch and insertion phases
was that necessary for operation of the AM Coolant Loop and the AM
Telemetry System required for Cluster systems monitoring. The initial
activation sequences were performed by the Instrument Unit (IU) auto-
matic sequences. As these sequences were accomplished, the ATM solar
array was deployed, the ATM loads were activated, and the ATMbatteries
began to perform as intended.
All back-up commands and alternate deployment sequences were
initiated in an effort to deploy the OWe arrays, but when it became
apparent that OWe array deployment was not possible, the Flight Control
Team began alternate plans of operation to protect the integrity of
both the AM and ATM power systems.
• Since the AM PCG batteries could not be recharged without the
OWS solar array it was necessary to terminate the battery discharge
before permanent damage wss done. However, the total cluster load at
this time was only 2300watts, allowing the ATMCBRMs te supply the
entire load without exceedin_ the 30 percent DOD limitation required
to achieve a cycle life from the batteries sufficient to support the i
elght month mlsslon.
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While assessment of the integrity of the vehicle was taking
place, power management techniques were initiated to minimize the
total Cluster load. The most significant techniques used initially
were: 1) delayed spinup of the A_ Control Moment Gyros. Control of
the vehicle remained by the OWS Thruster Attitude Control System (TATS)
which required only momentary power when the thrusters fired and there-
fore the power requirement for this control mode was considered negli-
glble; 2) delayed activation of the OWS Radiant Heaters. The activa-
tlon of these heaters was designed to bring the internal temperature
of the OWS within the limits required for crew entry. Since it was
apparent that the crew would not be launched per the premlsslon sched-
ule, this event could be delayed without compromising the mission.
The activation of these heaters was never accomplished during the Sky-
lab mission because the OWS internal temperatures never again dropped
below the lower limit of the crew comfort requirements; and 3) the MDA
Wall Heater Thermostats were not reset to their 70°F setting as planned.
Similar to the OWS Radiant Heaters, this change in set-polnt was de-
signed to allow shlrtsleeve entry of the crew into the Cluster. With
the launch of the manned spacecraft delayed, this set-polnt adjustment
could be delayed without compromising vehicle integrity as long as the
internal MDA and AM temperatures were monitored to insure that the
coolant loops were above the minimum temperature requirements.
During t_e launch delay several substitute designs evolved to
replace the meteoroid shields function of shading the OWS skin from
the Sun's direct rays. Immediately upon insertion, the direct rays of
the Sun on the exposed OWS skin created such a severe hot environment
inside the OWS that food supplies and film in the storage lockers ap-
proached their maximum temperature limits. In an attempt to cool the
OWS and prevent loss of the planned manned mission due to food spoil-
age and film deterioration, the vehicle was maneuvered out of the nor-
mal solar inertial pointing mode into an orientation resulting in less
direct sunlight on the OWS exposed skin. The departure from the SI
pointing mode resulted in a reduced ATM solar array output capability,
and the use of power management techniques was mandatory to maintain
the integrity of the ATM power system.
I Table 6.I summarizes the off nominal pointingmodeswhichwere
implemanted during this first unmanned storage phase in an attempt to
protect the integrity of all Cluster subsystems. Frequent changes in
the vehicle attitude were required because no single attitude was opti-
mum for all vehicle subsystems. The ideal attitude for the OWS envi-
romnental problems caused the AMcoolant loop to approach freezing;
the a_titude required to thaw the AMcoolant loop reduced the solar
array output to an unacceptable level; etc. Therefore, it was neces-
sary for the ground controllers to continuously monitor all system
and vary the attitude to insure tnte&Tity of the vehicle.
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NOOF = 0,Sl INCIDENTdOS NEX SYSTF
• CBRMs CAPABILITY ANGLE I00% CAPABILITY
18 4800 0° 100.0 4800 _
18 4800 35 ° 81.9 3931
18 4800 45 ° 70.7 3394
18 4800 55 ° 57.4 2755
18 4800 60 ° 50.0 2400
17 4540 0° 100.0 4540
; 17 4540 35 ° 81.9 3718
17 4540 45 ° 70.7 3210
: 17 4540 55 ° 57.4 2606
17 4540 60° 50.0 2270
J
Table 6.I. CBl_i "Energy Balance" Off-Nominal Capability
During the off-nominal pointing modes, iC was decided that the
Cluster load requirement made necesoary a revision to the mission rule
which required that an average CBR14battery DOD of 30 percent be main-
tained. The MSFC/JSC management decision was to allow the batteries
to operate within energy balance each orbit, that is, the only con*
straint on battery operation was that the battery "Recharge Complete"
indication was present for each of the CBRI4 batteries prior to enter-
ing each orbital night. The revised criteria increased the ATH vower
system total output capability 300 watts to the levels shown in Table
6.I.
The premission predicted load profile indicated an average
load for the first unmanaed period of 4500 watts. As long as the
vehicle remained in SI the ATH power system had suff_,cient capability
to provide the total power requirement without off-loading. However,
as the Sun incident ankle increased to greater than 30 degrees power
maoagement techniques were required. A list of candidate off-loads
was Senerated; this list served as a shoppins list of load reduction
pojsibilities to be used as necessary to reduce the total Cluster load i
requirement within the capabilities of the ATH power system. Table
6.11 is the list of candidate off-loads used by the ground controllers
durins the crucial unmanned period.
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TOTAL CONNECTED
LOAD TITLE LOAD-WATTS
AM WALL HEATERS (15) 316.0
MDA WALL HEATERS (8) 546.6
CSM PORT ASSEMBLY HEATER 19.9
CSM TUNNEL HEATERS (2) 185.6
SPARE DOCKING PORE HEATER 19.9
AM COOLANTPUMP(lOF 6) 85.0
AM TM TRANSMITTERS (I0 WATT) (3) 138.6
ATM TM TRANSMITTERS (2) 117.6
ATM VALVE ELECTRONICS CONTROL ASSEMBLY 20.0
ATM TCS MONITOR 2.0
ATM PUMP INgERTER ASSEMBLY 125.0
table 6.11. Unmanned Off-Load Candidates
On DAY i0, in an attempt to solve the pressing thermal pro-
blems, the vehicle was maneuvered to an attitude resulting in a Sun
incident angle of 55° for an extended period. As seen in Table 6.I,
the ATM power system capability at this attitude was only 2755 watts.
The available off-loadlng did not permit reduction of the total Cluster
load within this value and the constraint to operate the system within
energy balance was waived. More energy was taken out of the batteries
during the nlght portion of the orbit than could be replaced during the
sunlight portion. Vehicle attitude was not constrained to allow the
batteries to recharge. A CBRMdesign feature automatically discon-
nected each CBRM from the load buses when the battery voltage approached
26.4 volts. Continued operation at this attitude resulted in a deple-
tion of the CBRMbattery stored energy, and eight batteries auto-dis-
connected from the load buses leaving the ten remaining CBRMs to supply
the entire load. The Sun incident angle was then decreased and seven
of the CBRMs were reconnected to the buses during orbital daylight.
CBRM 15 failed to respond to the attempts to reconnect it to the load
buses. Analysis of this anomaly concluded that the CBRM 15 solar array
con=actor was failed open. The loss of this CBRM resulted in a reduc-
tion in the ATM power system capability to the values shown for the 17
CB._l configuration in Table 6.I.
During this unmanned phase, the total cluster capability varied
from 4800 watts average per orbit in the SI mode with 18 CBRMs, to 2270
watts at th_ 60 degree pitch attitude with 17 CBRMs. The ATH average
load for this period was approximately 1600 watts. Since the ATM EPS
was providing all the power, the remaining 3200 watts, maximum, was
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transferred across the ATH/AH interface to the Transfer Buses for dis-
tributiou to the OWS/AM/MDA loads. The majority of the load for this
period was on AM Bus I and AM Bus 2 wlth owe Bus i, OWS Bus 2, EPS Bus
I, and EPS Bus 2 having very small loads on-llne.
Figure 6.1 shows the average load requirement for the first
unmanned period. Since the total load was being controlled to remain
within the maximum system capability, the load profile as depicted
approached the power system capability average over the 24 hour periods
that are plotted. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 are a breakdown of t_.e load
requirements for DAY 7 which was a typical day in the "Launch to Acti-
vation" phase. Table 6.II1 describes the bus voltages for DAY 7; the
! voltage levels for this time period are substantially above the 24-
volt minimum bus voltage required to be delivered to the components.
Although rigorous power management techniques were required
for the entire time period, the AT)I EPS capability was sufficient to
supply the load requirements for the vehicle attitude dictated, and to
protect the integrity of each subsystem. The loss of CBI_ 15 due to
excessive discharge, causing solar array contactor opening during this
._ time period, was the only power system anomaly that resulted in a con-
tinuous degradation of the power system output capability.
,i
HIND{_4 MAXIMUM
BUS VOLTAGE (VOLTS) VOLTAGE (V3LTS)i i
ATM MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 28.69 28.97
XFER I and 2 28.43 28.90 !
AM 1 and 2 28.42 28.83
EPS 1 and 2 27.64 28.67
OWS 1 and 2 28.22 28.64
Table 6.111. Bus Voltages DAY 7
After crew installation of the OWS parasol heat shetld, the
SWS was returned to the solar inertial attitude where it remaine_
except for occasional excursions to the Z-LV attitude for EREP oper-
ations.
For the first 14 days of the planned 28 day manna_, mission the
ATM EPS continued to supply the total SWS power requirement. Since
the CSM power was bein8 supplied by the CSM fuel cells it was not neces-
sary for the ATM EPS to supply any power to the CSM. The average load
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requirement for the first 14 days of the manned mission can be seen in
, Figure 6.1. Extensive load management was required during this period
• to ensure that the load requirement did not exceed the capability of
the system.
On DAY 17, during EREP i, the A11_batteries were excessively
discharged due to the long pass duration and the high loads. As a re-
suit, CBRMs 6, 7, 8 and 16 automatically disconnected from the ATM
load buses. Following return to solar inertial and acquisition of
sunlight, these CBRMs were reconnected to the load buses. Soon after
acquisition of sunlight, CBRM 3 automatically disconnected from the
! load buses. CBRM 3 did not respond to the commands to reconnect it
to the buses and subsequent analyses revealed that the CBRM 3 regula-
_ for had failed. CBRM 3 was lost for the remainder of the Skylab mis-
sion and the total remaining at this time was 16 of the original 18
CBRMs. Additional degradation was observed on DAY 24 when CBRM 17
output exhibited a reduced power output during specific orbital per-
iods. The estimated loss of capability was 80 percent of the CBRM 17
capability or approximately 150 watts left in the average ATM system
capability. Subsequent review of data indicated that this anomaly
occurred on DAY ii.
To avoid further degradation in the ATM power system output
i capability due to excessive discharge, the system power management pro-
cedures were updated and each flight plan activity was carefully ana-
lyzed. The critical periods continued to be during EREP passes when
the vehicle was maneuvered to the Z-LV attitude for experiment point-
ing. Four additional EREP passes were completed during the six mis-
sion days following EREP i. The most significant power management
technique used for these four passes was to shorten the total time out
of the solar inertial attitude. EREP I had an experiment data-take
period of 127 orbital degrees or approximately 33 minutes. The maxi-
mum data-take for the next four EREPs was 46 degrees or 12 minutes for
EREPs 4 and 5 on DAYs 22 and 23 respectively. Table 6.1V summarizes
the pass geometry, pass duration, and total cluster load for the first
five EREP passes of the SL-I/SL-2 mission.
The maximum total cluster load requirement for the first five
EI.EPpasses occurred during EREP i. The EREP instruments each require
D!ak power during the data take period. During this period the power
transfer from the ATM power system to the AM Transfer Buses exceeded
3200 watts. Although 3200 watts is in excess of the 2500 watt maximum
transfer used as a design goal for sizing the transfer network, all
systems performed without degradation. Figure 6.4 and 6.5 are a break-
down of the load requirements for DAY 17 which included EREP I; Table
6.V shows the maximum and minimum bus voltages for the EREP period.
Although the total power transfer exceeded the premlssion maximum
criteria, it can be seen from Table 6.V that the system voltages re-
maine_ above the levels required to insure a minimum of 24 volts to
the component.
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....... PASS _l PASS _2 PASS #3 PAss #4 PASS 4_5
EVENT DA_Y17 DAY 20 DAY 21 DAY 22 DAY 23
_DEG_ (DEG) (DEG) (DEG) (DEG) _ '_
ORBITAL MIDNIGHT 0 0 0 0 0
START MANEUVER 106 141 139 116 120TO Z-LV
END MANEUVER
141 160 158 147 150
TO Z-LV
!
START DATA TAKE 156 160 158 147 150
i
ORBITAL NOON 180 180 180 180 180 _
END DATA TAKE 260 199 201 193 196
START MANEUVER
268 199 201 193 196
TO SI
END MANEUVER TO 338 218 220 213 216SI
TOTAL DURATION 127 39 43 46 46
OF Z-LV
i
TOTAL DATA TAKE 104 39 43 46 46[ DURATION
ORBITAL AVERAGE 4550 4000 4030 3950 3970
LOAD WATTS WATTS WATTS WATTS WATTS :
Table 6.1V. EREP Pass Geometry - First Five Passes
During the solar inertial polntlng mode the total cluster load
requirement was managed to insure that the A_4 power system capability
was not exceeded. The premission predicted load for this time period
of 5500 watts revealed a need to reduce the total load by 1000 to 1500
watts to remain below the ATM system capability. Approximately 500
watts of the premission prediction was power required by the OWS duct
heaters. When the meteoroid shield was destroyed during launch sub-
Jecting the OWS skin to direct sunlight, the OWS internal environment _
exceeded the premissiou predicted temperatures, and the OWS duct
heaters were never required during the entire Skylab Manned missions.
An additional 200 watts of the premission prediction appeared to be
187
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! conservatism in the component load requirements. Thus, if the cluster
operation was continued to the premission plans a total load of 4800
watts would have resulted. Since this exceeded the ATM system output _
capability power management techniques were used to further reduce the
load. The primary loads which were managed to facilitate this load
reduction were the MDA and AM Wall Heaters, Internal Cluster Lights,
the redundant C&N components, Cluster fans and the AM Molecular Sieve.
To implement management of these loads required crew participation as
well as the continued management by the electrical ground controllers.
MINIMUM MAXIMUM
BUS VOLTAGE (VOLTS) VOLTAGE (VOLTS)
ATM MAIN I and MAIN 2 28.38 28.56
TRANSFER 1 and 2 27.79 28.03
AM I and 2 27.55 27.96
EPS I and 2 26.85 27.17
OWS I and 2 27.25 27.67
Table 6.V. Bus Voltages DAY 17
Although the power management techniques had to be constantly
applied and the results monitored, it was possible to continue all
planned astronaut tasks with the limited power available. Therefore,
the implementation of the power management techniques did not compro- ;
mise the planned mission objective, nor did they cause undue comp]i-
cations in the flight planning of desired astronaut tasks and experi-
Ments.
/
On DAY 25 the SL-2 astronauts diligently executed a repair
procedure developed by the back-up crew in the Zero-G simulator and
OWS Solar Wing I was freed from the metal restrainlug it and subse-
quently deployed to its normal position. The resulting increase in
the total power system capability heralded the end of the rigorous
power management techniques and a return to the premlsslon plans for
the spacecraft systems op_ratlons. For the remaining 14 days of the
SL-2 mission all solar inertial mode orbits had a positive power mar-
gin of at least 800 watts. Power wAnagement techniques were required
to accomplish the six EREP F,asses following wing deployment due to the
increased length of maneuve':s and data take durations. Table 6.VI
shows the geometry for eac_ of the last six SL-2 EREP passes together
with the average load requirement and the battery Depth of Discharge
(DOD).
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" PASS #6 PASS #7 PASS #8iPASS #9 PASS #10 PASS #ll
" '_ EVENT
DAY 27 DAY 28 DAY 291 DAY 30 DAY 31 DAY 32
+' _ ORBITAL MIDNIGHT 0° 0° 0° ! 0° 0° 0° _
START MANEUVER TO 61 ° 150 51o 35° 29° 57°
! Z-LV
END MA_:EUVER TO Z-LV 115° iii° 109° 97° 106° 115°
START DATA TAKE 115 ° III ° 117 ° 112 ° 106 ° 115 °
ORBITAL NOON 180° 180° 180° ; 180° 180° 180°
•+ END DATA TAKE 216° 216° 2250 I 2050 214° 2270
START MANEUVERTO Sl 216 ° 216 ° 2250 1 2050 214 ° 227 °
END MANEUVER IY)SI 247° 254° 267° 235° 253° 273 °
TOTAL DURATION OF 101o 105o 116o 108° 108° 112°
Z-LV i
TOTAL DATA TAKE 101o 105o 108 ° 83° 108 ° 112 °
DURATION t
ORBITAL AVG LOAD 4800 5300 5360 i5100 5350 5350
PCG MAX BATTERY DOD NO DATA 25.0% 28.5% !31.(Y/, 32.0% 40.0%
i
CBRM MAX BATE DOD NO DATA 35.0% 30.2% !26.07. 124.5% 32.1%
Table 6.VI. EP,EP Pass Geometry-Passes 6 through ii
Once the OWS Solar Array was deployed and the PCGs were reactl-
vated, the ATM and AM power systems operated in parallel to share the _-
total cluster load requirement. The power sharing between the ATM and
the AM EPS was controlled by adjusting the open circuit voltage (OCV)
of the AM/OWS EPS. This adjustment was controlled by the astronauts
by turning the onboard potentiometer to the desired setting. The ad-
Justment was not available to the ground controllers.
/
The goal of the original OCV setting was to maintain an average
maximum DOD on the CBRMbattet'ies of 30 percent and 15 percent on the
PCG batteries. The lower DOD on the PCGs was imposed by the loss of
one-half of the OWS solar array. To achieve the desired sharing of
the ATM and AM EPSs to ensure these DOD constraints would not be vlo-
fated, an OCV of 29.0 volts was selected, as the original value. Once
the constraints and the OCV were selected, the total capability defined
by these constraints was identified. The capability for this setting
was adequate to supply the total load requireraents with an approximate
500 watt positive power margin, as shown by Figure 6.1. Figures 6.6
and 6.7 plot the A_4 EPS output, the AM EPS output and the ATM to AM
transfer current for the paralleled systems. Figure 6.6 shows a typi-
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cal day containing an EREP pass prior to the CSM fuel cell shutdown.
Figure 6.7 shows a typical day after fuel cell shutdown.
DUe to the low DODs o,_ the I_G batteries, compared to the de-
s',[._'zvalue of 30 percent_ and the availabil._ty of addltional OWSsolar
array power, it was decided thee 15 percent DOD llmlt on the PCGbat-
teries should be relaxed. By operating the PCG batteries at the energy
balance point, the IX)Dz on the CBRHcould be _educed to opt/nlze the
total EP3 ltfet/ne. To Increase the PCG DOD, the OCVwas adjusted to#
29.4 volts and the AT)/ to AM/OWStransfer current was reduced.
On DAY 32, after 21 days of operation, the CSH fuel cells vere
deactivated, and the SWS EPS began to provlda the total CSMpower re-
qulrement. The CS)/ average load for the remaining seven _ay period
_rae approximately 1200 watts with P peak load of 2200 watts average
i for a t37o hour period during the CaM Entry Simulations. Figure 6.8
shows the CSH load requirement for DAY 35 which was a typical day
after the S_S EPS began to supply CSIdpower. Figure 6.9 describes
the DAY 33 C._4 power requirement which was the highest average load
day due to the S/jnbal mo_or checks during the entry sL_ulatlons.
The SWS EPS was parallele('_ briefly with the CS}4 fuel cells
prior to the fuel ceU shutdown. The paralleling procedure was accom-
plished, as written, and the OCVwas returned to the origlnal settln8
per the procedure. Duzlng the SWS #eactivation, the CN Descent Bat-
terle8 were peralleled with the SWS EPS during the CSM transfer to
internal power. Once _ore, this procedure was accomplished as planned
withG_t evidence o£ degradation of any EPS parameters.
On DAY 37, during the astronaut EVA to retrieve the ATH experi-
uunt flhn, an astronaut rapped CBRM15 with a hammer and the ground
comund8 vere sent to reconnect CBRN15 to the load buses. This tech-
nique was successful and CBRM15 began to perform normally. For the
remalnder of the SL-2 mission and the 8tora$e period bet_Tee_1 the SL-2
end SL-3 missions, 17 CBRNs were _ctive. During deactivation of the
SWS for storage, an OCV adjustment to 29._ volts was made to op_/nlze
the load sharing during the orbltal storas_ period.
During the storage period between the SL-2 and SL-3 missions,
the Skylab electrlcai l(_d requirement averaged 3100 watts per orbit.
Since the average power system capability exceeded 5500 vetts for the
entire period, a positive power umrsin of over 2003 watts existed for
the entire eterage period. The power system operated normally durln8
the storage period without failure of additional subsystems or off-
uoal_l o_ere_'l_ns. The 29.4 volt OCV setting served to equalize the
load sharing b_en the AMand ATI4EPS8 -.rid the transfer current yes
opt/nixed.
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One day prior to launch of the SL-3 manned spacecraft, the
thermostat setting for the MDA Wall Heaters was increased to the 70
degree point, which resulted in an increased load of 500 watts. At
this point the average orbital load was 3600 watts. Additional loads
included the docking lights, transponder, and tracking lights to sup-
port the rendezvous and docking maneuvers. However, the average loads
of this period did not increase beyond 3900 watts and since the EPS
capability was 5500 watts, a positive power margin of over 1600 watts
was maintained.
As the astronauts began the activation process the loads were
increased incrementally until at completion of activation, the total _
Skylab load requirement was 4800 watts average. The CSM load require-
ments were being supplied by the CSM fuel cells at this time, and
therefore, power was not being transferred between the cluster and the
CSM. The 5500 watt EPS capability during the activation period re-
flects an AM Reg Bus OCV setting of 29.4 volts. This high OCV setting
resulted in a minimal power transfer between the AM and ATM EPSs.
Initially, the AM transferred a small amount of power to the ATM sys-
tems but as the loads increased in the AM during the activation per-
iod, this was reversed and the ATM began to supply power to the AM !
loads.
On DAY 85 the Reg Bus OCV was adjusted to 29.2 volts to opti-
mize the power system capability while equalizing the recharge time
required for both the CBRMs and the PCGs. Figure 6.1 shows the his-
tory of each SL-30CV adjustment. Due to the large positive power
margin during th- first 20 days prior to CSM Fuel Cell shutdown it was
not necessary to readjust the OCV for the Z-LV mode required for EREP.
Nine EREP Passes were completed during this period. Table 6.VII is a
summry of the geometry, beta angle and performance of the system dur-
ing the first 9 EREP passes on the SL-3 mission. Figures 6.10 and 6.11
! show the PCG, CBRM and Transfer Bus loads for typical days during the
SL-3 mission, with an EREP pass both prior to and after fuel cell shut-
down. 6.VIII gives the minimum maximum bus voltages forTable and
these same two days.
! On DAY 95, when the CSM Fuel Cells were deactivated, it was
i necessary to reduce the AM Reg Bus OCV adjustment to ensure that the
AM DOD constraint would not be violated. This adjustment made avail-
able more of the ATM capability and, therefore, resulted in an increase
in the EPS total capability. The total cluster load requirement at
the time was 5850 watts average. When the requirement was compared to •
the power capability of 7000 watts at the 28.9 volt OCV setting, a
positive power margin of approximately 1200 was noted.
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HINIMUM MAXIMUM
,,,BUS VOLTAGE (VOLTS) VOLTA_ (VOLTS)
: DAY 90 DAY 113 DAY 90 DAy 113
ATM MAIN 1 and MAIN 2 28.69 28.66 28.90 28.81
REG 1 and 2 28.74 28.50 28.98 28.82
TRANSFER 1 and 2 28.82 28.58 28.98 28.82
AM 1 and 2 28.74 28.50 28.90 28.75
EPS 1 and 2 28.20 27.96 28.28 28.27
OWS 1 and 2 28.22 27.97 28.64 28.36
Table 6.VIII. Bus Voltages DAYs 90 and 113
After the CSM Fuel Cells were deactivated on SL-3, the Skylab
EPS provided an average of 1050 watts to the CSM main buses. During
the checkout and reentry simulations on DAY 130, the CSM required a
peak power of 2229 watts from the Skylab power system.
To ensure adequate capability for contingency cases during
the installation of the "Rate Gyro Six Pack" on DAY 105, the OCV was
adjusted to 29.1 volts. Although this resulted in a zeduced capa-
bility for the EPS of 400 watts, it provided protection for the ATM
battery system in event of a contingency situation by shifting the
load _oward the AM power system. This was necessary since the ATM
battery system had shown degradation in excess of the premission pre-
dictions. The "Rate Gyro Six Pack" installation was routine and the
OCV was returned to the 28.9 volt setting.
On DAY 112, the OCV was adjusted to 29.0 volts to increase the
power system capability during the Z-LV attitude for EREP. Since the
29.0 volt OCV also provided a positive power margin for solar inertial
operation, the setting was not adjusted after the EREP pass was com-
plete. Similar OCV adjustments of 29.1 and 29.2 volts were made on
DAY 125 and 126 respectively to further increase the Z-LV power capa-
bility.
A failure of the charger on CBRM 5 on DAY 123 resulted in a
reduced ATM power system capability. The reduction in capability at
the 29.0 volt OCV setting was only I00 watts and, therefore, the im-
pact on the solar inertial capability was negligible.
Since the power system integrity during the Z-LV attitude de-
pended on restricting the DOD of the batteries, it was necessary to
evaluate each planned Z-LV and predict the maximum DOD. After the
201 i
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inflight battery capacity tests were performed, it was determined that
• beginning with EREP I0, the ATM permissable DOD was 45 percent of
rated capacity and the AM was 50 percent. Using these criteria, power
management techniques were implemented if the DOD predictions indicated
_ a violation of the criteria for either or both systems.
It was possible to support all of the EREP passes shozm on
Table 6.VII by using power management techniques. The resulting bat-
tery DODs are also shown in the table.
With the exception of the CBRM 5 charger failure, the SL-2
failure of CBRM 3 regulator and the off-nomlnal performance of CBRM
17, all EPS subsystems continued to operate normally during the SL-3
miss ion.
; To establish a configuration of the AM/OWS EPS which was ac-
ceptable for the contingency requirements of a failure of both AM cool-
ant loops, the power transfer relays "AM TRANSFER", were cormuanded
open prior to SL-3 separation. At this polnt, each EPS began to oper-
ate independently, supplying those loads connected to their load buses.
: The AM and ATM electrical power systems continued to operate
separately during the entire storage period between the SL-3 and SL-4
missions. The average power system capability for this period varied
as the beta angle varied; Figure 6.1 shows the capability and average
load for the AM and ATM Electrical Power Systems respectively.
{
The AM electrical power system operated normally during the
entire storage period without failures or off-nomlnal performance.
The average AM electrical load during this period was II00 watts and
the capability of the system varied from a minimum of 2900 watts co
a maximum 3600 watts at launch of SL-4. The resulting PCG battery
! DOD for the ii00 watt load over the range of beta angles encountered
during the storage period varied from six to eight percent.
During the storage period the ATM electrical power system
opsrated normally with the exception of CBRM 17. Due to the off-
nominal operation of this component its contribution to the total ATM
i output was 80 percent less than that of the remaining 15 CBRMs. On: _ DAY 151CBRM 17 was removed from the load bus for a period of 20 hours;
after it was returned to the load bus it began to function properly,
and for the remainder of this period its contribution to the total
ATM power capability was equal to that of the other 15 active CBRMs.
The average ATM load requirement durir_, the storage period
was 2000 watts and the average system capability varied from a minimum
3800 watts to a maximum of 4900 watts at the launch of SL-4. The re-
suiting CBRMbattery DOD for the 2000 watt load over the range of beta
angles encountered during the storage period varied from 12 to 14 per-
cent,
1974022202-229
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One day prior to the launch of the SL-4 manned spacecraft, the
i thermostat setting for the MDA Wall Heaters was once more increased to
the 70°F setting, which resulted in an increased load on the AM system
of 500 watts to a total load average of 1600 watts. Additional loads
were added, such as the tracking lights, transponder and docking
lights, to support the rendezvous and docklng operations. The average
load on the AM system for this period was a maximum of 1900 w_tts, and
the ATM average load remained at 2000 watts. Since the power system
capability for both systems was the highest value of the entire stor-
age period at this point, a large positive power margin was still main-
i rained for each system.
L
When the MDA hatch was removed and the cluster activation
began, one of the first tasks accomplished was to parallel the AM and7
ATM electrical power systems and adjust the AM OCV. The OCV was ad-
justed to 29.1 volts for the first activation day and then was in-
i creased to 29.3 volts for the remainder of the activation period. The
power system capability of the two systems operating in parallel at
! the 29.1 volt OCV was 8000 watts. The adjustment to 29.3 volts caused
a decrease in the cluster capability to 7900 watts.
As the cluster was activated the load increased incrementally
until, at the end of the activation period, the load was 4800 watts
: average when the crew was awake and 4200 watts during the crew sleep
period. Compared to the 7900 watt capability for this period a minimum
power margin of 3100 watts existed.
The CSM load requirements were s_pplied by the CSM fuel cells
for the first 20 days of the SL-4 mission and therefore, the power
transfer to the CSM was zero during the activation period. At the
29.1 and 29.3 volt OCV the power transfer from the ATM to the AM was
minimal. As the loads on the AM system increased during the crew
awake period the amount of power being transferred increased; the
a-.-eragepower transfer, when the cluster average load was 4800 watts,
was 350 watts. When the cluster average load dropped to 4200 watts,
during the crew sleep period, the average power transfer was I00 watts.
Figure 6.12 shows the PCG and CBRM power requirements for a typlcal
, day together with the transfer bus power requirements.
The AM and ATM power systems continued to operated in parallel
2or the remainder of the SL-4 mission to supply the total cluster power
requirement. Since bc=h systems had a constraint on the maxlrum DOD
it was necessary to periodically adjust the AM OCV to ensure uhat the
constraints were not vlo]ated. As the OCV was adjusted the total
cluster power system capability changed to reflect the usable capa-
bility at that specific setting. Figure 6.1 shows the SL-4 capability
history for the various OCV settlng_ during the mission.
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_ On DAY 206 the CSM fuel cells were deactivated and the clustert
_ power system supplied the total CSM power requirement for the remain-
der of the mission. The AM Reg Bus OCV was adjusted to 29.1 volts to
insure that the AM DOD constraint was not violated because of the in- __
crease in load. The total cluster load, including the CSM, increased
to 5800 watts average when the crew was awake and 5200 watts average
during crew sleep periods. Compared to the 6200 watt power system
capabili,'y at the 29.1 volt OCV setting on DAY 206, a minimum power
: margin of 400 watts was available.
i Figure 6.13 shows the PCG and CBRM requirements and the trans- :
fer bus po,_erfor a typical SL-4 mission day after fuel cell deacti-
vation. Table 6.1X gives the minimum and maximum bus voltages for
these mission days plotted in Figures 6.12 and 6.13.
MINIMUM MAXIMUM
BUS VOLTAGE (VOLTS) VOLTAGE (VOLTS_
DAY 201 DAY 246 DAY 201 DAY 246
ATM MAIN I and MAIN 2 2e.75 28.75 28.93 28.95
i PEG I and 2 28.81 28.90 29.14 29.22
T_NSFER I and 2 28.90 28.90 29.14 29.22
AM 1 and 2 28.74 28.83 29.06 29.14
EPS I and 2 28.28 28.43 28.51 28.67
OWS I and 2 28.22 28.36 28.77 28.77
Table 6.IX. Bus Voltages DAY 201 and DAY 246
After the CSM fuel cells were deactivated on DAY 206, the
cluster power system provided an average of 1050 watts to the CSM main
buses. During the checkout and reentry simulations on DAY 265 the CSM
obtained its peak power from the power system. The CSM power require-
_ ment was supplied and the minimum interface voltage requirement was
met by the cluster power system for the entire Skylab mission without
i the need for CSM load management
The DOD constraints during the Z-LV orientation required for
the EREP passes on both the AM and ATM power systems were different
from the solar inertial constraint, to permit deep DODs for this
limited number of cycles. Up to DAY 43 the constraint on the ATM
batteries permitted a maximum of 9.0 ampere hours (45 percent DOD) to
be removed fro_ any CBRM; similarly the AM constraint was 16.0 ampere
hours maximum (48.5 percent IX)D). !
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On DAy 229 a battery capacity test was conducted on CBRM 10
I and CBRM 18. Since the measured capacity durin8 this test was less
_ than the predicted value, the ATMmaximum DOD constraint was decreased
to 8.0 ampere hours (40 percent IX)D). Since this decrease in stored
energy available from the ATM system restricted to a degree the types
of EREP passes permissible, on DAY 243 the AM criteria was relaxed to
permit a maximum of 20.0 ampere hours (60.6 percent DOD) to be removedfrom the PCG batteries.
": It was possible to support all of the EREP passes shown on
Table 6.X by using power management techniques. Most of the numerous
OCV adjustments shown on Figure 6.1 for the SL-4 time period were
power management techniques necessary to optimize the capability for
EREP passes. All of the OCV settings used during the SL-4 mission
provided adequate capability to maintain a positive power margin for
the solar inertial orientation.
EREP pass 29, a back-to-back _wo data take pass, resulted in a
violation of the 8.0 ampere hour DOD constraint on CBRM 11. The actual
DOD was 8.23 ampere hours; the DOD on the remainder of the CBRM8 for
this pass was less than 8.0 ampere hours. Since the excursion above
8.0 ampere hours was small and at a relatively low discharge rate,
CBRM 11 did not disconnect from the system. Following the return to
solar inertial, enough enersy was available for charging to completely
recharge the battery the followin 8 orbit. Therefore, the viol_tion of
the constraint did not adversely affect the ATM power system perfor o
mance and was not considered off-nominal operation.
On DAY 259 durin8 _P pass 45 the actual ATM DaD of 8.26 A-H
again exceeded the 8.0 A-H maximum criteria. However, since the ex-
cursion was small the power system continued to function normally,
and all system parameters were acceptable.
During the SL-4 manned mission one of the major experiment
objectives was to obtain data on the Comet Kohoutek. In order to
obtain the proper ansle for comet observation it was necessary to
maneuver the vehicle away from the solar inertial attitude. Since the
total cluster power sys_._a output capability was reduced as the vehicle
was maneuvered out of solar inertial the battery DOD for both the PCGs
and the CBIO4s was computed for each pass to insure that the p_ver sys-
tem integrity was protected. Table 6.XI lists the Kohoutek passes
and the resultant battery DODs. The JOP 18D Kohoutek passes were the
uost severe on the power system because the change in the vehicle
position was greater for this type of comet observation. The rela-
tively low DOD for many of the passes reflect the vehicle maneuvers
centered around orbital uidntsht end therefore the resulting DaD
approximated that of a normal solar inertial nisht period.
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CBRM 5 experienced a charger failure during the SL-2 mission
and could only be used by managing real-time. An operational charac- J
! teristic of CBRM 5 was that once each orbit it would automatically
disconnect from the bus due to battery over-voltage at the point of
1 100 percent charge. Once disconnected it could then be reconnected
to the bus and would operate normally until the next orbit when it
would once more disconnect. Due to the llmlted amount of crew time
available for EPS management and the limlted number of ground stations
a-ailable per orbit, CBRM 5 was not used for normal EPS operations.
Near the end of the SL-4 mission two JOP-13 passes and the EREP 50
pass required additional capability to insure that the 8.0 A-H maximum
DOD criteria was not violated. CBRM 5 was managed by ground control
to provide the additional capability for the passes.
Many of the changes in battery DOD during the Skylab mission
were related to the adjustment of the Reg Bus OCV, but in addition the
DOD also tracked the b_ta angle. As the beta angle increased in mag o
n!tude (eltL,_rpositive or negative) from zero degrees, the DOD de-
creased. Above 69.5 degrees beta angle the vehicle was in continuous
sunlight and the batteries did L_otdischarge at all. At zero degrees
beta angle, the orbital night period was maximum and thus the DOD
Increased. Figure 6.14 plots the average solar inertial DOD for both
the CBRMs and the PCGs and shows the rplatlonshlp to the beta angle
for the mission.
To facilitate the post-mission PCG battery verification test
with the _esired discharge current, the "AM-TRAN" power transfer re-
lays were opened durln_ the SL-4 deactivation of the cluster. Prior
to opening the relay contacts, an astronaut adjusted the OCV to Re8
Bus 1 to 29.1 volts and Reg Bus 2 to 29.8 volts. Power transfer
between the systems was tezminated at this point and each power system
supplied its own load requirement for the remainder of the SL-4
mission.
_HIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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MAX MAX MAX
F EXPo DAy CBRM PCG EXPo DAy CB_ I_G
! _ , DOD% DODZ DOD% DOD%
8019 196 15.0 17.7 JOPI8D 231 27.3 19.4
: _ $201 197 17.0 16.0 JOPI8 231 * 19.0
! S232 198 23.6 32.5 JOP18D 232 26.8 19.7 _:
S063 206 23.9 17.8 JOP18 232 * 17.8 •
8201 206 26.1 21.3 JOPI8D 233 25.2 20.5
8183 207 24.8 16.9 8201 234 36.0 32.0
#
S019 208 24.4 19.8 8063 234 31.5 20.1
• _ 8063 209 24.6 17.8 8183 235 29.7 23.7
8063 210 24.3 19.8 JOP18D 235 24.7 25.2
S063 211 26.7 15.8 8019 236 30.6 16.2
S201K 212 27.8 17.7 JOP18D 237 24.0 17.8
S201G 212 25.0 17.6 8063 237 28.8 21.4
8019 214 28.8 16.9 8201 238 28.6 22.5
8183 214 28.5 16.7 JOP18D 238 23.4 ]7.4
S019 215 26.8 16.6 8019 239 24.5 20.2
8201 217 24.8 17.8 8019 240 26.8 17.8
S019 217 24.5 17.3 8063 240 22.5 18.9
8019K 117 24.8 16.6 8063 241 20.7 15.5
6063 218 25.5 17.8 $183 241 22.4 17.0
S183 219 28.8 29.5 8201 242 19.1 20.1
JOP18D 220 25.4 31.6 $183 243 16.4 17.9
I 8019 220 33.5 18.9 8019 243 16.1 17.28063 221 25.2 16.6 8063 244 13.7 13.9
t JOP18D 222 26.6 26.8 8201 244 12.9 13.4
I SOb3 223 32.1 20.5 8063 245 11.5 11.4
8063 224 28.4 15.4 8019 246 9.0 10.2
8201 224 38.8 23.3 8201 246 8.2 7.2
JOPI8D 224 25.6 16.2 8201 257 20.2 19.9
8019 224 27.6 17.7 6201 258 22.5 17.0
JOP18D 225 26.3 16.5 8063 259 24.8 18.2
8201 226 * 19.7 8019 262 26.2 17.9
8201 230 34.4 25.4 8201 263 25.5 * i
JOPI8D 230 * 20.1 8201 264 31.1 17.9
-
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77. Module Hardware Mission Performance.
a. AM/OWS.
(I) Solar Arrays. The Solar Array Subsystem (SAg) de-
sign for the OWS consisted of two (2) wings, each consisting of a beam
fairing and three (3) wing sections. Each wing section contained ten
(i0). identical active solar panels for a total of 30 panels per wing
or 60 panels per system (Figure 7.I). Two (2) additional panels were
included in each wing section to provide spacing between active panels
and the beam fairing; one was a truss panel and the other a "dummy"
: (inactive) panel.
: At approximately 63 seconds into the Skylab 1 flight, the
vehicle experienced structural failure of the OWS Meteoroid Shield.
This failure unlatched and partially deployed SAg Wing 2 Beam Fairingj
as evidenced by the fairing secured bi-level event measurement and
indications of solar cell illumination, verified by an increase in
the Solar Array Group (SAG) voltages.
Following S-If cutoff at 589.2 seconds, all SAG voltages, with
the exception of SAG 4 voltage, exhibited an increase as SAg Wing 2,
no longer restrained by the launch vehicle acceleration forces, started
to prematurely deploy. The S-If retro-rocket exhaust plume impinging
on SAg Wing 2 contributed to the loss of the wing by causing it to
shear off, thereby severing all electrical connections at approximately
593 seconds. At that time all SAG voltage measurements dropped to the
level of PCG batteries and all SAg current measurements dropped to
zero. Subsequently, no valid data was received from any SAS Wing 2
temperature or position measurements.
SAg Wing 1 attempted to deploy at the nominal time but was con-
strained in s partially deployed configuration by debris of the meteoroid
shield. Wing section partial deployment in this configuration allowed
sunlight to illuminate some solar cell modules and provided power
approximately equivalent to one normally deployed module (1/240 of
total SAg capability). Although insignificant in terms of supplying
cluster loads, this output was utilized to allow some recharging of
the AM batteries. The IU commands, the Exploding Bridgewire (EBW)
electronic units, and the ordnance systems functioned as designed.
The command e_quences and results are shown in the Table 7.I. The SAg
Wing 1BeamFairing ordnance was successfully detonated at the proper
time by the pre-progrmmed primary command (Figure 7.2). The Beam
Fairing left its secured position and deployed until it was constrained
by debris from the meteoroid shield (as observed later by SL-2 crew).
The backup system EBN was charged end fired by DCS ground command and
operated nominally, but was ineffective in completing deployment.
The SAg wing section EBW responded to the primary Charge and Reset
t 213
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' PRIMARY SYSTEMS
TIME COMMANDISSUED CMD
MEASUREMENT GMT GET (SEC) SOURCE REMARKS ,
' SAS FAIRING
EBW FU 2 CHG 18:10:00 2400 IU S/S 9 SAS WING 1 FAIRING
EBW FU 2 _IRE 18:10:05 2405 IU S/S 53 SECURED _ASUREMENT
INDICATED
_ EBW FU 2 RST 18:10:I0 2410 IU S/S i0 MOVEMENT AT 18:10:06 :
SAS WINGS *
EBW FU 2 CHG 18:22:00 3120 IU S/S 11 EBW DID NOT FIRE -
EB_ FU 2 FIRE 18:22:05 3125 IU S/S 51 INTERLOCKED WITH
FAIRING
• ?
SECO_:DARY SYSTEMS
_ l SAS FAIRING
EBW FU 1 CHG 19:08:22 5902 DCS-182 PRIMARY SYS.
EBW FU 1 FIRE 19:08:42 5922 DCS-163 RELEASED
• EBW FU 1 RST 19:09:!0 5950 DCS-183 FAIRING
?
SAS WINGS ,
EBW FU 1 CHG 19:20:56 6656 DCS-172 SAS WING 1 POSITION
' EBW FU 1 FIRE 19:23:26 6806 DC_-162 MEASUREMENT INDICATED
EBW FU 1 RST 19:24:01 6841 DCS-173 MOVEMENT AT 19:23:28
]
Table 7.1 EBW Coamand History for OWS Solar Array Deployment. _
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commands (Figure 7.3), but was prevented from firing the ordnance for
deployment by an interlock which is only satisfied by full deployment
of both Beam Fairings. The backup system w6s charged and fired by
ground command and the Wing Sections were observed to partially deploy
until contact wlth the ONS tank wall was made.
On DAY 25 the astronauts, during EVA, proceeded to deploy SAg
Ning #I. A bolt cutter was used to sever the meteoroid shield re-
straining debris. A tether was tied to one gAS vent module and the
astronaut stood erect under the tether applylng a force to the beam
fairing and breaking loose the actuator damper. The beam fairing
deployed to the full open position in approximately 15 seconds. The
wing sections partlally deployed and then stopped because of the low
temperature of the actuator dampers. A -45° pitch maneuver was made
allowlng direct solar energy to warm the beam falrlngs. In approxl-
mately 5 hours (DAY 26:00:30 hours CMT), the wing sections had deployed
I00 percent, thus ending an abnormal storage period of 24 days in a
partially deployed conflguratlon.
: Deployment allowed the full power generating capabillty on that
wing or approximately one-half of the total SAg design capability of
each SAG.
The original 2-wlng solar array subsyatemwas required to
; deliver an average available power to the AN/OWS interface of not less
than 10,496 watts, within a voltage range of 51 to 125 Vdc, integrated
over the sunlight portion of the orbit at the end of mission. This
power was required to be distributed among eight (8) individual Solar
Array Group (SAG) sources with an available average of not less than
1,312 watts each. With the loss of Wing 2, the power was reduced to
5,248 watts total and 656 watts for each half-SAG source. The pre-
launch prediction for gAS performance degradatiot., from all causes,
was 8.3% at the end of mission. The mininunn required average of 5,723
watts total and 715 watts from each SAG at the beginning of the mission
was derived. The voltage requirement was not affected by the loss
of Wing 2. SAg performance was analyzed for several orbits following
deployment. Array performance was analyzed for an average array tem-
perature of +145°F (335°K) and Figure 7.4 shows an available average
array power of between 6,500 watts and 7,050 watts. The apparent
increase in power, over the period of the mission, occurred for two
reasons; (1) solar flux increased from a minimum (Aphelion) near the
beginning of the mission, to a maximua (Perihelion) at approximately
DAY 237, and (2) no measurable performance degradation was detected.
Solar Array Croup (SAG) voltage end current data was evaluated for solar
inertial orbits at beta angles from 0 ° to 73.5 ° . At low beta angles,
1) the SAg saw the sun approximately 61Z of the time, 2) the highest
Depth of Discharge (_OD) (for solar inertial attitudes) on the PCG
217
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batteries occurred, thus the $A$ operated at peak power for several
minutes. At beta angles above 69.5 °, continuous sunllght orbits
occurred, and battery charge/dlscharge cycles did not occur; hence
the system did not operate at peak power, and only small variations
were seen in SAg voltage and current.
Figures 7.5 through 7.7 show SAG voltage and current profiles
for DAYs 26, 42, and 206. Data for DAY42 (Figure 7.6) is Included
to illustrate high beta, continuous sunlight, SAG characteristlcs.
Figure 7.7 for DAY 206 shows voltage and current profiles during one
orbit of peak power operation after EREP 11.
Analysis of data for DAY 266, near the end of $L-4, revealed
the fact that voltages and currents for _ach of the groups were very
slmilar to those shown for DAY 26.
In solar inertial vehicle orientation, shadowlng from the ATM
solar array resulted in the loss of less than one module from SAG 5,
less than two (2) modules from SAG 6, and one full (I) module from
SAG 8. Only one or two cell strings were lost from SAG 5. For sAG 6,
one module was always shadowed and up to two additional strings were
shadowed on the second module. The variation in the number of string_
shadowed was a result of omall varlations from true solar Inertlal
vehicle orientation, and appeared to verify the ± 0.5 degree predicted
vehicle control accuracy.
The lower current in SAG 4 on Figure 7.5a was due to an ano-
maly in the current measurement whlch was pomtulated to have resulted
from SAG 4 return shorting when Wing 2 was lost. If the current for
SAG 4 was as low as indicated, the battery of I_G 4 would take much
longer to recharge than the other batteries. There was no indication
that Battery 4 had taken longer for recharge then any other battery
sup_lled by a 15 module SAG.
The events of an orbit can be followed on Figure 7.5. The
date begins near the end of the sunllght portion of an orbit. As
the solar array went into night, the current dropped to zero, and the
voltage dropped to the AM I_0 battery voltage. During thl8 period,
the batteri6s provided th_ pc_er to the loads and their depth of
discharge depended upon the load and the duration of the shadowed
portion of the orbit. When the arrays came into sunlight, they were
cold (see Figure 7.9), and the voltages were at their peak values
and decreased as the array warmed up. The current was high because
of the increased loads while the batteries were recharging.
When the batteries approached full charge, thecharge rate de-
creased repulting in a drop in current and a rise in voltage. After
220
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the batteries were fully charged, the current remained nearly con-
stant at the lower values shown and the voltage continued to vary _s
a function of temperature with a slight rise in voltage prior to the
end of sunlight portions of the orbit corresponding to the small de- _i
crease in temperature that occurred.
One _llce of data for DAY 26 was analyzed in detail when all
= SAGs were operating near maximum power, that is, when tllecombination
of battery charging and bus loads present the maximum demand and the op-
erating point of the SAS was controlled by the PCG peak power tracker.
The data slice was at 6.5 minutes after sunrise. At this time, the
average transducer temperature was determined to be 21.8°F. A delta-T
of 32°F was added to this value to obtain the solar cell temperature
of 53.8°F. ThefT correction factor is a functidn of (I) time from !
sunrise, and (2) beta angle. The voltage and current for each SAG
was determined at this time slice and plotted against SAG prediction
curves in Figures 7.8a through 7.8c. These figures represent the per-
formance predictions for 13, 14, and 15 module SAGs. In all cases,
except for SAG 4, the performance exceeded the predicted values. The
higher actual SAG performance values were attributable, in part, to
(I) _eflected energy from the gold tank surface, (2) less shadowing
than predicted, and (3) SAGs 5 through 8 were below the average array
temperature because they were primarily located on the outboard wing
section. Analysis of PCG input and output power values and battery
charge current measurements indicated normal PCG 4 operation, and that
SAG 4 was producing power comparable to the other SAGs having no sha-
dowed modules. For purposes of SAS performance evaluation, SAG 4
current was assumed to be equal to the average of SAGs i, 2, and 3
currents. Using this method of evaluation, it was concluded that SAG
4 current also exceeded the predicted value. Average array power,
at +145°F (335°K), was determined to be 6700 watts.
SAG I voltage and current profiles, shown on Figure 7.6 for
the 73.5° beta orbit on DAY 42, are for a Beta of 69.5°. SAG voltage
was fairly constant at 75 volts and SAG current measured 2 to 3 maps.
These values were consistent with the constant array temperature at
high beta angles and the fact that the PCG batteries demanded only
trickle charge current at this time.
Figure 7.7 shows the voltage and current performance of SAG I •
for DAY 206, beta angle = -9°, after the EREP No. ii mar. Iver to Z-LV
(Z-axls Local Vertical) which was concluded at Gbr£ 1634.
Battery Depth of Discharge (DOD) was great enough following
the maneuver to cause all SAGs/PCGs to remain in the peak power track-
ing mode for one entire solar inertial orbit. Array performance at
about 5 minutes after sunrise was analyzed. The average temperature
transducer measurement was (262OK), the delta-T correction
228
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factor was determined to be +32°F (18°K), and the resultlng average
array temperature was +44.3°F (280°K). Average SAS power was found
to be 6970 watts at +145OF (335oK).
As a verification of the above method of determining average
array power for instantaneous values of SAG voltage, current, and
temperature, continuous (taped) data was analyzed for SAG 1. Voltage,
current, and temperature data (Figures 7.7, and 7.12, respectlvely)
were integrated and average values of each were determined. Using
this technique the resulting average array power was found to be 6940
watts which correlates within less than 0.5% with the 6970 watts ob-
tained using the instantaneous or single data slice method.
Voltage and current performance characteristics for SAGs i
through 8 on DAY 266, beta O_are the same as those recorded on DAY
26, with the exception of time in peak power operation. Calculated
average array performance, at +145°F (335°K), was 6895 watts.
The calculation of average and maxlmmn available array power
values for each SAG were recorded on a daily basis. In both cases,
the variation since SAS deployment was well within the accuracy of
the measurements involved, demonstrating the assertion that no SAS
performance degradation trend was detectable throughout the mission.
'This was attributed to the fact that the orbital environment
encountered by the SAS was very nominal, and in particular, the
extremes of thermal environment were less severe than those assumed
in preflight analyses and testing. Addltlonally, there was no meas-
urable degradation of solar panel thermal control surfaces.
The power margin at the end of mission was also a result of
some conservatism in original performance predictions.
The early program concern over the discrepancy between the
AM power requirement and predicted array performance resulted
in concentrated efforts to make the best possible use of
available array area and to ensure providing a minimum of 51
volts at the AH/ONS interface.
Shsdovlng analyses considered 17 out of 240 modules would
be shadowed for entire orbits (5 ° TACS control). In
reality, only 3 equivalent modules (of 120 Wing I modules)
were shadowed during CMG control (± 0.5°). i
Power calculations assumed 3-slgma maximum instantaneous !
values of heat flux for entire orbits. In actuality, the t
effects of the random behavior of earth IR and albedo are
not wel 1 known.
232
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The assumption of an eight degree mis-orientation error
existing continuously between the array and the sun was
overly conservative.
Sole, module pre_nission performance capability was higher
than predicted because of higher average solar cell output
(256 NA vs. 248mA) and lower manufacturing losses.
SAg wiring was sized assuming worst case high temperatures
which resulted in less voltage drop than predicted.
(a) Thermal. With the loss of Wing 2, the operat-
ing temperature of the SAg was determined from the outputs of ten (10)
temperature transducers on Wing 1, corrected as a function of bets
• ngle and elapsed time since orbital sunrise. The solar panel trans-
ducer temperatures were cyclic with each orbit with the maximum •rid
minimum temperature dependent upon the beta •ngle of the orbit and
the orbital thermal environment.
As the beta angle increased, tlme in the earth's shadow de-
creased and total sunlight orbits occurred for beta angles above approx.
im•tely 69.5 °. Figures 7.9 through 7.12 show typical qAS temper•ture
tr•nsducer profiles for the followlng days.
7.9 7.10 7.11. 7.12
DAY 26 42 206 266
Beta +10o +73.50 -9o 0
Maximum and minimum temperatures of the 10 transducers are plotted.
Comparison of •ctu•l temper•ture profiles with predicted pro-
files shoved good correlation. Some differences did exist in the
p•ra_eters of the maximum temperature •nd the tomperature gradients
• cross the wing, but these did not signiflc•ntly affect performance.
The predicted maxlmum tomper•tu_e, occurring near orblt•l noon,
was _ower then the measured vslue_ since it was based on the assump-
tion that the SAg would be operating •t peak power continuously in
sunllght.
In reality, peak power oper•tlon ended when the bstterles sp-
proached full charge, and this generally occurred in the first 15
minutes of sunllght in • solar inertial orbit. When operatlns below
peak power, the array efficiency dropped and self heating increased.
The larger gradient of the actual temperatures wss s result of
the loss of the meteoroid shield. The meteoroid shield in the vicinity
of Wing I was painted black and had • low reflectivity. The loss of
233
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the shield exposed the high reflectlvlty gold surface and resulted in
increased albedo reflection from the OWS tank, and in the area where
the parasol did not shade the OWS tank, direct solar reflection from J
the tank to the SAS.
The temperature transducer measurement history indicated high
an3 low temperature, maximum and minimum, transducer readings at
orbital noon and prior to sunrise. A trend toward slightly warmer
temperatures, at a given beta angle, was attributed to increased solar
intensity as the mission progressed; hence, it appeared that no mea-
surable degradation of solar panel thermal characteristics had taken
place.
(2) Power Conditioners. Eight independent power con-
ditioners regulated power from the solar array to supply power to
assigned loads and to charge the storage batteries d'iring the day-
light periods. Conditioned power was applied to either of two main
buses by switch control. Major components of each power conditioner
were: a charger, battery, and voltage regulator.
_a) Charger. The battery charger (Figure 7.13)
received power from the solar array and supplied it to the bus regu-
lator primarily to satisfy load demands and secondarily to charge the
battery (Figure 7.14). A peak power tracker unit restricted the char-
ger output so that the solar array power requirement would not exceed
the maximum power point, thereby preventing overloading of the arrays.
An ampere-hour meter controlled battery charging by measuring the
amount of current supplied by the battery and ensured that a like
amount was replaced.
The battery chargers performed satisfactorily both before and
after the deployment of solar array wing i. The battery chargers, in
power conditioners 5, 6, and 7 operated with dual low power solar
array inputs to charge their respective batteries to I00 percent.
Solar Array currents during the charging of these batteries (5 through
8) were between 0.4 and 1.2 amperes, prior to Wing i deployment. These
current levels were _li_n_21cantly below the desired range of operation
for the battery chargers in any planned mode.
The other four batteries (I - 4) could not be charged because
the power available, from the imposed dual solar array group combina-
tions for these batteries, was insufficient to operate the battery
chargers. Another result of the low solar array power was that
flight telemetered data, on battery chargers I, 3, 4, and 8, and
possibly the other battery chargers, verified that they experienced
an oscillating input caused by the repetitive collapse and recovery
of the solar array output characteristic. The array voltage would
rise to the point at which the battery charger bias circuits would
238
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turn on. The current drawn by the bias circuits, however, would pull
down the solar array voltage to such a level that, because of the low
solar array power, the circuits would turn off again. At this point,
the array voltage would recover to its original level, and the cycle
would repeat again. Analysis of the battery charger circuits, however,
indicated that this condition should not have caused any problems. As
a safety factor, however, the charger switch was placed in the bypass
position, so that the solar array output was removed from the battery
charger input. This was maintained for most of that period in the
mission.
Another abnormal condition occurred when the Amp-Hour (A-H)
meters for PCG #8 were reset to 0% on DAY 14. This resulted when
A-H integrator CB #8, on STS panel 201, was inadvertently opened by
crew action. Normally, the reset to 0% would not have resulted from
this action, since each A-H meter is powered from redundant sources
through an A-H integrator CB and a battery control CB. However, all
battery control CBs were open during this period to prevent the A-H
meter circuits from d_seharging the batteries while the batteries
could not be recharged. After solar array power became available,
the A-H meters for #8 were returned to synchronization with the
actu_l battery SOC and they operated normally thereafter.
Each battery charger conditioned its associated solar array
group input so that peak powe."was extracted upon demand during ini-
tial battery charging, battery voltage was limited as determined by
battery temperature during the voltage limit charge mode, and battery
current w_s regulated when the battery-charger-controUlng ampere-hour
meter indicated a I00 percent battery state of charge. Figure 7.14
illustrates the typical operatlor, of a power conditioner for one
charge-discharge cycle after the _1orkshop solar array wing deployment
through to the all-Sun position attained ,n DAY 39.
Peak Po#er Tracking. Peak power tracking
was experienced from the beginning c,feach sunlight period until the
battery was iully charged. Availabl_ solar array power was maximum at
sunrise, and it gradually decreased following sunrise as the solar
array group temperature increased. _e peak power tracking portion
of the charger input power curve in shown in Figure 7.14. The opera-
tional diagram of the charger peak po_er tracker, Figure 7.15, shows
how it extracted maximum power from the -olaf array group in_nediately
i upon sunrise and then decreased its demand as the available solar
array group decreased. As shown in Figure 7.15, the peak power tracker
closely followed the characteristic solar array profile until the
battery charge voltage limit mode was reached. At this time, the
charger input power decreased with the reduction of battery charge
_ current demand. This device performed satisfactorily throughout the
entire 271 day mission.
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Battery Voltage and Current Regulation.
The battery charger was designed as shown in the simplified block
diagram (Figure 7.16), so that the battery voltage would not exceed
a limiting value imposed by battery temperature. Data showed that
the battery charger limited the battery under charge to the correct
value for the corresponding battery top-of-cell temperatures. Battery
temperatures throughout the mission varied from i to ii degrees Centi-
grade well within the predicted ranges.
Figure 7.17 illustrates battery volt_g_ limit values versus
battery temperature for the entire operating battery temperature
range from 40 to 50°F experienced through the end of SL-3. Values
are plotted for all eight PCGs in various orbits. A predicted per-
formance is shown for comparison and a tolerance band for TM accuracy
is also shown. The spread on the values for the various temperatures
compared very favorably wlth the predicted performance values based
on the battery charger acceptance test data.
When the controlling ampere-hour meter indicated that the bat-
tery had returned to i00 percent of charge, the battery current was
regulated to 0.75 _ 0.5 ampere. The battery current curve, in Figure
7.15, shows the drop to the trickle charge level at the time that the
controlling ampere-hour meter reached I00 percent charge. The cur-
rent then remained stable at 0.9 ampere throughout the trickle charge
region. This operation was typical for all eight power conditioners
through the end of SL-3. In some instances during SL-3, the charac-
teristics of the batteries were such that the battery voltage re-
quired to maintain the normal trickle charge current was higher than
the voltage limit. In these instances, the battery voltage was
limited to the voltage limit value, and as a result, the battery cur-
rent was reduced below the normal trickle charge level. Performance
remained normal throughout the remainder of the mission.
Ampere-Hour Meter Control. The ampere-
hour meter tracked the battery discharge-charge profile in I percent
(SOC) steps. The accuracy of readings was improved by including in
the integration of battery charge current a temperature compensation
factor, which corresponds to the battery ,emperature. Figure 7.18 is
an operational diagram of the A_. Figure 7.14 shows the typical re-
lationship between the ampere-hour meter SOC indication and the battery
current. The meter accurately registered battery discharge and charge.
Upon reaching I00 percent, the battery charger control circuitry
switched to trickle charge. The meter output remained at I00 percent
until battery discharge began at the next sunset. Figure 7.19 com-
pared the AHM SOC telemetry indications over one orbit to a calculated
SOC over the same orbit. The calculated SOC value was based on bat-
tery current and temperature telemetry data and included the tempera-
ture compensation factor during charge. Considering the telemetry
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accuracy limitation involved in the parameters used for the calculated
curve and those on the direct SOC readings, the AHNSOC integration
accuracy is seen to be very favorable.
The validity of this conclusion was borne out by the following
performance observations. There were no indications of any h_rdware
malfunctlons or failures during these periods and there wer_ no system
performance effects as a result of the drift of the AHMindications.
The AHMindications returned to correlation with other battery para-
meters after short periods of operation at reduced load levels.
Although the return factor was only compensated for battery
temperature variations, the actual return factor varied a small amount
with a number of other factors including battery depth-of-discharge
(DOD), battery aging, etc. To allow for these other factors, the
return factor was sllghtly conservative to assure that the >attery
was always fully charged when trickle charge was initiated. In addi-
tion to the design return factor being conservative, me_t of the
flight AHMsexhibited a tolerance error in the device clzcuitry which
was in the direction to increase the return factor.
At the beginning of a charge period, all available array power
was delivered tn the battery after the load was satisfied. The bat-
tery charger was peak power tracking at that time. As the battery
accepted charge, the battery voltage slowly increased to the tempera-
ture compensated voltage limit value. The battery charger then main-
tained that voltage until the battery SOC, as indicated by the con-
trolling AHM,reached 100 percent. As the baLtery approached a fully
charged state, the battery current decayed. If the AHHreached I00
percent SOC prior to the end of the daylight period, the battery char-
get switched to trickle charge. If the AIM integrated SOC had not
reached I00 percent prior to the end of the daylight period, the re-
turn factor had not been sail&fled, and the battery charger maintained
the voltage limit voltage at the battery terminals. This condition
had been observed for several ampere-hour met&re during the SL-3 mis-
sion and had also been observed in several ground system test programs.
Although sufficient solar array power may have been available, the char-
acteristics of the battery could have been such, that in the charging
time available, the battery current at voltage limit was so low that
the battery -mould not accept sufficient charge to satisfy the A_4 re-
turn factor. Tht battery was, in fact, achieving a fully charged state.
This had been demonstrated in ground test programs by capacity dis-
charge testing of the battery after a number of cycles under these
conditions.
Figure 7.20 shows a typical discharge-charge cycle during _hlch
the AIM SOC indication at sunset w88 less than for the previous sunset,
During this cycle, the battery voltage re_hed voltage limit 31 minutes
!
248
k
1974022202-275
7269 _.
t
1974022202-27R
after the beginning cf the dayllght cycle. The battery current decayed
to a level of approxlmately one ampere and main_alned this level for
the remainder of the charge cycle. The calculated ratio of ampere hours
returned to the battery to the ampere hours removed (actual return fac-
tor achieved) was 1.061. Since the AHHwa. designed for a return fac-
tor of 1.075 at the battery temperature observed, the AHM SaC indication
could not recover to the previous sunset level. If the condition of
the AHM return factor not being satisfied was maintained ov_r a number
of cycles, the AM indication would decay downward. The AH}4was an ana-
log measurement device, and as such contained some e_ror, both in bat-
tery current measurement and in the utillzatlon of the battery tempera-
ture sensor to establish the return f_ctor. Also, there _'_s a small
error which could occur in the transition from charge to discharge or
from discharge to charge. If the A_was no; returning to 100 percent
sac, th_ effect of these errors was not erased each cycle and could
accumu1: _e. These cumulatlve errors could cause ulvergence between the
primary and secondary AHMs and in s c_ne instances coulJ aggravate a dc_;n-
ward trend of the AHM sac indication. Thus, if the Al_ had not returned
te 100 percent sac over a large number of c}cles, th_ A:_may not have
had a close correlation to the actual battery sac, and a divergence be-
tween the controlllng a:id non-contro111ng A_ sac indication could occur
(Figure 7.21). Either or both of these conditions represented no com-
promise in system performance. Una_r these conditions, the battery
charging current characteristic was _he prlnclpal indication of the
battery state of charge. Near trlckle charge levels, for the final
minutes of charge at the battery voltage limit, i_dlcated that the bat-
tery was fully charged. Observation of battery voltage during dlscherge
also provided an indication of proper battery state of discharge and
had been observed to be _ormal in each instance observed on SL-3. The
probability of not satisfying the AHM return factor increased sharply
as the AM EPS load demand approached the AM EPS power capabillty. An
analysis of data during SL-4 indicated that the downward trend of the
AHN sac indications occurred during periods in which the actual AM EPS
load approached or exceeded the calculated AM EPS continuous power ca-
pabillty. The potentlcQetez adjustments, both reg bus and ?Ine adjust
affected the amount of power provided by each _CG and therefore affected
which PCGs exhibited a downward drift of 502 indication at any parti-
cular time. The rate at which tie A_ SOC indication recovered was dir-
ectly related to the number cf cecharge ampere-hours in excess of _hose
required to satisfy the return factor.
Efficiency. The ba_:ery charger effi-
ciency was considered to have been in the range from 90Z to 94 _ for
the operating conditions through the end of mlsJion. "hla estimated
level was necessary since reasonable efficiency calculations from flight
data were not possibl_ for the follovln8 reaso,,s: I) direct measure-
ments of the battery charger output voltage and current were not
available so a voltage regulator input power calculation was used
which in itself _,,aa based on indirect meaauremen_a; 2) the accuracy
limitations of several telemetry parameters led to a large uncertainty
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in the calculated numbers, and 3) the low value of the losses, at the
efficlencies being calculated, required very accurate calculations.
The first two obviously made it impossible to satisfy the third.
Overall operation in each PCG indicated continuous satisfactory battery
charger efficiency through the end of mission.
(b) Batteries. Each of the eight batteries com-
prised 30, series-connected, nickel-cadmium, sealed ceils. Each bat-
ery operated between 30 and 48 Vdc and had a 33 ampere-hour rating.
Thermistors in each batter_ provided temperature sensing for telemetry,
ampere-hour meter compensation, charge control, and protection against
excessive temperatures. Active cold plates regulated _verall case
temperature.
The eight AM EPS batteries provided power during the launch
phase. The batteries were then turned off at approximately 2 hours
after liftoff when it was determined that workshop solar array power
was not available. Batteries at this time ranged from 64 to 68 percent
of full charge. This remaining capability was planned as a contingency
power source for low power capability periods, such as during Earth
observation experiment passes, and also to retain maximum flexibility
in managing the batteries as the mission progressed and in the event
of recovering all or part of the solar array.
On DAY litthe batteries were turned on as it was determined
that partial deployment of one wing permitted limited power production.
They provided power only to the el_ctrical power system control buses
because all of the power conditioner output switches were in the Off
position. All batteries were subsequently turned off again on DAY 12
after approximately 8 hours of operation. The percent of charge for
batteries i through 4 at this time ranged from 48 to 53 percent.
Batteries 5 through 8 were cycled on and off at various ti_les for
troubleshooting purposes and attempted charging. By DAY 22, batteries
5, 6, and 7 were recharged to I00 percent. Battery 8 could not be
recharged to I00 percent. Battery 8 could not be recharged because
its available solar array power was insufficient to operate the bat-
tery charger. Batteries i through 4 remained off until DAy 25 when
they were again turned on in preparation for solar array wing i
deployment.
That initial 24-day period, during most of which all eight
batteries were turned off in a partially discharged state, consti-
tuted an abnormal storage period for the batteries. Recommended
storage was either, in a discharged state (18 amperes discharge rate
to 30 volts) for long periods, or in a fully charged state with
weekly boost charge periods. Although no special operations were
used to condition the batteries, they responded as originally ex-
pected when adequate solar arzay power became available to charge
them.
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Table 7.11 shows the indicated percent of charge of the bat-
reties just before and one orbit after solar array beam fairing deploy-
ment. The reading for battery 8 was abnormally low as a result of the
ampere-hour meter being inadvertently reset to zero on DAY 14. Prior
to that time it was reading 45 percent charged. The ampere-hour meters
for battery 8 became synchronized with the actual battery percent of
charge on DAY 29 and operated normally thereafter.
State of Charge, Percent
Time,
GMT, [Hr:Mtn Batt 1 Batt 2 Batt 3 Batt 4 Batt 5 Batt 6 Batt 7 Batt 8
17:00 45.8 45.8 50.7 48,3 96.2 99.0 95.5 0
20:07 55.4 54.1 62.7 56.2 99.8 i00.0 I00.0 21.4
Table 7.11 AM Batterles'State-of-Charge for DAY 25
All batteries demonstrated an ability to accept charge while
exhibiting predicted voltages. This indicated that no adverse elec-
trolyte distribution pattern had resulted from the "charged open
ciccuit" abnormal storage.
Recovery of the state of charge indication for battery 8 as
shown in Figure 7.22 provides qualltati_e information on charge reten-
tion during that period. The figure shows that once the measured 55%
depletion was returned to the battery a different rate of recovery for
the ampere-hour meter developed.
Battery cyclic performance from the time of solar array deploy-
ment until the first command and service module undocked was good. In
the course of the first visit, 21q battery cycles were a_cumulated.
Figure 7.14 shows a representative cycle profile of battery parameters.
The charge voltage limitation mode resulted in some avaitable power
not being used, but the charge voltage on the battery was maintained
at the proper level. This operational mode continued until cyclic
battery inefficiency was satisfied by returning more ampere-hours
than were dlschatged (overcharge), at which time the charge auto-
matically reverted to a maintenance trickle charge. The trickle
charge continued until the next discharge period.
The depth of discharge range most commonly experienced durin_
the SL-2 mission was 12 to 14 percent. Depths up to 30 percent were
experienced during high activity perloda#or periods of other than
solar inertial vehicle attitude. Continuous solar energy was
253
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available to power the vehicle for th_ initial four days of the SL-2/
SL-3 storage period because of the high beta angle conditions. The
batteries, therefore, were subjected to continuous charging at the
trickle charge rate for this entire four-day period. The battery
temperatures remained stable and the charging potentials required to
sustain the trickle charge rate for each battery converged toward a
uniform level, as expected. The batteries resumed normal cyclic
operation on DAY 44 and cycled _t an average DOD of approximately 9
percent during the remainder of the storage period. Cycle accumula-
tion at the tlme of SL-3 launch (DAY 76) reached 772 cycles. Composite
battery discharge experience is presented in Figure 7.24. The data
shown on these graphs covers the operating period from DAY 29 tl_Lou_h
DAY 39 and includes data points for all eight batteries. The telemetry
data was scanned to obtain discharge current rates in the three dif-
ferent ranges: 6.0 to 7.9 amperes, 8.0 to 9.0 amperes, and 9.1 to Ii.0
amperes. The curves indicate a linear and repeatable discharge volt-
age characteristic over the depths most consistently experienced dur-
ing the ml3slon. Where special mission activity resulted In greater
depth of discharge than the normal, a plateau is seen. Similar results
have been experienced during ground test programs.
Date dispersion resulted from instrumentation accuracy tolerance
allowances. Individual voltage readings have an allowance of + .25
volts and state of charge readings have an allowance of _ 2.5%.
It was anticipated that the coolant inlet temperatures to the
batteries would exceed the vernatherm control valve setting of 39
3°F and reach as high as 5_°F during periods of high crew activity
(EVA) or non-solar inertial attitude. These conditions did not ma-
terialize, and the vernatherms maintained continuous control. In-
dicated top of cell battery teT_peratures consistenLly fell in the 40
to 50°F ranFe. This was a favorable temperature range for battery
cyclic llfe.
Batteries supplying the same AM regulated bus exhibited a unl-
formlty of operation which made astronaut aljustmen_ of the regulator
flne trim pots unnecessary. Typical data which shows thls uniformity
is in Table 7.111. The discharge current shows that each battery In-
creased slightly as its voltage decreased. This was caused by the con-
stant regulator power demand on the battery. The curve for a 16 to 18
ampere discharge rate was obtained during performance of a battery
capacity test on DAY 106. For thls test, the regulator output voltage
was adjusted to increase the load on b_ttery 8, and the solar array
input was disconnected from che power conditioners to maintain con-
tlnuous battery discharge during the test.
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Start of DischarKe End of DischarKe
Minimum
Regulator Voltage, Current, Voltage, Current, State of
Bus Number Battery dc amperes dc amperes Charge
i i 41.78 8.74 38.32 9.44 88.5
I 2 41.79 8.66 38.23 9.37 88.1
i 3 41.99 8.59 38.23 9.38 88.5
] 4 42.08 8.68 38.23 9.39 89
2 5 41,57 8.97 38.02 10.15 87.5
2 6 41.68 9.39 38.03 10.18 86.3
2 7 41.88 9.30 37.83 10.97 87.4
2 8 41.78 9.53 37.83 11.27 86.3
Table 7.111 Battery-Regulator Performance for Typical Night Orbit
In addition to the test on battery 6, a capacity test was per-
formed on battery 8 on DAY 106 (Figures 7.25 and 7.26). Both batteries
were purposely deep discharged to determine their available capacities.
Capacity of the batteries had been determined in ground tests by
measuring the ampere-hours extracted at an 18-ampere discharge rate
to an end voltage of 30 volts. The inflight discharge procedure de-
viated from the ground practice in that the astronauts terminated the
discharge when they detected a terminal voltage of 33 volts. The
char_er ampere-hour meter state of charge indication was used to
measure the obtained capacities during these discharges. The results
of these flight discharges are shown in Figures 7.25 and 7.26. lne
change in the genera] Ph_pe cf Lhe alscharge characteristic since the
acceptance testing of _he unlt_ can be seen by examination of _he
figure. The characteristic exhibited at acceptance testing has in
both cases changed to one in which initial voltage plateau developed
at a lower level than a single plat_-u of the acceptance characteris-
tic. The final few data points before the termination of the inflight
discharges indicated the development of a second lower plateau, which
is compatible wit|_ ground test experience. The increased prominence
and duration of this second plateau and the recession of the initial
plateau may have been partially a function of cycle accumulation.
Composite battery discharge experience for the SL-3 mission
is presented in Figure 7.27. The SL-3 data shown on these graphs
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cover the operating period from DAYs 76 through 135. These data were
_elected and are presented in the same manner as the SL-_ composite
data. A comparison of the SL-3 and SL-2 composite data indicates a
detectable recession of the initial discharge characteristic plateau
from what it was during SL-2 as previously stated.
A condition where some ampere-hour meters drifted from what
was believed to be the actual state of charge of the batteries during
the SL-3 mission was covered in the SL-3 battery charger dls_ussion.
Whereas battery terminal voltage was not an accurate means ,f determin-
ing indlvidual battery state of charge, a comparison of several battery
discharge terminal voltages at like delta-ampere-hour extraction points
provided an indication of SOC status. This was done for several dls-
charges occurring in the ampere-.hour meter drift periods of $L-3 =rid
showed comparable voltage levels for all the batteries. This voltage
level consistency coupled with lack of a voltage degradation trend,
indicated, in a qualitative way, that all the batteries were being
fully charged irrespective of the ampere*hour meter indications.
The batteries had accumulated 1683 flight cycles at the time
the second crew departed on DAY 135. The depth of discharge range
most commonly experienced during the second manned period was 13 to
16 percent. Forty-one Earth observation passes were performed during
this mission. Battery depths of discharge were generally greater
during these passes than during _u_l solar inertlal operarlon. The
maximum depth of discharge experience_ occurred during the final pass,
DAY 131,when depths ranged from 36 to 42.7 percent.
Each AM battery was actively cooled. Parallel coolant flow at
controlled temperatures (4_ +2 -4°F) was provided to coldplates for
_atteries 3, 4, 7, and 8. 1_e coolant from these coldplates was
avMlable for batteries i, 2, 5, and 6, respectively, in such a man-
ner that for e_ch pair, the heat picked up from the _irst battery In-
creased t,_a coolant inlet temperature at the second battery.
On DAY 104, a coolant loop system operational change decreased
the coolant mass flow by approximately 50 percent. The effects were
detectable by an approximately 2°F Incrzsse in the operating tempera-
tures of batteries I, 2, 5, and 6. Changes in the temperatures of
batteries 3, 4, 7, and 8 were too small to be detected in the tele-
metry scatter. Other than this detected increase, the indicated top
of cell (TOC_ battery temperatures were comparable to those experienced
during the fi_rst manned period.
Contingency plannln8 called for discontinuing PCG operation
during SL-3/SL-4 storage in the event of coolant loop depletlon.
However, the batteries cycled throughout the entire storage period,
as execution of the contingency plan was unnecessary. By the time
i
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of the launch of SL-4, the batteries had ac umulated 2486 cycles. The
cycle depths which averaged approximately 7% during this period were
less than those of the first storage period because of the EPS config-
uration established per the modified SL-3 AM EPS shutdown procedure.
AM battery dischazge/charge cycle accumulatlon, at the time the
SL-4 crew _eparted on DAY 271 was 3790 cycles. The range of discharge
depths experienced during the solar oriented periods was 12 co 19%.
Discharge depths near 50% were common for the off-sun experiment or-
ientations wlth the maximum depth reachJng 57%. Composite _:_ttery dls-
charge experience for th_ SL-4 mission is presented in Flgu_e 7.28.
One hundred and ten non-solar oriented attitudes were esCab-
llshed in the course of the mission for Earth Resource and Comet
Kohoutek observations. Failure of a Control Moment tyro, on DAY 194,
resulted in more off-sun attitude tlme than normally would have been
required to accomplish the desired observations. AM battery per-
formance was uniform and rellable during the mission. Their ablllty
to sustain the heavy depths of discharge dependably contributed to
the high success level of the mission.
Capacity discharges were performed on PCG 6 battery at the be-
ginning, In the middle, and at the end of the SL-4 manned phase. The
flrst two discharges were performed according to the procedure used
In the SL-3 mission whlle the third, el-4 discharge, was continued
until the battery terminal voltage reached 30.0 volta. As mentioned
previously, the 30.0 volt termination _aa conslstant with ground test
practice. The results of these tests are shown in Figure 7.29.
consistent pattern of battery output voltage regulation degradation
with increasing cycle accumulation can be seen when SL-3 capacity
discharge information for PCG 6 is added to the informatlln contained
In Figure 7.29. This progressive pattern of nlckel-cadmium '_emory'
development was apparently mlnlmally affected by incomplete capacity
discharges.
A special E_S conflguratio, was established as part of the
el-4 crew closeout o_ the Skylab. This was done in anticipation of
capacity testing cf all Aldbatter_es _ter the crew departure. The
de_Ised system conflguratlon allowed groun_ selection of any one of
the eight AM batterJ ,_ for dlschaxge, established discharge rates
near the ground test l_vel of C/2, permitted continuous discharge
of the selected battery to a 30.0 volt completion, and pr vlded a self
limitation of battery discharge as the battery terminal voltage ap-
proached 29.0 volts. The last feature was desirable as ground station
coverage could not be assured at every critical discharge time. The
flexibility of the AM EPS control capability proved Invaluable in
accomplishing the test objectives.
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All eight AM batLeries were discharged to 30.0 volts duringthe post SL-4 test period. In addition. PCG 6 and 8 batteries received
, | a second full capacity discharge during this test period.
: _ Three distinct discharge profiles were found to exist. Figure
_ 7.30 depicts the discharge characteristic of PCG I and 4 batteries,
_ while Figure 7.31 shows the characteristic of the remainder with the
l exception of PCG 6.
i PCG 6 battery, which was discharged to 30.0 volts shortly! before the crew departed, exhibited discharge characteristics as shown
: i in Figure 7.29. When comparing these figures and previous ground
test experience on units with similar history, a marked consistency
_ was noted except for the duration of the second voltage plateau which
_ began at about 16 amp-hrs. One possible contributing factor to this
l dlfferen_e was the length of time the various batteries were in thef vehicle before launch. PCG I and 4 batteries were in the vehicle 22
I days p_ior to launch, while the rest were installed slxty-eight days
_ before launch. The second voltuge plateau for PCG I and 4 batteries
I was longer, and resulted in greater _mp-hour capacity.
: Comparing profiles of Figure 7.39 and the 3736 cycle profile
of Figures 7.30 or 7.31 indicates that PCG 6 battery had a slightly
i better performance characteristic than other batteries of similar
h_story. As was mentioned earlier, incomplete capacity discharges did
• _ not affect the onset of "memory" appreciably. The difference noted
here are small and are felt to be the result of periodic partial
i discharges of PCG 6 battery during the Skylab mission.
The more pronounced effect of full capacity discharges on the
subscqucat discharge profiles can be seen in Figure 7.29 by comparing
I the 373_ cycle to the 3797 cycle and finally to the 3803 cycle. This
same phenomenon was present in PCG 8 battery's end of mission capacity
data s,d in AM ground test experience with llfe cycle batteries.
(c) Bus Voltage Regulators. Eight bus voltage
! regulators supplled voltage to two main bus_s (Figure 7.32). The _ :
t char_er normall:, supplied power to the regulator; however, a bypass
! ! switch allowed the solar array power to feed directly to the regulator .:
i in the case of a charger malfunction. A potentiometer simultaneouslyadjusted the output of all regulators which were tied to the same bus.
i This bus voltage _djustment was made to regulate load sharing betweenthe AM/OWS power system a d _he other Skylab power sources. Fin i _
adjustment potenttometers regulated load sharing by the individual
regulators. _
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! Before SL-I launch the individual regulator potentlometers
were set to a value that permitted all 8 batteries to discharge at
y
a uniform rate. This wam done to compensate for the variations in
battery cells, differences in the individual circuit and component
resistances, and differences in regulator efflciencies. Analysis
of flight data for the complete mission indicated normal operation
of all 8 regulators. Specific fluctuations within the regulators
are discussed in the following paragraphs.
! Bus Voltage Regulation. Throughout the
mission the voltage regulator conditioned power from both the battery
and the battery charger. As a result, its input voltage varied in the
4 range from 38 to 46 volts. As shown in Figure 7.33 the regulated Reg
bus voltage was not affected by the relatively large variance in input
voltage. The small fluctuations in Reg bus voltage seen were attribu-
table to bus load variations and/or telemetry data conversion accuracy
limitations. This condition was typical for the entire Skylab mission.
V-I Output Characteristic. With four vol-
tage regulators operating on each Reg bus, the bus voltage decreased
from open circuit voltage (OCV) by 0,01 volt per ampere of load.
Figure 7.34 shows the relatlonshlp of telemetry data points to pre-
dicted V-I curves. The curves are based on a 0,01 volt per ampere
droop and Reg Bus 20CV settings of 29.22 and 29.45 volts. These
values closely approximate the desired settings for DAY 31 and 37,
respectively. Considering the accuracy limitations on the telemetry
data, the data points compare favorably with the predicted cur_ _s and
the comparison was typlcal for both Reg buses. The Reg Bus poten-
: tlometers were adjusted several times during SL-I/SL-2 for the purpose
of regulating AM load level or the AM/ATM load sharing. The potentio-
meter adjustments were made over nearly the entire adjustment range
from nearly full CCW to a 29.50CV setting. For the purpose of power
management, several adjustments of the Reg Adjust potentlometers were
made during SL-3. However, at no time were adjustments imposed for
either voltage regulatlon drift or instability purposes. The expected
bus voltage "Jroop" of 0.01 volts per ampere was observed for each
open circuit voltage setting. An OCV of 29.45 volts for Reg Bus 2
was malntalned throughout the SL-2 to SL-3 storage perlud and the
first ten days of SL-3. Thus the data for DAY 78 follows the same
V-I curve as the SL-2 data of DAY 37. The data of DAY 134 follows the
V-I curve corresponding to an OCV of 29.02 which was maintained for
Reg Bus 2 at that time. The SEPSA computer program which simulated
the normal AM/ATM distribution system was used to calculate the amount
of adjustment to be made. Each adjustment in Reg bus voltages and
AM/ATM load sharing compared favorably with predictions.
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Figure 7.34 AMBus Regulatlon (Typical)
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Efficiency. For the operating conditions
through the end of SL-2, the voltage regulator efficiency was better
than 93_. Accurate calculatlon of the actual efficiency levels from
fllght data was not possible for the followlng reasons: 1) direct
measurements of the voltage regulator input voltage and output voltage
and current were not available so that indirect measurements and an ou_-
put current estimate were used; 2) the accuracy limitations of the tele-
metry parameters used resulted in a large uncertainty in calculated
values; and 3) the mall value of the IR type Io_ses Involved. Vol-
tage regulator temperatures in the range from 40-F to 60°F were re-
corded by tel_metry throughout the mission. Temperatures in this range
certainly indicated normal operation with no overheating or efficiency
problems.
Power Hodule Operation. The AHVoltage
Regulator contained five redundant power modules which satisfied the
high reliability requirements. Each module operated successively as
the output current demand was increased by a 13 ampere increment. Dur-
ing DAY 37 the Reg Bus load was great enough, approximately 15 amperes
per PCG, that two power modules in each regulator were required to
operate. The fact that the discharge currents for batteries asso-
ciated with the same Reg Bus remained nearly equal and that no adjust-
ment of the Fine Adjust potentiometers was required during SL-2 demon-
strated that at least the first two power modules in each voltage regu-
lator operated satlsfactorlty.
During most of SL-3, the AM load was such as to exercise only
the first module of each voltage regulator. However, there were
several instances, such as DAY 128 _nwhich the load was sufficient
to exceed 13 amperes per regulator end thus also required the opera-
tion of the second module iL_ each regulator. Observation of the
battery discharge currents indicated proper operation of the first
two modules at these times. An apparent short on the AT)! TV Bus 2
on DAY 83 at 0320:21GMT reb_lted in a load of greater than 200 am-
peres on Reg Bus 2. This meant that four and possibly five of the
modules in each voltage regulator did operate for s period of approxi-
mately 3 seconds.
The bus voltages were adjusted approximately two volts below
their normal settings per the modified SL-3 AH EPS shutdown procedure.
These regulated bus voltages were maintained for all input voltage
levels and all bus loads. The regulator temperature telemetry para-
meters indicated no temperature or efficiency problems. Battery
discharge currents indicated continued proper load sharing between
regulators.
(3) Pow_ Distribution. All elements of the AM/OWS
Power Dist_ibution Systems functioned as designed during the entire •
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mission. A11 required switchi_g operetlons were successfully accom-
plished, power transfer and load sharing between EPS systems occurred
when and as co_manded_and a_l protective devices operated ae designed.
The four major el_ents of the Power Distribution Systems are:
(a) _'_itching. The following successful AM Power
L Distribution _quentlal control operations during SL-I/SL-2 were vital
to the success of tLe Skylab electrical system, in llght ef the damage
i_t_rred an_ operational streo.ses imposed durln_ the early days of the
utts_ion.
Activation of sequ_ntlal buses, and activation and de_ctl-
vatlon of deploy buses in respc._se to OWS-IU commandq.
Th_se were one-time opera;Ions during the sequential portion
of SL-I.
• Closln8 of Reg/Transfer bus ties in response to AM DCS com-
mands. This operation was performed during SL-I to parallel
the AM end ATH electrical power systems for the first time
in flight.
: Deactivation of sequential buses in response to manual con-
trol switching by crew. This was a one-£_e operation dur-
Ing SL-2 only.
In addition to the above, the followlng operations were performed:
Changing elect-.ical _Ingle point ground connection, for
each manned pt.ase, from AM to CSM, and from CSH to AM in
response to crew manual switching of the Electrlcal Ground
Control. The change frma AM Sl_ to CSMVGP des accom-llshed
after each CS_; docking and umbillcal connection and during
SL-2 activation. The change back to AMSl_ was accompllshed
during each deactivation prior to CSH undo¢_Ing.
Activation and desctlvetion of EREP buses in r_sponse to
manual control svltches located in the HDA. These svltchln8
operatlo,s _ere performed throughout the _isslo,s in con-
Junction vlth ali EP.EPo_er_ions.
(b) Circuit Protection. The AH/_ Power Vlstri-
: butlon System _.tlli_ed parallel circuit breakers c_n the power transfer
feeder _ires from AM to C&i; between _4 and ATH, _nd _ro_ Airlock to
O_S and within the O_S. There _re also two circuit breakers inter-
connoctin8 the Re8 buses, There wee only one unschedule,_ opening of
circuit breakers t an_ it occurred durln8 SL-I/SL-_. Fnder c|rcult
breaker 2 for O_$ bus I was opened by _n inadvertent crew action
but v_s reclosed without any probl_s. Scheduled operations of
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Transfer/CSN feeder circuit breakers end Reg Bus tie circuit breakers
were successfully accomplished. These operations were in conjunction
with the procedure for paralleling and unparallelln8 the CSH power '-
system and the AH/ATK combined cluster power system.
Other protective devices utilized included: circuit breakers
for transfer current monitors and for power distribution controls;
: fuses for voltmeter circuits and Reg Bus adjustment circuits; and fusls-
tars (fuse-resistors) i _ telemetry signal lines for AMBus parameters.
There were no unscheduled operations of any of these circuit protective i
devices during the mission. Scheduled operations of the circuit
breakers for the Power Distribution controls during activation and
deactivation periods were successful in all cases.
(c) Paver Transfer. Prior to Solar Array Wing #I
deployment, the A24Paver Conditioning Groups were unable to supply
paver to the AMaeg Buses because of the absence of solar array paver.
The AN/OWSpaver distribution systems were used successfully during
all mission periods to receive and distribute ATH electrical power.
The A}4EPS Control Buses were kept powered by closing selected PCG
output controls to alloy AT_ paver to each of them by way of the AM
Peg Buses. Power transfer during SL-I/SL-2 vas as high as 3200 vatts
from the ATe/Buses to the AMReg Buses. Thls paver transfer capability
contributed to the successful continuation of the mission until Solar
Array Wing #I could be deployed. Actual power transfer values for
the entire mission are detailed in the system performance section of
this report. On DAY 216, a short occurred on the ATN load bus 2. The
paver provided to this short by the combined AZ4/ATNpower system yam
sufficient to clear it within three seconds. Accurate analysis of
the condition during such • limited time span was difficult, however,
rough calculatioum Indicate that approximately 9,000 watts was trans-
ferred from the AMPeg buses through the /d4 transfer buses to the ATH
buses. The _eg/Tranofer Tie relays remained open throughout the SL-3/
SL-4 storage period 8o no power vat transferred between the AM and AT}/
electrical paver systems.
/
(d) Load Sharing. Load sharlnK betveen the AM
and AT}4electrical power systems was controlled by the Rag Adluat Bus 1
: and Bus 2 potentlouetars. These potentio_eters were adjusted 8 number
of times throughout the entire aission and in all cases the desired
AM and ATN EPS load levels were achieved.
Prior to SL-1 launch, both Rag Adjust potentlometer8 vere met
for an actual open circuit voltage (OCV) of 29.3 V on the Re8 buses.
This setting yes the calculated setting for the desired /M/ATH load
sharing vhen the ave systems vould be paralleled b.v DCS coanands dur-
ins the SL-1 mission phase. Inflisht adjustments are also referenced
•- to OCV settings by taking the sun of the lbtg bus voltage, and the P_
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/_ total current times the Reg bus voltage droop (0.01 volts per amp) as
being the approximate OCVvalue. There were no known inadvertent op-
: _ erations of the Reg bus potentiometers during SL-2. _
_ During the SL-3 mission, one inadvertent adjustment of _ _ _
I Adjust potentiometer occurred, when on DAY L09, an astronaut's p._r _,J_
• apparently caught on the B_s 2 potentiometer knob and resulte,_ £n a
CCWrotation which increased Reg Bus 1 current to 61.3 amperes and
_ decreased Reg Bus 2 current to 18.7 amperes The system imbalance was
_ quickly corrected by adjust!as the Bus 2 potentiometera CW for equr_l
! PCG total currents. Reg Adjust Bus I and Bus 2 potentlometers were
I adjusted a number of times throughout the SL-4 mission, primarily in
;: conjunction b_th E_EP and Kohoutek passer
_ (e) Controls and Displays. The onboard controls
were located on STS Panel 205 and the onboardmonitors were located on
STS Panel 206.
Control usage from SL-1 launch to OWSSAg deployment, was by
means of both DCS commands and crew switch actions. The low solar
array paver available to the PCGawas the general reason for the con-
trol switching that was performed. The solar array output switches
were cycled between their normal and alternate PC.Gsseveral times.
This yes done as a means of increasing power to a single PCG so its
battery could be charged, and as a safety measure to preclude low
power irputa to PCG equipments. The batteries switches were used to
turn the batteries off and on as requixed to charge when possible and
preclude discharging the rest of the time. The batterleswere also
turned on several times so the PCGs could act as backup for the ATM
EPS. The charger switches were cycled in conjunction with the solar
._rray output switches for analysis _rposes and to protect the battery
chargers _rom lay solar array power operation. The PCGoutput switche8
_ere cycled off and on when the PCGs were acting as backup for the ATM
EPS. The discharge limit switches were pieced in their inhibit posi-
tions on DAY 25 and returned to auto on DAY 26. This was done es
pa_t of the O_S solar array wing deployment activities so the PCG8
could supply power, if necessary, even if the battery SOCa went
below 30%.
All telemetry signals and onboard displays provided sufficient
parameter information for operation and _nalyal8 throughout this
period.
After the deployment of the OWSsolar _rray_rLng, the controls
_er_ used to return the PCGmto their normal confIsuration. No sub-
sequent control operations were required during the remainder of this
mission. All monitors provided satisfactos_y information with the
_ exception of the SAg #4 current monitor. The problem associated vl_h
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the gAS #4 current monitor ls discussed in detail later. The work-
i _._ound method de_eloped alloyed satisfactory evaluation of all
parameters.
AIZ required control switching during SL-3 was accomplished
successfully. All telemetry sod onboard monitors provided satisfactory
and sufficient para_,eter information for operation and analysis through-
out the SL-3 manned mission. The SAg #4 current monitor anomaly, from
SL-2, remained unchanged for the remainder of the mission.
Hose of the control switching during SL-3 was associated with
the capacity discharge testing of PC_ batteries 6 and 8 on DAYs 105
and 106, respectively. The discharge llmit command for PCG #3 was
also used several times during this period in conjunction with EREP
i passes. The status light svltches anJ the battery charge selector
switch (associated with the % SOC meter) were also used successfully
by the =rev for perlcdlc status chec_,_ on the AMEFS power system.
The first u.,,ege of a fine a_Justment potentlometer occurred
during the SL-3 mission. Optimizat_on became desirable during SL-3,
because EREPpasse_ were scheduled at the rate of one to two per day
over an extended period, toward the end ,;_ tht SL-3 mission. This high
EREP activity period _o occurred d,Jri, g a period of low beta angle
attltu_es where both EFS systeu: ?over capabilitles are at their mlni-_
mum.
Analysis of flight data shoved that battery characteristics
vere very 81milar for the eight batteries. Thet'efore, the pot adjust-
ments were required to balance out the effects of ._rray 8hadovlng. The
ATMarray sh_doved one nodule e,sch on SAC _ _nd #8 and rye modules
on SAG #6. The effects of the module 8h.dovtng yea that PCGs #5, 6,
sod 8 received less solar array _ver and could not recover from 8
DOVequal to the other $ PCGs in the same .mount of chargr, tins.
B_sed on the SI pover capability definitiml, therefore, PCG #6 limited
the allowable DOD to the energy balsoce value, thus none of the other
PCGs could operate at full capability. The a_ount of adjustment for
the Pine Adjustment pots were detem_.ned by using flight data sod _,
co_uter simulation progrsn_. Pot _7 v_s n_t 8dJtmted because PCG #7
was sharing equally vlth PCCa #1 t'hrough #_ and h_d the equivalent
solar array l,_put.
Pots #5, 6, sod 8 were adjusted to ca-_s, their EGg to supply
0.5 amperes of battery discharge current less tha_l PCG #7 to coupon-
sate for each shadowed SAG uoduls associated _Ith it. To melntaln
this conflgur_tlon as the two ReS bus pots were adjusted for AM/ATM
load sharin$ at subsequent t/:es, it yam only necessary to adjust
lies bus pot #2 so that I_C. #7 discharge current re.mined equal to
l_C,s #1 thro,gh #4.
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As a result of the adjustments described above, all batteries
returned to a fully charged state (IOOZ SOC) at very close to the same
time in a daylight period. Therefore, no one PCG, despite differences
in available input power, limited the Sl power capabtllty. A more _.
optlmum power capabillty was therefore achieved by use of the fine
adjustment potentic®eters.
Due to increased denand for power outlets, power to HDA loads
was supplied from higher power accessory outlets in the OWS forward
compartment vla two series connected 15 foot long utility cables for
the remainder of the mission.
No control operations were required durlns SL-3/SL-_. All
monitors pe,-f_,_e4 satisfactorily with the exception of telemetry
parameter battery f5 voltase, which skirted sliKhtly hiKher on DAY 165
throuKh the end of this pertod.
Telemetry monitors performed satisfactorily throuKhout SL-4,
with the exception of, the SAS tl current, Battery _1 throuKh #8 coarse
currents, Battery tl temperature, and EPS control bus 1 and 2 ca, trent
monitors. A T/H discrepancy caused erratic performance on these
parameters from DAY 216 throuKh the -,nd of mission. The SAS #4 cur-
rent telemetry monitor anomaly, described for SL-2, ren_ained the same
throuKh the end of the mission. Fine adjustment potentiometer I_'
was adjusted CC1/ sliKhtly to equalize the battery 07 discharKe current
with that of Battery t5 _ld Battery 18. End of mission battery testinz
required the operation of many relay circuits which had seen little
prior use. No problems were experienced as • result of this activity
which followed a lonK period of dormancy.
ThrouKhout the entire mission the follovinK facts became
obvious:
The crew dld not encounter any static dlschar8es.
known EHI related problems existed.
Power was continuously supplied at voltaKes between 24
and 30 Vdc as required.
(f) Trackin8 and DocklnK LiKht Operation. The
trackin8 liKht subsystem operated for each nlssion. SL-2 rendezvous
operations required then for three hours and two hours, respectively,
on DAY 12. DurinK rendezvous, the Skyleb was in 8 50" pltch-up atti-
tude |or thenml control. The 130 nautical Idle acquisition ranKe,
reported by the crew for both systems, wee considered very satisfac-
tory in view of thls off-noulr, al viewJnK ankle. The docklnK lIKhts
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were successfully operated from the terminal phase of the rendezvous _ !
and remained operational until dockln_about 1.5 hours, during mlsslon° :
The tracking lights subsystem were operated successfully durLng the _
SL-3 rendezvous on DAY 76. They were activated at 14:23 GMT and were
first reported by the crew at the 390 nautical mile range, which is
in excess ot the expected range.
Rendezvous for SL-3 and SL-4 was conducted with the SWS in a
solar inertial attitude because of the reduction in AM/OWS power-
generating capability as a result of loss of one OWS SAS wlng. The
solar inertial attitude caused some off-nominal look angles for the
tracking lights, resultlng in s_me predlctable periods of loss of con-
i tact between the CSM and the SWS.During .he SL-4 rendezvous on DAY 187 they operated for approxi-
i mately four hours. No indication was reported by ti_e crew as to when
the tracking lights were first sighted.
i"
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b. ATM.
• (1) Solar Array. SL-I liftoff occurred on May 14, 1973
at 17:30:0.20 hours GNT. ATM solar array deployment took three minutes _
and was completely successful. Twenty-elght minutes after liftoff the
ATM solar array wings were deployed, locke_',and operational
The loss of OWS SAS power, until DAY 25, reduced tLe overall
cluster electrical power system capability, and the loss of the meteo-
rold shield permitted excessive solar heating internal to the OWN itself•
To reduce the thermal heating on the OWS, the cluster was operated in i
a variety of non-solar inertial attitudes for the ?irst 13 days. Know-
' ledge of the exact off-polntlng angles and, consequently, consistent _'
ATM SAS data was unavailable for this period. (The APCS could not com-
pute the sun pointing angles when the sun sensor was pointed more than
25° away from the sun.) Approximations of the attitude were computed
using s cosine function for SAS output and the SAS temperature. This
unusual use of the ATM SAS, between DAY I and DAY 12, to determine
the spacecraft attitude, assumed that certain panels had not degraded.
Data indicated that the attitudes calculated were within a few degrees
of the actual attitude.
The orbital attitude of the cluster between DAY I and DAY 12
resulted in many of the ATM Solar Panels ex.eeding the -65°C lower
limit of the qualification tests by lY°C or more. The exact number >f
cycles that the lower temperature limlt was exceeded was not known.
The ATM solar panels were not designed to withstand temperatures of
-70°C to -80°C, because at these low temperatures, the stresses on a •
solar cell interconnect increase rapidly with sma_l changes in te_per-
ature. This severe exposure may have significantly red,ced tLe elec-
trical circuit reliability for the solar cells.
A specialized computer program (SEP$',)was used to determine
solar panel degradation. Input variables included the day of year
from which the solar distance is calculated, and the telemetered values
of current, voltage and temperature Jor each panel at a particular or-
bital time.
The origint,l array zequlrement to deliver 10480 watts at 55°C
at the beginning of mission (BOM) at zero beta angle was met by the ATM
solar array. Based upon a prelaunch predicted SAS performance degrada-
tion from all cavses, of 8.8% at the end of mission (EOM), the required
averase of 9558 watts st EOM was derived. SAS performance was analysed
and Figure 7.36 shows an available average array power of between 11886 _
watts and 13000 watts at 28°C and 140 mW/cm 2 solar intensity.
?
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!Solar Array panel voltage and current data were evaluated for
J
.50solar inertial orbits at beta angles from 0° to 73 . At low beta
angles, the SAS was exposed to the sun approximately 61% of the Lime
and the CBRM batterles had their highest DOD at high bus loads (for
solar inertial attitudes); thus, at low beta angles the SAS provided
maximum power for longer periods.
At beta angles above 69.5° , continuous sunlight orbits occur, _
and battery charge/discharge cycles do not occur, and only small varia-
tions occur in SAS voltage, current, and temperature.
Figures 7.37 and 7.38 show typical solar array panel voltage ,
and current profiles for DAYs 42 and 97, respectively. Data for DAY 42 _ :
was included to illustrate high beta, continuous sunlight, solar panel _ ,
characteristics. Figures 7.39 and 7.40 for DAY 120 show voltage and _
current profiles during one orbit of low beta operation.
(a) Degradation. Of the eighteen vanels, fifteen
were in operation continuously after SL-I launch. CBRM 3 (Panel 713A4)
ceased operating on DAY 17 when its regulator failed, and remained off. ,
Insufficient data points existed to establish a degradation trend for
panel 713A4. CBRM 5 (half panels 710AI-713AI) was not operated after
DAY 123 when its charger malfunctioned (except for EREP maneuvers late
in the mission). These panels were not included in the determination
of the average degradation rate.
CBRM 15 (Panel 713A5) was inoperable for an extended period
early in the SL-I/2 mission. However, sufficient data was obtained to _
establish a degradation trend for this panel.
An unusual phenomenon occurred on CBRM 17. The CBRM regulator _
output current was highly erratic, as observed on DAY 24. Analysis in-
dicated that the CBRM regulator was receiving full power from about ten
minutes into each orbital night until sunrise. An intermittent short
to negative on solar panel 17 (710A4) allowed no power to be available
to the CBRM during the daylight portion of each orbit. The solar cell, _
when cooled down (i.e., ten minutes into night), acted as a diode to
b_ock the short circuit condition. This condition continued until
l,Af151 when it disappeared and did not reappear.
Panel 711A5 (CBRM 13) showed a consistent trend of degradation
after launch of SL-I. Thls panel provided six percent less power than i
predicted at launch and continued to degrade at a rate of 2.8 percent
• per month.
!
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!Panel 711A2 (CBRH 8) started the SL-I mission with a power
deficit of between four and six percent. The first solar Inertlal pass
following SL-2 docking from which rellable data was available (DAY 14)
showed an additional abrupt power loss of six percent.
Solar panel 711A3 (CBRM 7), which was adjacent to Panel 711A2
showed similar behavior. Initially, the power capability was four to
eight percent greater than predicted by ground test data. On DAY 14,
: this panel indicated a ten percent power loss or 3.5 percent below
predicted.
The decrease in capability of the degraded solar array panels
was observable in the CBRM operatlon. Degraded panels were required
to supply high currents for longer periods in order to charge their
respective CBRM batterles. These CBRM batteries cut back from the
constant current mode to the constant voltage mode several minutes
later than the rest of the CBRMs. This delay in recharging _Iso war-
led depending upon orbital considerations, load, and the state-of-
charge and condition of the battery. As the panels continued to de-
grade at expected rates, the delay in reaching cutback to constant
voltage mode increased slightly.
Intermittent power losses on Panel 15 (713A5) were first ob-
served and recorded on DAY 206. The step voltage changes which occurred
seemed to be due to cyclic successive openings of as many as two modules
on Panel 15. Figure 7.41 shows the voltage versus time for Panel 15
during a typical orbit on DAY 206 The SAS current during this clme
was constant. The first voltage ;tep occurred at 28°C and was 1.6V.
The second step occurred at 30-C and was 5 V. The cumulative effect
of the two steps was the equivalent of a loss of two solar cell modules.
This resulted in a power loss measured in the constant current range of
operation (13.4 amperes) of approximately 13Z for the panel (0.8% for
the array). The orblt-to-orblt regularlty of the change suggested a
thermal-related making and breaking of a connection which Intermlttently
open circuited the module. A plot of panel voltage versus temperature
at constant current (Figure 7.42) further exemplifled the vroblem on
Panel 15. Notice the abrupt loss of voltage (power) at 28°C and 30°C. +
As can be seen from Figure 7.42 the anomaly occurred late in the orbit
each time it occurred allowlng normal battery charging and having no
effect upon the mission during solar Inertlal operstlons.
The power capabillty status of the ATH array was assessed as of
DAY 269 and compared with preflight performance measurements. The
results are given in Table 7.IV. Based on the EGM status, the average
degradation rate over the entire mission was 0.9 percent per month.
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The degradation shown by the AIM solar panels was caused by ._
expected failure mechanis_s such as mlcroueteorold damage, radiation
damage, and interconnect dauags due to thermal cycling. In addition, _.
the extremely low tempera_.ures reac_.,ed by the solar panels between DAY
i and DAY 12, which often exceeded qualiflcatXon test limits, could
have affected the degradation race for each panel, depending upon its
location and thermal characteristics.
During SL-2 docking, flyaround and undockin8 maneuvers, and
the SL-3 docking maneuver, the ATMsolar array wings were exposed to
engine plumes. While the individual exposures were short, the total
exposure during these maneuvers was sufficient to cause concern. The
accumulated exposure time has not been deternined. Two major effects
were caused by exposure to the plune: 1) contamination, and 2) flexing
of the solar array wings due to mass impingement.
The abrupt losses of power of panels on or near the ATMtell-
scope, indicated that the panel degradations probably were not th_
result of contamination.
Some discolorati._n of the S13C thermal paint on the u_derside
of the wings ms observed by the SL-2 crew. They reported that the
wing undersides were darkest near the ATH canister, becouing lighter
toward the _rXn8 tips. Darkening of the S13C could have caused a change
in the thermal cl_racteristic8 of the ATMpanels, However, no e_fects
resulting from the d_scoloration were observed.
Films taken during rendezvo._s, docking, and flyaround maneuvers,
indicated that the vlnss flexed as such as plus or sinus one foot as a
result of being sprayed by the RCS engine exhaust. The machanical
stresses induced by this flexing on the AIM panels could not be deter-
aimed with the ucasurments available.
(b) Thermal. Analysis of panel temperature transients
during the ulealon shoved Chat :hera tun no appreciable change in
, thenml charsr.terlstlcs and thus no additional effect on AT_ array power •
output capability. This was concluded frees a comparison of temperature
data early in the uisslon and late in the uission at the sane beta
an$1s and approxiustely the same solar tntensit.y. The minimm beta
angle and the largest tempexlture variation occurred on DAY 229. Figures
7.43 and 7._ show panel temperatures for selected panels 7, 10, and
18 on DAY 229 and DAY 117. The largest _rarlmtion on DAY 229 was seen
to occur on panel 7'8 front surface and vss from +79"¢ to -400C and
compared to the data on DAY 117 (+78" to -420C) try:_ sated no degradation
of the Cheryl cnattn 8.
t
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PARAHETEP UNITS VALUE
i lie i a I I
• Day DAYs 269
Beta Angle Degrees +15
Revolution Number 3874 *
Panel Current Amperes (Fixed) 13.4 ± .3
i
: Time after sunrise Minutes 19
Direct solar intensity :W/ca 2 I_A.I
Averase panel temperature oc 41
" Pouer output, 16 panels Watts 9596
Averaae desradation for 13 panels Percent 8.6
|
Note: Three panels were not considered in the dearsdation calcu-
lation because of temperature transducer anomalies. Also, the
solar stray panels for CBIO4s3 and 5 vere not on line and thus
not consldered.
* SolJ_ panel _-ate durln8 this _evo_utlon vas ,toed to r_resent
the EOI4ptz'formsnct status of the ATH array.
I i II
Table 7.1V I_H Status - AYX blar Array
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As early as DAY 3, inconsistent temperature readings were I '
observed. These observations indicated that the sensors on Panel 7 _ ,
indicated a gradient of up to 40"C between the front and rear surfaces _
: of the panel in contrast to gradients of seven to 13°C for the mld-wlng
panels of Wings i, 3, and 4. Also, temperature time profiles during
different orbits and mission times indicated that the backside tempera-
tures dld not agree with predicted data in most cases. Figure 7.47
shows a typical example for panel 18 on DAY 71.
The temperature profiles for DAY 100 (beta m 62") and DAY 42
(beta ffi73.5" or full sunlight) for Solar Panel 18 are included to show :
typical orbits at high beta angle. (See Figures 7.45 and 7.46.)
_ Two temperature transducers on panels 711A3 (CBRM 7) and 712A5
(CBRM 12) were either loose or operating intermittently.
Temperature measurement uncertainties continued to be a problem
on SL-4. During the last 14 days of SL-4, two addltlonal panel tempera-
ture sensors became faulty,necessltatlng estimation of true temperatures
by use of indirect means. The faulty sensors were on Panels 713A3
(CBRM 2) and 711A5 (CBRM 13).
Panel operating temperatures generally did follow predicted
transient patterns, but operated significantly cooler because of the _,
absence of reflected heat from OWS SAS Wing 2.
%
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: (2) CBRM. Each CBRM contained: a charger, to condl-
tlon the solar cell array power and control battery charging; a battery,
to supply energy during dark portions of each orbit; and a regulator,
to condition battery or solar array voltage supplied to the ATM power
buses. In addition, the CBRM contalned automatic protection and con-
trol circuits, telemetry and onboard display circuits, and a b_ttery
heater control circuit. The CBRMs were normally controlled by ground
cormmand with astronaut control for troubleshooting, battery capacity
tests, and general systems monitoring. Astronaut control was accomp-
lished through switch operation from the ATM C&D console, although
backup operation from the DAS Keyboard was available. Flag indica-
tions on the ATM C&D console alerted the astronaut to out-of-tolerance
conditions. See Figure 7.58 for the layout of the flags. Table 7.V
summarizes CBRM performance, in general, by parameter. The table com-
pares requirements, ground test measurements, flight values, and pre-
dictions. Table 7.VI lists the commands and responses of the CBRM.
Out-of-tolerance conditions caused applicable CBRM components to be
automatically turned off. Table 7.VII lists the CBRM automatic res-
ponse to malfunctions. No provision was made to automatically turn on
components if the malfunction should correct itself. However, the
component affected could be turned on manually or by command.
(a) Charger. The charger was a stepdown single-
ended regulator which conditioned the inputs from the solar array panel
to the level required for charging the battery while achieving maximum
use of array power (see Figure 7.48). The charger senses solar array
voltage and current, battery temperature, charge current, 3rd elec-
l trode voltage, and output voltage for charge control. The modes of
I operation of the charger are illustrated in Table 7.VIII.
i See Figure 7.49 for charge characteristics of a typical battery.
The voltage trip point (the voltage at which the charging mode is
cha_ged from constant current to constant voltage) was made relatively
' lower as the battery temperature rose (see Figure 7.50).
The average charger efficiency as calculated from data from
DAY 205 was 92.5% after a 20% DOD. This compares well with the ground
test data which showed the efficiency range from 92.9 to 94.3% over
the entire load range.
The high efficiency of the charger can be attributed to the
inherently high efficiency of a switching type charge regulator, com-
bined with a circuit design, which allows drive current for the reg-
ulator power switches to be supplied to the load.
The depletion of battery power during the early off-sun point-
ing caused automatic battery disconnect, on DAY 12, of 8 batteries,
including Battery 15. An unexpected regulator 15 disconnect occurred
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upon entry into sunlight. The low solar intensity of the SAS, combined
with both battery and charger off caused the regulator to oscillate and
to automatically trip off. The trip-off then caused the contactor to _{
open between SAS and CBRM 15. The contactoz then failed in the open
position. The astronauts, during a scheduled extravehicular activity
on DAY 37, struck CBRM 15 with a hammer to g_nerate internal forces
which freed the stuck relay and restored the CBRM to full operating
capability.
Fo failures, anomalies, or dcviatlons from normal performance
were detected through the end of the first manned mission for the pow-
er stages, charge control logic, auxiliary power supply, or the bat-
tery sensing circuits of the ch_irgers.
On DAY 123 the battery charger of CBRM 5 failed while charging
the battery causing the battery to automatically disconnect because
of overvoltage. The failure allowed the solar array power to feed
directly to the battery without conditioning. The CBRMwas not used
during the remainder of the second manned mission, and a workaround
was developed to combine CBRM 5 regulator and CBRM 3 charger and bat-
tery by use of Jumpers. This modification was carried up by the third
crew but was not implemented.
At the end of the third manned mission, in a power critical sit-
uation during Z-LV (EREP) operations, CBRM 5 was turned on to provide
added power since the charger failure mode basically allowed the charge :
voltage to exceed the maximt'm programmed voltage by one volt. Auto=
matic disconnect circuits t_rminated the charge at this point. CBRM
5 functioned under these conditions and maintained the battery operat-
ing parameters within their safe limits. Commanding was required to
reconnect the battery and regulator after autodisconnect at sunset.
SPACETHIS IO_ALLY LEFT B!ANK
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(b) Battery. The ATM NI-CD batteries provided
power for usage during the dark portion of every orbit of the Skylab
mission. The batteries had a nameplate or vendor rating of 20 Amp-Hrs
and the measured preinstallatlon measured capacity was 25 Amp-Hrs
average for the flight batteries. After ATM solar array deployment all
batteries demonstrated an ability to accept charge while exhibiting
; anticipated voltages.
After AM/ATM paralleling on DAY I at 19:27 and all AM PCG out-
put power was disconnected from the Skylab buses at 19:30, the ATM
power system provided all the power to the cluster buses until OWS
Solar Wing I deployment on DAY 25. In this time period, the ATM bat-
teries were managed such that energy balance was the goal. However,
the batteries were allowed to go below energy balance during many
orbits. Vehicle attitude was constrained such that the batteries were
recharged before a poor (for solar array pointing) attitude was attemp-
ted again for thermal balance of the cluster. Because of the required
thermal attitudes, CBRMs pointed toward the sun (CBRM #6, 7, 8, 16,
17, 18) experienced temperatures as high as 30°C. Deepest discharges
were observed on DAY 17 on the night portion of the orbit following
the first EREP pass. CBRM Battery II had the highest DOD, 54% (10.8
AH removed). In this period four regulators had been shut oft, and
the remaining 14 batteries provided all of the required power. This >
situation also provided the maximum battery discharge rate that occur-
red in the Skylab mission. CBRM Battery ii also had the highest dis-
charge rate, discharging at a 14.2 Ampere rate. (The pre-mission maxi-
mum allowable rate was 20.0 amperes.) As a comparison, during KSC
testing the maximum discharge rate occurred during a high cluster load
test (approximately II000 watts). The approximate discharge rate was
II amperes.
Specific CBRM outputs were also turned off during charging in
order to allow the batteries to recharge at a higher rate. See
Table 7.XI.
Battery cycling performance from the time of OWS solar wing
deployment until the undock of the CSM was satisfactory. 166 cycles
were accumulated prior to the first manned mission. 420 cycles were
accumulated in the course of the first manned mission. The discharge
and recharge modes of battery operation were as predicted for the
lower DOD after OAY 25. (Nominal recharge fraction, battery tempera-
tures versus voltage.)
The solar inertial depth of discharge range most commonly ex-
perienced during the period prior to the first manned mission was 19%
to 50%. Figure 6.14.
/
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IThe solar inertial DOD range experienced during the first
manned mission was 25 to 32% prior to OWS solar array wing deployment.
After wing deployment the solar inertial DOD range was 0 to 23%.
Depths up to 54% were experienced during Z-LV-EREP maneuvers. __
Battery performance remained uniformly acceptable during the
storage period between the first and second manned missions. Con-
tinuous solar energy was available to power the vehicle for the ini-
tial four days of this storage period because of high beta angle
conditions. The batteries were not cycled for this full sunlight
period. The batteries resumed normal operation on DAY 44 and cycled
at a DOD as high as 15% during the remainder of the storage period.
Total accumulated cycles reached 1137.
The batteries had accumulated 2054 flight cycles at the time
the second crew departed on DAY 135. The DOD range during the solar
inertial orbits of the second manned mission was 14 to 24%. During
Z-LV-EREP attitudes, the DODs ranged up to 50% during the EREP on DAY
113. See Figure 6.14 for average daily ATM DODs.
Capacity tests during the second manned mission were run on
five different batteries to determine an acceptable limit to which
the ATMbatteries could be discharged. The selection of batteries
to be tested was made with the following criteria: (I) The first
battery tested (#7) had the lowest capacity during preinstallation
tests and was one of the batteries with higher temperatures during the i
initial unmanned period. (2) The next two batteries tested (#i0 and
#18) had most telemetered parameters availaole on the ATM tape recorder
for continuous data recovery. One was a "hot" battery and one was
"cold" during the initial unmanned period. (3) The next two bat-
: terles tested (#5 and #8) gave another example of a hot and cold
battery. Batteries 10 and 18 tests were repeated twice later in the
second manned mission. CBRM #5 was retested and experienced a char-
get failure during its second test. Table 7.1X lists the capacityl
tests run during the mission. Capacity was determined by integrating
the battery current over the total discharge period.
Prelaunch capacities of ATM batteries had been determined prior
to installation for thermal vacuum test operations at JSC. Those CBRMs,
which were modified during KSC operations, had their batteries tested
at MSFC prior to return to KSC. However, these tests were run to a
discharge level of one volt per cell. The inflight system automati-
cally took the battery off llne at 26.4 volts or I.I volts per cell.
This would tend to indicate greater capacity during ground tests than
infllght tests. Also, the flight tests were run only to 'battery
voltage talkback" (which occurred at 27,5 volts) in order not to auto
disconnect the battery intentionally.
308
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BATT_Y MISSION DAY CAPACITY(AMP-HRS)
Estimated to
Auto=disconnect
7 93 12.1
10 102 12.4
18 102 13.1
5 104 12.I
8 104 12.5
10 105 12.2
18 105 12.9
10 118 11.7
18 119 12.4
I0 122 11.6
5 122 11.4
10 195 13.0 (Tests run at low
18 195 13.0 discharge rate)
I0 229 9.25
18 229 10.66
i Note: An astronaut monitored each test and terminated battery dischargeupon observing the battery voltage flag which indicated battery
voltage of 27.5 volts. In order to estimate the total usable
capacity, 1.l Ampere-Hours was added to the calculated capacity.
(1.1 Amp-Rrs was the estimated delta capacity to discharge the
battery from 27,5 volts to 26.4 volts).
Table 7.IX lattery Capacity Tests
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Comparison of battery end-of-discharge voltages proved to be
a poor correlation to battery capacity. However, without running the
batteries to auto disconnect the end-of-dlscharge voltages were the
only means of vred_ct_ng eap_r_y e_ _ ...... - ......... -6_ 7.51 fur discharge pro-
files on some of the capacity tests.
The batteries continued to provide sufficient power during the
unmanned period prior to the third manned mission. The ATM power sys- !
temwas unparalleled from the AM power system during this period, so
that ATM power was used only to power ATM hardware. Total accumu-
lated cycles reached 2853. The DOD for this period ranged from 9 to
14%.
ATM battery discharge/charge cycle accumulation at the time of
final crew splashdown on DAY 271 was 4108 cycles. The range of DODs
during the SI periods for the third manned mission was 0 to 24%. See
Figure 6.14. DODs up to 41.3% were experienced for off-sun pointing
during the third manned mission, with the maximum DOD reading on DAY
259.
Capacity discharges were performed on CBRMs i0 and 18 st the
beginning of the third manned mission (DAY 195). However, these tests
were run at a lower discharge r_te than the other capacity tests
which could not be directly compared to the previous inflight capa-
city checks. These tests were repe,ted on DAY 229.
During the final week of Skylab operations, the flight con-
trollers on the ground performed the battery capacity tests listed
in Table 7.X. All of these tests were run to battery auto disconnect
to determine actual capacity. Previous tests run to "talkback" (27.5
volts) used a factor of 1.1 amp-hours from "talkback" to auto discon-
nect. As seen in Table 7.X, the 1.1 amp-hours was seen to be ade-
quate except for CBRM 7.
Ground tests on the llfe tests CBRMs indicated a range of i,i
to 4 amp-hours from "talkback" to auto disconnect. However, after
3800 cycles on the llfe test unit, this number decreased to sbout
I amp-hour. The delta I.I Amp-Hrs was based on these tests.
A comparison was made of battery voltage versus amp-hours re-
moved during discharge st similar currents. Comparison indicated
small change in V-I characteristics over the mission at low DOD.
There was a wider variation of voltage at end of discharge st higher
DOD when compared from BOM to EOM.
Two types of anomalies impacted battery performance. One was
the result of electronic failures (CBRM 3 and 5), end the other was
the result of changes in battery characteristics from predicted.
i !
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Capacity
Mission (Amp-Hrs)
Battery DAY Capacity (Amp-Hrs) Estimate_ to A-D
(To talkback ffi 27.5 volts)
plus I.i AH estimated to
auto-dlsconnect included
!
1 267 8.9 9.7
2 265 No Data Available. 10.9
4 268 11.1 11.4
6 270 8.8 9.5
7 269 7.3 7.2
: 8 267 8.6 8.9
9 267 9.9 11.5 :
i0 265 8.3 11.9
ii 268 9.4 i0.0 :
12 268 I0.I ii.I ':
13 265 No Data Available. 9.8
14 266 No Data Available. 11.2
15 270 11.2 11.6
: 16 269 8.0 8.7
17 269 No Data Available. 8.9
18 265 8.9 Ii.5
7 270 7.9 7.5 :
8 27O 8.8 8.7
II 270 9.7 9.6 :_
16 270 8.8 8.6
AVERAGE - 10.25 AMP ,HRS.
Table 7,X End-of-Mission kttery Capacity Tests
312
! i
llll J I lllll ..... --. , ll[ll ,ml J] Jlll1_ I.t III I I1[..
1974022202-339
i The latter battery performance anomaly was a loss in usable J
; battery capacity. This characteristic was first observed on DAY 17
when, during an EREP pass, several CBRMs were automatically discon- _-
nected as a result of low voltage. The measured capacity, which was f
expected to be at least 15 ampere hours, was approximately 8 ampere
hours. Subsequent capacity checks on DAY 122 (ll A-H) and DAY 229
(10 A-H) indicate that the availablc capacity increased slightly
after DAY 17 and remained relatively constant during the remainder
of the mission. The capacity checks are shown in Figure 7.53. Al-
though the capacity loss did not seriously affect the mission, it
was an anomaly that was unexpected and unexplained.
The evaluation of the capacity loss requires the definition
of two factors, memory and fadlnE. Memory is a capacity loss which
has been demonstrated to be recoverable. The memory variables are
temperature and DOD. Fading is defined as a permanent loss in capa-
city which is essentially a form of accelerated aging.
The effects of memory are shown in Figure 7.53 by the recorded
data from the Skylab simulation test performed at MSFC on relatively
new cells. After degrading to approximately 10 ampere hours as a
result of the simulation program, the capacity recovered to the ex-
pected level. The fact that the subsequent capacity of the simula-
tion test battery did not remain within the expected range is attribu-
ted to fading.
The lack of capacity recovery indicated by the Skylab flight
data shown in Figure 7.53 is attributed to fading. Likewise, the
sharp drop in the life test battery capacity occurred at cycle 3800
and was also attributed to fading. In all three cases, Skylab flight
life test and simulation, the fading occurred immediately after sub-
Jecting the batteries to the conditions which occurred during the
first 15 days of the Skylab mission. These conditions, summarized
in Figure 7.52, were:
Battery temperatures were 25°C to 30°C for approximately
15 days on several batteries. On the remaining batteries,
the temperature did not exceed 15°C.
High depth of discharges 25% to 35%, occurred on all the
batteries.
Chargin 8 was often incomplete, i.e._ less than 100%.
Charge rates were much lower (5 to 8 amperes) than the
normal 15 amperes.
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$kylab batteries which demonstrated the greatest fading
• sustained 12 months of vehicle integration testing prior
• to launch such as trlckle charge and open circuit stand.
Life test batteries whlch demonstrated the second greatest
fading and accumulated 3800 simulated AT}I cycles at the
_ time the fading occurred.
The Skylab simulation test batteries which demonstrated
the least amount of fading were new and unused batteries.
Fading is apparently a combination of two or more of the above
factors. At present, it remains smatter of experimental investtSa-
tion tc determine what the relationships are in quantitative terms.
! This type of Inforuationwill be of considerable importance in future
long term space missions.
The other battery parameters, such as recharge fraction, watt
hour efficiency, and third electrode controls, remained relatively
constant throughout the mission. Life test data confirmed these
observations. The recharge fraction remained approximately 110
percent at a 20 percent DODat 10°C vlth a correspondlns watt hour
efficiency of 80 percent. Some of the pertinent factors are shown,
which provides a band to indicate the range exhibited by all $kylab
CBRMs. (Figure 7.56.)
A change in battery cyclic characteristics occurred on CBI_/ 9
whene_er the dlscharge time during a cycle decreased below 20 minutes.
Thle characteristic occurred at high beta angles. The change was
caused by a high third electrode signal which remained above 200 uV
when the charger was to be turned on. The hlgh signal, however, in-
hibited the char_er throughout the subsequent charge cycle. During
the subsequent discharge cycle, the signal decayed below 200 mV end
the charger was then turned on in the following sunlight period. In
effect, thl8 condition resulted in two battery discharges for one
charge. Although the cycles were not normal, the battery was not
being abused and could function Indeflnltely in thl8 mode. Normal
cycllc operation could be resumed when the discharge time agaln became
greater than 20 minutes.
Effective performance of the batteries was adequate to supply
the mission requirements in spite of the encountered anomalies. Bat-
tery capacity vaa adequate and supplied all the necessary mission de-
mends when power management was imposed. There vere no battery cell
failures during the mission.
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(c) Voltage Regulator. The load regulator s_c-
tion of the CBRMconverted a wide range of input voltage (25.S to 80
volts de) into a closely regulated output voltage. Input voltage was
supplied by either the solar array or the batteries, whichever was
higher. Output volC•ge was m_int•ined between 27.1 volts dc at full
load and 30.4 volts dc •t no load, with the output current limited
to 20.0 amperes m•ximumunder output short-clrcult conditions. The _
output voltage was modified by a zemote sen_Ing input signal to pro-
vide equal power and bus voltage. A block diagram of e CBRMresul•tor
(one of eighteen) is shown in Figure 7.55 .
During the first portion of the mission, the CBRMregulators
were cycled off and on to alloy the b•tterles to recharge 8ufflclently
from the off nomlnal conditions existing prior co the first crew
deployinq the heat shield and the _S array. Table 7.Xl indicates
which regulators were cycled on each mission day for power conserve-
tlon. In addition, CBRHRegul•tor 15 was cycled •t least 25 times in
• n attempt to unstick the SAg cent•tier for CBRM1S.
The only regulator failure noted during the mission was in
CBRH3. A failed component in the control circuit on DAY17
caused the loss of CBRH3 regulator output to the bus. Onbo•rd status
llghte Indlc•ted the "regulator on" command was setting to the CBRM.
All other functions of the CBRHworked.
One problem occurred on DAY 17 and repeated during the mission.
Fluctuation of _ 1 ampere in the CBI_ 4 regulator current was noted.
The problem was betieved to be caused by an open capacitor used in
an internal P,FI filter. The fluctuation did not migrate to the bus
and therefore caused no problems.
During end of _tssion testing_the CB_4 power sharing circuit
was verified by switching both primary and secondary remote sensing
! circuits off and observing the antlcipeted 0.3 volt drop in bus volt-
age predicted from premlsslon ground testing. Figure 7.56, ATHbus
cher•cterlstlcs, shows thle drop for 16 CBI_4s, the number on llne •t
the end of the mission.
Individual regulator volt•gee were not provided on telemetry
but only as sn onboard me•surement. Therefore, individual regulator
efficiencie8 could not be deteralned without crew observation of data
which w•s not requested.
Average regulator efficiency w•e umesured using the main bus
voltage. D•ta from DAY205 wee used to calculate the efficiency.
B•sed on 20_ IX)D, •nd the battery diode loss counted ag•inst the CBRN
as • whole, the average regulator efficiency during the sunlight por-
tlon of •n orbit was 92.4_. During the dark portion of an orbit the
reraletor efficiency yea 89.3_.
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, HISSION DAYS 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 17
Clmq NUMBEROF ON/OFFCYCLES TOTJtEGULATOIt
1 o
2 0
3 1 1 Re8 Failed 2 ;
4 1 1 2
$ 1 8 3 9 7 9 7 11 11 2 8 76**
6 1 $ 3 7 6 9 7 10 10 2 S 1 66**:
7 1 2 1 4
8 1 1 1 3
9 0
10 1 1
11 1 1 2 _,
12 1 1 1 1 4
1:) 0
14 1 i 2 2 2 8
15 2 2 • , 6
16 1 3 4 ii
17 2 1 2 2 1 8 :
18 0
•1 '
• *Nots: CBIU($ and 6 required extensive
mnaaeuent because of canister
shadovln8 in the off-nomlnal attitudes.
• Re$ cycled 25 tiuee in attempt to unstick the SAS
contractor prior to DAY 37 EVAFix.
", _ Table 7.Xl CBRM Regulator ON/OFF Cycling Matrix For
I Power Conservation (Pre OWS S/A Deploy)
t i
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The total CBRM efficiency, not including llne losses from the
solar array, was 78.1% based on an average CBRM load of 180 watts.
On DAY 266, using data from CBRMs 2, 7, i0, and 18, the CBRM effl-
clency based on 235 watts per CBRMwas 79%. This ndlcated, as did
prenktsslon data, that the efficiency increased as the load went up.
During the mission it was noted that the DOD of CBRM battery
#Ii was higher than anticipated compared to the other batteries. This
• was explained by the fact that the regulator characteristics of CBRM
II, in premisslon tests, showed that its regulator tended to provide
slightly higher output power than the other CBRMs. Table 7.XII com-
pares premlsslon regulator currents from KSC test KT-III0 and mis-
sion regulator currents from DAY 241 for an evaluation of power shar-
ing.
REG. CURRENT KSC Test KTIII0 Flight Data (DAy 241)
m i
• _Average
7.035 AMPS 7.032 Amps
Lowest
CBRM 9 6.805 AMPS 6.832 AMPS
CBRM 13 6.885 AMPS 6.822 AMPS
Highest
CBRM II 7.190 AMPS 7.330 AMPS
CBRM 15 7.170 AMPS 7.230 AMPS
Table 7.Xll Power Sharing Comparison ;_
J
i
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(3) ATM Power Distribution and Control. The ATM was
launched with only the main buses energized. During the unmanned acti-
vation on DAY I, the command to turn on the ATM Power System CBRMs was
sent automatically through the IU automatic sequencer at 17:50. This __:
command was sent in case of anomalous EPS shutdown during the boost
phase because the TM system was not yet activated. At 18:06 the IU
automatic sequencer activated the TMbuses which power the ATM tele-
metry system. Automatic activation of the ATM APCS was delayed until
19:07 with activation of the APCS buses. ATM experiment TCS activation
was delayed until DAY 2 at 18:35. ATM/AM buses were paralleled early
on DAY I at 19:27. The ATM transmitter was powered at DAY i at 22:34.
On DAY 14 after crew arrlva], the ATM C&D console was activated from
18:05 to 18:30.
On DAY 14, during initial experiment activation, an undeter-
mined internal S054 experiment failure made ti impossible to turn off
by conventional means, the Experiment S054 Main Power. Ground commands
had successfully activated the S054 Main Power but subsequent ground
commands (at 06:40) and later crew commands to deactivate were unsuc-
cessful. The only known method to turn off S054 Main Power involved
deactivation of the ATM experiment buses. It was decided to leave
S054 Main Power on for the duration of the mission.
Feeder circuits were designed to carry 2500 watts in either
direction and proved capable of carrying in excess of 3200 watts on
DAY 17. Vehicle response to commands and telemetry data for system
monitoring was good. One anomalous TMmeasurement, which sometimes
read offscale high, was the current measurement for ATM Main Bus Two.
This measurement had been intermittent during KSC testing.
Circuit protection devices and overall circuit control per-
formance was normal with exceptions occurring after the start of the
second manned mission.
The most serious distribution system anomaly occurred on DAY 83
when a 500 ampere current spike was observed on ATMMain Bus 2 for
three seconds. The ATM TV Bus 2 voltage went to zero. After much
ground analysis and testing, it was determined Chat s hard short from
ATM TV Bus 2 to ground occurred in the power transfer distributor.
Power circuits from ATMMaln Bus 2 to TV Bus 2 could not sus-
taln the short. The location of the short and the extent of the dam- (
_ age could not be assessed. ATM TV Bus i was sufficient to provide TV
Bus power for the remainder of the mission, although a work-around was
provided for the third crew as a backup to TV Bus I.
On DAY the tenth of the second manned the85, day mission,
ATM EVA lights were commanded ON from the C&D Panel, but the crew
f
323
7
4
.............-- ......... %........7 ;;
1974022202-350
noticed them to be OFF during the EVA operation. The lights were re-
enabled and operated normally during the remainder of the mission.
The most probable cause was the issuance of an inadvertant disable
command making the lights unable to respond to the "ON" connnand.
After the bus short occurred, many discrepancies accompanying
ATM C&D panel control and monitoring of the power system occurred,
which could possibly have been traced back to debris from the short.
None of these discrepancies affected the ability of the power system
to provide sufficient power. See Figure 7.57 for a description of the
alert logic of the ATM power system. The alert and EPS controls
section of the console are depicted in Figure 7.58.
On DAY 83 the crew turned the rotary switch on the ATM C&D
panel to the CBRM 17 position to obtain readouts, and CBRM 17 regu-
; lator went off. A subsequent turn of the rotary switch to CBRM 16
resulted in the CBRM 16 regulator going off. The ground commanded
both regulators back on and proper operation resumed. On DAY 89,
during troubleshooting, CBRM 17 operated properly, but CBRM 16 regu-
lator remained ON when the crew turned the regulator switch on the
C&D panel to "OFF." When the "rotary switch cycle test" was performed
on DAY 93 there was no abnormal regulator turnoff. However, the crew
had not tried to switch CBRM 16 regulator OFF and no attempt was made
from the ground to command it OFF.
On DAY 98 the crew reported C&D "battery charge" alert light
"ON" and the flag was in the '%arber pole" position in all CBRM posi-
tions. SubJequently, the flag went back to normal (gray) without
any action being taken. The crew was unable to determine which
battery caused the alert and flag indications by troubleshooting,
however, batteries 3, 7, and 17 current, voltage and temperature mea-
surements were erratic (low and off scale low) during crew trouble-
shooting.
On DAY 105, during battery capacity testing, the crew was
unable to turn off CBRM 7 regulator from the C&D panel. No attempt
was made to turn the regulato_ off by ground command and a capacity
test on CBRM I0 was done instead.
On DAY 123 the crew reported the "Regulator Voltage" talkbsck
flag on the ATM C&D console was '_arberpole" during the day and "gray"
during the night portion of the orbit, while the crew was monitoring
CBRM I0. Other CBRM8 wer_ selected but the anomaly did not clear
itself. Regulator voltages read within limits on the panel meter.
On DAY 144 after t_e issuance of several '_ain Power Off" com-
mands to the S0_5 experiment, the experiment remained powered up. This
commanding was done from the ground during the unmanned period between
I
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the second and third manned mission. During the third manned mission
panel activation on DAY 187, the S055 experiment's C_D panel power
switch was configured to secondary and no further onboard trouble-
shooting was attempted.
System activation by the third crew was normal with no problems
occurring in the power distribution system.
The vehicle command system _esponded free of failurc to all
commanding, by both crew and ground. Monitoring of the ATM system
via telemetry and crew response was efficient in enabling rapid reso-
lution of anomalies.
On DAY 195 during capacity testing of CBRM I0, the crew hadf
: CBRM I0 selected on the ATM C&D panel. The crew executed "CBRM I0
Charger On" and CBRM 5 and i0 chargers came on. CBRM 5 charger was
commanded off and CBRM 5 and I0 charger_ went off. A test was per-
formed where CBRM II was selected and the ground commanded CBRM ii
charger on. CBRM II charger was already on; however, CBRM 5 charger
came on. The select switch was disabled and CBRMs 5, i0, and 18 were
commanded from the ground and all con_nands worked properly. This
test proved that the CBRM 5 charger on/off control relay failed
closed. The effect of this failure was cross-talk between CBRM 5
charger commands (DCS or crew) and any CBRM charger selected on the
C&D console, The select switch was therefore left in the "Off"
position, thereby not selecting any CBRH.
After crew splashdown and prior to final vehicle power down
a brief period of time was allotted for the conducting of many essen-
tial electrical network system closeout tests.
The teats and their results were as follows:
I) The ATM electrical system bus redundancy design was tested
to check its EOldreliability. The procedure consisted of
alternate powering down of each subsystem's redundant bus.
Telemetry responses were monitored during this time frame
to confirm that all subsystem loads remained active while
the respective buses were cycled. All subsystems con-
firmed the reliability of the redundant bus arrangements
except for the ATM TV system buses. The test showed that
the secondary TV bus had been lost due to a short on the
bus during DAY 83.
2) The primary ATMmeasuring bus operated without degradation
throughout the entire Skylab program. The secondary measur-
ing supply was activated to determine its capability at EOM.
The secondary measurlng supply was activated successfully
with no noticeable degradation.
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3) Testing of the primary H-alpha-2 aoor motor logic circuitry
was conducted. The test would verify the operational status
of the primary motor circuitry talkback and primary door
motor. The procedure called for the inhibiting of both
primary and secondary motor power and the re-enabling of
the primary circuitry. Re-enabling of the primary cir-
cultry failed to produce a door talkback indicating the
loss of the primary drive circuitry. A possible cause
could have been s short in the drive n_tor or associated
circuitry resulting in a blown fuse.
4) The activation of the secondary auto playback timer in the
auxiliary storage and playback system to dump tape-recorded
telemetry was initiated to verify the backup timer unit.
The secondary auto playback timer functioned normally as
evidenced by the automatic commanding of the tape recorder
to the record mode following approximately six minutes of
data playback.
5) The S054 and the S055 conuuand capabilities were investigated
further. The test procedures served primarily as additional
troubleshooting in an effort to determine the causes behind
mission failures involving the inability of commanding each
experiment's main power "Off". Ground commands were issued
to turn off each experiment's main power and real time data
was analyzed. Attempts to deactivate both experiments
via main power "Off" ground commands were unsuccessful.
Analysis of the S054 anomaly indicates the most probable
cause is a failed power relay in the set position as both
ground and earlier panel commands to deactivate were
unsuccessful.
Earlier requests for the crew to couaand the $055 experi-
ment "Off" cia the panel switch were rejected. Several
attempts to deactivate via ground command wer_ unsuccessful.
Due to limited permissible troubleshooting approaches, only
suppositions can be drawn. Possible causes might be a
relay failure or open circuit in the command line to either
of the two relays involved.
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!c. MDA The docking lights were successfully operated
from the terminal phase of each manned mission maneuver and through
docking.
: The MDA interior lights functioned satisfactorily during the
first manned mission.
7 The only MDA electrical subsystem anomaly, during the first
manned mission, occurred on DAY 81 with the loss of the ATM C&D
panel variable integral and number lighting. Tests performed did not
positively isolate the failed component, however, the probable failure
was indicated as being in the Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) inverter
assembly.
A discrepancy occurred on DAY 20when the MDA 70 ° primary wall
heaters were commanded "ON". The heater groups 5 through 8 and 9
through 12 failed to energize. The crew determined, during the in-
vestigation, that MDA heater circuit breaker No. 2 was "Open". After
verifying that excessive current or transients had not caused the
circuit breaker to open, the circuit breaker was closed and the
heaters commanded "On." The heaters operated satisfactorily; it was
therefore concluded that the crew had inadvertently hit the circuit
breaker, causing it to open.
An MDA internal lighting failure occurred during the second
manned mission on DAY 99, with the loss of eft 2 and 4 lights.
Troubleshooting indicated possible causes of failure could have been
an intermittent failure of the light switch or relay. After successful
reactivation, the Switch was taped in the "On" position and local con-
trol at the light was used for the remainder of the mission.
A loss of integral and numeric lighting on the C&D panel oc-
curred on DAY 235. Numeric lighting was restored during trouble-
shooting which indicated that a possible short existed in the integral f
lighting system.
A comparison of power transfer voltage characteristics for
power transferred from the AM transfer buses to the CSM is shown
in Table 7.Xlll. Prelaunch data obtained during KSC integrated test- •
ing is compared to flight data from DAY 130.
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d. Skylab Caution aria .:arnlns System. The C6_ System
.operated nominally throushoue the Skylab mission and performed all
required mission functions. The system successfully monitored all
seventy-slx parameters and satisfactorily detected out-of-tolerance
conditions. The system yam operational for a total of 4011 hours. -_
During thls time, the system activated approxlmately 220 times.
(I) False Alarms. Out of the 76 parameters monitored,
the only false alarms which activated the C_ System were associated
with the fire sensor assemblies. These false fire alarms vere attri-
buted to the follovlns factors:
(s) Hlsh Temperature. Three false alarms occurred
on DAY 13 shortly after C_ System activation. The source of the
alarm yam FSA 639-1 which was located in the OWecenter sleep com-
part3mnt. These slam8 vere attributed to the excessively hish am-
bient temperatures (approxluately 145 desrees F) in tl_Ls area. The
FSA was quallfled to an operatln8 temperature of I00 desrees F. No
additional alarms occurred after the SWSreturned to nounal operatin8
temperatures followin8 the deployment of the thernal parasol.
(b) Hash Radiation Levels. Four false alarms
occurred durin8 passes through the South Atlantic Anomaly. Dosimeter
and proton spectrometer data indicated that at the clme the alarms
occurred peak radiation levels were encountered. On DAY 14 and 19,
two alarms were activated by the No. 1 Coolins Hodule Fire Sensor
(392-1). No additional alarms occurred follovins reduction in the
sensor sensitivity strains from 35 counts/sac to 45 counts/sac. On
DAY 232, and 248, two Experiment Compartment Fire Sensors (619-1 and
618-I) activated, reepectlvely. The sensitivity of these sensors
vat not chansed and the alarms did not reoccur.
(c) Sunlisht. The follovlnS false alarms were
caused by sola_ UV radiation enterlns the vehicle as direct sunlight
or as reflected lisht, i.e.D the earth's albedo.
Daring the first EVA on DAY 25, owe coolins module FSA 392-2 :
activated with entry of ounltsht throush the opened EVA hatch. Since
both GWScoolins module ,_lre sensors _tre :_ocated in the compartment
evacuated durtn8 EVA, the associated EVA proc®du_e8 vere revised to
inhtbtt both OrS coolin8 nodule tire sensors.
Two erroneous fire alarms occurred on DAY 83 and vere senerated
by the verdroou FSA 633-2. At the time of the slam, the Skylab vat
! passim8 throush the South A_lantic Anomaly tn • near Z-LV attitude
vith the vardroou window sunshade removed. In this conftiuration,
the unprotected window vie exposed to earth reflected UV radiation.
Although the SAA radiation level also encountered at the tans of the
alarms yes lees than that observed at the thne of the eL-2 alarms,
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i.e., approximately 0.I vs. 0.19 Rad/Hr, the combination of both con-
ditions was considered sufficient to have caused the alarm. No addi-
tional alarms occurred and no corrective action was considered neces-
sary.
Two additional fire alarms occurred on DAY 114. The alarms
were caused by ultraviolet radiation coming through the unfiltered OWS
SAL window during the UV photography experiment S073/T025.
(2) During the Skylab mission, two C&W System related
component failures occurred. They were:
(a) FSCP. During the SL-2 mission, one component
failure was identified. Side 2 of Fire Sensor Control Panel 392,
$/N 10, failed to respond to self-test and was successfully replaced
with an infllght spare. The removed FSCP was retained onboard as an
inflight spare for relnstallation in panel locations 530 or 619 in the
OW$ which used only side I.
(b) Pump Delta P. During SUS Loop No. 1 activa-
tion on DAY 85, no C&Walarm was generated from the Pump Delta P sen-
sing circuitry. This condition confirmed the loss of the EVA LCG-I
pump delta P sensing circuitry suspected to have failed during the
SL-2 mission.
(3) During the Skylab missions, :_ _ C&W System in the
AM/MDA U-2 vehlcle and the C&Wsimulation in the Skylab Test Unit (STU)
were maintained in a mission support mode. The Airlock U-2 Caution
and Warning System configuration was identical to Airlock U-I. Spe-
clel tests and operational modes were performed as required to sup-
port the resolution of problems or suspected problems on the SWS in-
flight. Data was plotted on all C&W System related parameters to moni-
tor system performance and to observe parmter trends for out-of-
tolerance or any erratic operetlon. This data primarily came from
the STU/STDN facility at St. Louis. AM/MDA U-2 and STU were used to
support slgntficanr mission problems occurring during the SL-2 mission
in regard to fire sensor false alarms and OWS Bus 1 and 2 low alarm.
(a) Three false alarms occurred on DAY 13 shortly
_fter act_vstlon of the C&W System. _Ire sensor assembly 639-I located
; in the OWS center sleep compartment was the source of the alarms.
Testing was performed at t_le contractor STU facillty on an FSA which
f_iled at a t_perature above the quallflcation temperature of I00
degrees F.
(b) An OWS Bus I and Bus 2 low alarm occurred
when the associated CB8 opened. The U-2 vehicle was utillzed to per-
form a test to verify that both Bus I and Bus 2 low sense circuits
I funccloned pror_rl,,. The test to determine the possibility of a short
circuit existi_g betwenn the circuits due to a wiring incompatibility
i proved t'_ C&W sense clrrult8 performed properly and were not tied
352
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8. Anomalies. The Skylab Hisslon Problem Trackln8 List was
i reviewed and Table 8.1 is a summary of significant anomalle_ within
the E1ectrlcal Power System. A llst of all Action Reports assigned
to or contributed to by the EPS Hisslon Support Group is Included in
i. Appendix 1.
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9. Conclusions an_ Rec_mnenoations,
a. Skylab Electrical Power System. _
(I] CoL_clusions. The Skylab EPS performance was suffi-
cient to _upport all mission obJec;ives without slgnxficantly constrain-
{ng mission plannlng and/or astronaut activlcies. The power systems
:, performed satlsfactorily in spite of the loss of one OWS solar array
i wing, and the _tressing of ATM EPS hardware prior to deploy_nent of the
restrained OW$ solar wing. i he deliberate deslgn feature of parallel
operation for two independent svb-_ystems provided the flexibility
: vh_ch minimized the Impact o_ the above conditions and other ]nomalies
and thus proved to be mi=slon essential.
Another contributor to mission success was the effective use of
power m_nagement t_chnlques. This tool permitted a relaxatlon in sys-
tem battery DaD llm_ts and allowed near real-tlme decisions for effec-
clve mission plannlng. This resulted in the approval of many data-take
maneuver =pportunltles which might utherwlse have been aborted.
The _ffectiveness of near real-time computer manipulations of
d _a to give vlslbility for load management and updating of predicted
performance was verified throughout the mission.
The _sc: Chat allowances had been made, in the launch confisura-
tion, for some hardware lost minimized the effects of losses during
the mission. In fact actual losses were less than premisslon predic-
tions. The required power capability for aatlsfying all end-of-mlsslon
essential loads of oper_tlonal procedures was never lost.
Control and monitor of the EPS was mainly by ground controllers,
thus freeing the crew for more cost effective duties. Occas_onally,
however, the crew was required to assist in EPS malfunction procedures,
battery capacity verification, and AM Reg Bus Voc adjustment. A11 per-
formance assessment was t_e responsibility of ground pe-sonnel based
upon TM data and crew voice inputs.
The loss of the mlcrometeorold shield and its thermal charac-
teristics resulted in higher than pre_ilcted OW$ temperatures; and this
had the positive effect of eliminating the need for operating the OW_
heaters. This reduction in predicted load helped to compensate for the
power reduction resulting from the loss of one OWS sol_r array wins.
Additional instrumentation, for EP$ engi_eerlng data, would
have permitted more timely and accurate assessment of anomaly and
degradation causes, which vould have not only resulted in more effec-
tive Skylsb monitoring, but vould have yielded detailed information
useful for future designs. The peak power trsckinK feature of the AM
EPS resulted in efficient use of power from the slnsle-wlng solar array
pover source.
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Open-Circult sLanding a_d trickle charging for ATM flight bat-
teries after installation may hare resulted in the lamnch of batteries
having degraded caFacity of an undetected _mo_mt.
In spite of the above mentioned conditions the Skylab EPS opera-
ted successfully from SL-I Countdown through SL-4 Splashdown.
(2) Recommendations. The following items have been
identified during mission monitoring and data analyses .ad are recom-
mended for EPS concepts, designs, and operation for future sp.cecraft:
Establish a working load management plan prior to
: launch.
Include sufficient instrumentation to permit etfect-
ire engineering analyses of performance and anomalies.
Include paralleling feature if there is more than one
power ge;_eration/condttioning syctem.
Use solar cell interconnector materials that more
closely match the sola_ cell material and where possi-
ble eliminate the soldeL interface. This w111 be nec-
essary for missions imposing large quaL_tlties of tem-
perature cycles.
Include peak power tracking in future power control and
conditioning designs.
Establish battery cell llfe data as a function of cyclic
temperatures, DOD, and fad.ng characteristics, pre-
m|ssi_
Install fresh batteries, just prior to launch, and have
their capacity verified.
Provide _apabillty to monitor position of various swit-
ches on C&Ds by data "_ord,which will eliminate need
to use crew to verify switch position.
Include the capability to override automatic operations
(such as meters and disconnect devices) to permit reset
of drifting meters and to permit l_mited use of hard-
i ware beyond established limits under contingency condi-
tions.
Avoid shadowlng of p_wer generation system and include
articulation capability where practical.
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b. Skylab Caution and Warning System. The following
conclusions and recommendations are the results of a review of the
C&W System design, the adequacy of the test program associated with
this system, and the performance of the C&W System duriL.g the -'_
Skylab mission.
(I) Conclusions. The design and verification of
the Skylab C&W System were proven to be effectual in that all required
mission functions were performed satisfactorily. In addition to
properly detecting all specified out-of-tolera,ce conditions, no
false alarms occurred as the result of abnormal C&W System behavior
or C&W System component malfunctions. The system was operatlonal
during all manned phases of the mission and succes_fully monitored all
seventy-six preselected parameters relieving the crew to perform other
assigned a_Livit£es. The crew:reported that the C&W System performed
in an outstanding manner and that they were well pleased with all C&W
System/crew interfaces; i.e., system control/inhibit switches, audio
alarm=, indicator lights, parameter categories, memory recall, and !
sy _r ;eset _apabilities. Out of the seventy-six parameters monitored,
only the gas flow, PPCO2 and CMG Sat parameters activated the C&W
Sy_.em an excessive number of times. The ATM CMG Sat.parameters
_ctivated frequently during periods of high = ew a_=ivity and/or AIM
rate gyro failuresjwhile the PPCO2 and gas flow alarms resulted from
marginal sensing techniques utilized. Refinement in techniques to
accurately measure PPCO2 and gas _low are required to make parameters
more meaningful.
(2) Recommendations. The following items we=e
identified during system testing and/or mission support activities
and are recommended to further _,prove the capabilities of the C&W
System:
Provide the capability to monitor the inhibit switch posi-
tions associated _'ith the various C&W parameters via a TM
data _ord. Continual questioning of the crews was required
to determine status of the inhibit switches.
Add TM parameter, with ground reset capability, to alert
ground support personnel that a C_T alarm occurred and was
reset while the vehicle was out of contact with STDN.
Improve technique_ for monitoring PPCO2 and gas flow to permit
meaningful surveillance of these parameters.
Utilize high level (0-5 VDC) input signals in lieu of low
level (0-20 my) signals for better noise rejection
characteris_Ics.
Stabilize the C_ voltage parameter_ by balancing the I'Mout- !
put circuitry.
i Impose stricter EMI requirements on component desig_l to avoid
late design changes as was experienced with the rapid delta
_, P sensnr.
348
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Simplify wiring by incorporating circuitry presently contain-
s, ed in the High Level Audio Amplifier into the Caution a_d
Warning Unit package.
Provide ground test capability of verifying sensors that are
unavailable to monitor such as the mole sieve temperature
sensors.
On future applications, add filter networks internal to the
rapid delta P sensor and C&W signal conditioner packages.
,i
i
t
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APPENDIX I _
HOSC ACTION REQUEST AND MISSION ACTION REQUEST LOG
HOSC JSC __
AR_i MAR # TITLE
i ,qlmFRAMF I RECORDING REQUIREMENTS
5 CHANGE IN STATUS OF CBRM 5 & 6
7 MOLE SIEVE BAKE OUT
9 ATYITUDE CONTROL MODE
13 CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
14 CSM STOWAGE FOR SL-2
16 ATM ASAP RECORDING REQMTS
18 CRITICAL LO_DS MANNED PHASE
22 ORBITAL ATTITUDE FOR RENDEZVOUS
24 REVIEW OF MD-I FLT PLAN
25 MOMENTUM MGMT @ X = -50o
29 AM COOLANT PUMP INVERTER STALL CURRENT
33 CRITICAL LOADS UNMANNED PHASE
3A ATTITUDE MANEUVER FOR SUS
30 THERMAL/ELECTRICAL MGMT PLAN
40 CANDIDATE STOWAGE ITEMS
'_3 REVIEW FLT PLAN MD 2, 4, 5
45 CONE ANGLE OF ATM SAS
47 MIN DATA WHEN COMPUTER DOWN
49 COMMAND PROCEDURES
SWSI DELTA-P DELTA-T SENSOR CDDT/FRT-INFO
CM9 CSM PWR REQ (INFO)
EX21R PWR PROFILES FOR MED. SUPPORT EQUIP.
CM33 XFR PWR ATM TO CSM SUPPORT EQUIP.
Z087 OWS RENDEZVOUS PROFILE
SWS92 ATM PWR CAPABILITY h
SWS94 LOOSE WIRE S/PHOTOS /DWGS
SWSI31 TEST FOR SAS
AXI30 ATM EXP PWR LOADS
ZO168 LIGHTING REDUCTIONS PERMISSIBLE
SWS174 FLIGHT PLAN
SWS201 SWITCH PCG CHG TO BYPASS
SWS206 ZLV-R CAP
SWS223 AM TAPE RECORDER USAGE
ZO235 SWITCH PCGs 3 & 5 TO ON
SWS268 ATM SAS TEMP LOWER LIMIT
SWS277 ATT ITUDE PREDICTION
SW_311 PCG CONFIG. PRIOR TO SAS DEPLOY :
SWS350 PROPOSED C&W POWER UP PROCEDURE
ZO288 SAS DEPLOY CRITERIA
SWS376 CBRM MANAGEMENT
'
351 _
PRDC_DING PA(_ BLANK NOT FILMED 1_
¢
]974022202-377
HOSC JSC
AR # MAR # TITLE
SWS428 EVA AUTO DOOR SWITCH
SWS547 INPUT TO SUMMARY FLIGHT PLAN
AX568 REDUCTION IN PWR F6R ATM EXP
145 SWS579 REQUESTED CHANGE TO C&W PW-RUP
ZO566 OWS PWR PROFILE W/SAS DEPLOYED
57 SWS380 20° ROLL AFTER SOFT DOCK
56 SWS372 EPS POWER NOTE i
54 ...... ATM CBRM #15 OFF
58 ...... RADIAL DOCKING
--- Z0358 SMALL BATTERIES
65 CX175 COORD OF DATA TO RESPOND TO CX-175
HMAR-I SWS414 DEACTIVATE ILCA HEATERS
67 SWS415 CBRM 15 TURN ON
SWS416 FIRE ALARM SENSORS
SWS428 EVA AUTO DOOR SWITCH
SWS415 CBRM #15 RECOVERY PROCEDURE
SWS4i4 POWER REDUCTION ITEMS TO LOWER ATM
BATTERY TEMPERATURES & CONSERVE POWER
HMAR-II CBRM #15 INFO
HMAR-6 SEC CONDENSATE DUMP HTR (INSTR. C&D CONVERTER CB)
74 UNDEPLOYED SAS ASSESSMENT
69 CBRM MISSION RULE DOD
76 CAPABILITY & LOAD PROFILE CURVE
77 OWS HEAT EXCHANGER FIRE ALARM
SWS437 CBRM #15 RECOVER PROCEDURE
78 20 AMP SPIKE ON AM i BUS
90 PWR CAPABILITY CATCUI.ATIONS
i01 SEC CONDEN'ATE HEATER STATUS
103 DEFINITION OF LOAD PROFILE FOR SUMMARY FLT PlAN
115 MD-7 EREP GEOMETRY
124 ATM CBRM AUTO DISCONNECT
128 CBRM #15 RECOVERY PROCEDURE
127 PWR MGMT LOADS FOR EACH MD
130 ZLV GROUNDRULES
131 CBRM #3 TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDURE
132 MD 7 LOADS
133 AH REMOVED FROM ATM BAT (EREP-I)
134 AM SEC COOLANT LOOP INV CB OPEN
156 ADDITION TO CONTAMINATION MISSION RULES
148 SWS590 GROUNDRULE S
SWS588 STAR TRACKER FlAG
142 S054 MAIN POWER TURNOFF
SWS623 ILCA TEMPS
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HOSC JSC
AR # MAR # TITLE
SWS63! CBRM BATTERY STATUS
EX629 MDA WALL TEMP
178 MDA WALL HEATER
164 SWS613 HSS WMC OUTLET OVERLOAD
SWS645 ILCA OP MODES
SWS658 TACS FIRING
SWS636 EPS PWR MGMT - HTRS
SWS670 POWER DOWN CANDIDATES
191 EREP MANEUVERS FOR BETA _ 500
188-E5 EREP PIE CHART
EX656 RECONSIDER EREP PASS LOCATION
149 SWS591 EMERGENCY CREW MGMT OF ATM EPS
SWS692 MD-12 LOAD PROFILE
168 OWS BUS I & 2 C&W
SWS708 THERMAL SOAK ATTITUDE FOR SAS WING
SWS707 BREADBOARD CBRM TEST
SWS718 DOY 157 PANACEA
205 TEST FOR PWR XFER TO CSM
197 Z0694 ATM EPS OVERLOAD
AX634 S054 DOOR FAILURE
SWS719 WMC E{20HTR CIRCUIT
184 WASTE TANK VENTS
203 SAS EVA ADDED PROCEDURES W/SUPPLEMENTS
SWS737 CBRM 17
SWS738 _CG COhTIG. FOR WING DEPLOY
211 FIRE SENSITIVITY ADJ
212 C&W PARAMETER INHIBIT FOR EVA
213 SWS742 OFFLOAD FOR EPS MGT
226 S054 MAIN POWER
235 PCG REGULATOR BALANCING
238 AM PCG REG ADJUST POTS
237 EREP ZLV MANEUVERS
239 DATA REQ'D TO ;RACK SYS STATUS WHEN NO R/T DATA
175 ATM 2 WING ATTACH TO MDA PORT
240 PWR XFER TO CSM
Z0830 BATT CHG LITE RESET
Z0840 USE OF EVA HDW FOR ADD HEAT LOAD ON SUS
SWS845 EPS EVAL OF EREP PASSES (DAILY)
249 AX781 S054 DOOR
255 BACK TO BACK EREP PASSES
54RI SWS870 EVA REPAIR OF CBRM #15
160 SL-R RETURN/SL-3 LAUNCH STOWAGE
263 CBRM #6 FAILS TO TURN OFF
271 SL-2 CLOSEOUT
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HOSC JSC
AR # MAR # TITLE -*'
268 SWS901 MDA WALL HTR 70° C/B
275 FSCP 392
269 SWS903 AM EPS/C&W ONBOARD STATUS
SWS2154 ATM/AM BATTERY CAP TEST
284 WARDROOM WINDOW (USE OF HEATER)
287 UNATTENDED OPS - GND STA REQ.
289 S149 ATTACHED TO ATM SUNSHIELD (S/A SFADOW)
281 S055 DOOR DISCREPANCY
AX906 S055 DOORS OPS ON 2 MOTORS
331 TROUBLESHOOT ING PROCEDURE
AXI014 S056 DOOR
356
AXI070 S054 LOGIC RESET _
AXI054 X-RAY ACTIVITY HISTORY PLOTTER _-
AX1078 S055 DOOR PROBIEMS
375 AXI088 MGMT OF SYSTEM DURING UNMANNED
376 WH METER
377 ZW SEL CMD DISCREPANCY :
357 SWSI060 OWS ';AG4 CURRENT _.
SWS983 FIRE SENSORS VS SUNLIGHT
312 SWS969 AM REG BUS OCV SETTING
270 SWS898 AM REG OCV SETTINGS
ZO878 MD 13 FLT PlAN COMMENTS
247 Z0827 OWS S/A SWITCHING (PCG)
246 Z0826 FMR 6-381 -
392 T027/S073 ,_
EXI095 PWR CONSTRAINTS " SL'3 - EREP PASSES
391 OWS BUS I PWR DOWN
SWSIII7 CBKM #3 SHUTDOWN
SWSIII8 CBRM #3 - POSSIBLE H2 BUILDUP
400 REVIEW FME FOR SL-3 ",,
413 RSS TROUBLESHOOTING TECHNIQUES _
SWSI144 JOP 13 THERMAL ANALYSIS
437 OPEN SOLAR ARRAY TO CBRM .4_,3 :_
434 REVIEW OF SL-4 MRD
AXII70 S054 READY/OPERATE LIGHT PROCEDURE _"
AXII73 ATM APERTURE DOOR MALF PROCEDURE
AXII76 ATM BBI2 OPERATION '_
443RI FMR CHANGES
SWSI222RI EREP PASS PWR ASSESSI_bri"
473 AUTOSCAN ASSESSME_'I'
425R6 MANNED MGMT CRITERIA
SWS1228 ATM BAT CAP TEST DATA CURVES :'
485 INVALID DATA ASSESSMENT
_J
I_ 354 Y
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HOSC JSC
AR # MAR # TITLE
480 SL INFLIGHT PROBLEM REPORT
SWSI154 CBRM 17 INFLIGHT TEST
SWSII56 BAT CAPACITY TEST
496 MOLE SIEVE B, FAN 2
SWS 1261 ATM MAG LATCH RELAY
501 SL-4 STOWAGE
505 CBRM #15 C&D
SWS 1292 ILCA ANOMALY
509 ATM C&D CONFIGURATION
531 POTENTIAL RESCUE PLANNING
527 REVIEW AUTOSCAN EVENTS SUMMARY PROGRAM
SWS1457 ID OF PWR XFER DISTR. FUNCTIONS
563 S052 LIGHT ANOMALY
554 S052 DOOR FALSE OPEN INDICATION
Z01447 SWS CONFIG FOR RADIAL DOCK
SWS1458 MECH DWGS OF 702AI DISTR
AX1459 TV MALF PROCEDURE
AX1427 REV 6 MANNED MGMT CRITERIA
1216 CBRM BAT CAPACITY VERIF
1247 -CBRM #4 FUNNY DOY 150
1263 CBRM #4 CONTROL
1390 S055 DOOR MALF.
1468 SL-R RADIAL DOCKING
1435 CBRM 17 FUNNY
1436 ILCA PROCEDURE
1456 S055 DOOR MOTOR OPERATION
569 TROUBLESHOOTING LIST
570
571 S056 DOOR SAILED TO OPEN
574 SWS1478 (,BRM 16 & 17 TROUBLESHOOTING PROC TO E_IL
575 TROUBLESHOOT TV BUS TWO
496 INCONCLUSIVE DATA - MOLE SIEVE
1479 SL RESCUE POST INSERTION TIMELINE
' 555 QUESTION _OR CREW ON CBRM 16 & 17 ANOMALy
579 GND VS O....OARD MOLE SIEVE TEMP READ
IA94 S056 DOOR OPERATION
; 581 SL-4 STOWAGE LIST
! 1480 MOLE SIEVE TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDUI_E
587 WCIU PLUG
588 ATM EVA LIGHTING OFF
! 593 OPS SYS W/O AM COOLANT LOOP
594 SYSTEMS STATUS
! 355
]974022202-38]
HOSC JSC
AR # MAR # TITLE
595 CBRM 16, 17 TROUBLESHOOTING
522-7-8 EREP #7 & #8
600 MDAC-W WEEKLY SUBSYSTEMS REVIEW
1543RI CBRM ROTARY SWITCIICYCLE
613RI CMG GIMBAL MEAS ERROR
625 MANNED MGMT CRITERIA
1595 ED25 MANEUVER (JOP 13)
622 1581 ILCA PROCEDURE
629 FINE ADJUST POT ON PCG 6 & 7
630 CONTINGENCY NOTE #17
455 POWER DOWN CANDIDATES FOR ZLV-E
AX1652 S082A DOOR OPS
SWS]655 BAT CHG LIGHT ON & BP ON C&D
SWS1385 TV 2 BUS ANOMALY
640 DOOR RAMP REMOVAL
AXI670 DOOR RAMP REMOVAL
SWS1673 SWS EQUTP DUTY CYCLE
641 SWS1695 ATM BATTERY TESTING
540-25 MDA LIGHTS/ATM C&D X-RAY & RNBM QUESTIONS
641 SWS1695 BATTERY TEST
SWS1721 ATM C&D/ILCA
647 RATE GYRO 6-PACK OFF LOADING
660 MDA LIGHTS (AFT) TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDURE
SWS1728 HKTOY CBRM CAP TEST
SWS1730 HKTOZ PCG CAP TEST
663 S052 DOOR PROBLEM DURING EVA
665 EPS OPS W/BOTH COOLANT LOOPS INACTIVE
668 6-PACK SFP
672 3030AI PCG BATTERY VER 30/238
CSM1689 DISABLED CSM ELECTRICAL CLOSEOUT
SWS1746 6-PACK SFP
676 SHORT M518 OPS PROPOSAL
675 CBRM 7
SWSI760 SEC COOLANT LOOP
Z01762 MANNED MGMT CRITERIA, SL-3
682 SWS1815 PWR MGMT COOLANT LOOP
AX1767 JOP 13
SWS1749 6-PACK
1762RI MANNED MGMT CRITERIA
SWSI673R2 SWS EQUIP. DUTY CYCLE
691 HURRICANE MANEUVER
SWS1812 CBRM BATTERY LIMITATIONS
SWS1813 S052 DOOR ANOMALY
694 REVISE MGMT CRITERIA - CBRM DOD
356
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HOSC JSC
AR # MAR # TITLE
697 SYSTEM STATUS
700 C&W ALARM
Z01844 REV 4 _L-3 MGMT CRITERIA
709 Z01855 SL-3 TROUBLESHOOTING CANDIDATES
708 EREP PWR UP/DN PROCEDURE
711 OWS LL MUX B INTERMITTENT OPS
715 REVIEW OF DOY 247/0730 DATA FOR "THUMP"
716 S/L #3 DEACTIVATION LIST
SWS1878 ATM BATT RECORD ASSESSMENT
Z0!887 TROUBLESHOOTING PROCEDURE
725 XUV AUX TIMER INSTALLATION PROCEDURE
SWS1887 TROUBLESHOOTING - R2- CBRM 4, DOY 145 - PROC.
SWS1917 TV BUS ALTERNATE
729 H-ALPHA-2 DOOR ANOMALY
730 PANACEA/SEPSA DOD PREDICTIONS
SWS1923 ATM BATT PRELAUNCH HANDLING
AXI931 H-ALPHA-2 DOOR MALFT/NCTION
738 BATT CAP VERIFICATION TEST
Z01949 MANEUVERS FOR S201 EVA OPERATION
739 ANOMALOUS MEASUREMENT UPDATE
743 S082A DOOR
745 CONTINGENCY PWR DWN PROCEDURE
751 CBRM 5
749 SL '4 TEMP MEASURING DEVICES
747 6-PAK UNMANNED CON'FIG ENVIRONMENT
760 EVENT STATUS FOR Y3 RGP NOISE
Z01993 CDR/PLT COMM DURING M509 TO20 RUN-SUITED
AXI999R2 ATM TV BUS CYCLING
Z02002 MANNED MGMT CRITERIA
AX2005 S056 FILM XPORT HANGUPS
AX1964 S082A DOOR INSPECTION DURING EVA-3
SWS1972 CBRM #5 BAT TEMP
AX1979 ATM EXP DOOR REMOVAL DURING EVA
759 AX1994 RATE G_RO 6-PACK
763 SWSI998 6-PACK GYt'O ENVIRONMENT FOR UNMANNED
736 ADDITIONAL TOOLS FOR SL-4
754 CBRM #5 TAG UP
$WS2017 PCG CAPACITY CURVES
775 PEG TB VOLT ON C&D - REG 1-12
774 POST SL-3 UNMANNED CRITERIA
AXI977R2 REFRIGERATION J-5
SWS2024 ADDITIONAL LOSS OF COOL-DUTY CYCLES
777 JOP 13
SW$2028 PCG MGMT FOR NO COOLING
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HOSC JSC
AR # MAR # TITLE
781 JOP 13 DOY 263
782 JOP 13 DOY 264
AX2044 WLC FRAME COUNTER
AX2042 ATM TV MONITOR/MGMT/TROUBLESEOOTING PROC
Z02067-1 SL-4 UNMANNEDS/C EXPERIMEN'I
SWS2062 EVALUATION OF J5 DISCONNECT PROC
AX2054 S082B TIMER INSTALLATION
SWS2092 J5 DISCONNECT VERIFICATION
AX2090 H-ALPHA-2 DOOR ANOMALY
803 AX2097 TV MON i TROUBLESHOOTING
805 OCV ADJ POT-STICK-ON LABELS :
806 GURGLING SOUND
810 ATM TV MONITOR REPLACEMENT: SL-4
816 REMOVAL OF KICKPLATE TO PERMIT ADDITION OF TIMER :
817 UNMANNED GROUND SYS MGMT
818 KOHOUTEK MGMT CRITERIA
825 SL-4 ACT/DEACT CHECKLIST
822 KOHOUTEK MRD ADDITION
834 JSC/TV
SW_2139 PORTABLE TV MONITOR
SWS2130 R/T DATA XFER TO MSFC SL-4
831 SL-4 PROBLEM INVESTIGATION STUDY
835 R/T DATA LOSS CONTINGENCY PLAN
840 AX2142 H-ALPHA-2 DOOR (PRI) OPSRATION
838 FLT MISSION RULES
829 SL-4 DEACTIVATION
832 AM & ATM BAT TEST DURING SL-4
Z02_0 SUBFRAME 4 DATA _
846 ATM TV MONITOR
Z02146 CYCLING ATM EXP BUS 1 & 2
SWS2153 SAS SHORTING PI.UGDATA
Z02159 UNMANNED GROUND SYS MGMT CRITERIA
837 SL3 EQUIP RE. 'D FOR EVALUATION ._
Z02162 REV 3 SL-4 U/M SPACECRAFT MG_rT CRITERIA
SWS2154 ATM/AM BATTER\' CAPACITY TESTING
SWS2148 EPC ACTUAT9,_ CURRE:_S
SWS2164 SL-4 SYSTEM PROBLEM [NVESTTGATION _IEVIFM
844 AX2146 S055 ELECTRICAL PROBLE>_
852 KOHOUTEK ATM VIEWING
SWS2183 180° ROLL ._I_NEUVERS
866 CBRM 9 AvroDISCONNECT "-
867 PWR DOWN/I IMITED C,_ERFOR NO COOLANT LOOP :
SWS218-) SL-4 U_LANNE.D MGlrF CRITERIA
869 REVIEW OF CP_NGE_ 'iOCOMMAND PROCED ,_L-4
\
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HOSC JSC
AR # MAR # TITLE
AX2199 S055 MAIN POWER
875 S055 ELECTRICAL POWER CONFIGURATION ._
SWS2203 CBRM 3 BATTERY DISCHARGE
SWS2205 SL-4 MGMT CRITERIA
SWS2221 TV BUS 2 OHMMETER CHECK
891 SL-4 SYS PROBLEM INVEST. & STATUS
878RI OCCULTING MANEUVERS FOR $201
901 LOSS OF SL-3 & SL-4 DATA
Z02238 MANNED MGT CRITERIA
SWS2257 AM DCS ANOMALY DOY 315
SWS2243 CONTINGENCY RENDEZVOUS
907 EPC U/D LOCK FAILURE
SWS2246 CBRM 3 RECHG/DISCHG
940-2 CREW QUESTIONS
950P EREP PRACTICE
913 ATM C&D COOLANT LOOP IS ERRATIC SL-3
920-6 MD-6 FLT PLAN
904RI TAPE RECORDER DATA
914 C&D PUMP OPERATION
SW52284 CREW ALERT CHFCK
915 $232 MANEUVERS
918 CBRM 9 RE.:}ICCOMPL ANOMALY
924 S183 MRD CHANCE
926 CBRM 5 CHG ON/OFF RELAY STUCK
Z02328 MANNED MGMT CRITERIA REV 5
Z02365 S054 C&D PANEL LIGHTING
Z02367 I'C_6 CAP TEST
937 EPC PROBLEM
93_ CMG OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT
941 VEHICLE VIBRATIONS
2403 MANNED MGMT CRITERIA REV 6
947 DATA WITH DTV OUT
949 SWS2418 AM OCV ADJUST
952 SAS 15 VOLT DROP
961 S082A T/S DOOR INDICATES IN TRANSIT
AX2466 S082A APERATURE DOOR ANOMALY
AX_469 S082A FILM CAI_"A IMPINGEMENT CONSTRAINT
962. C&D LOOP FT_W REDUCTIONS
SW_'2509 SPIN STAB OF O.A.
972 SL-4 EVA
AX2512 TV MONITOR OPS W/FAILED ATM C&D COOLANT LOOP
979 AIM C&D DAS ANOMALY
SWS2513RI ECM EVA QUASI-INERTIAL
985 SEQ FOR SECOND Cl_ FAILURE
359
]974022202-385
, I q
HOSC JSC
AR # MAR # TITLE
989 AM XMTR C
991 AM LL MUX NOISE PROBLEM '_
992 AM LL MUX NOISE PROBLEM
AX2593 SCAN SPEC GRATING POSITION
987 MANUAL CMG HEATER CONTROL
984 "'KLUI;K" -_
CX2625 RC$ CONTAMINATION DURING EVA
SWS2645 REV D TO FAILURE OF CMG
Z02649 SL-4 MANNED MGMY CRITERIA
i000 RCS FOR EVA 4 CONTROL
SWS2688 EREP ZLV TEMP CONSTRAINTS ,.
I011 SWS2705 BAT CAP CK @ END OF MISSION
1009 EOM CONFIGURATION "
EX2721 S193A GEOS-C SUPPORT-DATA TAKE
SWS2240 EPS MANNED MGMT CRITERIA
Z02748 MANNED S/C CRITERIA
1016 SWS2755 CBRM9 - RECH CMPLT SIGNAL
Z02778 SL-4 END OF MISSION FLT PLAN
1018 SL-4 POSTFLIGHT CREW DEBRIEFING
IOI9RI POST SL-4 CONFIGURATION
SWS2819 5OM ELEC TESTING
1054 CLOSEOUT PHOTOS
Z02802 BATTERY TESTING
AX2888 H-ALPHA- 1 DOOR
1060 STOWAGE BAG FOR REVISIT
1064 PICTD'_S
1066 END OF MISSION TEST PLAN
SWS2952 PCG A-H INTEGRATORS
360
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A 'PENDIX 2
: Sneak Circuit Analysis.
J
The goal of the sneak circuit analysis was to identify any
condition which, due to a sneak (unwanted and potentially anomalous)
electrical path, could degrade Skylab electrical performance. The
Sneak Circuit Analysis performed on Skvlab was imposed for reasons
of safety (equipment and personnel) and mission success. The program
involved:
Establishment and maintenance of a complete set of Skylab
design documents.
Verification of all module interfaces.
l)_velopment of simplified schematics which were used to
e¢_luate the actiwltion circuitry, system sequence checks,
and procedure studies.
The use of a computer as a tool in circuit analysis on programs
as large as Skylab was unique. The performance of this type of task by
manual methods would have been extremely difficult and inefficient con-
sidering the complexity of the Skylab electrical system.
_nalysis Description.
"the analysis performed included all modules of the Saturn Work-
shov: the Electrical Support Equipment (ESE) and the Saturn Norkshop
(SWS) interfaces with the Instrument Unit (IU) and Command and Service
Hodule (caM) werL included. Those IU functions which control SWS sys-
tems were analyzed, Experiments associated with the Skylab SWS were
also a part of the analysis.
The analysis continued through mission termination, ESE umbil-
ical power and contrG1 ctrcuits were analyzed fo_ the :tme period from
just prior to initiating the automatic sequence until after umbilical
separation. Circuitry o_ the airborne modules and interfa,es defined
above were analyzed for the operational modes of each mission phase.
The analysis included the primary power and control circuits,
switched secondsw power and control circuits, switched signal cir-
cuits, command circuits, and computer interface circuits. Certain non-
switched signal circuits, the grounding and mos_ of the digital logic
circuitry _,ereexcluded.
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Program Concept.
The prime function wa_ to obtair, the data for the analysis, _-
evaluate potentlal sneaks and ensure Implementatl_n cf corrcctlve ac-.
tlon. This function Included: analysis of the Skylab zircuitry _:,d
identification of potentlal problems, and coordination with contractor
home plants for potentlal sneak circuits and addltlona] data.
A review board, consisting of a member from associated organiza-
tion, was established to dispe_ition all reports.
Operations.
T_e task involved the acqu_sttion, correlation and _.-codtng of
over 4,0,3C detailed schematics and wiring lists for the various modules.
Eight new computer programs were developed and 1_ existing pro-
grams were modified to provide assistance in performing the analysis.
The purpose of these programs varied frcm tracking of i.pu" documents
and reports to automattcallt drawing network trees from inf_,rmation in
the oats base. A total of 400 computer ho_= (IBH 360/_." ;_nd 370/155)
were needed to complete the analysis eff.._.
A total of 1,530 change packages were recelwa :rod analyzed.
Of these, 312 were electrical functional cha_,ges,
L
Re su 1_].
The analysis resulted in the preparation of 259 Sneak Circui _
Reports. Hany reports described more than on_ Sneak Circuit condition.
A significant by-product of the analysis was :h- l'k_tification of
drtwing errors, Over 300 Drawing Error Reports were ze}eaaed.
"the Sneak Circuit Reports were reviewed and dispositioned. The
disposition was _s follow_: 66 Sneak Circuit tu]letins; 40 Problem
Reports; 91 Design Concern Reports; 17 Drawing Error Reports. Correc-
tive actxons resulting from review of reports included 20 hardware
changes, 37 procedural changes, 4 documentation changes, 5 test con-
straints. In add_tion, over 45 hardware changes resulted from the
Drawing Error Reports. Ai_ Sneak Circuit Reports were dispositioned
and closeJ out. _otification of drawing errvcb was made to all concc_nLd
organizations involved in the test, missio' cor, txol sad aission support
areas.
: Conclu|ions and Recommendatipns.
¢ E
The Sneak ,,._cuit Analysis o_ the Skylab Saturn _orkshop has
¢ resulteh in a range of conc}uslons relative to the Skylab Program and
= a ser_es of recoemendatlons for the . plic_tlon of the analysis on
future programs.
_62
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+ Conclusions.
• The follow_cg conclusions have been drawn from the analysis:
a) In obtaining and identifying the electrical schematics
for Skylab the following p_oblems were encountered.
Not sufficient continuity between the p!ectrical
schematics and the assembly drawings. !
Experimenters and prime module vendors did not pro-
vide the latest engineering into NASA's Repositories.
Some of the changes come into the Repository a year i i
after release.
Module vendors did not require sub-vendors to release
their drawing to NASA's Repositories. I
/ Top level drawings were hard to identify and some top i
level schematics were not available.
Had to determine continuity between terminals on
' terminal boards using the mechanical drawings.
End item did not have a configuration index drawittg.
Prime vendor did not have a reference de_ignatiou
system.
b) This analysis has been program effective for reasons other
than equipment and personnel safety and mission success
such as:
Eseablishment and maintenance of a complete set of
documentation for the Skylab elecLrical/elecLronlcs
systems.
Upgrading of documentation systems as a result of
drawing errors and index capabilities.
Verificstion of interfaces within and between modules
by the use of computer programs, analysis and reports.
Development of network trees which have been used to
conduct an activation survey, system sequence checks,
and procedural studies.
Cj J7
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Recommendations.
The ana_ysi_ results and conclusions indicate that sneak cir-
cuit analysis has had a m_jor impact on the gkylab Program. Signifi-
cab_ ecommendations can be sunm_arized as iullows:
' A sneak circuit analysis shou TM _:e performed on future
manned systems similar to Sky_,o and pn u_anned space
: '.'_tems where safer), reliabilitv or mission success
dictate a requirement for high probability of sneak
free operation.
• The analysis shoO_ be conducted _arly in the program
development cycl_ to realize the greatest benefits.
The Skylab analysis was started about six months after .'
Critical Design Review (CDP). Sneak conditions, iden-
tified later in a program, result in cosLly fixes, in
less desirable fixes being accepted, or in _ne condi-
tion being d_spositioned as an acceptable risk because
' of cost, schedu]e, and other nrogram constraints. -_
_ The data collection and correlation pr,_ess for future
programs should be initiate4 ,_arlI i., the program cycle.
For those programs where a sneak ciccuit analysis is
indicated, the initial data requirement should specify
• delivery of detailed schematics, w_:e l;sts, wire tapes
i and other required input data prior to the time the
• analysis is initiated, i
All end items should i,ave a configuration index that :
will identify all drawings and correlate the part num-
ber to the electrical schemnt_c wh_re applicable. Also
a document should be _ssue,, that lists all end items
: and part numbers.
i
It should be a _ong range goal for NASA programs to spe-
cify the _elivery of automated wiring information on
i wire tapes In addition to improving the efficiency of!
the _neak circuit analyses, othc:" benefits to the pro-
! 4_'_m in the _:eas of configuration management, systems
engineering, quality control, test and operations would
1 be realized. : _
i :
: !
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_ APPENDIX 3 _
Skylab Cluster Power Simulator - Installation through Mission Support.
0 I. DESCRIPTION
The Skylab Cluster Power Simulator, located at the Launch Vehicle
and Power Verification Complex (LV & PVC) Facility in MSFC Building
4436, consists of twenty-slx racks of equipment, an "A" frame
housing eighteen (18) charger battery regulator modules (CBRMs),
two (2) airlock battery modules housing four (4) power condition-
ing groups (PCGs) each, and an Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) Power
Transfer Distributor. The PCGs, CBRMs, and Power Transfer Dis-
_ tributor are flight type hardware located in an enclosed air con-
1 ditioned area providing proper ambient temperature and active
CBRM coolant requirements. In addition, a primary and secondary
_ r coolant unit is utilized for active cooling of the airlock module
PCG components (h_ttery, charger, and regulator) cold plates.
T
To provide a more detailed description of the Skylab Cluster
! Power Simulator, the system is divided into the following sub-
systems; ATM Power Subsystem, AM Power Subsystem, Command Service
Module (CSM) Simulator, and Associated Electrical Support
Equipment (ESE). In addition, a chronological listing of hard-
ware buildup and checkout completion dates is provided.
I A. ATM POWER SUBSYSTEM
The ATM Power Subsystem is comprised of eighteen (18) CBP_Is
eighteen (18) simulated solar array power supplies and solar
array programmers, an ATM power transfer distributor, an ATM
watt hour assembly, variable load banks, and control and
display panels. Control and monitor functions are provided
to allow both normal and contingency modes of power system
operations.
B. AM POWER SUBSYSTEM
The Airlock Module Power System is comprised of two (2) ;
_ • battery modules, each housing four (4) power conditioning
groups (PCG). Each PCG consisted of a battery charger. _
battery, and an output voltage regulator. Eight (8) simulated '
solar array power sources were used for battery chargin_.
Each solar array simulator consists of a DC power supply
and an associated series regulator to provide PCG battery
charger input power. The PCGs are controlled from the _M
EPS control and 4isplay panel (206), the AM power system
switching panel (205), and the power distribution circuit
breaker panel (201). These three flight type panels com-
prise the AM Power System Control and Display Console. the
AM Power qystem Control extends to the OWS, MDA, CSM, and
ATM Load Buses as selected on the control and display panels. :
Variable loads can be applied to any or all buses to simulate
various orbital load profiles.
_ C. CSM SIMULATOR
The Command Service Module (CSM) Simulator is comprised of
simulated descent battery and fuel cell power sources,
flight type CSM/MDA interface power filters, and variable
loads including flight type power inverters. Control and
display panels are provided to simulate flight power and load
profiles.
D. ESE
The Electrical Support Equipment is comprised of ESE power
supplies, a Digital Data Acquisition System (DDAS) Station,
Networks Switching and Control, a Low Temperature Test Unit
(LTTU), Cluster Load Banks, and a Hewlett Packard Data
Acquisition System (DAS). The DDAS System utilizes magnetic
tape recorders and a SEL 810 Computer for data monitoring.
The H/P DAS is a self-contained unit with magnetic and paper
tape recording capabilities in addition to visual data
readout.
E. INSTALLATION TASKS AND CHECKOUT HISTORY
The following chronological listing identifies the major
hardware tasks performed in building the Power Simulator
to its present configuration. In addition, the month that
completion and checkout was accomplished is noted.
1. October j 1970 - Started racks and facility installation
effort.
2. May, 1971 - AM Battery Module No. i Delivered and Installed.
3. September. 1971
i; s) Power Simulator Facility Power Installation Completed. :
b) AM Battery Module No. 2 Delivered end Installed.
c) DDAS Station Installation and Checkout Complete. _
4. November, 1971 - ESE Power Subsystem Checkout Completed. _
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!5. December, 1971 - ATM Power Transfer Distributor Delivered
_ and Installed.
i
6. March, 1972 - One-half Power System (9 CBRMs and 4 PCGs)
Operational. i o
7. Apri!l 1972 - Total AM Power System (8 PCGs) Operational.
8. June, 1972
a) Total ATM Power System (18 CBRMs) Operational.
b) Total Power System (18 CBRMs and 8 PCGs) Paralleled
_ and Operational.
, 9, 3anuarv, 1973 - "Upgraded" CSM Simulator Operational.
I0. Februarz, 197_3 o Added H/P Data Acquisition System in Prep- :
ar&tlon for Mission Support Role.
 OSC/M SSIONSUPPORTACTiVITIeS
The tests performed at the Skylab Power Simulator are divided
into three categories as follows: (A) Tests per Requirement
Document 40H35693, (B) Special Tests, and (C) HOSC/Mission
Support Teats. The following lists identify the tests and
completion dates.
A. TESTS I_.R 40M35693
1. October, 1972 - Power Subsystems Tests (AM and _M)
and Emergency Deactivation Tests (Sections 7.1 _nd 7.2).
O
2. March. 1973 - CSM Power Subsystem Verification Tests
(Section 6,7), :
3, April_ 1973 - Power Subsystems Parallel Operations
Verification Tests AM-EPS/ATM-EPS/CSM-EPS (Sections
7.3.1, 7,3.3, and 7.3.4.
4. May, 1973 - Power System Contingency and Malfu_,ction
Modes Operation Verification Tests (Section 7,4).
5. Hay, 1973 - Power Systems Power Sharing Characteristics
and Interface Voltage Lim£t Tests (Sections 7.3.7.3 and
7.3.7.5).
367 _ '
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!6. September: 1973 - Power System Bus Noise and Transient
Tests (Section 7.3.7.1 and 7.3.7.2).
7. January: 1974 - ZLV-R, Solar Inertial, and ZLV-E Simulated j
Orbit Tests (Sections 7.3.2, 7.3.6 and 7.3.8). NOTE:
Although these tests were not completed until near the
end of SL-4 Mission, a representative number of simulated
orbit tests for each section were completed prior to SL-I
launch.
B. SPECIAL TESTS
I. September: 197___22 .r
a) Additional AM Power Systems Bus Tests were conducted.
These tests were to gain additional bus voltage and
current characteristics under multiple PCG bus source
conditions.
b) Conducted CBRM Tests related to CBRM source input
capacit6: problems.
2. November, December: 1972
a) AM Battery Recharge Tests - Forty-two days of contin-
uous AM Battery Tests were performed. The tests were
conducted to investigate the effects of reduced charge
voltage and Amp-hour meter return factor on battery
operation and Amp-Hour meter control. During the
above tests 463 simulated Day/Night orbits (1.5 hours
each) were conducted. In addition, thirteen (13)
battery capacity tests were made for a total operating
time of 922 hours.
b) CBRM Capacitor Tests - Conducted an investigation of
the Tantalum Wet Capacitor Problems experienced by
the ATM CBRMs.
C. HOSC/MISSION SUPPORT
During all Skylab missions, Power Simulator support was pro-
vided with continuous support provided during activation and
deactivation periods.
368
-_ ............................ L
1974022202-394
f4
i mh. maJo_ suppor* _ffnrts are identified below.
[ May, 1973
L'
i a) Provided har_._are verification for a paper Simulation ;
Power Bus Management Problem.
_ o) Pcv....Simulator "On Line" during and after SL-I
Laur_h. !:'o_ersystem configured to simulate "On
I Board" pcoblem. (One OWS wing not deployed, Batteries-*ored)
c) A special CSL.to SWS Power System Paralleling Procedure
w;Js conducted and test data transmitted.
d) On May 18, 1973, the Power Simulator AM batteries
wcre configured to simulate on board AM battery con-
diti ns (Depth of Discharge and Temperature). These
conditions were maintained and monitored continuously
through o_ne 11, 1973. The purpose of this effort
• was to establish battery conditions similar to Skylab
in order to determine the response after the long
period prior to Wlng Deployment.
dorment SL-I
- i
! i June, 1973
I a) Conducted one-half solar array power recharge to AM
batteries at end of above dormant storage period.
b) Conducted a battery capacity check to verify that
Skylab battery capacity telemetry data was valid.
c) Conducted Telemetry Tests on a CBR_wlth both open
and low rqsistance telemetry _turns to identify
problems associated with Skylab CBRM #17.
d) Conducted Special Testa on the _rM Power System to
determine the effect on all other CBRM outputs if a
CBI_ loses regulator _utput power sharing remote -!
sensing capability. ,
e) Provided contlnuous coverage during SL-2 Launch (May)
and Skylab Actlva, ion and Deactivation periods.
369
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Jgly_ 1973
Provided continuous coverage during SL-3 Launch and
Skylab Activation.
August a 1973
a) A total o£ II0 simulated orbits (in real time wlth
Skylab) were conducted during this period.
b) Battery capacity checks were conducted on three
(3) CBRHs in real time with Skylab CBRH capacity
checks, These tests were conducted to validate
the Skylab Telemetry Data.
September_ 1973
a) Assisted in the development and verification of a
Special AM Power System Configuration for the Skylab
storage period between SL-3 and $L-4 missions. This
special power system configuration provides shutdown
capabllity (VIA DCS) of the AM Power System to pre-
vent equipment damage in the event of a coolant loop
failure.
b) Supported testing of hardware verification of a con-
cept to operate partlally dlsabled Skylab CBRMs 3 and
5 as one "Good" CBP,H. Bus characteristics and opera-
tional data were acquired under various load and
orbital (solar array) configurations.
c) A total of 72 orbits were conducted in real time
with Skylab.
d) Supported verification of ONS SAG 4 postulated short
on SAG 4 return wire by simulation of flight data.
October, 1973
a) Assisted with additional teats related to item
September-(b) above.
b) Conducted Special CBRHTests to verify CBRH Auto
Alarm indications operation.
November, 1973
Provided continuous Power Simulator Coverage during SL-4
Launch and Skylab Activation period.
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- December _ 1973/January and February, 1974
; a) Simulated orbits were run in "Real Time" with J
Sky Iab. I
b) Conducted special hardware vet'Iflcation of Skylab
c loseout and power down,
c) Provided continuous support durlrg SL-4
Deactivation.
llI. CREW AND FLIGHT CONTROLLER TRAVNING
In November, 1971, a requirement was identified to provide hard-
ware and power system theory training to fifteen (15) Skylab
Flight Controllers. As a follow on, in February 1972, the re-
quirement was expanded to provide five (5) Astronauts up to
fifteen (15) hours each of hardware training.
The following listing identifies the tasks rcquired to satisfy
the above requirement and their completion dates.
I. February, 1972 - Started development of "Skylab Cluster
Power System Description Document" (Training _lanual)
50}478001.
2. April, 1972
a) P_elimlnary training pit,:outline completed.
b) Twenty "Red Line" copies of 50M78001 distributed to
NASA personnel for review and con_aents.
3. Mawr, 1972
a) Heetlng held to conduct a final review of course material,
lesson plap- and proposed training sessions schedule.
+
b) Classroom training aids completed (fllp charts, _.raining
i session outlines, etc.).
c) Fit_el dreft of 50147800.1 released for reproduction and
distribution.
4. June. 1972 - Reproduction and distribution of 50M78001
completed.
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5. July. 1972 Conducted first fllght controller training
session•
6. August, 1972 - Conducted second and third flight controller j
t_alnlng sessions
7, September, 1972
a) Conducted fourth f11ght controller training sessions.
b) Astronauts J. Lousma, and O. Garrlott spent approxi-
mately three hours operating the simulator hardware.
8. October, I_72
a) Conducted the fifth Flight Controller Training Session.
b) Astronauts A. Bean and J. Lousma spent approxlmately
two hour_ operating the slmulator hardware.
9. November, 1972
a) Astronauts P. Conrad, Kerwln and Weltz spent two hours
operating the simulator hardware.
b) Conducted an abbreviated three-day tral_ing session for
on-slte personnel,
10. January, 1973 - Astronauts Cart, Pogue and Gibson spent
three hours operating the slmulator hardware.
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SEPSA Computer ProRram.
The Skylab Electric Power System Analysis (SEPSA) Computer ,_
Pro_rem was developed to provide a tool for simulation of the EPS t
performance over a wide range of operating conditions and environ-
ments. The program is completely documented in Document No. 40H35698-2,
Rev. C. The program is divided into five major sections: i
Attitude Trajectory Subsystem (ATS)
Solar Array Subsystem (SAS)
Charger/Battery/Regulator Subsystem (CgRS) i
Power Distribution Subsystem (FDS)
Electrical Load Subsystem (ELS)
These subsystems represent the EPS of the Skylab Cluster, and
the orbital trajectory and cluster attitude information needed to
determine necessary attitude dependent EPS parameters. (e,_., solar
array temperature).
A flow diagram of the program is shown in Figure 4.1. This
diagram shows the major sections Includlng the interaction among in-
dividual subsystems. In addition, important input _nd output param-
eters are shown.
Some of the capabilitles of the program may be summarized as
follows:
Generation of system performance data to evaluate the over-
: all power capability and margin for an arbitrary set of in-
put conditlous (attitude, temperature, load condition,
component failure, etc.).
Evaluetlon of mission proposals from an EPS standpoint.
Generetlon of subsystem performance data for an arbitrary
set of input conditions.
Determination of the effects o_ various subsystem component
and redundant bus failures on the Zl_ output.
Determination of EPS control parameters (e.g., AHRe_ulator
Bus Voltage setting) to allow setis|actory EPS operation.
Analysis of the electrical load requirements with respect
to EPS output capability, and determination of the power
and energy mar_in level and the effects on battery capacity.
373
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IDetermination of the sensitivity of EPS performance to
varying configuration in the operational components and
power distribution.
Determination of the sensitivity of EPS performance t,_
changes in mission parameters such as power level, orlenta-
tion maneuvers, and beta an_le.
The capabilities of the program could be utilized for an,,
specified time interval.
The program was utilized ._ a daily basis durim_ the _<ylsb
mission, particularly it,the analysis of proposed Z-LV-E and q_asl-
inertial (Kohou_k vl_eln_, JOP-13, etc.) attitude modes. Tt was
also used on an around-the-clock basis during the critical period
followin,_ SL-I launch when ono fl_Ssolar array wing was lost and the
other was still undeployed. Th. program proved to be a valuable tool
in mission profile analysis and power _ana_ement.
375 |,
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APPENDIX 5
Power Management Program
7
Irmaediac_ly after liftoff it was realized that the total clus-
ter power system capability would be substantially reduced from that
used in premission planning and imperative that real time power manage-
ment activities be initiated. The need for power management was urgent
and complicated by the contingency procedures required by the other
cluster subsystems.
Electrical power system contingency analyses performed prior to
the liftoff of the FL-I vehicle provided the basis for the initial power
management techniqu=s. However, since the exact configuration of the
orbital cluster had not been analyzed in the contingency analyses, it
became evident that different and more stringent techniques would be
required to insure the integrity of the ATM power system while decisions
were being made regarding possible additions to the power system capa-
bility.
Due to the large number of possible load configurations, and
the complexity of the subsystem interactions, many of the techniques
available for power management had to be scrutinized by all Skylab dis-
ciplines prior to use. During the period, from DAY i through DAY II,
it was necessary to maneuver the vehicle away from the planned solar
inertial attitude in order to cool the OWS structure left exposed when
the meteoroid shield was lost. Since the ATM rolar array output capa-
bility was reduced as a function of varied sun incident angles_
varying power management techniques were required for each different
vehicle orientation.
The premission planning required that the management techniques
be available for use during specified peak loading periods and contin-
gency situations. It became evident due to reduced power availability
that power management would be required for the entire mission. Since
the power system integrity was dependent on the orbit by orbit manage-
ment, the task was a 24-hour per day, 7 day per week task.
Neither the facility nor the tools for real-tlme power manage-
ment were planned premisslon and therefore it was necessary to establish
the facility and develop the tools at the same time the techniques were
being implemented.
In determining the techniques required to properly manage the
power system it was necessary to be able to constantly monitor the
electrical power system parameters, to know the exact vehicle electri-
cal load configuration at all times and to have a knowledge of the sub-
system requirements for each mission phase. Since the data and disci-
pline contact was availb_le at the HOSt the ideal location for the ' !
facility was in the i_3C. _
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Space was reserved in the HOSC to house the power management ;
team. !
It was evident that many of the computer programs developed for _
, premission load predictions and postmlsslon analysis would be extremely _
useful for real-tlme power management. An effort that resulted in a
remote access terminal being installed at HOSC was approved by NASA. .
The terminal was composed of a key board for making inputs and a
,_ Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) for verification of the inputs and displaying
the output data. In addition to the computer terminal an electronic
calculator was secured for use in data evaluation. Immediately upon
receipt of the necessary equipment, the team began a continuous support
effort that was to serve with little change for the entire Skylab mis-
sion
• The tasks essential to good power management included the follow-
.: ing:
I. Evaluate the daily flight plan or plans for compatibility
_, with the power system.
2. Evaluate all planned maneuvers for effect and forward the
information to the groups required to perform capability and DOD pre-
dictions. Evaluate the predicted DODs and recommend off-loadlng or
mission changes.
• 3. Review and comment on the daily Execute Package which con-
tained the data upllnked to the crew for execution of tasks.
4. Request the actual ATM CBRM DODs and actual loads during
i all off-nomlnal pointing modes.
5. Record all critical EPS parameters for each off-nominal
pointing mode on a summary sheet.
i 6. Continuously monitor the total electrical load including
the transfer loads and report significant deviations from the predicted
loads.
7. Review the 7-day flight plan forec3st for planned opera- I_
tlons requiring special attential by the EPS MSG. I
Summary flight plans were issued for review each day of the man-
ned missions. On days where a possibility existed that a planned task
would be cancelled both a "prime" and an "alternate" flight plan were
generated and issued for review; e.g., an EREP pass was sometimes can-
celled in near real-time due to inclem_mt weather cloud cover) over
the area of interest. Since the flight plans were completed by the
JSC team and then reviewed by all disciplines, numerous changes were
I 377
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required before the final plan was generated. The normal _eration
process resulted in three to four revisions of the fl/5._ plan being
issued for review but sometimes as many _s _ight flight plan revisions
: were issued for a single day.
To insure that the scheduling of astronaut tashs described by
the summary flight plan was compatible wlr_ =he power system capability
a predicted power profile was construc=ed for each flight plan. in_ae-
_lately upon receipt of the flight plan the astronaut_ schedule for the
day was translated to computer form and +rteced inLo the computer sys-
tem using the remote access terminal. _e accuracy of the computer-
: ized flight plan was verified and the loadsjnot depending on the astro-
naut activlt_ were scheduled to complete the load profile. The prin-
ciple loads scheduled in this manner were heater; duty cycles, unattended
experiments, ground controlled loads,and the CSM load requirements.
After completion of these inputs from the su_,r.aryflight plan the load
profile was computed using the SEPSA computer program.
One of the outputs from the SEPSA program was a load profile for
the entire mission day on a six minute increment. I_ addition to the
total load, the load was divided by module and by load bus Evalua-
tlon of the tabular data revealed reasons for the frequent _oad changes
and the location of the major contributions to the total load for each
of the de[ined tasks. It was possible to refine the load sequencing
criteria and improve the accuracy of the program by comparing these
predicted loads to the actual bus .oads and total cluster loads during
the mission.
Since the remc_te access terminal used to compute the predicted
load profile did not have printing capability, the data was displayed
on the CRT and recorded manually. The total cluster load profile was
then plotted for release to disclpllmes interested in the incremental
load; Figure 5.1 is an example of the predicted load profile prepared
for each summary flight plan. Since the power system capability for
each mlss_'_n was given on an orbital average basis, it was necessary
to average the predicted loads for the same period to insure that the
system integrity was protected during each orbit. A computer program
was written to average the incremental loads on an orbital basis. In
addiclon to the total cluster orbital average load the tabular data
included the average loads per module. Table 5.1 is the orbital
average loads for the mission day that was plotted in Figure 5.1.
The MSFC Skylab Mission Status Group maintained near real-tlme
status charts of key parameters for each system, These charts reported
the parameters for each revol_tlon of the Skylab vehicle. To keep
the EPS data consistent a computer program was created to average the
total cluster load by revolution. This predicted average load per
: revolutlon was plotted by the Mission Status Group on a plot in the
t
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ilORBIT TO_L ATM _M ! OWS CM EPS IO_IT
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773 6073 2041 1904 9Ul I000 227.0: 12.8
i 774 5971 20)_ 1937 752 I000 227.0 14.35 32 55 840 .i0 5 9
" _ 77q_ 6135 2059 1834 1009 i I000 234.0 17.4
_ 77_ 5748 2053 1728 736 I000 236 _) 19.0
778 5807 2035 1668 877 I000 227.0 a0.5
r
; 779 5576 1913 1585 852 I000 227.0 22.1
I 780 5793 2059 1699 808 I000 227.0 23.6|
7_;__ $_14 1913 1384 680 I000 236.4 25.2|
782 15049 1911 1372 539 I000 227.0 26.7_J
!
783 i 5126 1913 1400 521 I000 227.0 28.3
784 I 5165 1915 1496 528 1000 227.0 29.9
785 ! 5020 1908 1362 522 I000 227.0 31.4
r
786 5070 1915 1373 574 I000 227.0 33.0
787 5138 1911 1371 629 i000 227.0 34.5
,.I
P_K PWR IS 6429 WATTS _ _._._ _URS
Table 5.I. Average Load l_r Orbit
L_
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• chartroom and compared to the actual loads which were computed from
_ real-time data obtained during ground station passes by the MSFC elec-
_ trical console operations. Figure 5.2 is a plot of the predicted load •
_ _ per revolution with the actual computed loads shoxm as a dashed llne.
Power system capability for the solar inertial revolutions is also
plotted on the chart for reference, i
_4
; " If the computed load profile predicted a load_for a particular _
• revolutio_ that exceeded the capabil_t_, then suggested techniques were
submitted to JSC for consideration and use. Off-loading, AM Rag Rus
OCV adjustment, or rescheduling were the three techniques used. Prior
_ to reviving the AM EPS it was necessary to continuously manage the
vehicle to allow the astronauts to accomplish the desired t_sks. How-
_: ever, after the OWS solar wing was deployed on DAY 25 the power system
had sufficient capability to permit relaxation of power management
during the solar inertial mode for the majority of the revolutions.
i L/ adjusting the Reg Bus OCV only for major changes, such as CSM trans-
r fer _o internal power or large changes in beta angle (i0 to 15 days of
: _ chang_ at approximately 4 degrees per day) it was possible to maintain
• a posit_, power margin at all times without daily management tech-
i _ niques. The one exception to this was that off-loading of lights and
_ fans in the OWS was suggested during the EVAs to compensato for the
increase in load requirement caused by the EVA lights and the astro-
naut llfe support equipment.
The predicted load profile was also useful for realtlme support.
i It provided the basis for evaluating the actual load for proper opera-tion of the electrical components. If the loads were significantly
_ ! higher than the predictions indicated, a possible anomalous situation
_ existed and an investigation was begun. Also the difference between
the predicted loads and the actual loads indicated a change in astro-
naut operating proce_re that was important to other disciplines,
(e.g., when the ONS temperatures began to increase, the astronaut_ would
use only half of the interior lights and would switch them to the low
; intensity setting_ This was detectable by noting a reduction in OWS
bus current from the predicted value. This change in operating pro-
cedure was very important for proper environmental control as was verl-
lied by crew voice transmissions.
In addition to analyzing the sumfaary flight plan the power man-
agement area received the maneuver charts for each planned excursion
from the so:ar inertial attltu_e. This chart was generated by JSC and
forwarded to MSFC for review. The chart was titled "H-Bar Maneuver
Pad" b_c was commonly known as the "Pie Chart" due to the fact that
the maneuver description divided a circle into segments resembling
plecea of pie. The Pie Chart defined the duration and location in the
orbit of the off-nominal pointing, the maneuver rates and times for
the transition to the oil-nominal attitude, the excursion from nominal
383 i ;
] 974022202-409
!
T
+i in each the X, Y and Z axis, and the time of the planned pass. Upon i
l_ceipt of the Pie Chart it was distributed for review and computation
I
of thf predicted DODs. Along with the pie chart the power management i
personnel also provided the predicted load for each phase of the
pass
to be used in the computation. SEPSA computer programs were originally i
designed and used for premisslon and postmisslon support to compute ithe predicted DODs.
[ The power management personnel compared the predicted DODs to :
i the maximum allowable DOD constraints to determine if the constraints
were violated. If a violation or near violation was indicated, power
management techniques were suggested and the DODs were recomputed to '
reflect those techniques. This iterative process was continued until
the maxim,im predicted DODs for both the PCGs and CBRMs were within
the constraints. Once the proper combination of OCV adjustment and
off-loadlng was established to protect the integrity of both the
CBRHs and the PeGs the definition of this configuration was forwarded
to JSC. Table 5-II is an example of the form used to record the DOD
predictions, typical predictions have been added to the form for com-
parison.
The Flight Support Team also had a computer program used for
cluster load and EOD predictio:_s. Basically the system used two pro-
grmns, PEARL and PANACFA, plus manually calculated shadowing co-effi-
cleats to compute the predlcteJ values. The predictions w're recorded
in _ report called "EPS Evaluation" which was forwarded to HOSC each z
day, when applicable, for review. Many times the MSFC and the JSC
: predictions were run at different Reg Bus OCV or different combinations
of off-loading or both; in these cases the DOD predictions appeared to
I be different and understandably so. If both predictions resulted in
5
! the protection of the integrity of the power system then the selec-
i tion of the power system configuration was left to the discretion of
the electrical representative on the flight team. If, however, the
, two centers both used the same vehicle power system configuration and
one of the programs indicated a violation of the maximum DOn criteria,
then additional power management techniques were suggested unt41 both
programs indicated predicted DODs below the maximum allowable cri-
teria. Table 5.111 shows a comparison between and the actual DODs
for a typical EREP pass.
Each day a copy of the *'Execute Package*' which contained all
the data sent to the crew via the onboard teleprinter was approved.
This data included _he summary flight plan for the day, a detail flight
plan for each astronaut, temporary and permanent general messages and
check Slat updates. The power management personnel reviewud these
packages for accuracy, All comments to the Execute Package were co-
ordinated with other HSGs prior to being forwarded for action.
385 _
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EREP-23
DAY 240__
PEG BUS I OCV 29..__._3 RE(; BUS 20CV 29.3
GROUND OFF LOADING MDA WALL HTR$ CREW OFF LOADING (HKg0A) N.._._O
! PIE CHART KEV DISTL PREL
,,, CBRM , , PCG
_. AH 7, AH _ AHJ
I
1 33.7 0.74 10 31.6 6.32 1 33.9 11.19
2 32.6 6.52 11 34.1 6.;52 2 33.9 11.19
3 12 32.0 0.40 3 30.2 9.97
4 33._ 6.72 13 32.3 6.46 _ 32.7 10.79
5 14 32.7 6.54 5 34.9 11.52
6 31.5 6.30 15 34.5 e.90 o 30.2 9.97
7 32.4 6.48 16 32.2 b.44 7 40.0 13.20
I
8 32.5 6.50 17 32.2 6.44 ] 8 34.0 11.22
9 31.0 6.20 18 31.6 6.32
Table 5. II EREP DOD Predictions
I
t
i
!
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ER£P 21, DAY 238
ACTUAT-SEI)SA PAI_CEA __ .]ACTUAL SEP_ PAI_ACE6 _.Cls_._ r ......
_BRNNO DOD PRED PRED NO ! u_u PRED PRED7. 7. _. 7. 7. _;
I 31.4 33 *34.7 34 * 10 J
33:2 34 * ] 11 I 35.9 i 36
- ] ;2 33.1 33 *
t34.1 34 * 13 32,7 33 *
- - t 14 i 33.2 34 * i
33.0 33 34 '[[ 15 35.5 35 *
34.1 33 !t * 16 33.4 33 *
i
34.4 , 34 i * ! 17 [ 33.0 33 *
9 ! 32.7 32 i, * [ 18 i 33.4 32 * _
_ _-'TP^'_6_,
28 * II:I:::I::l: F
I 7 I 32.0 I29__
• Jf_ OMLY PREDICI_D DOD FOR WORSZ CASE
IIAI"fl_IES.
Treble 5,IZZ HSFC-J:;C DOD Predtctton Co_.,,.:rLson
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!After each maneuver of the vehicle to an off-nomlnal pointing
mode, the actual battery DOD was computed for the CBRM batteries. The
data was obtained from l_)RS in near real-time. Since the CBRMs did
not have an amp-hour integ:ator as a design feature, the battery cur-
zents for each CBl_4were integrated during the period of Ir:erest to
determine the deepest depth-of-discharge. Additionally, the actual
load requirements for each time period used in computing the predicted
DODs were computed for comparison to _he predicted load values.
A permanent record was maintained for all the off-nominal point-
ing mode orbits in the form of a "Summary Chart" for each period. These
Sunnary Cherts were reviewed by MSFC management periodically when deci-
sions were required concerning the power system operation. The sunnary
charts llst the redson for the pass, the geometry of the maneuvers,
comparison of actual values versus the predictions and other data of
interest. An example of the Summary Charts is include5 here as Table
5.1V.
Special team attention _es given to periods of peak loading,
such as, EREP passes and astronaut EVAs. Where necessary, power manage-
ment techniques were suggested real-tlme to eliminate underslrable con-
ditlons before permanent damage to the power system occurred. The power
msnegement personnel responded as required to all one action requests
esslgned. (Appendix I)
In order to 8ire visibility for long range manpower and computer
requirements plannlns, the seven-day mini-stuunary flight plan which
stumerized the major tasks planned for that period was reviewed. Plan-
ned tasks that Indicated possible violation oi the power system con-
straints were noted end preliminary investigation of the task was begun.
In retrospect the decision to assemble the power management tem
for near reel-time mission support was instrumental i_ insuring the
orderly ettelrnent of the mission support $oa18. The procedures devel-
aped for Skyleb pov_r manesement would be of value to flight support
teams preparing for support of future large spacecraft.
i
}
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EREP- 26
19:00:00
19: 10:00 MVR -_"--'_ .._--_- 17:25:00
__._'OU'E S _ -17:13:00PIE CHART REV FINAL
DAY 24.__._3 P ,u_/IN / DATA TAKE LENGTH
DATA _///z-_J/ 970 25 MIN
REG I OCV TAKE TOTAL Z-LV DURATION
PREDICTED _ ...--- 109° 25 MIN
ACTUAL 29.40 _/ _
: Z-LV CENTE_ 227 °
REG 20CV , BETA ANGLE -56.06._._°
_,_D_CTr.D29.4O
^CTUAL 29.30
-- 17 : 53:00 MID
1974022202-415
APPENDIX 6
r HOSC Monitoring Description.
Data for HOSC monitoring was available In many forms. Figure
6.1 illustrates, in a simplified block diagram, the types of data
transmitted by Skylab, its flow through the data retrieval system, and
the various presentation methods used by HOSC personnel.
The methods of display utilized most extensively by the Elec-
_ trical Mission Support Group were the HOPS and the OSR console. Data
from MOPS was for specific TM data aud was defined in real time to
assist in performance analysis when the real time OSR console displays
were inhibited and for resolution of problems by retrieval of stored
data. The use of MOPS was restricted in all other cases to priority
items. Generally, the display formats were pre-defined by NASA/JSC,
however, real time requests for contingency periods permitted con-
struction of specific plots and graphic displays for a limited time.
These required a new request for each application. The MOPS responseL
generally was rapid excepL when JSC priorities restricted it.
: Real time OSR console displays were limited to the daily de-
fined station coverage times throughout the mission. The effective-
ness of monitoring was acceptable with the coverage that existed.
Prior to the launch of SL-I all HOSC real time displays were
defined by: device, limits to be detected, parameter to be displayed_
and dis_!sy format for D/TV.
Monitor equipment consisted of a four (4) rack console with
the devices located as illustrated in Figure 6.2. Figures 6.3 through
6.6 typify the displays on each device which were used most throughout
the mission. Also shown are the predicted limits used to monitor the
parameter.
In a_itlon to these display devices, the OSR console and asso-
ciated Mix-ton Support Group Work Area (CWA) were equipped with the
following voice monitorl,g channels:
GOSS (crew voice) (listen only)
Flight Director (listen only)
Networks (intercom) L
Operations Director (HOSC)
FOMR (NASA/MSFC reps at JSC)
Various conference loops
";1 With the exception of occssional display aborts caused by com-
puter anomalies within HOSC or JSC all devices and monitoring
?
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equipment functioned sufficientlywell to permit performancemonitor-
ing and anomaly detection and resolution in a timely manner throughout :_
themission, iJ
Table 6.1 is a typical console log maintained in real time by ii
the operator on duty. 2
Table 6.II lists the Skylab EPS Power-Down events for the
final storeage of the system at the end of SL-4. !
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klG1 SECT2 klG2
WG1 SECT3 _ 2
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AHeusi E:][]
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001
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SP803
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Figure 6.Sb Typical D/TV Display for ATHSolar Array Deployment
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O. N01411-$13 Xlrl_ DUSI V. 1S 19 3S 211 30
P. N01S0-513 XFM IUSZ V, 1S 11D3S 28 30
Q. I_1115-S01t XFK1t/CSNI CUlt 0 TO1:0 10 '11_
t. HO164-S011 XFIUA/CSPl2 CUR 0 TO 100 10 Jl$
S. N01|7-S011 RLr_XF,ER1 _ -100 11D_100 -ZO t_0
t. MOIli-S09 ItKr_xFOtZ OJIt -100 TO_100 -aO liO
V. N01S7-1iOI ATWXlr_I CUP -I00 11)4.100 elO 10
V. N01IS-IiO0 ATWXlrEIIZ CUR -I00 TO'100 e]O M
i Figure 6.5h TypiceL D/TV Display for Sl:ylab Main Bus Performance
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Table 6.T HOSC EPS Console Log for SL-I through SL-4
DAY:GMT EVENTS/SL-I !
01:17:30:00 SL-1LIF _ - OFF (FIRST MOTION)
17:31:03 OW_ SAS WING 2 BEAM FAIRING SEPARATION _i
17:34:48 MDA '.tENTVAL_S CLOSED
17:39:51 S-II/PAYLOAD SEPARATION
17:39:54 AM SEQUENTIAL BUS ACTIVATION
17:45:21 PS JETTISON {
17:45:34 AM DEPLOY BUS ACTIVATION
17:46:49 INITIATE ATM DEPLOYMENT
17:46:53 DISCONE ANTENNA 2 DEPLOYFD
17:46:54 DISCONE ANTENNA i DEPLOYED
17:48:56 ATM DEPLOYED AND LOCKED
17:54:49 INITIATE ATM SAS DEPLOYMENT
19:04:27 BACK-UP RS RAD SHIELD JETTISON CMI) (AM DCS)
19:08:22 BACK-UP OWS SAS BEAM COMMANDS (AM DCS)
19:20:56 HACK-UP OWS SAS WING COMMANDS (AM DCS)
19:27:23 PARALLEL ATM/AM POWER SYSTEMS (BUS i)
19:27:38 PARALLEL ATM/AM POWER SYSTEM (BUS 2)
19:28:04 PCG i OFF
19:28:14 PCG 2 OFF
19:29:05 PCG 3 OFF
19:29:13 PCG 4 OFF
19:29:24 PCG 5 OFF !
19:29:36 PCG 6 OFF
19:29:48 PCG 7 OFF
19:30:06 PCG 8 OFF
20:12:30 BACK-UP METEOROID SHIELD JETT CMD
20:33:56 AM DEPLOY BUSES OFF
23:23:53 PCG 1 ON
23:24:07 BATT 1 OFF (AM)
23:24:25 PCG 2 ON
23:24:41 BATT 2 OFF
23:25:06 PCG 3 ON
23:25:21 BATT 3 OFF
23:27:56 PCG 8 ON
23:28:18 BATT 8 OFF
23:28:34 PCG 7 ON
23:28:52 BATT 7 OFF
02:00:15:07 BATT 1-8 SOC's: 59.9, 61.2, 62.3, 59.7, 65.3,
73, 62.3, 62.6
05:22:30 PCG 5 ON
06:22:00 BATT 5 OFF. VEHICLE MANEUVERED TO 90°
08:10:00 VEHICLE MANEUVERED TO 45°
10:30:00 BACK TO Sl
405 1
,!
i , i
1974022202-431
• • ,++_-+ !
li
i+i
++
DAY:GMT EVEN_S/SL-1
15:18:18 PCG 6 ON _
15:18:37 BATT 6 OFF (SOC 76.2%) i_
23:16:28 PCG 6 OFF
23:16:51 BATT 6 ON +_
23:17:18 SAS 5 TO PCG 6
03:01:07:01 BATT 6 OFF (SOC 60.5%) +
01:58:00 BATT 6 ON _=
02:40:00 BATT 6 OFF BATT 6 cycled in attempt to recharge 4
03:02:25 BATT 6 ON
04:13:36 BATT 6 OFF
06:17:48 BATT 6 ON _ _=
07:20:Ii BATT 6 OFF
09:27:49 BATT 6 ON
09:28:25 CHG 1 BY-PASS
09:28:36 CHG 2 BY-PASS
09:28:46 CHG 3 BY-PASS _ :
09:28:55 CHG 4 BY-PASS +'
09:29:19 CHG 8 BY-PASS
09:29:55 CHG 7 BY-PASS
I0:26:35 BATT 6 OFF •
11:03:59 BATT 6 ON
11:09:00 SAS 2 TO PCG 3/SAS 7 TO PCG 8
12:01:38 BATT 6 OFF
13:02:42 BATT 6 ON
13:45:00 BATT 6 OFF
14:37:00 BATT 6 ON
15:21:06 BATT 6 OFF
15:32:15 BATT 6 ON
16:26:01 BATT 6 OFF
17:40:31 BATT 6 ON
18:05:31 BATT 6 OFF
19:01:00 VEHICLE AT 45° PITCH ATTITUDE
19:28:07 CBRM 5 REG OFF (BATT NOT CHARGING DUE TO ATTITUDE)
19:28:26 CBRM 6 REG OFF (BATT NOT CHARGING DUE TO ATTITUDE)
19:42:34 CBRM 5 REG ON
19:42:51 CBRM 6 REG ON
20:23:20 BATT 6 ON
20:46:00 VEHICLE PITCHED TO _u
21:16:13 BATT 60FY ";
04:04:00:00 VEHTCLE DRIFTED TO 55° TO 60° (5° CORRECTION
INITIATED)
05:00:10 CBRM 5 REG OFF
05:00:2] CBRM 6 REG OFF +
05:33:42 CBRM 5 REG ON
05:33:54 CBRM 6 REG ON •
L
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IDAY:GMT EVENTS/SL- 1
06:42:21 CBRM 5 REG OFF
06:42:29 CBRM 6 PEG OFF
07:10:16 CBRM 5 REG ON
07:10:25 CBRM 6 REG ON
! 07:30:00 ATTITUDE IS 50° PITCH, 13°Y, OI°R
08:44:04 CBRM 5 REG OFF
09:04:03 CBRM 5 REG ON
14:08:10 CBRM 5 REG OFF
14:08:25 CB_M 6 PEG OFF
14:35:27 CBRM 5 KEG ON
14:35:41 CBRM 6 PEG ON
15:45:33 CBRM 5 REG O_F[_(_BRM,s 5 & 6 were cycled on and off15:45:45 CBRM 6 PEG 0_ o
n_ _throughout 45 pitch att. (load16:12:27 CBRM 5 REG v- Lmanagement)• (145:08:13 stopped)16:12:40 CBRM 6 REG ON
05:00:27:00 MANEUVEREDBACK TO SI
11:21:56 PCG 6 ON
06:05:58:00 MANEUVEREDTO 50 ° PITCH-UP
07:19:13 CBRM 14 REG OFF
07:36:50 CBRM 14 REG ON
07:20:10:00 AUTO SWITCH OVER IN COOLANT LOOP (TO SEC)
01:15:00 2ND AUTO SWITCH OVER TO SECONDARY
01:15:36 AM PRI COOLANT INV 1 OFF
01:15:47 AM PRI COOLANT INV 1 ON
01:16:23 CMD AM COOLANT LOOP TO PRI
01:16:44 AM SEC INV i OFF
01:43:00 AM COOLANT LOOP AUTO SWITCH TO SECONDARY
03:20:53 PRI INV 1 OFF
03:21:17 SEC INV 1 ON
03:21:56 SEC AUTO SWITCH-OVER ENABLED
08:13:49 SAS 5 TO PCG 5
08:14:36 SAS 7 TO PCG 7
08:14:56 CHG 7 NORM
08:15:00 CHG 8 NORM
08:_7:49 PCG 7 OFF
08:28:00 SAS 6 TO PCG 7
08:28:39 BATT 7 ON
08:29:41 PCG 5 OFF
08:29:55 SAS 8 TO PCG 5
08:30:09 BATT 5 ON
09:12:50 BATT 7 OFF
09:13:12 BATT 5 OFF
09:52:00 BATT 5 & 7 ON
10:09:31 BATT 5 OFF
10:11:40 BATT 5 ON
10:47:50 BATT 7 OFF
j
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DAY:GMT EVENTS/SL-I
10:48:00 BATT 5 OFF
11:46:12 BATT 7 ON
11:47:00 BATT 5 ON
12:27:42 BATT 5 OFF & 7 OFF
12:29:00 CHG i, 2, 3, 4, TO NOrM
13:16:00 BATT 5 ON & 7 ON
13:18:00 BATT 3 ON
13:19:00 BATT 3 OFF
14:04:00 BATT 5 & 7 OFF
14:50:00 BATT 5 & 7 ON
15:00:00 FORMAL REQUEST TO PUT ALL CHRGS EXCEPT 6&7
TO BY-PASS TO PREVENT CHGR ON/OFF OSCILLATIONS
DUE TO LOW SAS VOLTAGE
15:43:00 BATT 5 & 7 OFF
!6:26:00 BATT 7 ON
16:52:00 BATT 7 OFF
17:59:00 BATT 7 ON
18:00:00 SAS 8 & 5 VOLTAGE BEGAN OSCILLATING BETWEEN 48
AND 68 V. CHGR 5 ON/OFF CYCLING
18:32:00 BATT 7 OFF
20:47:00 BATT 7 ON
23:08:00 BATT 7 OFF
23:54:00 BATT 7 ON
08:00:44:00 BATT 7 OFF
02:49:00 CALLED EGIL BACK-ROOM TO PUT CHARGERS TO BY-PASS
04:25:00 BATT 7 ON
05:45:00 CALLED EGIL BACK ROOM AGAIN TO PUT CHARGER IN
BY-PASS
05:55:00 CHG I, 3, 4 TO BY-PASS
15:40:00 BATT 7 ON
16:08:00 BATT 7 OFF
17:20:00 BATT 7 ON THEN OFF
17:31:00 BATT 7 ON
17:40:00 BATT 7 OFF
18:31:00 BATT 7 ON
!_:_3:00 PCG 3 & _ ON
19:25:50 BATT 7 OFF
20:05:40 BATT 7 ON
20:52_16 BATT 7 OFF
21:36:00 BATT 7 ON (Main reason for charglng/dlscharglng
22:28:26 BATT 7 OFF batt. 7 Is to provide heat to AM
23:11:00 BATT 7 ON coolant loop.)
09:00:00:48 BATT 7 OFF
00:19:40 BATT 7 ON
01:36:00 BATT 7 OFF
408
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DAY:GMT EVENTS/_L- I
| 01:58:00 BATT 7 ON
1 03:04:14 BATT 7 OFF (SOC 70.8%)
! 03:36:30 BATT 7 ON
i 08:36:00 PCG 50FF/B_TT 5 ON
08:37:00 CHG 5 NORM (FINE BATT 5-0.17 AMP)
ii:i0:00 BATT 5 OFF
13:18:00 ATTITUDE IS 40° UP, 0° YAW, O° ROLL
13:32:00 BATT 5 ON
13:32:30 BAS 5 & 8 VOLTAGES BEGAN OSCILLATING
13:39:00 BATT 5 OFF
15:16:00 SENT ARTO EGIL TO HAVE CHG 5 TO BY-PASS
(TELECON ALSO)
15:17:00 CHG 5 TO BY-PASS & PCG 5 ON
: 16:34:00 BATT 7 IN ENERGY BALANCE AT APPROX. 50 WATTS
OF SAS POWER
18:00:00 BATT 50N/CHG 5 NORM/PCG 5 OFF
18:42:00 SAS 8 & 5 START OSCILLATING (SAS 8 & 5 TO PCG 5)
18:46:00 AR TO EGIL TO TURN BATT 5 OFF, PCG 50Nj CHG
TO BY-PASS
22:29:50 BATT 7 ON
10:02:17:25 BATT 7 OFF
02:54:23 BATT 7 ON
03:20:00 CBRM 15 SAS CONTACTOR FAILED OPEN
04:04:10 BATT 7 OFF
04:31:00 BATT 7 ON
05:37:11 BATT 7 OFF
06:18:00 BATT 7 ON
07:06:30 BATT 7 OFF
07:53:40 BATT 7 ON
08:44:58 BATT 7 OFF
09:24:32 BATT 7 ON
10:26:32 BATT 7 OFF
10:32:00 BATT 7 ON
11:58:33 BATT 7 OFF
12:43:48 BATT 7 ON
15_6:00 _R_NTTY AT 46° PITCH CWTTT,cn ?0 48°)
21:16:58 BATT 7 OFF
21:54:22 CHG 7 - BY PASSIPCG 7 ON
23:20:00 MAR SUBMITTED TO EGIL TO USE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE
WHEN RECONFIG. PCG'S:
o CHG TO NORM
o BATT ON
o PCG ON
o BATT OFF
o CHG - BY-PASS
21:40:00 MANEUVER TO -65° PITCH/HOLD FOR 2 REV'S/THEN TO
-45° PITCH/HOLD FOR 5 REV'S/THEN TO 50° PITCH
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DAY:GMT EVENTS/SL-I
11:01:04:00 PCG 7 OFF, CHG - NORM, BATT 7 ON
07:10:00 ATTITUDE CHANGE TO - 51°
09:45:00 BATT 7 OFF
i0:32:00 BATT 7 ON
10:43:00 AT - 45° ATT GOING TO - 50° ATT
11:15:00 BATT 7 OFF
12:01:00 BATT 7 ON
12:51:00 BATT 7 OFF _
13:32:00 BATT 7 ON
13:47:00 ATT - 50°
13:47:00 SAS 6 & 7: NOT ENOUGH SAS PWR TO CHG BATT.
13:59:50 BATT 7 OFF
15:10:00 BATT 7 ON - NOT ENOUGH SAS PWRTO CHG2BUT
LEFT ON FOR COOLANTLOOP HEAT
17:50:23 BATT 7 OFF
18:12:00 BATT 7 ON i
18:17:00 PITCHED TO 54° ATT
18:58:00 BATT 7 OFF
19:50:00 MANEUVERED TO - 40° PITCH ATT, 0° ROLL
20:10:00 BATT 7 ON
21:22:56 BATT 7 OFF
21:23:06 PCG 7 ON
22:40:00 SAS 6 & 7 VOLTAGE OSCILLATING - CALLED FOMR
TO HAVE EGIL SWITCH TO BY-PASS
23:18:18 CHG 7 - BY-PASS
12:04:51:00 CBRM's 4, 6, 7, ii, 12, 15, AUTO SWITCH
OFF, GND COMMANDED 4, 6, 7, Ii AND 12 ON.
ATTEMPTS TO RE-CONNECT 15 FAILED
07:50:00 CBRM 15 BACK - ON
08:09:00 CBRM 15 NOT CHARGING
EVENTS/SL-2
13:00:00 SL-2 LIFT-OFF
14:29:07 BATT 7 ON, CHG 5-NORM
17:55:16 PCG 50FF/BATT 5 ON/ CHG 5 - NORM
17:57:07 TRACKING LIGHTS ON
18:43:28 BATT 5 OFF
20:41:14 BATT 7 OFF
21:03:00 FLY-AROUND OF OWS
21:07:52 CHG 5-BY-PASS
21:08:04 CHG 7-BY-PASS
21:15:00 SOFT - DOCK - A OK
21:58:00 SAS 2-PCG 2, SAS 6-PCG 6, SAS 8-PCG 8
410
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DAY:GMT EVENTS/SL-2
i- 21:58:56 DOCK LITES Z AXIS OFF
21:59:09 DOCK LITES Y AXIS OFF
22:36:32 PCG 10FF/BATT 1 ON
22:37:02 CHG i NOLO{
22:37:17 PCG 20FF/BATT 2 ON
22:37:51 PCG 30FF/BATT 30N/CHG 3-NORM
22:38:00 PCG 40FF/BA_ 40N/CHG 4-NORM
22:39:40 BATE 50N/CHG 5-NORM
22:40:13 PCG 60FF/BATT 6 ON
22:40:41 BATT 70N/CHG-NORM
22:41:18 PCG 80FF/BATT 8 ON
_ 23:29:00 UNDOCKING
13:00:14:57 DOCK LITES Z AXIS ON
00:15:06 DOCK LITES X AXIS ON
00:23:00 UNABLE TO DEPLOY OWS SAS WING (EVA)
03:53:20 DOCK LITES OFF
06:28:17 BATT 10FF/CHG I-BY-PASS/PCG 1 ON
06:28:34 PCG 20N/BATT 20N/BATT 20FF/CHG 2-B_-P_SS i
06:29:44 PCG 30N/BATT 30FF/CHG 3-BY-PASS
06:30:13 PCG 40N/CHG 4-BY-PASS/BATT 4 OFF
06:30:43 PCG 50N/BATT 50FF/CHG 5-BY-PASS ._
06:31:00 PCG 60N/BATT 60FF/CHG 6-BY-PASS •
06:33:11 PCG 80N/BATT 80FF/CHG 8-BY-PASS =,
06:33:11 SAS 6 TO PCG 7
06:33:31 BATT 7 OFF
07:26:48 BATT 7 ON
09:53:57 BATT 7 OFF
10:45:00 BATT 7 ON
11:25:41 BATT 7 OFF
13:00:00 BATT 7 ON
: 13:04:17 BATT 7 OFF
' 13:55:51 BATT 7 ON
14:50:33 BATT 7 OFF
15:26:00 BATT 7 ON
• 15:49:17 BATT 7 OFF
16:23:00 CREW ENTERED MDA
16:30:00 MDA ACTIVATION START
16:30:00 CSM DE-ACTIVATION START
i"
16:46:00 BATT 7 ON
i 16:55:00 STS ENTRY
17:02:00 SEQUENTIAL BUSES OFF
7 04 CB PANELS CONFIGL_ED
17:09:00 CM/MDAUMBILICALS CONNECTED
I 17:26:00 C&W SYSTEM ACTIVATED17:30:00 SPG TRANSFERRED TO CSM
i 411
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DAY:GMT EVENTS/SL-2
18:35:00 OWS ENTRY
18:40:00 C&W TESTS
19:30:00 CONDENSATE DUMP HTR-SEC-DID NOT SHOW TEMP.
LITE ON
14:01:30:00 PARASOL DEPLOYMENT
02:40:00 #8 A-H INTEGRATOR C/B OPEN ACCIDENTLY BY
CREW (FOOT SLIPPED UNDER GUARD) BOTH PRI/
SEC AHI RESET TO 0%.
04:17:31 PRI COOLANT LOOP INV I ON
22:46:00 20 AMP SPIKE REPORTED ON AM BUS i (AR 78) -
FOUND TO BE CREW i0 SEC ACTIVATION OF MOLE
SIEVE HEATERS
15:22:34:00 CREW STATED THEY TURNED ON MOLE SIEVE BED
HTRS TO OBSERVE TEMP. (AR 78)
16:01:44:36 SEC COOLANT LOOP COMMANDED ON, CREW
03:25:00 REPORTED SEC INV i C/B OPENED AND
THEY TIN%NED INV 2 PUMP B ON
03:29:33 DCS CMD - SEC INV 3 PUMP C ON FOR REDUNDANT
BUS POWER
17:19:00:00 EREP #i
22:13:00 ATM EXPERIENCING ELECT. DIFFICULTIES. AUTO
CUT-OFF EXPERIENCED AT DOD s MUCH LOWER
THAN EXPECTED (APPROX. 50%). THIS KICKED
OFF BATT 6, 7, 8, & 16. IN ADDITION REG
3, 6, 7, 8, & 16 KICKED OFF AT SR. THIS
WAS NOT DISCOVERED UNTIL GOLDSTONE PASS
(22:39) AT WHICH TIME THESE BATT _qERE NOT
CHARGING. APPROXIMATELY HALF WAY THRU
DAYLIGHT CYCLE. CBRM 6, 7, 8, 16 WERE
TURNED BACK ON. BUT CBRM #3 WOULD NOT
COME ON. OFF LOADING WAS MADE INCLUDING
SEC COOLANT LOOP
23:50:00 ALL CBRM "ON" SWITCH ATTEMPTED - NO JOY
ON REG'S 3 & 15. C_RM 3 SAS CONTACTOR IS
CLOSED BUT REG NOT OUTPUTING.
18:00:18:00 SEC LOOP BACK ON
20:03:07:00 WREN WASTE MGMT HTR TURNED OFF, CREW
r REPORTED C&W ALARM ON OWS BUS I & 2 LOW.
CHECKED AND FOUND OWS BUS i FEEDER #2
C/B OPEN.
i 03_43:00 OWS BUS LOW VOLT SENSE C/B FOUND OPEN
(BUSI & 2)
I 22:05:02:36 BATT 7 ON
05:08:38 PCG 7 ON
i 05:51:00 BATT 5 ON
i 05:52:20 PCG 50N/CHG 5 - NORM
i 17:44:00 BATT 7 AT I00% SOC
07:40:00 SAS 5 VOLTS OSCILL_rlNG (LASTED 5 MIN)
412
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!DAY:GMT EVENTS/SL-2
08:21:00 SAS 5 VOLTS OSCILLATING FROM 34% TO 52%
FULL SCALE (43-65V). BATT CHG CURRENT
ALSO OSCILLATING (O-la) FOR 2 1/2 MIN
(SUNSET)
12:17:49 BATT 7 OFF
12:17:58 SAS 6 TO PCG 6
12:18:07 BATT 6 ON
12:18:18 CHG 6 - NORM
12:18:30 CHG 7 - BY-PASS
12:32:23 SAG 7 TO PCG 8/BATT 80N/CHG NORM
13:59:02 BATT 8 OFF
17:05:00 EREP PASS
18:57:00 CREW PERFO_4ED OWS BUS C&W TROUBLE
SHOOTING - "TRULY AN UNEXPLAINED ANOMALY"--
FLT DIR TO ECIL.
23:03:40:00 NOTICED SAS 5 UZCILLATIONS AT END OF MADRID
PASS - 15 MIN LATER AT GWM;OSCILLATIONS HAD
STOPPED. BATT CHG OK
04:17:00 GWM LOS - SAS 7 VOLT OSCILLATING (TO PCG 8)
BATT 8 IS ON
05:20:00 BATT 50FF/CHG - BY-PASS
11:48:54 BATT 80FF/CHG - BY-PASS
12:10:00 BATT 5 & 7 - 100% SOC, BATT 6 - 100% PRI
95% SEC
15:02:00 MSFC REQUEST IF OK TO CYCLE TACS C/B ON &
OFF ON PNL 202 TO INHIBIT
18:24:00 BATT 6 SEC A-H INTEG AT 100%
21:00:00 VERIFIED BATT 6 OFF (NO DATA) CHG BY-PASS
24:20:55:18 SAS 7 TO PCG 7/BATT 70N/CHC 7-NORM
20:55:47 SAS 6 TO PCG 7/BATT 60N/CHG 6-NORM
20:57:21 SAS 5 TO PCG 5/BATT 6 ON
25:02:10:20 BATT 6 & 7 OFF
03:54:25 SAS 5 TO PCG 5/SAS 6 TO PCG 6
03:55:07 CHG 6 TO BY-PASS/CHG 7 TO BY-PASS
15:48846 mATT 6, 7, 8 ON
15:49:00 CHG 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 - Nr_RM
:' 15:50:00 PCG it 2, 3t 4t 51 61 71 8 - OFF
: 15:51:00 BATT 1 THRU 8 DISCHG LIMIT - INHIBIT
: 15:53:40 PCG 8 TO REG BUS 1
18:03:00 OWS SAS OUT AT AOS
18:32:00 PCG 1 THRU 8 ON
21:4%:00 PCG 1 & 20FF/REG 8 TO _S 1
23:26:00 PEG 2 POT ADJUSTED CW 15 _
26:00:25:00 SAS WING AT 100% DPLYMT - HURRAHII
01:09:00 BACKTO SI
413
l '
1974022202-439
DAY:GMT EVENTS/SL-2
02:40:00 PCG 8 BACK TO REG 2
02:46:00 CREWTOLD TO ADJUST REG 1 TO EQUAL
REG 2 CJRRENT
06:08:40 PCG 1-8 DISCHG LIMIT - AUTO
27:03 :27:O0 CREW TO GIVE EPS PANEL STATUS TOMMORROW
14:23:O0 CREW ADJUSTED REG 2 COARSE POT CW UNTIL
REG BUS CURRENTS EQUAL
REG 1 - 37.7 amp REG I - 28.68 V
PEG 2 - 34.5 amp PEG 2 - 28.73 V
(2NDADJUSTMENT)
15"02:00 EREP PASS _t6- REV 374 ORBIT 234
AVG LOAD - 2300 WATTS
MAX DOD - 111
28:14:19:00 EREP PASS _t7- RL'q389 ORBIT 249
AVG LOAD - 2400 WATTS
29:05:01:00 BATT 8 SOC - IOOZ
13:10:00 PRESENT OCV 29.0. EGIL WANT CREW TO ADJUST
TO 29.2. OCV
13:44:00 CREW ADJUSTED POTS TO 29.20CV.
15:12:00 EREP PASS _8 REV 404 ORBIT 255 AVG LOAD -
2300 WATTS MAX DOD - 23Z
30:12:56:00 EREP PASS _9 REV 417 ORBIT 279 AVG LOAD -
2550 WATTS MAX DOD - 28Z
31:13:46:00 EREP PASS #10 REV 432 ORBIT 295 MAX DOD -
31Z AVG LOAD - 2500
32:03:01:00 CYCLING 17 AMP UNEXPLAINED LOAD WAS REPORTED
CYCLING ON/OFF. WAS FIRST SEEN OVER MAD
APPROX 02100. SEEN AGAIN OVER CRO & HS,'.
CREW CHECKED VARIOUS SWITCXES_ ALL OK
14:40:00 EREP PASS #II;REV 446_ORBIT 311;AVG LOAD -
2550.MAX DOD - 40Z
17:49:O0 XFER_NG CURRENT TO CSM. AT AOS: XFER/CSM
BUS 1 - 26.2 a
2- 15.5a
17:54:00 CHG MODE 8 .-TEMP LIMIT _
17:56:00 CHG MODE 8 - NORM I SUSPECT DATA DROP
33:05:00:00 EGIL REPORTED CREW UNEVENLY SET REG POTS
AFTER CSM XFER: PEG 1., 29.00CV PEG 2 -
29.20CV NO CHANGE TO BE MADE AT THIS TI_
08:50:00 CREW TOLD EREP PASS TENTATIVELY PLANNED FOR
DOY 169
35:]9:41:00 CREW INSTRUCTED _O ADJUSt BUS I POT 30° CN
AND BUS 2 POT 20" CW. RESULT: REG BUS 1
OCV 29.35 BUS 2-29.42_WAS: REC BUS I OCV
29.03,BUS 2-29.16
36:19:10:00 FLT DIR/EGIL DISCUSSION TO ADJUST REG BUS
OCV'S TO 29.5 FOLLOWING EVA FOR ORBIT
STORAGE
414
|
1
1974022202-440
f?
DAY:GMT EVENTS /SL- 2
37:10:46:00 EVA
11:16:00 CREW HAMMERED ON CBRM 15-WORKED; CHG
TURNED ON. HOW ABOUT THAT I!
19:55:00 CREW TNSTRUCTED TO ADJUST PEG BUS 1 POT 15°
CW. INITIAL ADJUSTMENT VIA TM SIIOWEDTOO
MUCH. CREW INSTRUCTED TO TURN BUS 1 POT 5°
CCW. RESULTANT OCV BUS 1-29.5 BUS 2-29.5
20:30:00 ALL CONSOLE OPERATORS REVIEW "PROFESSIONAL
OUTSIDE UNDERHANDED NATURAL DISCREPANCY
EMISSION REVERSER (POUNDER)"
38:12:04:00 CREW CHECKED MDA PORT HTR C/B - OPEN - TEST
OF CKT OK.
13:30:00 DISCUSSION CONCERNING BATT CNTL C/B BETWEEN
EGIL & FDIR "EVERYTHING WILL BE DONE TO
ASSURE THAT C/B PANELS ARE LEFT IN PROPER
CONFIG. DURING DE-ACT ./INCLUDING BATT CNTL
C/B".
16:23:00 EGIL/F-DIR DISCUSSION - "EGIL CANNOT CONFIRM
BATT CNTL C/B ARE CLOSED."
39:03:20:00 AT AOS LOOKS LIKE CSM TRANSFER TO INTERNAL
PWR COMPLETE.
04:25:00 ADJUST PEG BUS 2 FOR 5 AMPS. COMPLETE-OCV
AT LOW LOAD TURNED OUT TO BE 29.4 ON EACH
BUS.
40:08: 55:O0 CSM/SWS SEPARATION
p
! m •
: EVENTS/SL-3
76:II:08 SL-3 LIFT OFF
76:14:22 TRACKING LTS ON
76:18:27 DOCKING LTS ONZ AXIS ITS COMB OFF @ 10:15
76:19:O0 DOCKING
76:22:43 S.P.C. - CSM
76:22:48 SIEVE B SEC FAN PROB.
77:13:35 SIEVE A YAN TO SEC & SIEVE B FAN TO PRI
77:19:20 CSM _ A&B C&WALARM CREWI_I_ORT - ALSO
20 A SPIKES MN A
79"10:33 & BETWEEN BA'_T#5 PSOC & SSOC
t 82:17:35 EREP #1
i 83:03:20 ATH TV BUS 2 SHORT.
i SHORT IN POWER_ DISTRIBUI_it. OPEPATION
IS ON ATM TV BUS 1.
83:03:40 BAT 6&8 NOT 1007,
83:16:27 EREP #2
415 !
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DAY:GHT EVENTS/SL-3
84:14:23 EREP #3 "
84:15:59 #6 DISCHG. LIMIT - INHIBIT
84:16:07 ERI_P#4
86:02:26 PEG #1&2 ADJ - #1-29, 1 6 #2-29.0
86:23:41 PEG #2 ADJ - 29.2
87:13;49 POSSIBLE SIEVE FAN-SWITCHING
87:15:14 EREP #5
87:22:55 SIEVE B FAN T/S
87:23:13 SIEVE B FAN REPLACED - NEW FAN DID NOT WORK
88 CREW REPORTED MOLE SIEVE A&B HEAT EXCHANGER
Trk_S READLOW - TELEMETRYMEASUREMENTSARE
OK
88:13:07 EREP #6
88:13:15 #6 DISCHG LIMIT - INHIBIT
88:18:53 #6 _ISCHG LIMIT - AUTO
89 CREWREPORTEDCBRM#16 WOULDNOT TURNOFF
FROM THE C&D PANEL
90:14:50 EREP #7
91:02: 07 EREP #8
91:14:07 EI_P #9
93 ATM EAT 7 CAP TEST = 12,1 AH
95:17:03 PEG 1 & 2 ADJ #1-28.9 & #2-28.8
95:17:03 CSM ON XleERBUSES
_7:18:54 REG #2 & FINE #6 & 7 ADJ
I00 CCW(AFTER #1-28.9, #2-28.9)
98:07:55 ATM C&D PANEL BATT CHARGE ALERT LIGHT ON &
FLAG BARBERPOLE - PROBABLECAUSEIS INTER-
MITTENTSHORTIN POWERTRANSFERDISTRIBUTOR
98:14:53 BAT #6 AMPHR. READINGPEACHEDIOOZ. AFTER
A PERIOD OF FAILING TO REACH100X (TURN
AROUNDERROR)
99:00:47 SIEVE A BED BAKEOUT
100:01"02 MDA LT PROB. AFT 2&4 LTS NOT WORKING
100:13:30 SEC C13T PU_ C/B PROB.
101:18:37 #7 FINE ADJ - WAS TO BE IO°CW BUT WAS TURNED
CCW
IO2"15:54 ATM BAT #18 CAP TEST - 13.1 AH
102:17:31 AT)/BAT #10 CAP TEST - 12.4 AH
102:18:30 AM PRI CI,NT LOOP$HUT-Dk'N
102: 20:38 #7 FINE ADJ-. 6 TO . 7 AMP INCR.
103:12:52 PEG #1& _2 ADJ FOR EVA: REG1-20 ° CW;
REG2-30UCi_(/t.IFTER#1.29, 1 #2-29.1,_
103:16,24 EVA _ INSTALLATION
103:21:21 ERRATIC BEHAVIOR OF SECONDARY TIME REFER-
ENCE SYST_ REPORTEDBY CREW
416 i
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: 103:23:44 PEG #1 b #2 ADj. #1-20° _CW, #2-30° CCN,
28.9V
I04:21:12 ATMBAT #8 CAP TEST 12.1 All
i04:22:43 ATMBAT #5 CAP TEST 12.5 AH
105 REGULATOR WOULD _OT TURN OFF FROH C&D PANEL
TWO OTHER REGULATORS HAVE BEEN REPORTED NOT
TO TURN OFF. CBRM #6 ON DOY 150, CBRM #16
ON DOY 222
i05:15:27 PCG E_' #6 CAP TEST 32.18
106:16:3i PCG BAT #8 CAP TEST 31.aO
109:15:21 BAT 1 CHG/TRICKLE, CHG4- 2A FROM 2.3 TO
•5 @ TRICKLE CHG
109"18:34 PEG 2 POT BUMPED
109:18:41 BEG 2 READJUSTED
II0:01:II PEG #2 AD3 - ADJ I0° CW; OCV BEFORE & AFTER
28.9
110:20:53 I_A AFT LTS. 2&4 TROUBLE-SHOOTING PROCEDURE
RUN. _A ITS OPERATE
II0: :37 REC #2 AD3,AFTER: #2-59.1
110:14:33 EREP # i0
110:16:44 PEG #2 READJ
i12:12:51 REC #2 ADJ.AFr_: #2-29.1
112:14:07 EREP #11 /
112:16:08 REC #2 ADJ,RETURNED TO 28.9
112:17:46 EREP#12
113:13:43 PEG #2 ADJ.
I13:15:05 EREP #13
I13:17:24 PEG #2 ADJ,RETIlI_ED TO 28.98
114:07:25 CREW REPORTEDTHUMP
114:14:16 EItEP #i4
114:17:55 EREP #15
114: :07 #8 FI_._ _)J.COAL 10° CW; CRI_ WENT"TOO FAR"
118:21:14 EREP #15A
I17:02:20 #8 FINE ADJ,,EQUALTO BATT #5 DISCHARGE
117:20:32 ERE? #17_
118 ATMBAT #10 CAP. TEST 11.7 AN
119:17:46 PEG #1&2 ADJ,AFrFA: #1-29.25 & #2-29.25 '
119:18:48 _ #18B
119:20:19 PEG #1&2 ADJ. BOTHRETURNEDTO 29.0 VOLTS
120:15:00 LARGESAS 51 @ TRICEI,ECHG. 6.44 TO
120"18:07 EREF #19
120.'19:54 EREP#20
121:12:58 ERE? #21
EREP #22 CANCELLED
121:20:49 EREP#23
417 i
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DAY:(_T EVENTS/SL-3
122:12:16 EREP #24 ._
122:16:33 EREP #25
122:20:02 EREP #26
123:02:30 CBRM #5 CHARGER MALFUNCTION
123:17:42 EREP #27
123:19:17 EREP #28
124:16:43 EREP #29
125:14:52 EREP #30 CANCELLED REG l&20CV ADJ
i-i0° CW, 2-15° CW, #1-29.17, #2-29, 1
125:16:01 EREP #31
125:17:46 EREP #32
126:00:10 PEG 2 ADJ.WAS 29,22, NOW 29, 18
126:15:20 EREP #33
126:16:40 EREP #34
127:14:29 EREP #35
128:00:07 EREP #36
128:15:39 EREP #37
129:01:46 TIMER PROBLEM
129:13:38 EREP #38
129:19:47 EPEP #39
131:13:23 EREP #41
131:12:30 REG 1&2 ADJ.#1-15 ° CW & #2-10° CW, AFTER
1-29o 26 #2-29.34
131:15:40 REG 1 & 2 ADJ.#1-20° CCW & #2-25° CCW;
AFTER #1-29.11 #2-29.14
132:11:17 HATCH OPEN - EVA
132:16:15 REG 2 ADJ.AFTER I0° CCW - 29.0
135:09:40 (SCHED) CSM PWR XFER TO INTERNAL
135:11:10 PEG XFER l&20PEN_REG #I & #2 ADJ #1-170°
CCW, #2-165° CCW
135:13:29 (AOS) SPG - AM, C&W PWR DWN
135:19:49 (SCHED) CSM UNDOCKING
135:22:19 SPLASH DOWN
EVENTS/SL-4
187:14:01:23 SL-4 LIFT OFF
187:17:18 TRACKING LTS ON
187:20:39 DOCKING LTS ON
187:22:02 SL-4 DOCKING
188:14:29 REG 1 & 2 ADJ,RESULTANT OCVS #I - 28.8,
#2 28.7
188:15:47 KEG 1 & 2 ADJ.#1 - 29.2, #2 - 29.2
188:16:15 REG/XFER TIES CLOSED
188:16:57 SINGLE PT. GND TO CSM
418
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189:03:36 PEG 20CV CHANGE. CREW ACCIDENTALLY BUMPED
POT & ATTEMPTED TO RETURN IT TO ORIGINAL
POSITION
189:18:46 REG 2 ADJ,#2 - 29.2
189:19:43 KEG 1 AD_ #i = 29.30, #2 = 29.26
195:18:08 PCG #6 BATT CAP TEST 26.6 AH @ 32.5 VOLTS
196:22:01 KOHOUTEKMNVR, $019K
197:22:50 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S201K
198:14:41 KOHOUTEKM/T/R, $232
201:16:11 EREPMNVR
202:17:10 EREP MNVK
203:16:26 EREPMNVR
203:17:59 EREP MNVR
204:15:47 EREPMk_R
204:17:20 EREP MNVR
205:15:33 EREPMNVR
206:03:13 BEGIN PWR XFER TO CSM
206:03:29 REG BUS 1 & 2 ADJ,#1 = 29.17, #2 = 29.11
206:04:05 PEG BUS 1 ADJ,#1 = 29.13, #2 = 29.11
206:14:51 EREPMNVR
206:21:35 KOHOUTEKMNVR, $201K
207:02:23 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S063K
207:13:09 REG i & 2 ADJ.#1 - 28.97, #2 = 28.97
268:01:43 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S183K
208:13:15 PEG BUS 1 & 2 ADJ,#1 - 29.14, #2 - 29.13
208:13:28 EREP MNVR
208:18:37 JOP 13 MNVR
208:23:19 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S019K
209:18:06 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S063K
210:00:01 EREP CALMNVR
210:01:11 EREP MNVR
210:20:37 KOHOUTEKMNVR, $063
211:00:32 REG BUS 1 & 2 ADJ.#I - 28.92, #2 - 28.93
211:16:49 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S063K
213:01:15 KOHOUTEKMNVR, $201K
213:05:35 KOHOUTEKMNVK, S201K
214:14:42 WOHOUTEKMNVR, sOIgK
215:00:02 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S183
215:15:34 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S019K
215:22:26 REG BUS 1 & 2 ADJ,#1 - 29.10, #2 - 29.18
215:22:37 EREP MNVR
215:23:21 PEG BUS 2 ADJ,#I - 29.09, #2 - 29.11
215:17:11 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S201K
; 217:21:51 KOHOUTEKM%NR, s0igK
i 218:02:31 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S019K
f 218:16:32 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S063K
219:01:15 REG BUS #2 ADJ.#1 - 29.09, #2 - 29.20
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DAY:GMT EVENTS/SL-4
219:01:15 EREPMNVR
219:02:55 REG BUS #2 ADJ #i = 29.09, _ = 29.16
219:10:09 REG BUS #2 ADJ #i = 29.09, _ - 29.33
219:10:34 EREPMNVR
219:13:13 PEG BUS #2 ADJ #i = 29.09, #2 = 29.16
219:21:36 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S183K
220:15:37 PEG BUS #i & 2 ADJ #i = 28.94, #2 = 28.92
220:15:51 JOP-18DMNVR
220:22:27 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S019K
222:01:23 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S063K
222:15:23 JOP-18DMNVR
222:23:10 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S063
223:16:17 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S063K
224:15:02 KOHOUTEKMNVR, $201K
224:18:41 JOP-18DMNVR
225:00:45 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S019K
225:17:58 JOP-18D MNVR
226:21:05 KOHOUTEKMNVR, $201
229:16:43 PCG #6 BATT CAP TEST 23.0 A.H. @ 32.6 VOLTS
230:18:54 REG BUS #1 & 2 ADJ #1 = 29.20, #2 = 29.08
230:19:39 KOHOUTEKMNVR, $201K
230:20:28 REG BUS #2 ADJ #1 = 29.20, #2 = 29.18
230:21:30 REG BUS #1 & 2 ADJ #1 - 28.91, #2 _ 28.92
231:01:51 JOB-18D MNVR
231:14:16 JOP-18DMNVR
231:22:06 JOP-18DMNVR
232:15:07 JOP-18DMNVR
232:22:53 JOP-18D MNVR
233:11:38 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #1 - 29.4, #2 - 29.3
233:14:50 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #1 - 29.14, #2 = 29.13
233:11:50 EREP MNVR
233:22_06 JOP-18D _L'_'R
234:01:19 REG i & 2 ADJ #i - 28.9, #2 - 29.2
234:14:26 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S063
234:21:05 PEG I & 2 ADJ #I = 29.15, #2 - 29.19
234:21:56 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S201K
235:10:27 EREP MNVR
235:15:17 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S183K
235:20:01 PEG 1 ADJ #I - 28.85, #2 = 29.19
235:20:36 JOP-18D MNVR
236:00:19 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #i - 28.94, #2 - 28.92
236:18:47 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #1 - 29.25, #2 - 29.23
236:19:05 EREPMNVR
236:21:09 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #i - 28.92, #2 - 28,89
236:23:52 KOHOUTEKM_/R, S019K
237:4:03 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #i - 29.03, #2 - 29.00
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237:14:37 JOP-18D MNVR
237:23:11 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S063K
238:13:10 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S201K
238:17:08 PEG i & 2 ADJ #I ffi29.17, #2 m 29.20
238:17:42 EREP MNVR
238:20:59 REG i & 2 ADJ #i ffi29.0, #2 ffi29.0
238:23:12 JOP-18D MNVR
239:12:44 EREP CALMNVR
239:16:28 REG i & 2 ADJ #i = 29.24, #2 ffi29.16
239:17:00 EREP MNVR
239:18:59 PEG i & 2 ADJ #i = 29.0, #2 = 29.0
239:23:26 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S019K
240:11:48 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S019K
240:15:50 RE(;i & 2 ADJ #i ffi29.3, #2 ffi29.3
240:16:13 EREP MNVR
240:18:28 REG I & 2 ADJ #i = 29.0, #2 = 29.0
241:00:18 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S063
241:15:09 PEG i & 2 ADJ #i ffi29.18, #2 ffi29.19
241:15:30 EREPMNVR
241:20:28 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S063K
241:23:34 KOHOUTEKMNVR, S183K
242:16:44 KOHOUTEK MNVR, S-201K
243:00:06 REG i & 2 ADJ #i = 29.48, #2 = 29.48
243:00:16 EREPMNVR
243:16:02 REG i & 2 ADJ #i - 29.40, #2 ffi29.30
243:17:13 EREPMNVR
243:22:18 KOHOUTEKMNVR S183K
244:01:25 KOHOUTEKMNVR sOIgK
244:15:15 REG 2 ADJ #I - 29.40, #2 - 29.42
244:16:32 EREP MNVR
244:21:39 KOHOUTEKMNVR S063K
245:00:46 KOHOUTEKMNVR S201K
245:21:00 KOHOUTEKMNVR S063
246:14:02 REG I & 2 ADJ #i - 29.61, #2 + 29.59
246:15:03 EREPMNVRS
246:18:05 REG L & 2 ADJ #i - 29.40, #2 - 29.40
246:20:24 KOHOUTEKMNVR S019
247:01:04 KOHOUTEKMNVR
250:20:20 EREP MNVR
251:18:13 EREPMNVR
252:18:43 EREPMNVR
253:19:46 EREPMNVR
254:19:03 EREP MNVR
256:16:25 EREP MNVR
256:16:54 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #1 - 29.32, #2 - 29.25
I
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257:15:44 EREP MNVR
257:17:37 PEG i & 2 ADJ #i = 29.14, #2 = 29.16 -_
257:23:54 KOHOUTEK MNVR S201K
258:13:03 KOHOUTEK MNVR S201
258:18:12 REG i & 2 ADJ #i = 29.47, #2 = 29.50
258:18:12 EREP MNVR
258:21:21 REG i AND 2 ADJ #i " 28.90, #2 = 28.95
259:11:08 REG 1 AND 2 ADJ #i = 29.30, #2 = 29.30
259:11:17 EREP _VR
259:17:30 EREP MNVR
259:20:57 REG i AND 2 ADJ #I = 28.94, #2 = 28.94
260:00:13 KOHOUTEKMNVR S063K
260:16:46 REG i AND 2 ADJ #i ffi29.14, #2 = 29.16
260:17:41 EREPMNVR
260:19:51 REG i & 2 ADJ #i = 28.93, #2 " 28.93
261:15:57 PEG 1 & 2 ADJ #i = 29.4, #2 = 29.4
261:16:07 EREP MNVR
261:9:07 REG i & 2 ADJ #i = 29.00, #2 = 29.03
261:22:20 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #i = 29.53, #2 = 29.62
261:23:45 JOP-13 MNVR
262:01:28 PEG i & 2 ADJ #i = 29.06, #2 = 29.06
262:15:12 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #i = 29.4, #2 = 29.4
262:15:26 EREP MNVR
262:18:49 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #i = 28.93, #2 = 28.90
262:23:38 KOHOUTEKMNVR S019K
263:13:49 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #i = 29.44, #2 = 29.44
263:14:42 EREP MNVR
263:18:04 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #i = 28.91, #2 - 28.97
264:12:08 JOP-13 MNVR
264:12:14 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #i = 2q.42, #2 - 29.34
264:13:52 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #i - 28.87, #2 - 28.91
264:15:22 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #i = 29.27, #2 - 29.33
264:15:39 EREPMNVR
264:18:40 PEG 1 & 2 ADJ #I - 28.89, #2 - 28.89
264:23:49 KOHOUTEKMNVR $201
268:11:51 PCG #6 BATT CAP TEST 33.87 AN at 30.0 VOLTS
269:23:37 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #I - 29.09, #2 - 28.94
270:12:20 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #I - 28.90, #2 - 28.78
271:03:49 CSM TO INTERNAL POWER
271:04:44 REG 1 & 2 ADJ #i - 29.07, #2 - 29.80
271:04:54 REG/XFER TIES TO "OPEN"
271:05:59 SINGLE PT GND TO AM
271:15:16 SL-4 SPLASHDOWN
271:15:16 BATT #2 CAP TEST 31.2 AN AT 30.0 VOLTS
271:18:28 BATT #4 CAP TEST 38.22 AN AT 30.0 VOLTS
422
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271:20:30 BATT ]_6CAP TEST 33.37 AH AT 30.0 VOLTS
i 271:22:17 BATT _8 CAP TEST 30.94 AllAT 30.0 VOLTS
271:00:19 BATT 4_ICAP TEST 38.74 AH AT 30.0 VOLTS
o 272:04:11 BATT #3 CAP TEST 31.94 AH AT 30.0 VOLTS
272:07:28 BATT #6 CAP TEST (SECOND) 37.72 AH AT
30.0 VOLTS
272:09:52 BATT I_8CAP TEST (SECOND) 32.01 AllAT
30.0 VOLTS
272:12:29 BATT 4J5CAP TEST 31.60 AH AT 30.0 VOLTS
" 272:14:35 BATT _7 CAP TEST 31.41 AH AT 30.0 VOLTS
272:16:33 REG/XFER TIES TO "CLOSED" - AM & ATM RE-
PARALLED
272:18:19 POWER DOWN-AM BATT #2 "OFF" - LAST COMMAND
_ SENT TO SKYLAB(See Table 6.If for complete
Power-Down Sequence).
THIS SPACE INTEI_I'IONALLYLEFT BLA,_
i
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C&W SYSTEM EVENTS - SL-I/2
TIME ALARM* EVENT
13:17:25 C&W SYSTEM ACTIVATION
17:28 C1 & C2 PRIMARY COOLANT TEMPERATURE LOW-DUE TO A LACK
OF HEAT LOAD BROUGHT ON BY THE LIMITED AVAIL-
ABLE POWER CONDITION.
18:27 C1 & C2 ACS CMG SATURATE -
18:28 WI & W2 ACS HI RATE -
21:54 W1 & W2 AT AOS GOLDSTONE THE CREW REPORTED THAT
THREE FIRE ALARMS HAD OCCURRED. THESE
ALARMS ORIGINATED FROM FIRE SENSOR CONTROL
PANEL 639 FIRE SENSOR #2, IN THE OWS SLEEP
COMPARTMENT. IT IS FELT THAT THE ALARMS
WERE CAUSED DUE TO EXCESSIVELY HIGH TEMPERA-
TURES IN THE VICINITY. SENSOR POWERED DOWN.
14:03:05 CI & C2 BATTERY #8 STATE OF CHARGE ALARM - #8 AMP
HOUR INTEGRATOR C/B (PRI. & SEC.) WAS INAD-
VERTENTLY OPENED BY THE CREW. THIS RESET
THE INTEGRATORS TO ZERO.
03:10 C1 & C2 ACS 2/3 RATE GYRO AND ACS CMG SATURATE -
CAUSED BY DRIFTING GYROS
03:15 CI & C2 ACS CMG SATURATE - DRIFTING GYROS
16:05 CI & C2 ACS CMG SATURATE - SLEEP COMPARTMENT SENSOR
ACTIVATED. ALL SENSORS TESTED OK.
21:11 C1 & C2 SIEVE A GAS FLOW - MOLE SIEVE A ACTIVATION
AFTER BAKEOUT. NORMAL OPERATION AFTER BED
BAKEOUT.
21:40 W1 & W2 OWS HEAT EXCHANGER FIRE ALARM -
FI & F2 ALARM WAS DETERMINED TO BE CAUSED BY THE
HIGH RADIATION LEVEL IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
ANOMALY. THE ALARM ORIGINATED FROM FIRE
SENSOR CONTROL PANEL 392 AND SENSOR #l.
23:14 C1 & C2 ALARMS UNEXPLAINED BY CREW OR GROUND
23:16 CL & C2 THERE ARE NO TM MEASUREMENTS THAT MONITOR
THESE FUNCTIONS. (i) MOLE SIEVE CYCLE
TIMER, (2) MOLE SIEVE BED TEMPERATURE HIGH,
AND (3) C&W SIGNAL CONDITIONER POWER.
CREW POSSIBLY TESTING TO SEE WHICH SWITCHES
CAN BE ENABLED.
* C - CAUTION
W - WARNING
F - FIRE
R - RAPID LOSS
OF PRESSURE
424
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C&W SYSTEM EVENTS - SL-I/2 (Continued)
TIME ALARM EVENT
16:01:44 W1 & W2 SECONDARY AM COOLANT LOOP ACTIVATED FROM THE
GROUND.
17:17:38 W1 & W2 CSM ALARM - CSM WATER DUMP ACTIVATED CLUSTER
18:00:19 W1 & W2 PRIMARY AM COOLANT LOOP ACTIVATED FROM THE
GROUND.
23:33 W1 & W2 CREW ALERT #i - STDN CREW ALERT CAPABILITY
TEST.
23:34 W1 & W2 CREW ALERT #2 - STDN CREW ALERT CAPABILITY
TEST.
].9:00:40 W1 & W2 PRIMARY AM COOLANT LOOP ACTIVATED FROM THE
GROUND.
01:11 C1 & C2 AT AOS CREW REPORTI.O A RATE GYRO ALARkl.
THE CAUSE WAS GYRO DRIFT.
08:22 CREW TRANSCRIPTS (CHANNEL B) - NINE SWITCHES
INHIBITED; 8 BATT CHARGE LOW & 1 PPCO2 B HIGH
19:40 WI & W2 FIRE ALARM - OWS HEAT EXCHANGER FIRE SENSOR
FI & F2 #i (392-1) WAS TRIGGERED AGAIN BY RADIATION
IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC ANOMALY.
20:47 FIRE SENSOR 392-1 (ABOVE) GAIN WAS REDUCED
FROM "4" TO "3".
20:08:40 Cl & C2 AT AOS THE CREW REPORTED ON OWS BUS LOW
ALARM. REAL TIME TROUBLE SHOOTING FOUND
ONE OWS POWER FEEDER C/B AND BOTH C&W OWS
LOW VOLTAGE SENSE C/B's OPEN. CREW IN-
HIBITED C&W INDICATION AND GROUND INFORMED
THEM TO MAINTAIN THAT CONFIGURATION UNTIL
FURTHER NOTICE.
11:16 C&W AND EMERGENCY #i SUBUNITS POWERED DOWN
FOR POWER CONSERVATION - CREW AWAKE PERIODS.
18:54 C2 ACS CMG SATURATE.
21:00:50 C2 & W2 ACS RATE GYRO ACS CMG SATURATES ACS HI RATE,
AND ACS THRUSTER STUCK CAUSED BY A FAILURE
IN A Z AXIS GYRO.
02:25 W2 PRIMARY AM COOLANT LOOP ACTIVATED FROM GROUND.
02:59 C&W AND EMERGENCY #i SUBUNITS POWERED UP -
CREW SLEEP PERIOD.
11:15 C&WAND FMERGENCY #1 SUBUNITS POWERED DOWN
FOR POWER CONSERVATION - CREW AWAKE PERIOD.19:45 W2 TWO CSMALARMS - CRYO PRESSURE WAS OUT OF
TOLERANCE.
425
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C&W SYSTEM EVENTS - SL-I/2 (Continred)
TIME ALARM EVENT
22:03:21 C&W AND EMERGENCY #i SUBUNITS POWERED UP -
CREW SLEEP PERIOD.
11:36 C&W AND EMERGENCY #i SUBUNITS POWERED DOWN
FOR POWER CONSERVATION - CREW AWAKE PERIOD.
16:24 C2 MOLE SIEVE GAS FLOW B LOW - MOLE SIEVE B
FAN WAS DEACTIVATED.
19:18 OWS BUS LOW C&W ALARM TROUBLE-SHOOTING COM-
PLETED. ALL C/Bs WERE CLOSED. C&W OWS
LOW VOLTAGE ENABLED - NO TRIP. SYSTEM
WORKING OK.
23:26 W2 PRIMARY AM COOLANT LOOP ACTIVATED FROM
GROUND.
23:03:09 C&W AND EMERGENCY #i SUBUNITS POWERED UP -
CREW SLEEP PERIOD.
11:20 C&W AND EMERGENCY #i SUBUNITS POWERED DOWN
FOR POWER CONSERVATION - CREW AWAKE PERIOD.
24:03:26 C&W AND EMERGENCY #I SUBUNITS POWERED UP -
CREW SLEEP PERIOD.
12:49 C&W AND EMERGENCY #i SUBUNITS POWERED DOWN
FOR POWER CONSERVATION - CREW AWAKE PERIOD.
14:26 CREW VERIFIED THAT ALL FIRE SENSORS HAVE
BEEN CONFIGURED TO BUS #2 POSITION.
20:29 C2 ACS 2/3 RATE GYRO - 3 - i GYRO WENT INTO
HEAVY OSCILLATIONS.
25:02:40 C&W AND EMERGENCY #I SUBUNITS POWERED UP -
CREW SLEEP PERIOD.
11:08 C&W AND EMERGENCY #i SUBUNITS POWERED DOWN
FOR POWER CONSERVATION - CREW AWAKE PERIOD.
12:59 W2 PRIMARY AM COOLANT LOOP ACTIVATED FROM GROUND
13:57 C2 CONDENSATE TANK &P - DUE TO A LEAKY QUICK-
DISCONNECT CONNECTOR (QD).
13:39 C2 PRIMARY COOLANT LOOP TEMPERATURE LOW - OC-
CURRED JUST AFTER SWITCH TO BYPASS POSITION
WAS MADE, CREWMAN REPORTED A BIG BANG.
13:41 W2 EVA #I COOLANT LOOP TEMPERATURE LOW - COOLANT
LOOPS FROZE DUE TO A IACK OF HEAT LOADS.
13:49 W2 EVA #I PUMP AP - CREW IS PREPARING FOR EVA.
i 15:05 W2 b R2 RAPID AP #2 - _USED BY OPENING OF AM/OWS
HATCH _TII A AP PRESENT ACROSS COMPARTMENTS.
OCCURRED PRIOR TO EVA AFT LOCK DEPRESS.
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C&W SYSTEM EVENTS - SL-I/2 (Continued)
TIME ALARM EVENT
25:16:04 W2 PRIMARY COOLANT LOOP INVERTER #i POWERED UP.
16;33 W2 & F2 FIRE ALARM ORIGINATED AT FSCP #392 SENSOR #2.
FALSE ALARM WAS CAUSED BY SUNLIGHT ENTERING
AFT COMPARTMENT WHEN EVA HATCH WAS OPENED.
18:06 C2 CONDENSATE TANK AP ALARM - AGAIN CAUSED BY A
LEAKY QD.
19:37 C2 SECONDARY COOLANT LOOP TEMPERATURE LOW ALARbl -
DUE TO A LACK OF HEAT LOADS ON THE LINE.
19:39 C2 MOLE SIEVE A GAS FLOW LOW ALARM - MOLE SIEVE
A FAN WAS POWERED UP. POST EVA ACTIVATION.
19:40 C2 MOLE SIEVE A & B GAS FLOW LOW ALARM - MOLE
SIEVES Fb2_S POWERED DOWN DUE TO LOUD NOISES
IN THE SYSTEMS. PROBLEM IS TIED IN WITH LOW
COOLANT LOOP TEMPERATURES.
26:01:08 W2 SECONDARY AM COOLANT LOOP ACTIVATED FROM
GROUND. THE PLAN IS TO EXPOSE STUCK TCV VALVE
TO THERMAL SHOCKS.
02:40 W2 SECONDARY COOLANT LOOP ACTIVATED FROM GROUND.
C&W AND EMERGENCY #i SUBUNITS POWERED UP -
CREW SLEEP PERIOD.
04:40 WI & W2 EVA I & 2 PUMP AP-SUS LOOP POWERED UP TO HELP
WITH LOW COOLANT TEMPERATURE PROBLEM.
27:02:15 W1 & W2 PRIMARY COOLANT LOOP POWERED UP.
02:17 Cl & C2 PRIMARY COOLANT LOOP TEMPERATURE LOW.
TEMPERATURE OF LOOP APPROX. 30°F.
02:21 TROUBLESHOOTING FOR THE LACK OF EVA PUMP AP
ALARM AT PUMP ACTIVATION. RESULTS SHOWED NO
ALARMS AT ACTIVATION.
16:44 ACS 2/3 RATE GYRO ALARM - CAUSED BY COMPUTER
SWITCHOVER AND GROUND NOT UPDATING DRIFT COM-
PENSATION IN TIME.
18:15 WI & W2 PRIMARY COOLANT LOOP ACTIVATED FROM GROUND.
18:42 W1 & W2 FIRE SYSTEM TEST PERFORMED PER. SYSTEMS
FI & F2 CHECKLIST. SIDE #2 OF FIRE SENSOR CONTROL
PANEL 392 DID NOT TEST CORRECTLY.
28:13:07 CREW REPLACED FSA (392-2) AND FSCP (392).
FSCP SIDE #2 WAS MARKED "BAD" AND _{E USED
FSA AND FSCP WERE STOWED IN LOCKER 432 AS
SPARES. FSCP ,MAY BE USED IN THE OWS IN
POSITIONS 530 AND 619.
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C&WSYSTEM EVENTS - SL-1/2 (Concluded)
TIME ALARM EVENT
28:13:54 W1 & W2 PRIMARY COOLANT LOOP ACTIVATED FROM GROUND,
29:15:38 Cl & C2 ACS CMG SATURATE - CAUSED BY EREP PASS
16:49 Wl & W2 ,_DDITIONAL SECONDARY COOLANT LOOP PUMP
POWERED UP IN AN ATTEMPT TO FREE STUCK TCV
VALVE.
22:07 W1 & W2 TWO PUMPS IN SECONDARY AM COOLANT LOOP ARE
COM_[ANDED ON IN ATTEMPT TO FREE STUCK TCV
VALVE.
22:09 CI & C2 SECONDARY COOLANT LOOP TEMPERATURE LOW
CAUSED STUCK TCV VALVE.
30:14:35 W1 & W2 TWO PUMPS IN SECONDARY AM COOLANT LOOP WERE
COMMANDED ON AN ATTEMPT TO FREE STUCK VALVE.
VALVE WAS FREED.
31:23:14 C1 b C2 PPCO2 B HI - CREW IS TOLD TO INHIBIT
PARAMETER SINCE BED IS NOT ACTIVE.
33:22:53 W1 b W2 FIRE ALARM - '_ERIFIED BY MOPS - NO CREW
F1 b F2 VERIFICATION.
34:10:57 C1 & C2 MOLE SIEVE A GAS FLOW - MOLE SIEVE A FANS
CYCLED OFF AND ON.
10:58 C1 MOLE SIEVE B GAS FLOW - MOLE SIEVE B FANS
CYCLED OFF AND ON.
16:23 PPCO2 HI ALARM REPORTED BY CREW - CAUSED BY
BED CYCLING AND THE CORRESPONDING RISE IN
C02.
35:11:II Cl, W2, R2 RAPID AP SYSTEM CHECK - ALL OK.
C2, WI, I%1 FIRE SYSTEM CHECK FROM 206 PANEL
CI, W2, F2
C2, WI, FI FIRE SYSTEM CHECK FROM 206 PANEL - ALL OK.
37:08:50 Cl b C2 MOLE SIEVE B FAN CYCLF/) OFF AND ON TO CHECK
FOR CAUTION #2 ALARM.
08:53 Wl & W2 ADDITIONAL PUMP IN SECONDARY AM COOLANT IS
ACTIVATED.
08:56 SUS LOOP #I CYCLED ON & OFF 3 TIMES, NO C&W
EVA PUMP _P ALARM OCCURRED.
NOTE: CREW EXPLAINED DURING DEBRIEFING THAT
i
A RAPID _P ALARM OCCURRED DURING REPRESS
AFTER EACH EVA.
40:05:10 Cl PPCO2 A HI - MOLE SIEVE FANS WERE SHUT DOWN
PREVIOUSLY. NOIt_AL OPERATION IN A NO FLOW
CONDITION FOR THE CO2 TO BUILD UP.
05:33 C&W SYSTEM DEACTIVATED FOR STORAGE MODE.
i
i
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!C&WSYSTEM EVENTS SL-3
TIME ALARM RE_L_nKS
76:22:29 C&W System is powered Jp.
23153 CI&C2,WI&W2 Caution and Warning System tests i
FI&F2,1U&R2 per activation procedure. NO PROBLEMS.
77:16:36 Wl&N2 CSMMALFUNCTION - 3rd CSM Alarm that has
(3 times) occurred today. CSH people feel it is
EMI.
19:10 WI&N2 C_MALFUNCTION - A shurt in the Cir-
cadian Data System caused the alarm.
Some 70 amp spikes lowered the bus
voltage to 25 volts. The System shorted
open relieving the problem.
23:26 CI&C2 SIEVE A GAS FLOW - Mole Sieve fans were
(2 tlmea) powered up. Sporadic air flow caused
the alarm. Crew inhibited the parameters
(SIEVE A&B Gas flow.)
81:I0:42 Wl&W2 CSM MALFUNCTION - Quad B Temp Low,
Secondary Quad 3 heaters are selected.
23:36 Crew reported the following Switches
inhibited on panel 207.
Rate Gyro
Condensate Tank AP,
Sieve A&B PPCO2
Sieve A&B Gas Flow
82119:40 Wl&W2 PRI COOLANT FLOW - Primary coolant loop
powered up via ground Command.
83103:20 Wl&W2 CSM MALFUNCTION - No problems in CSM
; CI_C2 found. This alarm occurred at approxl-
mately the same time as the ATH bus short
although no connection between the short
and the alarms were found.
13127 WI&N2 CRENALERT - STDN Check of Crew Alert 1
and Crew A_ert 2 capability.
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C&WSYSTEH EVENTS SL-3 (Continued)
T]_ ALARM RE,lARKS
83:17:43:29 WI&W2,FI&F2 FIRE ALARM - Wardroom Fire Sensor 633-2 was
17:44:06 WI&_2,FI&F2 triggered by high UV through the Wardroom
window. The vehicle was Just coming out of
Z-LV in which the Wardroom wlndow is facing
the Earth. The Sunshade had been taken off
the window for picture taking.
85:14:26 NI&W2 PRI COOLANTFLOW - Second pump in primary
AM Coolant loop powered via ground command.
86:00:05 WI&W2,RI&R2 RAPID P - An expected Rapid AP alarm oc-
curred during Airlock repress after EVA.
87:00_33 Wl&W2 PPO2 LOW - Crew reconflgured to:
PPO2 #1 - Control
PPO2 #2 - HONITOR
PPO2 #3 - OFF
PPO2 #3 Triggered the alarm.
13:45 CI&C2 SIEVA A GAS FLOW - No explan_rlon over loop.
13:49 CI_C2
13:54 NI&R1 RAPID _P - Rapid AP drill performed by
crew.
19:11 NI&N2,FI&F2 FIRE - Fire test performed per HK Task 10-B.
23:51 CI&C2 SIEVE A GAS FLOW- This alarm was caused by
troubleshooting on Sieve B secondary fan
circuit.
90:12:08 C1 SIEVE A PPCO2 HI - Crevwaa advised about
bed cycling. They were told not to in-
hibit parameter unless alarms became more
frequent.
91:02:48 C16C2 OK; SATURATE - Alarm caused by hish ve-
hicle momentum.
17:10 C1 CHG SATURATE, HI - RATE, AUTO TACS, &
17:10 WZ TRRUSTER STUCK - I_gh vehicle momentum
17:19 C1 caused alarms.
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CaW SYSTEM EVENTS SL-3 (Continued)
TIME ALAI_ REMARKS
91:Ig:XX CI CHG SATURATE (?) - High mo_lentum related
to previous alarm is still present.
92:11142 WI&W2 CSM MALFUNCTION - Quad B Temp Low trans-
ducer is reading iv'ermittent.
15:=O Wl&W2 csM MALFUNCTION - Quad B Temp Low trans-
ducer is still readirg intermittent Crew
inhibited parametel #n CSH by 16100 l_S.
16:00 Wl&W2 CSM MALFUNCTION - Quad D temp low.
20:26 CI&C2 CHG SATURATE - Venting of vehicle per
TO 20:28 (4 times) Experiment put torque on vehicle causing
CMG's to saturate.
93:02:55 Crew verified the following switches in-
hibited on panel 207:
_ondensate Tan_: AP LOW
Sieve A&B PPCO2 HIGH
97:17:16 WI&W2 CSM MALFUNCTION - Alarm caused by trouble-
17:18 WI&W2 shootxng on the CSM accumulators.
99113:37 C1 SIEVE A GAS FLOW - These expected alarms
TO 13142 (7 times) were caused by Hole Sieve Bakeout. Crew
wa_ told to inhibit p_rameter.
1OO:13130 WlSW2 SEC COOLANT FLOW - C/B kept tripping while
TO 13:34 (6 times) trying to activate Second_y AM Coolant
loop. Loop was finally pc_ered using a
different configuration.
• ]_:21 WI&W2 SEC COOLANT FLOW - Hlnor troubleshooting
: (2 times) on above problem.
18139 Nl&W2 EVA 2 PUHP AP - SUS Loop #2 is activated.
(5 times)
103:12:53 WI&W2 SEC COOLANTFLOW - Second pump activated
in Secondary Coolant loop to support EVA.
431
i
1
k
1974022202-457
C&W SYSTEM EVENTS SL-3 (Continued)
TIME ALARM RE_ERKS -_"
103:13:31 WI EVA 2 PUMP_P - SUS loop is activated for
(2 times) EVA.
16:13 C&W Side #2 and EMERG Side #2 is powered
down for off loading during EVA.
17:48 WI This alarm was on for over 12 minutes.
Crewman was unable to recall the alarm.
Later troubleshooting found no problems
with system. ,
19:13 C1 CMG SATURATE - High vehicle momentum.
(2 _Imes)
19:54 CI CMG SATURb£E - High vehicle momentum.
(3 times)
20:%8 C1 CMG SATURATE - High vehicle momentum.
(2 times)
21:08 W1 EVA 2 PUMP AP (?) - Alarms are caused by
21:11 W1 EVA panel power down.
22:03 C&WSide 2 and EMERG Side 2 are powered up.
'4:13:45 Crew verified the following switches in-
hibited on panel 207:
Sieve A&B Gas FLOW
Sieve A&B PPCO2
OWS GAS Interchange :
Condensate Tank AP
13:57 Crew performed lamp test on panel 207. :
No burned out lights were found. This :
test was performed because of alarm
unable to be recalled on DAY 103.
107:18:24 WI&W2 Crew reported that Fire and Rapid AP tests
FI&F2 per IlK tasks IO-B were performed satis-
:_&R2 fac totfly.
i.
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C&W SYSTEM EVENTS SL-3 (Continued)
TIME ALARM REMARKS __
109:03:44 CI&C2 OWS GAS INTERCHANGE - This alarm was
caused by sporadic air flow. The crew
inhibited the parameter.
111:21:45 CI&C2 HK task 70 H, Warning System tests, was
WI&W2 performed. This procedure was initiated
to check the memory recall capability of
the C&W system. The system performed
satisfactorily.
114:01:05 WI&W2 FIRE - This alarm was caused by Experiment
FI&F2 S073/T025 which uses an unfiltered window.
The cover was removed from a SAL window
:_ for UV photography.
7
116:01:35 CI&C2 SIEVE A GAS FLOW - This alarm was caused
'_ 01:50 CI&C2 by sporadic gas flow during Sieve B_d
cycling.
23:16 CI&C2 EMERG PWR - Crewman stated that he acci-
dentally opened a C&W C/B.
117:00:49 CI&C2 Crew reported the satisfactory completion
WI&W2 of HK test IO-BI and IO-B2 which are Fire
FI&F2 sensor and Rapid AP system verifications.
RI&R2
00:56 CI&C2 EMERG SNSR PWR (?) - Crewman accidentally
WI&W2 opened another C&W C/B. Rapid AP alarm
RI&R2 occurred upon reset.
II_:14:49 CI CWS GAS INTERCHANGE - Crew enabled the i
14:51 CI parameter because the AM duct fan was to
be replaced. After the alarms they im-
mediately inhibited the parameter. Re-
placing fan resulted in no appreciable
increase in gas flow.
120:02:54 CI SIEVE A GAS FLOW - Sporadic gas flow ,
caused the alarm.
02:55 Cl SIEVE B GAS FLOW - Sporadic gas flow
caused the alarm. •
Y
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C&WSYSTEM EVENTS SL-3 (Concluded)
120:14:38:11 CI CMG SATURATE - High vehicle momentum caused
the alarm.
14:38:32 Cl EMERG PWR, RAPID _P - The crew said it was
14:38:34 WI&R1 possible they accidentally flipped the re-
set switch. Data shows the Caution alarm
occurring probably when the crewman switched
Emergency power #i switch to OFF. The
Rapid _P alarm occurred when the switch
was repositloned to ON.
14:39:01 CI&C2 ACS MALFUNCTION (CMG SATURATE) - High ve-
14:39:29 CI&C2 hicle momentum believed to be caused by
15:09:54 C1 experiment venting. TACS was used.
15:14:48 CI
15:16:22 C1
15:18:10 CI
18:18:55 C1
123:07:35 CI&C2 SIEVE A GAS FLOW - Sporadic air flow at I/
Mole Sieve Bed cycling caused the alarm.
Crew inhibited both Sieve A&B Gas Flow.
20:35 Cl&C2 ACS MALFUNCTION (CMG SATURATE) - High ve-
21:22 CI&C2 hlcle momentum caused the alarm. TACS
was fired at 2nd alarm.
125:14:08 WI&W2 Crew reported Fire and Rapid _P tests
FI&F2 were performed satisfactorily.
RI&R2
16:46 CI&C2 CMG SATURATE - High vehicle momentum from
EREP pass caused the alarm.
130:11:20 WI&W2 CSM MALFUNCTION - The crew performed T
minus 5 day entry procedure which included
CSM C&W checks. No problems.
132:14:01 WI&RI RAPID _P - This was an expected alarm which
occurred after the EVA during Airlock re-
pressurization.
135:13:17 SL/3 Deactivation is in progress. C&W
system is powered down.
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C&W SYSTEM EVENTS SL-4
TIME ALARM REMARKS
188:17:18 C&W System is powered vp per Activation
C/L.
19:37 C&W checks are performed. These include:
Fire Sensor Test
Fire System Test
Rapid AP System Test
Warning Test
Caution Test
No problems occurred.
189:21:34 WI, W2 CSM MALF - Crew was working in CSM at the
t_me of the alarm. Data verified the
CSM trigger.
190:21:16 WI, W2 CREW ALERT - HK Task 60G, Crew Alert
Warning test is performed.
21:21 WI, W2 CREW ALERT - HK Task 60G, Crew Alert
Warning test is performed.
23:20 WI, W2 CSM MALF - CSM Operations in progress.
191:00:33 WI, W2 PRI COOL FLOW - Primary Coolant loop
reservicing operations are in progress,
00:36 WI, W2 PRI COOL FLOW - Primary Coolant loop
reservicing operations are in progress.
00:55 WI, W2 PRI COOL FLOW - Pump " ..ommanded on via
ground uplink.
03:44 WI, W2 CREW ALERT i - Retest o_ L{KTask 60G.
03:45 WI, W2 CREW ALERT 2 - Retest of HK Task 60G.
193:01:47 CI, C2 ACS MALF (RATE GYRO) - Alarm was verified
by MOPS.
" 15:51 WI, W2 PRI COOL FLOW - Pump C commanded on via
i ground upllnk.
i 16:42 CI, C2 CONDENSATE TANK AP - Alarms were verified(3 times) by MOPS.
435
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C&W SYSTEM EVENTS SL-4 (Continued)
TIME ALARM REMARKS
194:00:19 WI, RI, RAPID &P - This was an expected alarm
W2, R2 which occurred during the Airlock re-
pressurization after the EVA.
197:14:32 WI, W2 PPO 2 LOW - This was an expected alarm
caused by PPO2 sensor testing per HK 60V.
198:15:40 CI, C2 ACS MALF (AUTO TACS) - Caused by $232
operations.
201:20:10 WI, W2 CSM MALF - This alarm was caused by
switching a pump on the CSM Glycol loop
per CSM housekeeping task CM-7.
207:14:56 CI, C2 SIEVE B GAS FLOW - Fan power switch to
14:58 CI, C2 "OFF" caused the gas flow tr stop while
performing HK task IIA.
210:23:20 CI, C2 House Keeping Task 28E is performed. This
to RI, P.2 includes Emergency System Checks, Rapid
23:50 FI, F2 &P System Checks_and Fire Sensor Checks.
WI, W2
214:15:12 WI, W2 CSM MALF - There was an incorrect con-
15:14 WI, W2 figuration in the CSM at the time a command
was uplinked.
215:22:33 CI, C2 SIEVE B GAS FLOW - Mole Sieve fan off
loaded for EREF 15.
216:03:58 C2, W2 Crew inadvertently opened C&W Converter
#i and EMERG Converter #2 CBs.
219:15:59 Cl, C2 ACS MALF (RATE GYRO) - Y3 rack gyro output
was noisy.
220:12:53 WI, W2 PRI COOL FLOW - Coolant loop pump activated
by tb_ crew.
225:03:25 CI, C2 ACS MALF (CMG SAT) - TACS were used to de-
saturate vehicle.
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C&W SYSTEM EVENTS SL-4 (Continued)
TIME ALARM REMARKS _i
226:15:08 WI, W2 PRI COOL FLOW - A second pump was com-
manded on to support the EVA.
19:06 WI CLUSTER ATT. (Hi-Rate) - Large torques on
(3 times) ve_'icle pruduced by EVA crewmen caused
the alarms.
19:07 C1 ACS MALF (CMG SAT) - Large torques on
(4 times) vehicle proddced by EVA crewmen caused
the alarms.
23:11 W1 CLUSTER ATT. (Hi-Rate) - Large torques on
vehicle produced by EVA crewmen caused
the alarms.
23:16 C1 ACS MALF (CMG SAT) - Large torques on
cehlcle produced by EVA _rewmen caused
the alarms.
23:51 WI, R1 RAPID _P - This expected alarm was caused
(2 times) by repressurization of the Airlock per
EVA procedure.
230:14:51 WI, W2 PRI COOL FLOW - A second pump was com-
manded on to support the EVA.
20:13 C1 ACS MALF (CMG SAT) - Caused by large
torques produced by cre_mlen during EVA.
20:13 W1 CLUSTER ATT. (THRUSTER STUCK) - Caused by
large torque produced by crewmen during
EVA.
20:14 C1 ACS MALF (CMG SAT) - Caused by large
torques produced by crewmen on EVA.
20:53 C2 ACS MALF (CMG SAT) - Caused by large
torq_,es produced by crewmen on EVA.
21:O1 WI, R1 RAPID AP - This expected alarm was caused
(2 times) by repressurlzatlon of the Airlock per
EVA procedure.
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caw SYSTEM EVENTS SL-4 (Continued)
TIME ALARM REMARKS
f
232:00:33 Cl, C2 ACS MALF (CMG SAT) - Caused by data
maneuver.
01:40 Cl, C2 ACS MALF (CMG SAT) - Caused by data
maneuver.
14:06 W1, F1 FIRE - This false alarm was caused by
! W2, F2 high radiation through the SAA.
233:11:47 Cl, C2 ACS MALF (CMG SAT) - Caused by EREP data
maneuver.
12:39 C1, C2 SIEVE B GAS FLOW - Fan was off-loaded for
EREP pass.
236:20:58 CI, C2 ACS MALF (CMG SAT) - Caused by data
maneuver.
f
239:17:43 C1, C2 ACS MALF (CMG SAT) - Caused b:,data
maneuver, i
18:05 CI, C2 ACS MALF (CMG SAT) - Caused by data
maneuver.
240:00:00 C1, C2 Housekeeping task 28E was performed satls-
WI, W2 factorily by the crew. This included
FI, F2 Emergency System Verification, Rapid AP
RI, R2 System Verification, and Fire Sensor
Verification.
243:00:14 CI, C2 C&W POWER 1 - Crew cycled C&W Converter 1
CIB.
02:22 C2 C&W System powered down for EREP.
02:25 WI, W2 C&W System powered up.
C1, C2
t
247:10:47 WI, W2 CSM MALF - Quad B Temp in CSM.
248:16:38 WI, W2 PRI COOL FLOW - The loop was activated to
reduce the workshop temps during HI Beta
Angles. i_
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C&W SYSTEM EVENTS SL-4 (Continued)
TIME ALARM REMARKS
252:21:16 W1, FI FIRE - This false alarm was caused by •
W2, F2 high radiation through the SAA.
253:04:30 An unscheduled C&W/SIA Interface Test was
performed. No Interface Malfunction de-
tected.
259:19:00 CI, C2 ACS MALF (AUTO TACS) - The vehicle drifted
out of attitude during an EREP pass.
261:22:14 Crew Inhibited all 8 BATT CHARGE LOW
Parameters. This was performed to pre-
vent alarms during upcoming data-take
maneuvers. Also, high OCV's have caused
large divergences between the actual and
AMP HR integrator S ,.;i
264:11:17 CI, WI Alarms caused by powering down C&W #2
and EMERG #i for data take maneuvers.
264:11:17 C&W Side 2 and EMERG Side 2 are off
loaded for JOP 13 and EREP pass.
19:13 C&W Side 2 and EMERG Side 2 powered up.
265:14:05 WI, W2 CSH MALF - Crew having problems putting
to 14:19 (8 times) CSM Bait 4 on line.
266:12:28 WI, W2 PRI COOL FLOW - A second pump was com-
manded on to support the EVA.
20:41 RI, W1 RAPID AP - This expected alarm occurred
R2, W2 during Airlock repressurlzatlon after
the EVA.
i 23:49 Cl, C2 CNDST TANK AP - The crew enabled Condensate
Tank Switch (PNL 207) to verify that the
tank pressure was zero.
f
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C&WSYSTEM EVENTS SL-4 (Concluded)
TIME ALARM REMARKS
I
268:02:12 Crew inhibited the following parameters
to preclude alarms which might be caused
by ground testing:
ATM &anister Pump AP
ATH Canister Coolant Temp
ATM Canister Heater Temp
271:05:59 caw System is powered down per SL-4
deactivation procedure.
!
THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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i Table 6.11 Skylab EPS Power Down Sequence
Con_nand SITE/tlme, Event
• AM045 CRO/39:04:41 PCG5 to Reg I
AM046 PCG6 to Reg I
AM047 PCG7 to Reg 1
AM048 PCG8 to Reg 1
AM193 GDS/39:15:11 ATMI/XFRI Open
i AM194 ATM2/XFR2 Open
• AMI52 Batt 2 DISCH-LIMIT-INHIBIT
AM052 PCG2 to Reg 2
j AM012 SAS2 to PCG3
AM042 VAN/39:IT:I3 PCG2 to Reg 1
AM002 SAS2 to PCG2
AMI42 Batt 2 DISCH-LIMIT-AUTO
AM154 HAW/39:18:20 Batt 4 DISCH-LIMIT-INHIBIT
AM054 PCG4 to Reg 2
AM014 SAS4 to PCGI
AM044 RAW/39:20:04 PCG4 to Reg 1
AMO04 SAS4 to PCG4
AM144 Batt 4 DISCH-LIMIT-AV_O
AM156 Batt 6 DISCH-LIMIT-INHIBIT
AM056 PCn6 to Reg 2
AMOI6 SAS6 to PCG7
AM116 VAN/39:22:07 Batt 6 - Off
AM046 PCG6 to Reg 1
AM006 SAS6 to PCG6
AM146 Batt 6 DISCH-LIMIT-AUTO
AM158 Batt 8 DISCH-LIMIT-INHIBIT
AM058 PCG8 to Reg 2
AMOI8 SAS8 to PCG5
AM106 GWM/39:23:04 Batt 6 - On
AM111 VAN/39:23:45 Batt I - Off
AM118 CYI/40:00:04 Bait 8 - Off
AM048 PCG8 co Reg 1
AM008 SAS 8 to PCG8
AMI48 Batt 8 DISCH-LIMIT-AUTO
AMIO1 MAD/40:00:18 Batt 1 - On
AMISI Batt 1DISCII-LIMIT-INI41BIT
AM051 PCGI to Reg 2
AMOII SASI to PCG2
AM108 HSK/40:00:53 Batt 8 - On
AM041 HSK/40:02:32 PCGI to Reg 1
AM001 SASI to PCGI
, AM141 Batt 1DISCH-LIMIT-AUTO
i AMI53 HSK/40:04'13 Batt 3 DISCR-LIMIT-INHIBIT
AMO53 PCG3 to Reg 2\
AMOI3 SAS3 to PCG4
*Time given in Day of Year, GMT hours and minutes.
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Table 6. II(Cont. )
Command SITE/t Ime Event
AMII3 GDS/40:06:19 Batt 3 - Off
AM043 PCG3 to Reg 1 _.
AMO03 SAS3 to PCG3
AM143 Batt 3 DISCH-LIMIT-AOTO
AM103 BDA/40:06:35 Batt 3 - On //
AM156 HSK/40:07 : 26 Batt 6 DISCH-LIMIT-IRtlIBIT
AH056 PCG6 to Reg 2 "_/AMO16 SAS6 to PCG7
AHll6 GDS/40:09:36 Bert 6 - Off
AH046 PCG6 - Reg 1 '_
AMO06 SAS6 to PC.G6
AM146 Batt 6 DISCH-LIMIT-AUTO
AM106 Batt 6 - On
AH158 BDA/40:09:46 Batt 8 DISCH-LIMIT-INHIBIT
AM053 PCG8 to Reg 2
AMOI3 SAS8 to PCG5
AM118 ACN/40:II:53 Batt 8 - Off
AM048 PCC8 to Reg 1 ,
ARO08 SAS8 to PCG8
AM032 PCC8 - Off
AMI08 Batt 8 - On
AMOI5 SAS5 to PCG6
AMO17 SAS7 to, PCG8
AMII$ Batt 5 - Off
AMl17 Batt 7 - Off
AM141 Bett 1 DISCH-LIblIT-INtIZBIT
KN142 Batt 2 DISCH-LIMIT-IRHIBIT
• AM143 Batt 3 DISC .LIMIT-INHIBIT
AM144 Bstt 4 DISC;;-LIMIT-IRHIBIT
AM141 Bstt 6 DISCH-LIMIT-INHIBIT
t44155 G_M/40:12: 27 Batt 5 DISCH-LIMIT-INHIBIT
AN055 PCC5 to Reg 2
/04028 PCG8 - O.
AM105 htt 5 - On
AM'll$ Butt 5 o Off
AM157 G1_/40 :14 :30 Butt 7 DISCH-LIMIT-II_ilBIT
AM)57 PCG7 to Reg 2
AMI07 Bait 7 - On
AHII7 VAN/40:I6:32 Batt 7 - Off
_195 ATHI/XFR 1 Close
AM196 ATM2/XFR2 Close
AT088 VAN/40 : 18: I0 C&DLogic Bus I - Off
AT09$ TM Bus 1 Off
AT082 C&DLogic Pwr On !
ATO94 TM Bus 1 on
AT088 C&DLogic Bus 2 Off _ •
AT087 TM Bus 2 Off
AT096 TM Bue 2 on t
AT088 C&DLogic Bus 1 Off
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Table 6.II(cont.)
Command Sl_E/t ime Event
AT087 TM Bus 2 Off
AT096 'I'MBus 2 On
AT088 C&D Logic Bus I Off
AT061 CBRM I Chgr Off
AT021 Reg Off
AT062 2 Chgr Off
AT022 Reg Off
AT063 3 Chgr Off
AT023 Reg Off
AT064 4 Chgr off
AT024 Reg Off
AT065 5 Chgr Off
AT025 Reg Off
AT066 6 Chgr Off
AT026 Reg Off
AT067 7 Chgr Off
AT027 Reg Off
AT068 CBR/d 8 Chgr Off
AT028 Reg Off
? AT069 9 Chgr Off
AT029 Reg Off
AT070 10 Chgr Off
AT030 Res Off
AT071 11 Chgr Off
AT031 Reg Off
AT072 12 Chgr Off
AT032 _eg Off
AT073 13 Chgr Off
AT033 Reg Off
AT074 14 Chgr Off
AT034 Reg Off
AT075 15 Chgr Off
AT035 Reg Off
ATC,?6 16 Chgr Off
AT036 Reg Off
AT077 17 Chgr Off
AT037 Reg Off
AT078 18 Chgr Off
AT038 Reg Off
AT095 VAN/40:19:49 TM ]_us 1 Off
AT097 Tlq Bus 2 Off
AM193 ATM1/XFR 1 Open
AHI94 ATM2/XFR 2 Open
AM038 ACN/40:20:04 PCG8 - Off
AH034 PCG4 - Off
AM036 PCC6 - Off
443
i
1974022202-469
TTable 6.1Z (Cont.)
CoJmand SITE/t!me Even
/01078 Chl_r 8 - Bypass _,
AHO74 Chsr 6 - B_aH
AN076 Chsr 6 - Bypasp
AMll_ Batt 8 - Off
AMII4 Bait 4 - Off
AMII6 Bait 6 - Off ,
AMlll Batt 1 - Off /
ANll3 Batt 3 Off
AM0U SA$1 to PCG2
AMO13 SAS3 to PCC4
AM032 :'CG2Off
AMII2 Bait 2 Off
THIS SPACE INTEI_IO_ALLY LEFT BLANK
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APPE_IX 7
Crew Debriefings.
I. De_cri_tio n. Following splashdo_ of each _nned Skylab mission,
each crew held two separate debriefings. The first was a self-
debrteflng which followed a specific outline with no que-tions.
The second debriefing was a Sys_s question and answer sessio_
with the questions developed by MSFC. The pertinent crew c_en_s
are su_rized in the following parographs_
A. $L-I/2 Self Debriefing. Pertinent co_ents were provided by
Joe Kerwin.
B. SL-I/2 STs_:ems Debriefinz. C_ents were provided by Pete
Conrad, Paul Weitz, and Joe Kerwin.
C. SL-3 Self Debriefi_. Co_ents were provided by AI Be_n, Jack
Lou_, and _en Garrlott.
D. SL-3 Syst_s Debriefing. C_ents w_re provided by Jack Lotls_
and _en Garriott.
E. SL-4 Self Debriefing. Co_ents were provided by Bill Pogue,
Jerry Carr, and _ Gibson.
F. SL-4 Systems Debrlefi_s. Co_ents were provided by Bill Pogue
and Jerry Carr.
_IS SPACE I_IO_L_ LE_ B_
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A. SL-2 CREW SELF DEBRIEFING
KERWIN:
Electrical Power System. The ground did most of the management on
that, God bless them. Some confusion still remains in my mind as to
exactly what was going on in one or two of the CBRMs, and why we had
iights at given times. But I think those are details, and the fact
that the ground handled the power system with very little assistance re-
quired from the crew simply allowed us to forget most of what we knew
about EPS malfunctions in the ATM.
SWS Parallel Power. Again, the ground handled paralleling and had
us set the transfer bu" voltages pretty much by rote, from time to time,
to keep the paralleling to where they wanted it, and that worked out
very well.
Cont. lq and Displays. I think the controls and displays are very
awkward .LeAIM In terms uf malfunction detection in the CBRMs. The
business of alert light, talkback, switch position, talkback going gray
tng _cK to barber pole, not going gray when you powerrd the thing
,L_n-.-if there was more than one CBRM that was havlng a malfunction, the
light would stay on. That's a complicated, cumbersome syster., and I
hope we won't design one like that again. It contributes to my own
present mental confusion as to exactly what the status of the CBRMs was
at all times. It looks like it would be easier Just to tape up those
alert lights that go on all the time so you can use those ale_t lights
for some objective.
We taped up two of them. "e di@,_ t tape the BAT CHARGE light. I
guess we always hoped we were go.ng _o get through that one, but we
didn't. We dld put a piece of red tape over the DOOR OPEN light and
the POWER SYSTEM ALFRT light. Wa still had the BAT CHARGE light on mogt
of the time.
Lighting Subsystem. The only comment I have on ATM lighting is
that we never used the integral lighting _n the ArM except for pointing
a couple of times. The ambient lighting of the ATM is adequate to do
the Job. It's not as bright as you'd like to have for reading and writ-
ing, but if you made it that bright, it would be too bright for good
observation on the monitors So, we generally operated with two MDA
lights on in the vici,ity of the ATM panel and that's all. The integral
lighting, under those condiLions, was simply not necessary. It's beauti-
ful l_Bhting, but it's not required. One cogent on the controls and
displays that Paul and I noticed. Under the lighting conditions w_ had,
it -as very difficult at times to tell a gray talkhack from a white talk-
back. If you see first one, and then the other, the ambiguity goes away;
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but if you look at a gray talkback, you're very likely to think it's a
white one, if you don't see a white at the same time. And I think in !
the future we should avoid those two colors on the same talkback.
The brightness of the numezic displays on bus 2 (fixed) was not un-
comfortable although it was brighter than we would be running once we
got our variable lighting back. There is some brightness authority
available when you set the thing to comfort level; not a lot, but some.
I mentioned in the technical debriefing that the brightness of the dis-
play of the numerics did not appear to decrease noticeably to us over
the course of the mission.
B. SL-2 CREW DEBRIEFING - ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
SOLAR ARRAY
i. How close did the CSM fly by the ATM Solar Arroy?
About 35 to 50 feet above and aft, - one time.
2. Give a general description of the wiring remaining at OWS SAS
Wing 2 root. Was the wiring cut clean or were many wires dangling?
Wiring was torn--fragments extend 2 to 4 feet from OWS.
3. Was there any damage observed to the solar cells on the out-
board panels of each wing section of OWS SAS Wing i after deployment?
Flyaround showed no visible damage.
LIGHTS (General/Panel)
4. Are any instrument panel status lights inoperative? !
All status lights on 200 panel were operative.
5. Were all docking and EVA lights operative?
All lights operative.
6. How many, if any, i0 and 20 watt tunnel or STS handrail lamps
required replacement? Were there any replacement problems?
One handrail light was and is out--no attempt was made to replac_
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7. Was the lighting range provided by the AM light dimmer controls
adequate? Comment on the effectiveness of varying the lighting range
under the constantly changing external light sources.
J¢
Dimming control seldom, if ever used. Handrail lights used
for most applications.
8. How often was the lamp test performed? How many failures?
Routine lamp test per time line. No failures on 200 panel.
9. Were there any failures or flickering of general illumination
lights?
No failures. There was some transient flickering that was
noticeable only if looking directly at fluorescent bulb.
: MISCELLANEOUS
10. Was any problem encountered with static discharge?
None.
ii. Why did you perform the power transfer function on dark side
of orbit?
No predetermined reason for timing. Ground said, "Transfer
when ready" so they did without any consideration of orbital position.
WIRING I_RNESSES AND INSTALLATIONS
12. Any comments on any electrical equipment or wiring thereto that
appeared to be an annoyance or hindrance to movement in the Workshep?
No problem or comments.
13. Was any excessive fraying or damage observed to fiberglass cloth
covers on wire harnesses at penetrations in floor and other areas?
No problem. One OWS wire bundle was located too conveniently
for handhold and eventually slipped outside tubing off of the fitting.
Repair accomplished without incident. No further problem as they stopped
using wire bundle as handhold.
14. Did convoluted boots come loose from any exposed connectors in
the Workshop?
i One incident -- item 13 above.
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15. Any difficulty with the electrical connectors for the food
trays or the urine centrifugal separator?
No problem.
16. Was the clearance adequate for mating/dematlng of connectors
on the intercom boxes?
All units used were adequate.
17. Were any fans ever operated at high power?
After SAS deployment, many combinations were used--all coordi-
nated with ground control.
CONTROL & DISPLAY
18. X-Ray Activity History Plotter:
a. Review events prior to discovery that the History Plotter
paper was jammed.
Problem was crew induced by rolling paper back too far to
a known tear and the torn part Jammed.
b. What action was taken to verify the Plotter would not
operate?
i
Obvious--tear was visible.
19. Did any crew member have problems with toggle circuit breakers
other than the ones on STS panels?
No--problem was primarily with foot operation. •
20. Has the brightness of the C&D numeric displays decreased slg-
nlflcantly?
Yes--on ATM panel, "Frames Remaining Counter" particularly--
i
"100's very dim on "i", This degradation was expected.
21. Were the flare alert and event timer tones audible in the MDA
and OWS?
Yes--MDA can be heard in OWS--(flare alert); OWS flare alert
left off.
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22. Does the control phi_)vophy utilizing momentary switches with
position feedback provide adequate control?
All were OK for the tasks assigned.
23. Were the circuit breaker/switch guards adequate?
Not in the S_S--at least a learning curve was required, with
control of feet a problem.
24. Were there any problems with Zero-G connectors? For future
design do you recommend changing any non-Zero-G connectors to Zero-G,
or vice versa?
No failures or any connectors--thls crew did not llke such a
variety of connectors. Standardization is highly desirable, Zero-G
undesirable particularly preattach alignment requirement.
25. Did any of the electrical panels or equipment present a touch
temperature problem?
OWS panels were hot on the sun end, vacuum cleaner blower was
known "hot" items, but had adequate protection for application.
26. Discuss the legibility of panel marking and swltch/clrcult
breaker nomenclature under lighting condltlonF encountered during the
mission. Contrast early mission (reduced lighting) with post OWS SAS
deployment periods.
Couldn't read STS during (pre-deploy) early mission on ambient
light. Legibility is OK if light is available. !
_7. Was the nomenclature adequate for identification/understandlng i
of intended control functions? _A
t
eliminated mlssi, n difficulties. Could 1Training
not change hardware once it was built,
28. Were there any nuisance circuit breaker trips?
A few in beginning of mission, mostly by "foot trlp"--the check-
out proved OK. No electrical tripouts recalled.
29. Was any difficulty encountered when required to position switches/
circuit breakers on a panel and observe system response on a display on
a difflcult panel?
None recalled--one problem with lights on S073 during sleep period.
With all lights possible turned off, crew had to rig guards to dim lights
on remaining 4 to get sleep.
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30. Is identifJ=ation and grouping of frequently used switches/
circuit breakers adquate to preclude inadvertent operation of adjacent •
circuit breakers or switches?
Some on ATM too tight--(too man_ controls in too small an area)
Also, STS had to many C/B's on a panel - parallax is a proLlem and re-
suited in inadvertent "off" operations.
31. Assess the adeouacy of onboacd displayed instrumentation for
range_ and banding of meters.
Direction of current flow to/from CSM confusing, particularly _
since ground and flight displays for CSM volts did not agree--some
problem in reading low scale values on high range meters--(CSM amps _
typical).
LOAD MANAGEMENT
32. How long was vacuum cleaner _sed each operation? •
About 15 minutes for screen cleaning, spread over 1/2 hour
(Over 3 day period)- - the blower in shoT,,._rabout 1/2 hour; su_t drying
30 to 40 hours per usage.
33 Was vacuum cleaner used in MDA or AM?
w
Used in OWS and MDA, didn't cecall AM usage.
34. Were high intensity lights used for photography oz _V? If so,
_en?
MISI and S073 as defined in fllg_t plan.
35. Was video tape recorder standby power on continuously? Was all
colo_ TV recorded?
In early mission, panel switched per ground instruction to con-
serve power. After SAS deploy - operated per flight plan.
36. Were any general illumination lights lef_ on continuously dur- i
ing the mission--especlally during sleep periods?
No--all lighting down eventually--flashlights considered adequate
for orientation during sleep periods.
37. What general illumination lights did you turn on routinely uponj
awakening?
I No standard pattern.
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38. When did you turn on the waste processors each day?
Twenty-eighth day of manned mission was first use.
39. Were food tray timers used to sequence the cavity heaters for
the meals?
Not until after day 14- (used 45minutes, on manual). Used timers
for 1.5 hours maximum (not 2.5 hours) after day 14.
40. How long before each meal were the food tray cavity heaters
activated?
About 1.5 hours heating before heating--thawed in amblenu.
41. Did any equipment operation require the use of any support
equipment (such as vacuum cleaner, portable fan, high intensity light,
etc.) not identified in the checklists?
Checklist 99 percent OK--N__oroutine oversight.
CAUTION & W_/_.NING
42. In the crew_ op_nlon, were the number of Caution and Warning
parameters monitored adequate?
Performed well--alarms received were inputproblems. Sufficient
coverage| rapid Delta P had deficiencies in mission rules. No omissions
known in STS/AM. CBRM still confusing. Didn't Jike control scheme.
Ambiguous C&W_couldn't clear (inhibit) perm. failure--taped lights--
talkback on "bat low" (ATMshould be like AM).
43. Would you reco_mnend retention of both Caution and Warning para-
meters/alarms for future deszgn or would a single "Alert" function be
satisfactory?
Human factors consldered--Pete prefers dlffe_ent tones--Do
react differently to "Caution" & alarm.
44. Were the audio le,_Is of the Caution, Warning, and Emergency
tones adequate throughout the vehicle? What was the desired setting
on the C&Wvolume control_? [
Adequate--left at launch setting.
45a. Were there any difficulties encountered when replacinB a fire i
sensor assembly or fire sensor control panel? _!|
No.
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45b. Was the procedure followed and was it adequate?
Yes.
46. During the second EVA on DOY 170 the AM _.FTcompartment fire
sensor inhJbit switches on Panel 207 w:_e "inhibited." Did sunlight
activate FSA 392-2? This would be indicated by the appropriate light
on FSCP 392.
Also inhibited inputs to fire sensor --system died during EVA-
precautionary to prevent burnout of box (Bus i and 2 sws off on 392-2).
47. During the second EVA which panel was used to activate the
SUS pumps? If panel 317 and/or 323, did the C&W Delta P warning para-
• meter go off? •
Per checkllst/timeline -- no warning.
C. SL-3 CREg SELF DEBRIEFING
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTr_24
BEAN:
They did all these battery checks which were simple enough, except
they were time consuming. We can do those if it's necessary,
L0USMA:
I felt that I was being employed in the busywork operations from
time to time on this battery check, particularly when you checked the
same battery that you checked a day or two before. :
GARRIOTT:
Everybody knows how those things are working and the flight control-
lers can give them a better briefing on that than we can. I think thc.y
ought to have a briefing on the way the battery tests run, how the ground
; is discharging the various CBRMs and determining their state of charge
! and their charge capacity. We had not had any of those briefings prior
to launch and so had to figure out from the teleprinter info that came
: up. They should get a good thorough briefing on the EPS and all of the
tests that are contemplated.
BEAN:
Want to say anything about that funny you had, Owen? That went
away and never came back?
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GARRIOTT:
Well, it was reported on the down-link and I presume that we're
talking about the one where we changed the CBRM selector switch. When
we rotated ':o the new position, as I recall, both the chargers and the
regulator kicked off, all three, and batteries. I forgot whether they
all kicked off, but I think they did.
BEAN:
That's what I remember.
GARRIOTT:
It was never repeatable after that. Although I thought the ground
had some vague suggestion as to what it might have been. Some sort of
a transient in there. It happened on one occasion. I flipped it twice
to make sure that it wasn't Just two different CBRMs. So it wasn't
Just my imagination, and I don't know any other explanation at this point
for it. There was normal operation after that, I know of no other problem.
BEAN:
Power Distribution; Buses, Shunt Regulators, Ground System; Power
Transfer; Control and Displays: You might want to say something about
ATM at this moment.
GARRIOTT:
We have a problem with turning power on both ATM TV buses simul-
taneously.
GARRIOTT:
You somehow power up both buses at the same time when you throw the
sync gen swills. An to avoid that, we're Just using ATM TV Bus 1, as I
understand it. And the ground is essentially doing that for us. We
have a piece of tape over the sync gen switch. Apparently this is the
way we want to continue to operate in SL-4. And we also have some pro-
• blems with the AC buses. But I w_ald rather get the EPS expert_ to try
to explain that problem and not try to do it without having had a chance to
talk to the system experts first, and at this point we have not yet had
! a chance to talk with them. We may only have one AC bus available, In-
stead of two. Can you add anything to that, Jack?
LOUSMA:
I Negative.
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GARRIOTT:
So, the story I've just given you has some reservations as far as
accuracy is concerned, l'd like for you to talk with the ATM experts
before really getting a clear explanation together to give to the next
crew.
LOUSMA:
As far as operating all the electrical power system, instrumentation
and all that, the recording and so-forth -- the ground handles all of
that and occasionally they'll come up for a request to adjust the pot
or something like that, but other =han that, it's all ground control.
I'm glad it is, because there are too many other important things to do.
It was very satisfactory arrangement, I think.
GARRIOTT:
They can do such a much bette: Job of it anyway, because they can
monitor real time, monitor telemetry, look at it continuously, and find
any glitches that show up)and they're just far better equipped for it.
LOUSMA:
You seldom find yoursei doing anythin B to that whole system. An
occasional glance, maybe, to see how the batteries are doing, for your
information, but othez than that, the ground takes care of all that.
GARRIOTT:
ATM Alert Light Subsystem: We had one light taped. I think it's
the bat charge alert light. SL-2 crew left it taped and we never took
it off.
ATM Lighting Subsystem: Now, there is some stuff on the lighting_
but I don't think we're the best ones to describe which of those buses
are avail_ble and which ones are not. With the present panel configura-
tion, we leave t_e numeric integral in the fixed positions. We never
go to variable. That's because of the availabzlity of certain buses
an¢'problems on the other buses. And I'd rather not try to describe
that and get it mixed up. I'd ra_ er get the ATM people to give SL-4
a good briefing on it.
i
i
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D. SL-3 CREW DEBRIEFING - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
J
CONTROLS & DISPLAYS
i. Any general comments about physical arrangement of switches/
circuit breakers and identification of systems on the :ontrol and display
panels?
I'm glad that the design includes switch guards. We did use
circuit breakers for switches. In some cases, the checklists call for
circuit breaker_ and in some cases, switches. There seems to be a
randomness between use cf circuit breakers and switches.
2. _asess legibility of panel markings and switch/circuit brea'er
nomenclature under lighting conditions enco,mtered during the mission.
Adequate.
3. Swltch/circult breaker grouping versus tasks:
a. Was any dlfflcuJty encountered when required to position
switches circuit breakers on a panel and observe system response on a
diqplay on a different par,=1?
Some operations required a two-man operation, however, this
did not present a problem. Examples are: I) dump heater switch in the
wardroom and the light in experiment compartment; 2) fire sensor panel
in the STS and sen_,rs in the OWS.
b. Is identification and grouping of frequently used switches/
circuit breakers adequate to preclude inadvertent operation of adjacent
circuit breakers or switches?
Adpqua_e.
4. Assess adequacy of on-board meter ranges and color banding.
Adequate in most cases. Bus amps (in the ONS) did not have
the proper resolution fo_ accuracy.
5. Did any circuit breaker nuisance trips occur?
f None in the OWS. (ATM AC circuit breaker for Inverter Lighting
tripped a couple of times. Reported on slr-to-ground, Channel A.)
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6. Assess adequacy of solar flare alert panel (607).
Hardly ever used because someone was normally at the ATH C&D
panel.
7. Assess adequacy of guards to prevent inadvertent operation of
switches or circuit breakers. Were any problems encountered with the
guards and the related fl,tgerclearance?
We may have _nltiated a Fire Detection test switch checkout
wben attempting to clear a master alarn_. Was reported on alr-to-ground
at the time.
8. Were there any failures when lamp tests were performed?
No.
9. Were any problems encountered because of proximity of rotating
litter chair to the power and display console?
No.
LIGIiTING
I0. With regard to _2 lights installed in OWS assess adequacy of
general illumination levels in each compartment.
Reported during the mission as one part of M487. In general,
the lighting was not bright enough. Close work required the use of a
flash light. Lighting was best in the wardroom and wocst in _he WHC.
II. Assess adequacy of control of illumination levels via control
panel switches and light integral switches.
D_.fferenc_ between bright and dim levels was vet,, slight. Used
them on either high ¢r off.
12. Did any general Lllumlnatlon bulbs fai__ Any fli-ker?
Don't rec_ll replacing ,,ny_S lights. Replaced a few (12) small
bulbs on the STS hand rail. Some of these were left cn all night. 'rhey
i would begin to get dim prior to burning out.
13. Assess adequacy of illumination of the C&D panels.
Adequate in the OWS. '_hepanel light_ were required in the
STS and were used when requlr#a. The e!ectrolumlnescent lights were
used on the ATM C&D console.
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14. If portable lizhts were used, any comments on ease of usage
or light output?
A1 used one _n the sleep compartment because he turned his bed
around to improve the ventilatim It was a permanent installation.
1_. Assess adequacy of portable high-intensity photo light. What
operating modes were used?
In general, they were used per the checklist, however, they
were used as required. Jack reraembers using it once on the wardroom table.
_£RING HARNESSES AND INSTALLATIONS
16. Any comments on any electrical equipment nr wiring thereto that
appeared to be an annoyance or hindrance to movem&nt in the Workshop?
No.
17, Was any excessive fraying or damage observed to fiberglass cloth
covers on wire harnesses at penetrations in floor and other areas?
No.
18. Did convoluted boots come loose from any exposed connectors in
the Workshop?
No.
19. Any difficulty with the electrical connectors for the food t_ys
or the urine centrifugal s¢parator?
They worked good.
20. Was the clearance adequate for matlng/dematlng of connectors
on the intercom boxes?
Yes.
21. Were any probless encountere_ in _ating/dematin8 Zero-C con_e,_tors?
No.
22, Assess crm_Mn's ability to mate/deuate non-Zero-C connectors.
A couple were a little t£ght (molesieve, I_NPD). All types of
connectors were _cceptable; Zerv-G, aicrodot, bayonet, etc.
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IMISCELLANEOUS
23. Assess utility outlet adequacy, accessibility, number an_ loca-
tion.
Never used the ones in Naste Management Compartment. Could use
two more in experiment compartment and two more in _DA.
24. If any lights, intercom boxes or heaters w_re replaced, any
con_ents on cause or problems?4
Replaced one SIA and the dump heater probe. No problems.
25. Was any probl_ encountered with static discharge?
Oven reme_u_rs one time he could feel static electricity in
the hair on his arm while getting dressed one morning.
26. Nas the "ONS TCS CHECK", feZ. SNS SYSTEMS CRECKLIST, Sheet 9-18,
ever performed dur_ag the mission?
Th_s is HK70V. Can't recall performing and Er_ does not re__l!
requesting the performance. Pre-mlssion concern was e:cpr_ss_d abou_
noise from fans. It 13 difficult to determine if they are Tunnt_g e_n
when you are in the same area.
2?. Heyday 10 and 20 watt A_, light b_,Ibs burned out and required
replac_aent? (_oteton SL-3 DOY 221ylt was reported that three 10-_at_
STS light bulbs were replaced.)
See quzstlon 12.
_8. As a result of troubleshootlng the _)A aft 2 and 4 lights, it
was reported thst the toulc switch was intermittent. How was this
conclusion azrlved at?
The svltch wme turned on one day and lights didn't come ont
the tmxt day when turned on the lights came on. Therefore, it w_s
reported as Interulttent. After the llshts came on, th_ svltch was taped
and the lights _are operated usln8 the svltches on the llsht_.
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29. Could you expand the descTiption of the AMPCG battery cap_eltV _ :
discharge test? Did the current rate control require constant input? _
_ _:s there any unusuallunexpe_ted behavior, glitches, etc.? Did the
i fine adjust pot adjustment utilize the full travel in either direction? i
The first one required constant adjustment in keeping within j
_" _ limits, After talking about it on the air-to-ground, it was understood[: that constant adjustment was not required. On subsequent tests the ,_
! adjustment was made to the specified setting and not adjusted again.
• i The ends (stops) of the rheostat were never reached. _
I 30. Are any AM power system status )ights on panel 205 burned out? }
All are working. _ :
31. Were the battery control circuit Lceakers opened du_ing de- _ _
activation? i
They were left open.
32. During fly-around prior to leaving Skylab, did you notice any
discoloration on the back s_ rfaces of the ATM solar panels? If so, to ?
what extent?
•_ Didn't do fly-around. Undocked at night and could not see.
33. Describe to the best of your recollection the anomalies asso-
clated with the ATM C&D panel with respect to the power control section
of the panel.
ATM or EGIL should have a complete list. All management was
i done from the ground. Jack was not impressed with the Alert system.
: He got used to seeing the blue light on and did not respond to the ATM :o
alerts.
L
34. To your recollection, were there any times during the mission i
chat CBRM 18 was selected other than during CBRMBAT 18 capacity testing?
Most certainly. At various times all of them were Jelected. _
Do not recall seeing ATM Bus 1 low light on. If there was one it would i
have been reported on alr-to-ground, i
35. Was the original problem on I/LCA variable lighting on DOY _
214:22:25 encountered while operating on variable bright control or did _ _
variable lighting fail to come on when turned on? i
: i
Have been using variable as thR normal routine. Can not recall _ ,
for sure)but Chink it was noticed when we came to the panel one morning.
The switch would have been in off and then _witched to variable.
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36. How was the mating and demating of the NB connectors used on ,
_, the rate gyro 6-pack, compared to the zero-G and Mtcrodot connectors _
used throughout the cluster? :_
I It is easier in Zero-G than in One-<;. A tool is used sometimes _ __
to get the alignment more precise.
• _ 37. Were the HDA 1,_ht filters for aft lights 3 and 4 required } -
: I wh£1e operating the ATH C&D? _
_ No. We forgot about them. The lights were turned off instead
: , of using the filters. _ ,
FOX i
38. How long was the vacuum cleaner used each operation? _
_ -
Five minutes.
i 39. Was the vacuum cleaner used in the MDA or AH?
I
j Used to clean three screens, with two-length extension cord.t
40. Were the high intensity lights used for photography or TV?
: If so, when?I
See question 15.
: 41. Was the Video Tape Rqcorder standby power on continuously?
! No.
l 42. Was all color TV recorded?
Per checklist.
I 43. Were any general illumination lights left on contlnuously dur-
ink the mission, especially sleep periods?
All in OWS were off. Handrail lights in STS were on.
f 44. What general illumination lights did you turn on routinely
when you woke up every morning?
All OWS lights. ,_
45. When did you turn on the waste processors each day? "
: As required.
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i
46. Were the food tray timers used to sequence the cavity heaters
for the meals?
> _ Always.
1
47. How long before each meal were the food tray cavity heaters
activated?
Longest--l.5 hours.
i 48. Did any experiment operation require the use of any support f
_ equipment (such as vacuum cleaner, portable fan, high intensity light,
etc.) not identified in the checklists?
_:- No.
49. What is the dlfficulry in turning off loads when required for
EREP and Anomalies? Loads such as H20 Heaters (WMC, Wardroom); C&W
Redundant Loads; ILCA Heaters; OWS TCS Monitor; OWS Duct Heaters; OWS
lights, MDA & AM Lights.
None--sometimes the MDA lights were not off-loaded as they
were needed to read the checklist. Usually, we off-loaded OWS lights
tO compensate.
E. SL-4 CREW SELF DEBRIEFING
ELFCTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
P
CARR:
I, quite frankly, never had any difficulty coping x'ith the solar
array system in training and I felt that I had grown to understand it
and it was a reasonablebstraightforward syste_, %
POGUE:
The only co_nent that one could make _t these power conditioning
groups and the CBRHs I_,that they ought to be accessible from inside i
the vehicle, because we could have performed all kinds of maintenance
if we could have gotten to the connectors, etc., from inside. Now, :
don't ask me how to do it, but that sure caused a lot of trouble.
GIBSON: I
Yes, I think that's a _eal _ood point. We had problems with the
ATHand, if we had been able to get to them, I'm sure we coutd have done _ !
a much better Job. i_
462
"1974022202-488
Iv
CARR:
_ I think being able to get in and change things like voltage regula-
" tors and things llke that would certainly have simplified a lot of _
their problems. If we would have just had access to go on in and change
the voltage regulator that's giving you trouble or a battery charger,
things would run smoother.
GIBSON:
Well, we at one time, were talking about a task EVA which would
allow you to get solar array power from one unit over to another CBR_
and, had we been able to do that EVA, I'm sure we'd have done it right
away and gained a little extra power. As it turned out, we didn't
really need it because we had a little extra power in the system, but
we're always better off designing it so you can get to it. In terms
of the whole power system, I found that I thought I was overtrained for
it. I spent an awful !or of time over there in the simulator working
with bus shorts _nd all kinds of problems which I would never encounter
in flight, becaz_e I was never sitting right in front of that panel watch-
ing things happen. I thought that in flight, I had negligible interface
w'._ that system, whereas I really trained a lot on the ground for it.
: _ POGUE:
f
It was an interesting and intriguin_ system, and that's one of the
reasot_s that we all three spent mote time on that than we needed. How-
ever, l've looked into that system and I think that there are several
_ lessons to be learned from the desigr. One is that when we mentioned
_ the bus short, there were certain people in the design business who felt
that we were questioning their integrity personally. But the point was i _
i made that you could not experience a bus s_ort in Skylab. We were handed
pieces of the buses encased in some plastic and told this thing can't
short. Well, of course, wh_ we meant was it doe n't make us any differ-
I ence whether that piece of metal shorted or _mther a wire from that busshorted. To them, it was a matter of pr._fesslonal pride, and certainly
there was a misunderstanding there for a long time. The point is, that
we did have bus shorts in flig_:t, and we were guaranteed prior t that,
that there was no way to short out one of those buses. How=_er, we did
train for bus shorts.
t :Now, the CBRM, and the PCG systems--I did not feel that there wassufficient controllability over the configuration in eithe_ one of these
two to protect yourself against an uncontrolled short and to take maximum
_dvantage of the power-generating ca_abillty that you had. I think that
this would not be a satisfactory system for y,,ingto Mars. We _o not
have enough control over this system in isolating shorts, _nd we did not
have enough control over this system to take advantag_ _f a perfectly
good solar panel group which might have to be iso_,.ed because it was
feeding a snort.
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JGIBSON: _
4_
That's a _ood point. I remember the problems that I could picture
us getting intv and we actually did get into some with the CBRMs. I
would think we ought not only to be able to transfer power from one solar
array over to another CBRM but also be able to replace those components
which are bad. _nd that goes back to our original plan of being able
to get to it all.
POGUE:
We did not have complete--satisfactory monitoring of the status;
we had to pull all kinds of shenanagans to isolate bus shorts in train- i
, Ing.
CARR:
An example of the areas you were talking about was when we had a
collapsed solar array; it had such a draw on it that it finally collapsed.
We didn't know that; we had to ask the ground that kind of question.
POGUE:
Also, the indicators, when fed a real heavy short would reverse
i themselves and start indicating all over again, stuff llke that was
biting us, and that's the sort of thing that you want to avoid.
CARR:
Power Distribution: The only area here is the shunt regulator i
which was always a mystery. It took a long time to understand what a i
shunt regulator was and I wonder if that wasn't something that could i
have been dealt with differently in the design and made more clear. It _
Just killed us in training to have to throw away a whole solar array I
group, because what it was feeding was bad and there was no way to move
it to something else and take advantage of that power source. Maybe !
access to go down and put Jumper plugs in somewhere would do it. t
GIBSON:
ATM Electrical Power System: We let the ground do most of that.
We've already touched on the electrical power system for the ATM. There
were the problems of being unable to get to the CBRM to make mechanical
repairs and being unable to allow one solar array to go through another
CBRMbwhlch would have been desirable.
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_, GIBSON (continued): _
.: ATM Control and Displays: These were a nightmare to interpret
where there was a fault in a given system or whether there was a DAP
problem or low voltage. This troubleshooting onboard required exten-
sive chasing around through rotary switches and two- or three-position _
switches.
f
_ That was an exceptionally cumbersome system to work and if we
had it to do over again, we would have designed it differently. We
i worked ourselves into a corner when we guaranteed that there was only
_ going to be one CBRM failure and then we could in no way inhibit any
, _ of the fail inputs into the logic which controlled those controls and ;}f'
displays. It was very evident throughout the Skylab mission, that
_ we would have been better off it we had had a parameter inhibit capa-
bility, a thermal control subsystem. It all worked well and we never
i had any reason to be working with that system at all. If you do start
having problems, however, you might get involved with those controls
and displays and a little bit more.
! ATMAIert Light Subsystem: I found that the alert light occasion-
ally comes on and you never notice it, so we did have a slight problem.
If you were looking for something like a scan spect alert light, which
I was on occasion, you would see the alert light come. But there were
a few times that I mentioned before when we had S055 tripouts that the
scan spect alert light came on. It went unnoticed for a period of time
then all of a sudden I noticed that we had a different alert light on
than we had before. I would rather have some type of a tone associated
• with that to call attention to the fact that something changed. The
_ _ visual cue at the top of the panel was not enough.
Lighting Subsystem: On the ATM panel I was sorry to see that we
had to operate in the fixed mode on two out of the three controls. It
/ took away some of the flexibility I would liked to have had. The varia-
ble mode was useful, and it should be designed into the future control
i and display subsystems. Lastly, we lost the integral lighting I found
that before we flew I was somewhat of a skeptic on the utility of the
integral lighting, I felt that it was a nice thing to have, but not
mandatory. However, I was no longer a skeptic after we lost it because
in the darked atmosphere in which we were working, it was quite difficult
at times to read the panel, and some mistakes were associated with not
being able to read the panel. I still forgot the nomenclature on switches
as well as I knew that panel nomenclature. That is needed on future
C&D systems where you plan to work in a darkened atmosphere which we
certainly did on the ATM.
{
¢
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_ CARR:
: Lighting System: I thought the MDA lighting was more than adequate
and you could pretty wall set up almost any way you wanted to.
: GIBSON:
I found that we were continually changing the configuration of the
! lighting around the ATM. Each of us liked it a little different way.
I llke it relatively dark and the other guys liked it relatively light
:' and we were forever changing those lights. Even when you're working at .,
the panel you'd find the need to see something on the display a little
better and you would have to leap off of the foot restraints you were
in and turn off a couple of lights. In that circumstance, I would have
liked to have had control of the lighting around the ATM right at the
A_M panel itself.
I covered this in an M487 debriefing, but I think that there is
. the case to be made for various and sundry types of dark curtains and
shades, much as radar men use when looking at scopes. It would have
been nice if there was something like that around ATM. This may affect •
the ventilation. I think, however, that there is a way of handling it.
It would have been good to have a double curtain at the MDA forward
hatch for the commentary photographs. Of course, no one knew ahead of
time that we were going to be using those windows.
7
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]CARR:
In the Airlock Module area, the lighting was more than adequate.
r
_ You had selectable, bright or dim, and T had no complaint with alrlock
_ iighting. I did notice that light bulbs were inclined to plate out.
A_parently, the filaments would plate out on the inside of the glass
of the bulb and pretty soon your light bulb that started out nice and
bright, would get very dim and you'd have to change it out. I completely
> changed out the bulbs in the aft airlock one day because the lighting
was getting so dim.
r
i POGUE:
_ One of the things that bothered me a little bit about those incan-
descent bulbs was the covers. I know they were supposed to slide off
_ but they were always getting knocked free. 1 would like to have a little
_ more positive snap shut f_ature on those things so they wouldn't always
come loose.
CARR:
i In the workshop area, lightin_ was easily controllable and quiteadequate. You could go from bright lighting in the dome area and th
_ forward compartment to very dim lighting or no lighting, whatever you
: _ wanted. There didn't seem to be any great problem. One area where we
i did run into a few problems was when somebody using the antisolar air-
lock needed to have it dark. It meant that the whole workshop had to
_ be darkened because one of the disadvantages of the grid floor was that
i _ it also lets light as well as air come through. We had to turn off the
lights in the wardroom and the experiment compartment, and everyplace,
in order to get the forward compartment dark enough for dark adaptation
for some of the experiments we were doing. This again is a good case
for the idea that Bill proposed of hoods. It would have made it possible
for a crewman to do a scientific airlock experiment without having to
turn off every light in the house.
POGUE:
Before I forget, we need a wristwatch that has a real good night
dial llght. After the lights went out, the Accutrcl dlal went out, too.
We couldn't really use it in the dark.
Counter argument to that would be that the experiments were all ad
hoc. I'ii never see the day coming where we will not have ad hoc experi-
ments. There will always be that last item that's thrown on board, where
you do everything manually. We do need a good night wristwatch.
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I: GIBSON:
Going back to the problems of the SAL: I think Blll proposed a _
reasonable idea u_th a hood. Two problens that we ran into there: one
was the case where you need complete darkness, as in the S063 looking
at the airglow, for exanple. You'd find that the record ltaht on the
opposite SIA would shay up In the fleld-of-vlev and reflect Into the
instrument; sonethlns that small would interfere vlth the operation.
Eavln$ a hood surroundlns the whole thins would _Ave ellulnated that
problem.
f
Another problem I encountered when runntns S063 on the day side,
was I wished that I had a mail ntsht lisht right next ;o the SAL, which
I could have used to shine on the checklist and the pad. I would operate
the S063 ozone inatrunent, look out in the Sun, dram at the Earth, and
then try to look back in and look at the pad and found out that I use
completely blinded because X had nothin8 but sunltsht coming in my face.
X couldn't read At. X finally had to tape a flashlight, which I ran
down durln8 the course of two or three orbits. I don't think that was
the nay to 8o. I think we needed a little night light at the SAL's as
well as something ve nay Set to later, which vould be a checklist holder.
CAR][:
Ltahtin8 in the vazdroou, the sleep compartnents, in the expert-
uent compartnent.
POGUE:
Ezper/nent T002 could have been perforued in the wardroom if we'd
had a way of blockin8 off 1_aht other than that enonmus hood that they
had, which was uuch too complex. That's not the way to 8o. We had a
shade door on the wardroou and it was translucent. I could have darkened
that area pretty well there if that would have been a little less trans- ,
utssive of ltaht. Partition doors are aomathin8 to consider in the future.
A8 far 88 the llahttn8 in the wardroom ttsolf, it was 8rest.
CARR"
Li8httn8 was certainly not one of our problems in crew system.
There was plenty of ltshttn8 and it was flexible enoush so that you
could turn It off, If you didn't want it.
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: F. SL-4 CREW DEBRIEFING - ELECTRICAl SYSTEMS
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
I la. During pre-docking/station keeping are the 4 lights on the dis-cone antenna visible, and do you think they were necessary?
: i The discone antenna lights wer_ observed during rendezvous and :
_ they are necessary for measuring depth perception at night.
lb. Are all AM colored running lights still burning? (Have any
burned out yet?)
The undocking was during orbital daylight so the running lights
were not observed. The crewmen recall that there w_re a lot of lights
i during rendezvous prior to docking. There were som_ good films of the
rendezvous sequence and a review of these films would be helpful in de-
termining if all the running lights were on at that time.
• 2. Have any AM EVA lights burned out? What location?
t
i No. Lighting for EVA was excellent.
i 3. How many i0 and 20 watt AM bulbs required replacement? Any
problems encountered during replacement?
_ The aft and lock compartment lights were replaced because the
light level decreased due to metallic plating on the bulbs, Similar
plating has been observed in the JSC trainer. Prior to undocking the •
STS and Forward Compartment lights were beginning to dim due to the
plating and were nearing the replacement level. The replacement pro-
cedure was simple. The incandescent light covers were always slipping
: out of position. The crew was surprised that some of the light bulbs
were not broken due to impact after the covers slipped out of place.
Handrail bulb covers were easily bumped free,
• 4. Did the tracking lights operate properly?
Yes. The crew expressed surprise that the occulting light
made tracking more difficult. The tracking light flashing frequency
wae too low and did not permit adequate time to acquire and "mark"
for tracking.
5. Did any of the status lights burn out? STS Panels 203, 204,
216, 205, 206?
No. The crew kept them off.
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6. _n_ich type of connector is preferred for connecting and dis-
connecting by the crew? (Zero-C, Airlock/Microdot or Bendix wlth crew
: assist ring, etc ) Which type is least preferred and why?
i
The "Zero-(]" connector was Judged to be far s,perior t_, the
other types. It was safe and almost Imposslble Co day,age the Z_ o-C due
to m:tsallgnment. The Zero-(] could still be improved but is definitely
superior to the other types.
: 7. Was meter lighting used in STS? Was meter llghtln8 adequate? (
Is meter lighting considered necessary?
Hecer lighting was used in the STS during periods of low light
levels such as during comet observations. The meter lighting was dell-
nicely required in the lock compartment prior to egress.
8. Were the variable dinnning controls provided for STS and meter
lighting utilized? Is this a desirable feature to retain?
The variable dimming controls were used by each of the crewram_
at some time during the mission. The crew suggests that the status
lights for future designs have di_ers in ca_e onboard system monitoring
is necessary. Sometimes a very small status light appeared very bright _
and was distracting requiring that it be t_ped,
CONTROLS?_qD DISPLAYS
9. Any general comments about physical arrangement of switches/
circuit breakers and identification of systems on the Control and Display
panels?
The design of onboard panels should be sufficient to glve the
operator visibility of the system operation. Panel 225 in the AM is
considered an ideally designed panel. The C&W Inhibit Panel was especially
difficult to use. See self-_ebriefins.
10. Assess legibility of panel markings and switch/circuit breaker _
nomenclature under lighting conditions encountered during the mission.
Always had light available. Crew"wanted distinctive mjrkins t
for light switch. The panel m2srkings and nomenclature did not give the _
visibility required for system operation from the panel. The crewmen J
would like to be able to operate the genezll illumination lights while |
seated at the C&D panels. |-•
k
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IIi. Switch/circuit breaker grouping versus tasks: Is identification
l and grouping of frequently used switches/circuit breakers adequate to _
preclude inadvertent operation of adjacent circuit breakers or _witches?
No. The visibility of the system was not obvious and the ncmen- _
clature was ambiguous.
12. Assess adequacy of onboard meter ranges and color banding.
The use of percentage on meters rather than the meaningful
, parameter (such as, volts, amps, etc.) limited the syste_visibility
because it was difficult to remember the significance of the values.
r _ Color banding is encouraged but parallax did present a problem since
the color banding was on the cover glass rather than the meter face.
A:oveable color band would be helpful in areas where a change in the:axtmum/minimum allowable system parameters was _er_itted or expected.
13. Did any circuit breaker nul_ance trips occur? •
No. The Gemini type breakers were easily thrown when using i
the panel guards for a hand hold. The crew did not especially like
the switch type circuit breakers (too fragile). _ever closed breaker !
without concurrence from ground.
14. Assess adequacy of solar flare alert panel (607).
The solar flare alert panel was not used because of nuisance
alerts when going through the South _tlantlc Anomaly and over Canada.
The h_A _adlo Noise Burst Monitor was not used for the same reason; i
nuisance alerts. HDA audible alarm could be heard in OWS.
15. Assess adequacy of guards to prevnnt inadvertent operation of
switches or circuit breakers. Were any problems encountered with the !
guards and the related finger claarance?
The suards are necessary to protect the panels but they do re-
strict the visibility of the panel nomenclature. Inadvertent s_ttch
thrown-timer tn AH. _
16. Were there any failures when lap tests were performed?
No. 1
17. _ere any problems encountered because of proximity of rotating
litter chair to the power end display console?
NO.
i
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18. The DAS was operated far what uses?
The nmln use of the DAS was associated with the APCS. Most _.
additional usage was assoclated_rlth anomalies such as AIM doors and CHC
number one. The occasions were few and far between. Dr. Gibson gave
a real good In-depth dlscour_e on the operation of the ATMpanel on a
_D-19 downllnk.
LIGHTING
19. With regard to 42 llghts Installed in OWSassess adequacy of
g,._eral illumination levels in each compartment.
_WS general illumination lighting was good.
20. Assess A_. adequacy of control of illtminntion levels ¢la con-
trol panel switches and light integral switches.
The variable lighting was not adequate because it all failed
and only the fixed lighting was available. Florescent ,lghting better
than incandescent.
21. Did any general illtmination bulbs f_il? Any f_'cker? _:
No. None.
22. Assess adequacy of illumination of the owe C&Dpanels.
The OWSpanel lighting was fine. Plenty of light was available.
23. If portable lt$ht8 were used, any cmments on ease of usage or
light output?
All crewmen used the portable lights during the mission, The
_nly problem encountered was that of finding the sables required. Future
deeiEns should include cable caddies with internal locks. All cables
should be color coded for ease in cable tdenttfica_ton.
24. Assess adequacy of portable high-intensity photo light. _st
operating nodes were used?
The htsh-intematty photo lights were adequate but quite direc-
tional in nature and therefore cauHd shadows. The light controls vere
J_ the hack of the light and were difficult to see. The mxinum light
output was used at all tines. The liahta provided excellent illumina-
tion for photoerephy.
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WIRING HARNESSES AND INSTALLATIONS _
g
25. Any comments on any electrical equipment or wiring thereto _
_ that appeared to be an annoya_.ze or hindrance to movement in the Work-
shop?
None of the cluster wiring was an annoyance or hindrance. The
cable wires that were annoying were those that the crew had to a_semble
; themselves. During operation of the MPA Multipurpose Furnace2cabses •
%1 had to be connected to the OWS dome outlets. The cables were a hi1_dranceto crew movement.
26. Was any excessive fraying or d_mage observed to fiberglass
cloth covers on wlre harnesses at penetrations in floor and other areas?
i None. _
27. Did convoluted boots come loose from any exposed connectors in :
the Workshop?
No. -
28. Any difficulty with the electrical connectors for the food
: _ trays or the urine centrifugal separator?
No. The connector for the urine centrifugal separator _as lo-
cated behind the separator and was difficult to reach. This presented
i_ only a minor problem since the connector was only mated once during the
mission.
29. Was the clearance adequate for mating/demating of connectors
i on th_ intercom boxes? .f
Two of the intercom boxes were replaced and the connectors i-
[ were demated and mated without difficulty.
f -MISCELLANEOUS30. Assess utility outlet adequacy, assessibillty, number and loca-
tion.
The number of utility outlets was adequate. If the cable caddies
mentioned earlier were available the outlets would have been more readily
available. (Needed one more on Z SAL.)
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31. If any lights, intercom boxes or heaters were replaced, any
comments on ease or problems?
None of the heaters were replaced during the mission. One
probe was removed and replaced. The crew was prepared to replace the
Urine Dump Probe but it was never necessary.
32. Was any problem encountered with static discharge?
Static discharges were never observed. When donning and removing ii:
clothing, the hair on the crewman's arms and heads stood up momentarily.
!
33. Was the "OWS TCS CHECK", Ref. SWS Systems Checklist, Sheet 9-18,
ever performed during the mission?
t
The "OWS TCS CHECK" was never performed unless it occurred dur-
ing activation.
34. When the Earth Terrain Camera was operated during EREP passes,
the OWS bus loads increased more than the amount required for the camera.
Can you think of any associated loads that would cause this increase?
The Earth Terrain Camera sounded like a rock crusher during
operation. The crew did not know any other reason for the high OWS
bus current.
35. How long before each meal were the Food Tray Heaters on? Was
any degradation in the Food Tray Heater operation noted during the
mission?
Generally, the trays were not used for breakfast and lunch un-
less one of the crewmen had chili for lunch. Normally, around 4:00 P.M.
the crew activated one tray tow arm the evening meal for all three
astronauts (on High not Auto), then each turned on an individual tray i
to keep his food warm during the meal.
i
36. Were t_e portable circulation fans used during the mission? i
One portable fan was installed to blow on the crewman when he
was riding the ergometer. This was optional to the crew. One portable
fan was installed in the hatch to blow air on the heat exchanger diffusers.
37. When operating the ATM C&D console, was it noticeable if the
_DAWall Heaters cycled?
No.
+
!
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i38. When passing through the AM, was it noticeable when the AM -_
Wall Heaters were on? If so, did they seem to be on continuously? }
No. Crew suggested a visual indication of heater operation _
_ such as liquid crystal indication - (low or no power).
EGIL
_ 39. Was the Regulator Adjustment an annoyance? _
i_ The adjustment of the AM Reg Bus pots was a minor nui_a,_ce, _-especially if a crewman was in the middle of an ATM experiment sequence _:_ .
and had to interrupt it. A moveable scale for re-referencing the pots
I would have been helpful.
|
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